Netanyahu’s Endgame - with Ari Shavit

You are listening to an art media podcast.

Netanyahu is in a state of mind of moving from war to peace.

And what he hopes for, that in the 60 days of negotiations, you can inject major successes of Arab-Israeli peace into this process.

Now, after the success in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, he feels much more self-confident.

That enables him to make more concessions, something Mr.

Netanyahu is not eager to do.

It's 3 p.m.

on Wednesday, July 2nd here in New York City.

It is 10 p.m.

on Wednesday, July 2nd in Israel, where it has been a relatively quiet evening, albeit with one ballistic missile launched from the Houthis on Tuesday evening, parenthetically, that disrupted an engagement party that my mother in Jerusalem was attending, and they had to dash down to the Mamad in the middle of the engagement party, such as life in Israel these days.

Over the past few days, we've observed strong signs that Israeli leaders are moving to bring the Gaza war to a close or to some kind of close.

On Tuesday, Israel's Minister of Strategic Affairs, Ron Dermer, met with senior Trump administration officials in Washington and is expected to meet with U.S.

Special Envoy Steve Witcoff, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Vice President J.D.

Vance in the coming days.

Dermer's trip to D.C.

is in advance of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to D.C.

He's scheduled to be at the White House on Monday, July 7th.

Netanyahu's and Dermer's trips come amid U.S.

pressure to end the war in Gaza, to end the war with the return of all all Israeli hostages.

President Trump said on Tuesday that Israel had agreed to a U.S.

proposed 60-day ceasefire, during which we would see hostages released and discussions geared toward ending the war.

A Hamas spokesperson said that the terror group was open to a ceasefire and hostage release, but only in exchange for a complete end to the war.

Hamas has not yet signaled it accepts the U.S.

proposal.

Trump wrote in a post on Truth Social, and I quote here, I hope for the good of the Middle East that Hamas takes this deal because it will not get better.

It will only get worse, close quote.

In other news, former IDF Chief of Staff Gotti Eisencott, who was the second highest-ranking member in the National Unity Party, one of the parties that is not in the government, that is Benny Gantz's party, he announced that he will leave the party and the Knesset.

Many are speculating that he intends to find a new political camp ahead of the next Israeli elections.

The Israeli news outlet WyNet reported that, according to unnamed political sources, Yesha Tid party chair and opposition leader Yair Lapid is looking to offer Isencott a leadership role of his party before the next election cycle.

As the opposition begins to anticipate and prepare for the next elections, and as the post-Iran war geopolitical map is being drawn, we wonder what could be Prime Minister Netanyahu's final moves in this war as this story comes possibly to an end, at least the story of this war.

What could be his end game on multiple fronts?

Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and domestically as well inside Israel.

Joining me to discuss all of this is an Israeli analyst, observer, journalist who has been following Prime Minister Netanyahu for decades.

That is Ari Shavit.

Ari was a senior correspondent at Haaretz and is the author of a number of books, not the least of which is the award-winning book, My Promised Land, which I highly recommend and we will post in the show notes.

Ari, welcome back to the podcast.

Pleasure to be with you.

You are joining us from Tel Aviv as Prime Minister Netanyahu gets ready to make this trip to DC.

And as I said in the intro, Ron Dermer is already in DC.

So there's a lot we want to cover here, but let's begin with what you know about the deal being discussed or proposed to end the Gaza war.

Generally, it's a well-known deal: 60 days of ceasefire, 10 living hostages back, most of them in the first days, 18 dead hostages, Israeli withdrawal, not total withdrawal, but partial withdrawal.

A change of the humanitarian, giving more humanitarian support for the Palestinian population.

And the main thing is the beginning of negotiations regarding the real end of the war.

That's the crux of the matter.

And obviously, the discussions now are mainly: Hamas wants an end of war.

Israel does not want to give them that.

And that's where the wording game is going on now.

I'll give you one tip.

The next stage should be negotiations probably in Qatar.

If we will see Ron Dermer going to Qatar, then we'll know it's the real deal.

And I'll explain why.

Ron Dermer is the most adamant anti-Qatar Israeli.

And the Qataris don't like him either.

If we'll see Ron Dermer going to Doha, that means the business and the deal is close.

I hate to get very speculative about a proposal that we don't actually have in front of our eyes.

But just as you understand it, what are the issues that remain unresolved?

I mean, obviously, the end of war is a big one.

If they only are getting out 10 living hostages, then that means there's a lot of living hostages that would be left.

What would be the process for getting the rest of them back?

Oh, the full deal.

That was clear all along.

I mean, this, what is called the Witkoff outline, which is pretty much the Netanyahu Dermer outline, that was what it was all about.

It was let's get half the hostages out immediately, have a ceasefire and see whether we can come to agreement regarding the end of the war.

And the end of the war will bring all the hostages back.

But Netanyahu, he's much more flexible now, and I can explain why.

I mean, Netanyahu was much tougher before because he felt that giving away too much to Hamas, having Hamas there, will be a defeat in war.

Basically, Netanyahu's attitude, he did care and he does care about the hostages, contrary to some rumors.

He also understands that politically, only bringing the Hodges back is Israeli victory, but he saw it in the past as a possible defeat in war.

