The Warning

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When people ask me what I make of Donald Trump and the state of American democracy, I tell them that alarm bells are ringing everywhere.

The similarities between what is happening today in America and what I witnessed in Vladimir Putin's Russia are frightening.

We are seeing the creation of an oligarchy where those in power and those with money slowly merge.

We are seeing the proclamation of a one-party system.

And perhaps most troubling, we are seeing Donald Trump and those around him pick targets to go after and make them obey the administration's wishes.

To anyone who has witnessed an autocrat come to power, this is chilling.

And it's why we're bringing you a special episode today.

From the Atlantic, this is Autocracy in America.

I'm Gary Kasparov.

My guest today is Michael MacFaul, the U.S.

ambassador to Russia in the years following Putin's return to the presidency there.

He saw autocracy take hold before his eyes, and he has a warning for those in America who seem ready to capitulate to the Trump administration.

Mike, I want to thank you for joining the show.

For those who are not familiar with you, I believe you are one of the best American experts about Russia.

You have long studied Russia as a country and a place, and you speak Russian fluently.

But we should have this conversation in English, okay?

Yes, of course.

Well, thanks for having me, Gary.

It's a real honor to be on with you.

And you've studied Russia for a long time, and you're actually fluent in Russian, too.

So I hope this will be a.

I was born in the audience.

Yes.

I hope this will be a conversation because you know as much about this topic as I do.

So great to be with you, though.

Okay, very good.

One of the early guests in this show was Jake Sullivan.

And I asked him about American foreign policy towards Russia, just to cover the 25 years since the appearance of Vladimir Putin as the top man in Russia.

Or you can go even back to 1991.

Something did go wrong.

Very quickly, can you summarize it before we start talking about your own experience there?

So when the Soviet Union collapsed,

and that was a euphoric moment for me personally, there was a bet by the West and most certainly by the United States that if we could facilitate the consolidation of democracy and capitalism in Russia, that would be good for security in Europe and be good for the United States.

And I was a part of that.

I moved to Moscow.

I've lived there before during the Soviet period, but I moved in the summer of 1992 to open the offices of an organization called the National Democratic Institute.

And our commitment was to facilitate ideas about democracy, institutions about democracy.

And that was a bet that I think Democrats and Republicans made together.

I think it was the right bet, by the way,

with one big

mistake.

We should have had a hedge to that bet.

We should have had a hedge to the rest of Europe, and we should have brought in the rest of Europe that wanted to join NATO faster.

And to those that did not, were not qualified to join, we should have armed them in case that project failed.

Because as we all know, that project did fail.

Aaron Powell, okay.

So you have been actively engaged in formulating Russia policy and advising, but at one point, you know, you became the centerman of United States policy toward Russia as an ambassador in Moscow.

Yeah.

So you arrived in Russia in 2012 as the architect of the Obama administration effort to engage with Russia, so-called the reset policy.

By the way, is it fair to call you the architect of it?

I don't know.

That's a Gromkaskazena.

That's an overstatement, I would say.

But I would most certainly was part of that process for sure, because I was working at the the White House at the time.

So now tell us about your experience in Russia.

Well, let me start a few years earlier with the origins of the Obama administration and our approach towards Russia.

So we had this approach that I took right out of George Schultz's memoirs.

George Schultz was the former Secretary of State in the Reagan era.

And I think it's chapter 27 where he talks about re-engaging the Soviets.

And this is years before Gorbachev came along.

And his strategy was a very clear one, which is that on some issues we have to deal with Moscow.

Back then, the early years of Reagan, they had no contact with Moscow at all.

That was the evil empire, and Schultz said, no, we got to talk to them about like arms control and nuclear stuff.

But we're going to do that without, one, checking our values at the door and without two, throwing other countries under the bus.

And I'm paraphrasing, of course, he didn't write in such blunt terms, but that was his strategy.

And I thought that should be our strategy.

So with the government, we had some things we wanted to get done that only engaging with the government we could do.

The biggest one was the New START treaty.

The old one was expiring in 2009.

We thought it was in America's national interest to do a new one, and we did, and we reduced by 30% the number of nuclear weapons in the world.