Now, after the success in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, everything is different.

He feels much more self-confident.

And if I can take a risk and say in a sentence, why is it more probable than in the past?

One, because Netanyahu is stronger, two, because Hamas is weaker.

And three, because Trump is impatient.

These three ingredients make this moment much more hopeful than previous moments we've experienced.

Aaron Powell, Jr.: And where does the possibility of Israel remaining, keeping some security forces inside Gaza, even if the war quote-unquote ends, fit into this?

Because I'm hearing increasingly from Israeli political leaders and Israelis in the security establishment and Israeli journalists talk as though Netanyahu's position about the idea of staying in the Philadelphia corridor, that area right there by the Egyptian border, which was a source of such controversy earlier on in the war and early on in other ceasefire negotiations, now people talk about it as though, A, it's not such an unreasonable position in the context of an end-of-war ceasefire, and B, that actually Hamas may actually accept it.

Hamas is, as I said, much weaker now, but the Netanyahu is the main figure here.

Netanyahu is in a state of mind of moving from war to peace and what he hopes for that in the 60 days of negotiations you can inject major successes of arab-israeli peace into this process whether the success will be in syria or saudi arabia wherever we'll discuss it he hopes there will be something larger that enables him to make more concessions without being perceived as someone who gave up or was defeated god forbid so this is the reason that we began in Gaza.

Ironically, the war in Gaza was run quite badly.

We can discuss it.

We had spectacular success in Lebanon, Syria, Iran.

And when you come back to Gaza, you have more possibility politically and strategically to be more generous, so to speak, or to be more flexible.

This is the change you see in the Netanyahu line.

When it was, Israel was intimidated by Hamas and did not have have deterrence, he was really afraid or did not want to give in.

Now that Israel's deterrence was so much has been established and Israel has become the superhero of the Middle East, some say the superhero of the White House as well, he feels much more confidence in making concessions, something Mr.

Netanyahu is not eager to do.

Yeah, in terms of superpower of the White House, I don't think we could there's another leader of another country that has met with President Trump this many times so soon into his administration.

Not, I mean, this will be his third meeting.

Okay, so I want to just dig a little deeper on your analysis here in terms of the yen state that Nets and Yahoo is aiming to shape in Gaza as it relates to, I would say, the core five dilemmas that have been stubbornly persistent throughout the war.

And those five core dilemmas are: one, the hostages, two, Hamas, three,

an alternative to Hamas that could govern Gaza after the war, four, rebuilding Gaza.

And then five, what to do with the 2 million plus Gazan Palestinians.

So I just want to go one by one with each of these.

Let's start with the hostages.

So you said if there is a deal, Israel could get 10 living hostages out right away.

And the idea would be what?

That the rest would come out through the course of the deal, the final stage being when the war ends and then they get the balance of them out.

Is that the gist of it?

Let me just a general paragraph here.

One, Netanyahu's mission, as he sees it, is to prevent a nuclear Iran and to prevent a Palestinian state and then have an Arab-Israeli peace that doesn't jeopardize these two objectives.

Within the context of Gaza, his goal was no Hamas, no Abbas.

His feeling was that if Hamas is there, Israel lost the war.

If Abbas will be there, Israel will lose the peace.

So that's the entire concept of the way he ran the war.

Well, then no, no, I want to stay on that for a second, Ari.

I'm with you on why Hamas, and I think most of our listeners would agree that Hamas staying in power is losing the war.

But I don't think it will be as clear why Netanyahu thinks that the Palestinian Authority, which is in the West Bank, having some kind of governing role in Gaza, led by Abu Mazen, Mahmoud Abbas, why that is characterized as losing the peace.

The point where Netanyahu and Dermo are very tough is regarding the PA's role.

They really see see the PA as a problematic entity with the incitement, with a kind of not as aggressive and barbaric as Hamas, but they actually don't want it as a major part of the solution.

This is why they were looking for all kinds of alternatives.

Basically, they had two visions, two different visions.

One was a kind of the Arab solution, you know, the Emirates coming in, the Saudis coming in, all that.

We can discuss that.

The other was the tribal solution, looking for gangs, clans, all kinds of sub-national organization in Gaza that will replace Hamas without being Abbas.

That's the end game.

So it's going to be very interesting now to watch whether on this crucial issue, Netanyahu will be willing to compromise, whether we will have a PA ingredient as part of the Gaza solution.

Because throughout the war, this is what Netanyahu did not want.

He was very adamant that he doesn't want to give Gaza to the PA.

And that was in many ways, this is one of the reasons the war took such a long time.

If I may say so, one of the failures of Israel in the war in Gaza, that we didn't create an alternative, a reliable alternative to Hamas.

And therefore, there was a fundamental problem with the Israeli strategy.

And, you know, in a previous conversation we had, and I mentioned to you that the Petraeus idea of having such a war is clear, hold, and build.

Israel did clearing.

It's doing holding just in the last few months, and we never did building.

We never created a real alternative for Hamas.

And this, in my mind, is one of the flaws in the way the war in Gaza was run.

Now we'll find a moment where either Netanyahu has to accept that the PA will be part of the solution, or he'll be able to bring some other solution that we actually right now don't see.

Okay.

So I have another view on Abbas and the Palestinian Authority.

I'm curious for your reaction.

On the one hand, I understand where Netanyahu and Derma are coming from with regard to that, that they I don't think they've ever officially condemned what happened on October 7th.

I don't think they've ever officially condemned Hamas for what they did on October 7th.

I know Abbas has made some comments that have been critical, but there's been no official like making it clear, drawing a line that we do not stand with Hamas and Hamas is the enemy, the way many, by the way, Israeli Arab leaders have done inside Israel.

But so I'm sympathetic to that view, but I have a separate issue with the PA.

It's just amazing to me how things get memory-holed.

People forget Abu Mazen, Abbas's Palestinian Authority, was in control of Gaza, and they were driven out by Hamas in 2007.

So Hamas just had a complete takeover of Gaza sometime after, you know, Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005.

The Palestinian Authority takes over Gaza, and then there's a civil war inside Gaza, and Hamas just drives the Palestinian Authority out of Gaza, and the Palestinian Authority has to retreat to the West Bank.

And it's since that time that Hamas has been in control of Gaza.

And a combination of Hamas having some modicum of support, some threshold of support among the Palestinian Gazans, combined with the Palestinian Authority, Abbas, being incredibly weak.

and not being able to push back against Hamas and defend, if you will, their political control of Gaza.

To me, it's like, why would anyone have confidence that they could come back in, given what we've seen that Hamas is capable of, and just do the same thing and the same thing not happen again?

So if we moved from commentary to opinions, I actually partially agree.

I believe that we need to think outside the box regarding Gaza.

I think the only solution to Gaza is North Sinai.

I totally agree that right now, sadly, the moderate Palestinians Palestinians are dysfunctional.

They don't have legitimacy, they are corrupt, and they didn't yet accept the Jewish state or did not give up on the right of return.

So the good news in the Middle East is the potential of an American-Arab-Israeli alliance that will take responsibility for Gaza and for the Palestinian issue altogether.

The specific solution, I think, the only, it seems like a dream.

but the only realistic way to solve the Gaza problem is to triple or quadruple the size of Gaza by giving the Palestinians North Sinai.

If President Trump demands of President Assisi to enlarge the Gaza Strip and then have a major development project in northern Sinai funded by the Saudis and the Emirates and whoever, that's actually the only way because Gaza is insolvable and the Palestinian Authority is unable to deal with such an issue.

I think that we need an American-Arab audacious, ambitious project, a kind of marshal plan that is based on the northern Sinai that will rebuild Gaza.

I think that's the only way to go forward.

Okay.

Just one other point I want to raise on the hostages.

A number of weeks ago, Amit Segel was on our podcast and he said something that I was struck by by the reaction it had among our Israeli listeners, which he basically said, and I don't have the exact words, the quiet part out loud, meaning it's a likely fact that no one wants to address out loud, which is Hamas is never going to release all the hostages.

Even in a final deal, Israel's not getting all the hostages back.

Now, we could debate how many continue to be held by Hamas, but he just, he basically argued that it's well understood within the Israeli security system that at the end, the only insurance policy Hamas has in which they can influence and shape Israeli behavior long after Israel is quote-unquote out of Gaza and long after the end of the war are hostages, whether they're living hostages or deceased hostages.

The reality is this notion that we have that there's going to be a point at which every hostage comes home, he was skeptical.

And he wasn't, by the way, to be fair to Amit, he was expressing a view that he's picked up within the Israeli security establishment.

So what is your view on that?

I hear that opinion, but I'll say two things.

One, Israeli society is totally committed to the hostages.

Totally.

And therefore, there will not be a victory if the hostages are not back.

And I think that Netanyahu understands this politically.

I agree that it's very, very difficult to do.

And what you will need is a huge stick and a sweet carrot.

And there will not be an easy way to do it.

Only, and when we'll talk about Iran, we can make the comparison.

Only when they are seriously threatened, where they know the alternative is political death, will Hamas give up on the hostages.

So I think that it's difficult, it's challenging, but we have a moral commitment to bring all the hostages home.

Okay, I agree with you about the moral commitment, and I agree with you that that is where Israeli society is.

I'm just thinking, I'm not sure that the Israeli security establishment, while they're very supportive of this goal, and they're very both strategically and emotionally committed to it.

The point of view that was represented was that there's just this sense that you could have like a Gilad Shalit situation or previous hostage situations where the enemy just decides we're going to hang on to a couple.

Again, it may not be living hostages, but still, just because it's the only insurance policy we have, but whatever.

This is all speculative, you know.

So we talked about Hamas and an alternative to Hamas.

This idea that Israel, and I've heard this from the Israelis, and I've also heard this from someone involved on the Woodcoff negotiating team, this idea that Israel would demand Hamas, I don't know,

giving up arms, Hamas leaving Gaza.

There'd be some symbolic step that Hamas would take that would really signal unconditional surrender.

What is this?

What is the symbolic and practical image we need to see and that Netanyahu needs to see in order to get to end of war as it relates to Hamas?

Even if there's an alternative governing body, the idea that Hamas is unconditionally defeated.

So the logic of the deal as it is now is that the issues are so difficult.