But I want to be clear, it wasn't holding hands and singing kumbaya with Medveda for Putin.

These were really concrete things.

But we had this other strategy.

that was very controversial in our own government, Gary, just so you know.

And you actually sparked, I don't know if you know this, I'm going to tell you now, you actually sparked this debate because we had this idea of dual-track diplomacy, that we're going to engage with the government, but we're also going to engage with civil society, business, students, and even the political opposition.

And so my first trip to Moscow, working at the National Security Council, we were doing the invite list for a reception at Spaso House.

And I put your name on the the list.

And there was pushback.

There was like, oh my goodness, we're in this moment of engagement with the Russians.

We can't invite Gary Kasparov.

The people

in the Kremlin will be upset about it.

But I prevailed.

And I just tell that vignette because I want to be clear that that was the strategy.

The president agreed with that strategy.

So when we came in July for his first visit to Moscow as a president, he had his meetings with Medvedev.

Then the next day we went out and spent four hours with the Prime Minister Putin.

And then the rest of the day he spoke to students at the new economic school.

He went to a business-to-business

summit.

He then attended a civil society summit, which Medvedev chose not to do.

And he ended his day in a roundtable with Russian opposition leaders.

And Gary, you were there too.

I have that photo on my desk.

It's important to understand that because when things were more cooperative, that dual-track diplomacy wasn't a big news.

It wasn't, oh my goodness, you know, Obama's fomenting regime change in Russia.

But by the time I got to Moscow in 2012,

as you know well,

there was a massive

mobilization against falsified elections in December of 2011, a parliamentary election.

And it was just falsified kind of like a normal Russian, you know, it was nothing exceptional or extraordinary about the level of falsification to us, but that's not the way Russians, including you and people like you, perceived it.

And with technology,

there were these massive mobilizations against the regime, first for free and fair elections, and then for a Russia without Putin.

That became one of the slogans.

And when that happened, the Kremlin blamed us.

In fact, Medvedev, even before I got to Moscow, called President Obama and he said, what are you guys doing?

You're funding NGOs that are seeking our overthrow.

Your Secretary of State sent a signal, this is what he said, to protest against our regime.

And he was obviously just, you know,

mimicking the words handed to him by Putin.

But the mood had changed radically.

So by the time I got there, I was perceived and portrayed as

somebody sent to Moscow to foment revolution against Putin.

And I want to be crystal clear, that was not my assignment.

And if it was, we would have messed it up anyway, right?

We're not very good at that.

But there's no doubt that whether they believed it or not,

Putin adopted an extremely hostile position towards me.

And he expressed that, by the way, to me from time to time personally.

He said, we know what you're doing here, and we're going to stop you.

I'm paraphrasing, but he said that to me a couple of times.

So for the rest of my time in Moscow, I mean, I had,

ironically or paradoxically, I did have relations with other parts of the government, but not with Vladimir Putin.

No, I can't confirm that American participation in the protests 2011, 2012 was minimal.

Yes.

I could even add that those groups, those NGOs mentioned by Medvedev that were funded by Americans, they were least radical.

As a matter of fact, you know, the real push to become more aggressive and just to go to the the streets and to protest these faked elections came from people like myself that were not on the funding list.

Exactly.

Yeah, it's quite a paradox.

But you described what I saw, and by the way, I believe at that time it was a mistake, a lot of American goodwill.

So you try.

But Vladimir Putin's agenda, to my knowledge, was already quite clear.

I mean, he was quite consistent in expanding Russian imperial influence.

So what did go wrong?

I mean, it says, at what point you, and again, I say you Americans, recognize that this policy was a failure?

Well, let me tell you about me personally and then the Obama administration and later the Biden administration when we'll get to it.

So for me personally, I never had any illusions about Putin and his agenda.

There was no doubt when he became interim president and then president that he had an anti-democratic agenda to me.

And people can go look it up so you don't think I'm just making this up post facto.

I wrote my first anti-Putin piece in the Washington Post in March of 2000,

even before he was inaugurated as president, saying, it's very clear he does not believe in democracy.

That was clear to me.