Let's get the 60 days.

Let's get half the hostages back and let's do everything possible within that time in order to think outside the box.

As I said, I think that Israel will be considering some concessions regarding Hamas that it was not willing to consider before.

If there is a larger context of a historical change in the Middle East, then the Hamas issue will be shrunk.

Netanyahu was an expert on this, and I think there is some justification for that.

If we will see

potentially, again, we'll discuss it whether it's possible, peace with Saudi Arabia, deal with many other countries, Abraham Accords.

Then letting some sort of political Hamas stay for a while in parts of Gaza will be digestible.

The two plus million Gazan Palestinians that will still be in Gaza if and when the war ends, despite all the talk about they're going to be moved out, they're going to be relocated, that's unlikely to happen.

What happens to all these people?

I think that as a Jewish democracy, Israel must take, on the one hand, we have to be very powerful.

We had to win the war and we have remained strong, but we need a moral dimension and a moral vision to our life in this region.

And therefore, we cannot ignore that tragedy.

I mean, the Palestinians are responsible for the fact that Hamas emerged as an evil force.

They're responsible for October 7th.

But we cannot, we'll be endangering ourselves morally and politically if we ignore the plight of these two million people.

Okay, Ari, I want to move to Iran.

There is, I know, still a debate in some corners about the practical results and success of this 12-day war, at least as it relates to Iran's nuclear program.

Some argue that it was set back.

The program was set back by months.

Others, present company included, believe it was set back by years based on the conversations we've had with American officials, American experts, and Israeli officials and Israeli experts.

We did a two-part episode on our podcast about this.

But most experts agree that one way or the other, Iran is going now to have to make political decisions, the Iran's government, the regime, about what it does now with its nuclear program.

And that that, as much as anything, will determine the speed with which Iran is able to build back.

But from Netanyahu's perspective, what are his objectives now with the Iranian nuclear program?

And what leverage do you think he has to meet those objectives?

Okay, so one sentence, first of all, personal about this amazing event.

Look, we tend to take for granted astonishing historic events, and we should not.

Okay, so let's say three things about this war, the Iran war, the 12-day war.

One, it was absolutely essential.

Two, it was absolutely brilliant.

And three, it did not solve the problem.

And we have to live with this complexity.

Regarding Netanyahu, just we cannot ignore that.

Netanyahu really saw it as his life's mission.

He really believed it's a kind of 1940 moment, that it's relevant to save the Jewish people and to save Western civilization.

And he led a very impressive action, but again, it did not solve the problem.

Where are we now?

The amazing Israeli success, I say there was a semi-trailer coming, just about to run over us.

We managed to dismantle that semi-trailer.

There won't be 10 nuclear bombs in 10 or 15 years.

But out of the wreck, the Iranians are able to create or build a motorcycle that can be lethal as well.

So while the danger of an industrial-sized project, 10, 15 bombs,

is much more remote, the danger of a dirty bomb or a simple bomb or a device is very much there.

Some say even increased.

Faced with this situation, you have to decide what what are you going to do.

The best way to turn this spectacular military success is a second GCPOA, which will really be longer, stronger, wider, deeper.

That will, this time will not have all the flaws of the previous one.

I was very critical of the previous one 10 years ago.

Why do you want that?

Because the enriched uranium is still there.

The danger of the wounded beast that is weaker but more desperate is very much there.

So if you have a political continuation of the war, actually you are much safer that you won't face another

simple device or another round of war in two or three years.

I believe that the interesting conversations in the White House next week will be about two different ideas.

Because I think what happened is that Netanyahu, because of the success of the war, is now into regime change.

That was not the goal of the war.

Throughout the struggle, the metaphor used by Netanyahu and his people was a chess metaphor.

We are threatening the king in order to get rid of the queen.

We are threatening the regime, not because we want to regime change.

That's the only way for them to give up on the nuclear project.

Now with the success, there is a different approach which goes for regime change because the assumption is the queen is gone.

And Netanyahu does not want the Iranians to have the money and the legitimacy to survive.

And he's become more ambitious.

I understand that logic, but that's risky.

Because once you do that, if you don't have an agreement and it's an open, unstable situation, then the danger of the wounded, weaker beast is very much there.

So I think, you know, we're talking about Gaza, which is very important, but the great strategic dilemma of the the moment is how do you fight the regime after the war.

My attitude, I'm for regime change, but again, I think we need different terminology.

I think what is needed is what the US did with USSR, not what the US did in Iraq.

We made the mistake in Lebanon in 1982, and you made the mistake in Iraq in 2003 of trying to impose a different regime on a country.

It didn't work in both cases.

What succeeded is what Reagan did with the USSR, which is not a direct attack of regime change, but a multi-dimensional, long, sophisticated campaign that weakens your adversary, the evil empire on the other side, economically, encourages subversive elements, all kinds of things.

There's a lot.

If the CIA and the Mossad and all the others get to it, I think that's a right goal because the war in the Middle East will not end as long as there's a strong, radical, crazy Iranian regime.

So the goal is there.

But right now, to go for a direct assault on that regime, there is a potential it will work, but it's a very high-risk game.

And it's very different than the way, the cautious and calculated way that the war was run so far.

If there is not regime change in Iran, or it does not seem realistic that there can be regime change in Iran.

I know there are these vision or fantasy, depending on who you ask, of regime change going back to a day before the Islamic Revolution, you know, before Ayatollah Khomeini came to Iran.

And if you go back before that period, the Pakhlavi regime, the era of direct flights on LL between Tel Aviv and Tehran, if you assume that that is very unlikely, wouldn't the current situation of a very weak regime that is highly unpopular with its own domestic population, that is economically a basket case under enormous economic pressure, that's nuclear program is stymied, to say the least.

A regime whose proxy system is wiped out, that they've spent years and billions of dollars investing in, with no real conventional army military to speak of that's a real threat.

Just letting that kind of regime, that's a shell of its former self, hobble along for the time being, isn't that an excellent outcome?

I believe that in the long term, the only way to end this war and to have a peaceful Middle East is a new regime in Tehran.

As long as the Hyatoas are there with their extremism and with the strength, we are all in jeopardy.

World order is in jeopardy.

Israel is in jeopardy.

The Arabs are in jeopardy.

These people want to kill the Jews and enslave the Arabs and eventually take over the West.

So they should not be there.

You know, I have a friend who is a Persian Jew who makes me listen all the time to his favorite DJ.

He's an Iranian DJ that has these wild parties on the Tehran rooftops.

And wherever I listened to that music, I said, that's where hope is.

Eventually, the Iranians will get rid of this regime.

The real goal is to free the Iranians or help the Iranians free themselves from the regime.

But there is a difference between that and trying to attack the regime right now.

This is why I'm saying, let's not do Iraq.

Let's do USSR.

That worked and that will work.

The regime is fundamentally weak.

But right now, because of the questions that remain, again, after the spectacular success, the problem of the missing uranium, the problem of distilled ballistic capabilities, you cannot ignore the threats that are still there within a weekend Iran.

So I think we need a very sophisticated, again, tough, assertive, but sophisticated campaign that will eventually replace the regime.

But keeping the situation totally unstable now, I think may be dangerous.

I want to zoom out and look at Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

I want to take each of those and ask you how you, Netanyahu's geopolitical vision fits with or impacts each of these places and where you think he'll meet resistance.

So let's start with Lebanon.

So we have the saying from the Bible in Hebrew, Mitzafon ti patachava, evil will come from the north.

In this case,

there is a good chance that the good news will come from the north.

So if I may, I'll begin with Shira because that's Netanyahu's thinking.

The feeling is that there is a short window of opportunity with Syrah.

That this new leader of Syria, Jolani.

Jolani, he has several names.

So does Mahmoud Abbas.

So do many Israeli leaders.

You know, within a year, he'll either be dead or be strong enough that he won't need us.

Right now, he's desperate for Western money and support.

So he may be willing to make concessions that no other Arab leader, Syrian leader made in the past.

I want to remind you that Syria is all the weak and broken and all that, is symbolically very important for the Arab world.

Damascus is the capital of Arab nationalism.

So beyond the ruins you have there, Syria is very important for the region.

So the chances, and I think the Netanyahu team believe there is a at least 50-50% chance that you can reach a deal, perhaps not full peace, but non-belligerency or some sort of arrangement with this regime.

If we will have Syria, we'll have Lebanon.

And Lebanon is in a sense even more fascinating.

Because, you know, we talked about the right kind of regime change.

This is actually what's happening in Lebanon.

We didn't do 1982.

We didn't put a Jumail puppet leader in Beirut.

But we defeated the bad guys.

We broke their bones in such a way that the good guys are more assertive and they have more self-confidence to deal with the bad guys.

So you actually have now in Lebanon a political process continuing the military operation.

This is a dramatic change.

So the potential good news in Lebanon is enormous.

Again, talking about the history, no, my grandfather, who grew up in Sfat in the Galilee, studied in the American University in Beirut.

The potential of Israel and Lebanon is huge.

The synergy is huge.

We had all these problems because the PLO in the past and then Hezbollah.

If they are weakened dramatically, the possible synergy between Lebanon and Israel is very promising.

I don't want to promise anything.

It's a Middle East.

Thing may not happen.

But the hope...

and I think that's very much Netanyahu's hope, not only his, is that Syria and Lebanon are possible.

Again, not necessarily full peace, but at least some sort of political arrangements that will change the situation dramatically.

And by the way, these two issues are less connected to Gaza.

And now I'm going to Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is the big prize.

I want to get to Saudi Arabia in a second, but before we do, I have been cautiously impressed or cautiously optimistic or pleasantly, I guess, surprised by what appears to be some, not all, but some political actors within Lebanon.

post-Israel taking out Hezbollah and taking out Nasrellah that seem to be willing to step in and fill a vacuum in a way that the Lebanese state has not been prepared to do, or at least not functional enough to do in previous periods where a vacuum has been created, or there was a thought there'd be a vacuum created.

I'm thinking after 2006, after the Second Lebanon War.

But you can go back to your point all the way back to 82.

So what is different now?

First of all, do you agree with me that we're seeing this?

This is exactly what I'm doing.

Look, look at the facts.

Why was Iran such a spectacular success beyond the genius of the intelligence and the air force and the Israeli industry?