For me, the day that Putin announced that he was running for president again, September 23rd or 24th, 2011, that was the day that the reset ended for me.

And I actually briefed the president after that a few days later, and I just said, you know, we're not going to be able to work with this guy at all.

And he, you know, he said, he kind of agreed with me analytically.

And then he was like, well, but we don't have a choice.

We don't get to choose who we have to interact with.

But for me, and that I want to emphasize, that was before the massive protests, right?

And I'd already been nominated to be the U.S.

ambassador.

And I even thought about whether I should withdraw because I just, for me, that was it.

That was the end.

But not everybody agreed with me.

If you're working on arms control, you don't care about protests and you don't want to get in the way of talking about these other things.

But that was it for me.

I think for the rest of them, I think it took until Putin invaded the first time in 2014 and seized Crimea when

at least the Obama administration thought all bets were off.

But then when we get to the Biden folks, they came in and their first big idea about Russia was we want a, I'm paraphrasing, but pretty closely, a stable and predictable relationship with Russia.

And, you know, they tried to achieve that.

And they even had a summit in Geneva to try to stabilize Russia, if you will, so that they could focus on China.

So even they kind of re-litigated where the end of the Obama administration was.

Now, as of today, there are some who argue that there is still room to engage with Russia.

In fact, one of the guests on this podcast earlier this season, George Friedman, made that very case.

What do you think?

Just I'm hard-pressed to think what that might be.

I mean, maybe

some extension of the START treaty that's going to expire next year.

That could be one area.

But can you trust Putin?

Well, my general strategy and thinking is no, and we have to go back to

a modernized version of containment, including economic containment.

Just like we had this thing called COCOM during the Cold War,

we need that in place as a way to contain the pernicious elements of interaction with Russian elites, including Russian companies today.

We'll be right back.

So, you were in Moscow and the period when Putin was re-elected and consolidated his power and rule.

Yes.

So last week you wrote that many Russian oligarchs didn't resist Putin's early autocratic moves because he offered them some kind of deals.

He cut their taxes.

Right.

And then years later, they regretted their passivity when they had the power to resist.

Yeah.

Can you be just more specific, describe more about that?

Yeah.

So when Putin first came in, and he was an accidental president, you know, he wasn't, he didn't have some great movement behind him, picked by some of these oligarchs as a way to stop another guy, Primakov, from becoming president.

There's a mythology, including here in the United States, that there was this groundswell of support for Putin's style of illiberal nationalism.

And that's just, this is not true.

I mean, that's just not true.

He was picked by Yeltsin.

Right away, he did two things simultaneously.

On the economic side, he brought in those, you know, in Russia they would be called liberal reformers.

Here in the United States, they would be called conservatives.

And in particular, he cut individual income tax to a flat tax of 13%.

He then cut corporate taxes.

And for the business community and the oligarchs, they welcomed that.

At the same time, he went after media very aggressively.

And that was the first thing he went after.

He wanted to control the media.

media, and he took over the two state-controlled channels pretty easily.

And one of the oligarchs had to flee and later died mysteriously in London.

Who controlled that, Boris Berezovsky?

But the real drama, as you'll remember, was about NTV, an independent station owned by another oligarch, Gagusinski was his name.

And they did a couple of things.

First of all, and this is the echoes of the moment we're in in the United States, eventually, one of the state-owned enterprises loyal to Putin, Gazprom,

and its branch called Gazprom Media took over NTV.

And it was all, oh, it was just a business interest, right?

You know, that's what we hear today.

It's just a business interest, just, you know, no big deal.

And then two years later, one of the most famous

satirical shows called Kukly, Puppets, was taken off the air.

And that's the echo of the moment we're in now.

Then,

and these are not, I want to be careful, you know, history rhymes, but it's not exactly the same.

And

I don't want to stretch the metaphor.

And there's some good things about America that we have that Russia did not have then that you've written and talked about recently.

But there was this other pivotal moment.

It was this horrible tragedy, as you remember, this terrorist attack on a school in Beslan, Russia.

And it was just horrific, the whole thing.

And that moment of tragedy was used as an excuse by Putin to cancel gubernatorial elections, to cancel elections for the equivalent of American states.

And there were one more moment that was in this troika that was really important.

It happened in 2003

when somebody you know well, Mikhail Khartakovsky at the time, the most successful and richest businessman in Russia.

And he wasn't just the richest businessman in Russia, by the way.

He was also

an entrepreneur.

He was not an oligarch owning a state-owned enterprise.

That gets garbled in American media sometimes.

But he also began to see the trend lines with Putin, and he tried to do some things about it.

And he got arrested.

And he spent another decade in jail.

And his company has been first nationalized and then taken by one of Putin's closest henchmen.

Right, Igor Sechin.

And you put those three things together, that's when

this notion that he's going to cut our taxes and everything's going to be okay.

That's when those people, and I don't want to overemphasize how well I knew them, but I knew some of these people and I knew them when I worked in the government.

I think had they they now lament, A, that

they thought that Putin was going to be safe for their own economic interests.

It turns out that he wasn't.

And B, you know, maybe had we tried a little harder to stop him in those early years, we might have had more success.

But by the time they tried to stop him, it was too late.

But then you already echoed that when he came back, there was a period of a little bit of freedom.

I don't want to overstate it.

Russia was still an autocracy, but it was a softer autocracy than it is today.

It was in that Medvedev era, and that's when you had, you know,

organizations like TV Doge, TV Reign, I think was founded around that time.

That's when Navalny's anti-corruption organization was founded.

And it was a, you know, it was a more free time.

You were part of it, Gary.

You were living it, and you can tell people better than I can.

But after Putin came back a second time, he gradually and then dramatically began to shut it all down with, you know, arresting people that were protesting, most famously May 6th, 2012,

calling NGOs, foreign agents, and using that as a blunt tool to shut down their funding.

And then

it gets even much worse after he launches his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Mike, but to be fair, so the attack on the Republic of Georgia in 2008 technically happened.

Yes, good point.

Yeah,

under Medvedev.

So that's why I believe Putin never lost control.

And so he was the power behind the throne.

Absolutely.

You're right about that.

All these

tragic episodes of modern Russian history,

they bring us to the recent news of the attacks on free speech coming from Donald Trump and his advisors here in the United States after the Charlie Kirk assassination.

Yes.

And I'd like to go through a couple of things that have happened and to contextualize them in terms of your experience dealing with Russia.

So one is this promises of new scrutiny for non-profit groups that support certain political causes.

We know what kind of causes.

Then next, the Attorney General's warning that she and the DOJ would prosecute hate speech.

And one more, just to add for the collection, the threat to revoke the broadcast licenses of television stations that carry messages the President doesn't approve of.

For me, those were frightening parallels, what's happened in Russia.

But many Americans believe that America was not Russia, it's not Russia.

America has long-standing democratic traditions, there is an American constitution, and

it's an exaggeration even to bring Russia in this context.

Do you think so?

Or you believe as I do that the threat to American democracy is existential?

Well, I think the threat is real.

We shouldn't underestimate it.

That list that you just ticked off are frightening things.

And of course, we could add to that list in other dimensions.

Oh, absolutely.

I just, you know, just those

headlines, yes, headlines.

And

I think, you know, not only Russia, but other places that had drifted from democracy to autocracy, it can be this kind of salami tactics, right?

Bit by bit by bit.

And then you wake up one day, and

the most important element of a minimal democracy, free and fair elections, are no longer available.

And we haven't got there yet, but let's talk about that.

We're creeping towards that.

So I think it's very serious.

Most certainly the most serious challenge to democracy in my lifetime.

And, you know, having studied democracy around the world and colleagues here at Stanford, we have a big group that works on democracy here.

I think most of my colleagues who are real experts on global democracy think this is the greatest threat since the Civil War.

That's how grave it is.

That's the bad news.

Second, to add to more bad news, it just is becoming increasingly clear to me that the president doesn't think in terms of democracy and autocracy.

You know,

I do.

You know, that's the title of my new book, by the way, Autocrats versus Democrats.

He doesn't use that analytic framework to think about global politics, most certainly, that's obvious.

But I don't even think he thinks about that in American terms.

He thinks about us and them, us

versus our enemies, right?