Because Syria was not there and because Hezbollah never attacked us.

These are huge.

All the plans of 20 years of attacking Iran had dramatic catastrophic scenarios of Syrian attacks and Hezbollah attacks on Israel.

So the fact this is where this war succeeded in an astonishing way.

I say, while in Gaza it's still so messy, in the north, the war succeeded dramatically.

And there is a potential of turning this military success into a new political reality in a way it's already happening.

Look, this is a war-to-peace moment.

And you talk about Netanyahu, that's his vision.

He feels he won the war.

He now wants to have peace.

Again, his peace, a peace without a Palestinian state.

He doesn't want a Palestinian state, but he believes that the Arab-Israeli relationship can be renewed and intensified in something between normalization, non-belligerency, and peace.

And the most promising part is Syria and Lebanon right now.

And if we can go to Saudi Arabia, I'll explain to you why it's more complicated there.

Okay.

The peace with Saudi Arabia has been ready, or the normalization, for years.

It was very close several times.

In a way, October 7th, one of the reasons October 7th happened is because it was so close and the radicals tried to prevent it.

If you remember Netanyahu's speech in the UN, just October 7th, it was a Shimon Perez speech.

He was talking about the New Middle East.

It was the most full of hope and prosperity and no threats, very unlike Netanyahu's speeches.

Okay?

So that was very close.

Ironically, tragically, sadly, October 7th made it more complicated.

Why?

Because the normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia has a Palestinian component.

And what happened is that the public opinion in Saudi Arabia was radicalized to an extent against Israel because of Al Jazeera pictures of Gaza.

And Israeli public opinion went way to the right, and people are not willing to give anything on the Palestinian issue.

What you're saying is the average, quote-unquote, average Saudi, I think it applies more to younger Saudis, but whatever, we can have that debate.

But the average Saudi, which had not been paying attention to the Palestinians, probably didn't care about the Palestinians.

If you hear the Saudi leadership talk about, they said the average Saudi doesn't care about the Palestinians.

Suddenly, between the images on Al Jazeera and the images on TikTok, they were suddenly, it was unavoidable on the one hand.

On the other hand, the whole Israeli political spectrum shifted to the right at the same time.

At the exact same time that the quote-unquote Arab street is often referred to, was telling the Saudi leadership, we can't ignore the Palestinian future.

The Israeli, the sentiment, the political sentiment in Israel shifted strongly to the right, which is figuring out the Palestinian arrangement is not our problem after what we just went through on October 7th.

I want to remind you something.

Netanyahu gave the Barlan speech in 2009, June 9th, 2009.

Barlan University.

Actually, accepting the two-state, his version of a two-state children.

Nothing happened.

No Palestinian state, nothing.

But it allowed him, it gave him the legitimacy and the context during the Obama years to fight Iran.

Netanyahu was willing to make some concessions that are rhetorical on the Palestinian issue, that are not really creating a Palestinian state, that it's more difficult for him to give these concessions now because of the political climate in Israel.

And what he was willing to give is not enough for MBS.

MBS couldn't care less about the Palestinians.

He doesn't like them.

But he has a public opinion.

So there is a chance of normalization.

It's more difficult than it was before October 7th.

But now I'll tell you another complication as a result of what's happening now.

Because of the success of the operation against Iran, On the one hand, Israel, as we said, is a superhero.

Moderate Arabs throughout the region admire Israel.

But the glue that created the Arab-Israeli alliance is weaker.

Because the whole point strategically is how we fight Iran together.

When they are less terrified of Iran, they have less incentive to make peace with us.

So this goes back to President Trump.

This is the moment for American leadership because the need for the normalization is still there.

The potential is still huge, but it's more complicated than in the past.

And you will need very assertive, creative American leadership and diplomacy in order to bring the Saudis in Israel together.

And if I may end with a hopeful note, if that happens, really the sky is the limit because it's economic peace and the most prosperity can be amazing, but it also has a religious element because they control the holy cities.

They have a religious role.

So that that can lead to a kind of Jewish-Islamic rapprochement

that is very much needed.

I mean, we can really have the alliance of the moderates at last after we talked about it for so much.

So Saudi Arabia is essential.

I think it's still possible, but it's more complicated than it was before October 7th.

I tend to agree with you.

On the one hand, the urgency from some, namely in Riyadh, for normalization with Israel has lessened for the reasons you're saying, because the threat from Iran is not advancing, on the one hand.

On the other hand, to your point about the U.S.

leadership, that is why I thought what President Trump said the night of the U.S.

operation in Iran was so important, where he talked about the close working relationship he had with Netanyahu.

and that they were a team and Israel and the U.S.

were a team and they were completely attached at the hip and best team ever in the history of teams, never better partnership, et cetera, et cetera.

I thought that was such an important message to the Saudis because I've heard from Saudi leaders on the one hand that they're open to normalizing with Israel, obviously.

They've been talking about it for some time, quietly, but there's a risk to them in the region for doing it, whether from Shiite radicals or Sunni radicals that could try to seize on Saudi normalization with Israel.

And, you know, that MBS has Sadat syndrome, that he's terrified of being on Mar Sadat, of his life ending of the back of a peace with some kind of accommodation with Israel.

And so the Saudi officials have said to me, if we're going to stick our necks out and do some kind of normalization deal deal with Israel, who's going to have our back?

Who's going to be in it with us?

And the U.S.

message, the U.S.

saying we're there, because there was this question, is the U.S.

really going to be there?

But I think what the Trump administration has been signaling is not only are we going to be there, but the train is leaving the station because we're partnering with Israel, as you see by this dazzling operation we just did and all that it represents.

And it's this incredible partnership.

Do you, Saudi, want to be part of it?

So you're absolutely right that it's so essential, as we said throughout the years, not to have daylight between America and Israel.

The moment America and Israel are together the chances of peace increase and the risks of war decrease dramatically.

It's essential.

And right now we are in a very good moment because what happened during this war is two things.

On the one hand, Israel acted on its own.

It's much better that America joined later.

Okay, so Israel showed that independently it's so strong, it's a regional power, it's a kind of global mini-power.

It showed how strong it is independently.

And it's important to say that a lot of the ammunition used and the genius was blue and white.

It wasn't only American weapons.

It was blue and white.

Very important to mention that.

But then when America came in and America is committed, that creates a very powerful alliance.

And I agree that that increases the chances.

I'll even say something else, that many moderates in the region, in the Gulf, are worried about America in the long term.

The fact that that Israel proved to be such a reliable, strong neighbor actually encourages them to have an alliance with us just in case America pivots east and leaves us all in 10 years' time or 20 years time.

So again, the fundamental interests and wishes to have an American-Arab-Israeli alliance are very much there.

Now it has to be done because, as I said, there are some obstacles and complications, but there is potential.

All All right.

I want to talk about domestic Israeli affairs, and that also is its own front, if you will.

And much of this conversation has been about how the war has reshaped the region and Israel's strategic position in the region.

But I want to turn inward to Israeli society.

Domestically, many would argue that Netanyahu's conduct of the war has been divisive domestically.

You know, many have argued that on this podcast, many of our guests.

And that his own political future has been too prominent factor in his decision-making in terms of how he ran the war and ran, you know, possible end to the war and ceasefire negotiations.

You, you know, all the criticisms or the canards, depending on how one looks at them.

But I think he and his...

the people around him have got to believe that there is this breakdown in trust inside Israel without getting into who's to blame, but just there is this breakdown in trust on many fronts and in many aspects of Israeli society.

Trust in government, trust in the political leadership, to some degree, trust in the military, at least in terms of their failures on October 7th, trust in Netanyahu.

How do you think he thinks about that and his vision or his responsibility for addressing that, the unity or the lack of unity among Israelis going forward?

So, look,

I'm a great Israeli patriot.

I believe in Israeli individuals, Israeli society, Israeli economy.

I love us and I believe in us.

I think we've been hit with a flesh-eating bacteria called Bibesis.

For 10, 12, 20 years, we are totally split regarding this one man in a crazy way.

We stopped being rational.

We've split into two basic narratives.

I'll explain.

Netanyahu's narrative is the following.

Netanyahu believes that the Jews are existentially threatened and they are not aware of the existential threat facing them.

So he sees himself himself as a guy who's on a mission from the God he doesn't believe in to save the Jews from themselves.

And these Jews are so ungrateful.

They don't see how wonderful and great he is.

And they don't, whether they persecute him,

they are after him.

So he has this story that he's a kind of heroic story of himself.

The story on the other side is that he's some sort of villain who took over the country.

He doesn't care about anything, and he just uses power for his own egocentricism, narcissism, whatever.

I think that the war creates an opportunity to create a third narrative.

I mean, these two narratives are wild, okay?

You can understand what I think about them.

I think that on the one hand, we see Netanyahu's total responsibility for October 7th.

You cannot ignore it.

And what is it?

It's not an intelligence and military failure.

The country was so divided, and it's not only his fault, but he was a prime minister.

Netanyahu thought that in order to do his life's mission, Iran and all that, he can split the country.

He worked with tribalism.

He thought that tribalism in politics helps him.

So there was internal destruction of Israeli society, and he is responsible for that.

Again, people on the other side were responsible as well, but he was the leader.

But on the other hand, you have the success of June 13th now.

Okay, he's responsible for that as well.

And you see it among many people who oppose him that suddenly they say, wow, he's not just a nobody.

The guy knew what he was talking about.

He had a real agenda.

He proved to be a serious leader.

I think that it's a must now to use this moment to move forward.

I personally think he's been in power for long enough.

And our challenge is to end the Netanyahu era in a peaceful way.

I think that if he succeeded in war, if we'll have elements of peace now, before he leaves, the mission is internal unity.

This internal destruction that torn Israeli society and turned us, you know, we are such talented people and we became like crazed with internal hate.

Now, we know what happened to us in the First Commonwealth and the Second Commonwealth.

We went, and it's time for Netanyahu, you know, he likes Churchill so much, in victory, magnanimity.

It's time for Netanyahu to rise and to understand the internal divisions in Israel are our most serious existential threat.

Iran is dangerous, but what we are doing to ourselves is more dangerous.

So whether it's practical, whether there is a chance he will do it, I really don't know.