And

whether they're they're Democrats or autocrats, it's immaterial.

So he's not afraid to use the power that he has against his enemies.

So he is not himself,

he doesn't seem to have these democratic norms embedded in him.

I don't know about the people around him, but I don't see a lot of people pushing back.

And the Constitution, this is a point you made last week, which I agree up completely with.

It's just a piece of paper unless there are groups and people

that actually try to enforce what's written down there.

And Russia, again, is another example of that.

The Russian Constitution became too super-presidential back in 1993, for my taste.

But it wasn't, the Constitution was not an anti-democratic constitution when Putin took it over.

He just used it in certain ways, and the piece of paper didn't hold him back.

So

what will preserve our democracy is not a piece of paper, and it doesn't seem like it'll be motivation from within the regime.

It'll be resistance from small D Democrats in American society.

And I said that very specifically, small D Democrats, because I don't see the fight for democracy as being a partisan issue.

And in some ways, I think that may be a tactical mistake here in our society that we're allowing it to be framed that way.

And I was really, really pleasantly surprised to see Senator Cruz, for instance, to

denounce the removal of Jimmy Kimmel from the heirs.

We need this to be a movement and a resistance for democracy, not for one political party or the other.

Now, the title of your book that you mentioned, Autocrats versus Democrats, is well suited to the podcast.

And

I want us to ask you, because when I was younger and you were younger, the clear divide in the world between autocracy and democracy was between the Soviet Union and the United States and the respective blocs these countries led.

What about today?

I mean, divide today is no longer geographic.

Right.

Yeah, so I agree.

But let me explain.

There are many theorists here in the United States that think that regime type doesn't matter, ideology doesn't matter, it's just about power.

John Mersheimer is probably the most prominent theorist in academia that thinks that way.

And my book is explicitly a rejection of that way of thinking about the world.

But when I went through the projects for autocratic export and looked really closely at both what Xi Jinping is doing and what Putin's doing, I got to tell you, I started in one place and ended in another.

I started believing and animated by the hypothesis that the ideological threat from China was the biggest one of all and that Russia was just kind of a sidekick.

I ended reversing that.

That dynamic and that ideological struggle is playing out in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia.

And by the way, we're retreating from it now.

I think this is a giant mistake by the Trump administration.

That's over there.

There's another ideological struggle that's autocrats versus Democrats.

But it's, you know, I'm going to oversimplify, but it's illiberal nationalism that Putin has been propagating for two decades now versus liberal internationalism or just democracy.

You know, I'll oversimplify.

And that is not just between states.

That is within states.

And I think, and I learned this from you, Gary, so I want to give you credit for that.

Many years ago, you got me onto this threat from Russia.

And I go through in the book all the instruments that Putin uses to propagate these ideas.

And the harshest, of course, are his soldiers invading and, you know, sweeping lands and taking them over, as he's doing in eastern Ukraine right now.

But it's RT, it's the church, it's NGOs, it's finding affinity with, you know, podcasters in America,

where you see this this

weird world that, again, you know better than I do, of the overlap of their illiberal nationalists with illiberal nationalists in Europe and the United States.

And that struggle is happening within Hungary, within Slovakia, within Italy, within France, and within the United States.

And I'm struck by how, you know, Putinism and Putin's friends, how successful they've been.

And I would say, tragically, that that illiberal autocratic project, it's been very successful.

I'll just leave it at that.

And we ignore it at our peril.

Aaron Trevor Barrett, so it's fair to say that Trump's administration is pushing America towards autocracy.

I think there are definitely certain elements of his policies that are anti-democratic.

And

I'm still cautiously optimistic that we're strong enough as a society and we have deep, deep enough values

that go back hundreds of years.

That's something Russians didn't have in the 1990s, as you know, but we have these strong traditions.

There are these autocratic tendencies and they are achieving some successes.

There are pushbacks and they are achieving some successes too, right?

So I see this, this is a struggle now.

It is a struggle for the,

and I really want to emphasize, I am not talking about Democrats versus Republicans.

I'm talking talking about the struggle for democratic practices, democratic institutions, democratic values.

It's a struggle now.

I know that this is not the first time.

we've been through this.