But I think it's a moment, not, look, we should have debates.

We have left and we have right and we have the Palestinian issue and the ultra-Orthodox issue and many issues.

We should debate.

But the kind of almost conceptual civil war we got ourselves into, we should never, ever go back to October 6th.

Never, ever.

And I hope, I pray that he'll find himself the greatness, the generosity to reach out and try to unite this nation because so much work needs to be done here.

And again, we proved to be so great in so many ways.

You know,

I look at what happened.

You know, I'm not a religious person, but what happened is yet another Israeli miracle.

It's unbelievable what came out of this nation.

So to see that and the next go back to petty politics and extremism and fanaticism and internal hate,

that's horrible.

And we should use this great moment.

Look at the pilots of the protest movement who actually went to Tehran to implement Netanyahu's vision.

It was the very same pilots who were who were so angry at them and he attacked them in such a vicious way.

And in war, they worked together, and together they achieved this victory.

Now we must turn this victory in war into a kind of reconciliation and remedy in peacetime.

You know, Ari, I'm listening to you, and you're bringing into sharp relief something I've been thinking about, but I haven't really talked about on this podcast, so I figured I might as well do it now.

You're speaking to the paradox of Netanyahu.

And the paradox of Netanyahu is the Netanyahu of October 6th, to use your term, which is a man who was leading an Israel that was deeply divided.

And as you would say, he was part of that crisis.

And yet you look at the dazzling results of the last couple of weeks.

And many Israelis, including Netanyahu critics I speak to, say it's hard to imagine another Israeli leader pulling off what Israel just did in the last few weeks.

It's not to say that it's because of Netanyahu that Israel has these incredible intelligence capabilities and this incredible air force.

Of course not.

That's not about Netanyahu.

But the way that Israel managed to pull this whole thing off and persuade the U.S.

and persuade Trump to let Israel do the first, call it two-thirds or three-fourths of the war in Iran without standing in the way.

And in fact, we can debate whether they supported Israel in those efforts in that war or allowed Israel to do it, but one way or the other, they did not stand in the way.

And then basically telling the U.S., we will do the hard work, the quote-unquote dirty work, as the Chancellor of Germany called it, Israel's doing our dirty work.

And then giving the U.S.

the option to come in at the end and finish off Ford, effectively.

The way that was all managed with the U.S., with a complicated president and commander-in-chief in the U.S., took extraordinary, almost like Kissinger-like geopolitical skills.

And I've heard many Netanyahu critics say we are furious with him about the divisiveness within Israeli society, and yet we are sort of in awe of what Israel has pulled off with regard to Iran.

And it may be that same kind of canny and geopolitical deafness that only he, not only he forever, but only Netanyahu among Israel's current political class possesses.

Netanyahu has incredible strategic talent.

He has incredible flaws.

And it's this combination that drives us crazy for 30 years.

The guy is so remarkable in this combination of talent and flaws.

But I say, again, if we're talking about his narrative, you know, Netanyahu always wanted to be Churchill, okay?

So he had a kind of Churchillian moment in a degree.

But what's more interesting, the new twist to the narrative, when October 7th happened, Netanyahu suddenly fell in love with FDR.

He was determined to turn October 7th to his Pearl Harbor.

And he said, I will take this moment and I will turn it around to victory.

And in a sense, again, we still have to be cautious.

There are still a lot of threats and problems, but the achievement, the turnaround is very much no.

So I say if we acknowledge the fact that he's responsible for October 7th, we acknowledge the fact that he's responsible for June 13th.

If we see that he was a great strategist in many ways, he saw things that others didn't, he led many things that you should credit, but the internal politics, the division, you know, the dependence also on the ultra-orthodox and extremes there are many flaws i don't want to get to the whole list it's not a moment i want to get into that i think that the key to israel's future is a zionist alliance where the extremists are left aside and where all the people who participated in the war lead the rebuilding of israel if the right and the center can create a kind of alliance that translates that into a new reality i think that we we can turn this war into open a new page.

We have a lot of work to rebuild and unite our society and to rebuild our nation.

And I think that coming to a kind of peaceful end of the Netanyahu era is essential in order to have this kind of new beginning.

Okay.

Ari, we will leave it there.

Thank you for giving us a lot of perspective and a lot to think about.

And it's always good to kind of take a step back with you and look at the big picture and all these different storylines, if you will, that are taking place with incredible speed and intensity.

So it's just good to kind of slow down and consider each one of them.

And hopefully you have a calm night in Tel Aviv.

And I look forward to talking to you soon.

Thank you very much.

It was a pleasure.

That's our show for today.

If you found this episode valuable, please share it with others who might appreciate it.

Time and again, we've found that our listeners are the ones driving the growth of the Call Me Back community, so thank you.

And to offer comments, suggestions, sign up for updates, or explore past episodes, please visit our website, arcmedia.org.

That's arkmedia.org, where you can deepen your understanding of the topics we cover.

Call Me Back is produced and edited by Lon Benatar.

Sound and video editing by Martin Huergo and Marianne Khalis Burgos.

Our director of operations is Maya Rakoff.

Research by Gabe Silverstein.

Our music was composed by Yuval Semo.

Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.