Obviously, the worst was the Civil War, but we got through that too.

But just because we did in the past doesn't mean we will in the future.

And so I should be careful about predicting the future.

Yeah, but now we have the president and his administration that are pushing a liberal agenda.

Yes.

And we have to resist.

So it's we in agreement that the threat threat is real.

Yes.

And election 2026, the midterm elections, could be the most faithful elections in our lifetime.

Yes, I agree.

But to underscore the point, you also said just that you are absolutely right that you did not have the office of the president was not the source of these anti-democratic tendencies.

And right now, it's all three major branches of government are there in alignment.

The good news is that not all states are.

And Trump, you know, he wants you to believe that he won a Ronald Reagan-type landslide election.

But people should go and look at the maps from 1984 versus our last presidential election.

He did not.

I think the contingency of that election gives me hope.

And again,

I'm sounding, again, like I'm a partisan.

I'm a pretty centrist guy, by the way.

But in this moment,

we need the checks and balances in our system to work.

And that's why the 2026 election is so important that there might be at least one branch of government that is not beholden to the White House.

Because I want to say one other thing that really makes my skin crawl, Gary, and it reminds me of living in Russia.

I know, and you know, some of them were even, I would have called friends of mine 20 or 30 years ago, that when the tides turned and Putin was in control,

they flipped and they started supporting Putin.

And then they went beyond that.

They didn't just support Putin.

They started praising him and idealizing him and treating him the way I remember, you know, propaganda when I lived in the Soviet Union would talk about Brezhnev.

And that is strange to me because I know they don't believe it.

You know, there's this cult of a personality thing that is also, you know,

seeing Trump's giant poster over one of the government buildings in D.C.

the other day, just for you and I, that reminds me of all those posters from the Soviet era.

Aaron Trevor Brandon,

but it's not just about posters.

I'm sure, you know, you can name few people, at least few people, probably your former friends here in America, that now are just trying to excuse any of Trump's illiberal actions.

Yes.

That's another parallel.

So there are too many parallels.

But overall, I remain optimistic.

And I understand that your book ends on a hopeful note about the renewal of America.

And I always like to end the episodes of the show with such a positive note.

So just summarize, just in the last minute,

your belief in American democracy, in the strengths of this democracy, and

the renewal of America, not only domestically, but internationally, regaining its historic role of being, for people like myself, a beacon of hope.

Well, on the domestic side, I'm nervous, like I've expressed, but I'm also cautiously optimistic because I do think tens of millions of Americans believe in democracy, and the polling shows that.

And

I think we're in a period of overreach for the president, and I think there'll be a backlash against that.

And I think in the long run, we will have this renewal of American democracy.

And that will be good for the markets, and that will be good for our power in the world as well.

And second, on the international stage, I'm also worried about isolationism, retrenchment, pulling back.

But when I look at the long stretch of history, the arc of history is pointing towards more freedom.

If you go back hundreds and hundreds of years, the evidence is just overwhelming.

And then finally, we got better ideas.

Gary, our ideas are better than theirs.

Most people around the world think it's better to elect your leaders rather than have God or the Communist Party or the military choose who should lead you.

And the data on that is just overwhelming.

So I think if we get back our confidence, we just had such a loss of confidence right now.

We have more power and we have better ideas.

And in the long run, I'm quite optimistic even about the victory of democracy over autocracy in the world as well as here at home.

Mike, thank you very much for this optimistic note.

I think it's very important

both for our audience and for the public at large to hear the reassurance from an expert of your caliber who actually saw the rise of autocracy in Russia and is capable to caliber.

the threat to democracy in America.

Thank you very much for joining the show, Mike.

Thanks for having me, Gary.

It was a really great conversation.

This episode of Autocracy in America was produced by Arlene Orevolo.

Our editor is Dave Shaw.

Original Music and Mix by Rob Smirsiak.

Fact-Checking by Ina Alvarado.

Special thanks to Paulina Kasparov and Mick Gringer.

Claudia Nebay is the executive producer of Atlantic Audio.

Andrea Waldis is our managing editor.

I'm Gary Kasparov.

I'll be back on Friday.