CEASEFIRE! - with Amit Segal and Nadav Eyal

You are listening to an art media podcast.

This

really looks like a Gaza-four-Tehran deal behind the scenes between the White House and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

And what I mean by that is:

look, you want us to greenlight your attack in Iran, and then you want us to join this fight against Iran, fine.

But the president has made clear that he wants the war in Gaza to end.

And I can definitely imagine him saying to the prime minister, you got what you wanted from me, now I get what I want from you.

We see the light at the end of the tunnel.

The Lebanese front is over.

The Iraqi front is over.

The Syrian front is over.

The Iranian front is over.

Hamas is half over.

I think we see it.

We can see the end.

It's 11 a.m.

on Tuesday, June 24th here in New York City.

It is 6 p.m.

on Tuesday, June 24th in Israel as Israelis wind down their day.

A lot has unfolded in the Middle East since America's historic strike on Iran's three nuclear sites this past Saturday night.

On Monday, Iran launched its highly anticipated response to the U.S.

attack, firing multiple missiles at the American Al Udaid air base in Qatar.

The attack seems to have been far more symbolic, if not completely theatrical, than militarily strategic, as Iran gave both Qatar and the U.S.

advance warning before firing the missiles.

In a post on Truth Social yesterday, President Trump mockingly thanked Iran for, quote, giving us early notice, which made it possible for no lives to be lost and nobody to be injured.

Also on Monday, the Israeli Air Force struck critical IRGC targets.

This included multiple hubs of IRGC internal operations, including its military headquarters, missile production sites, radar systems, and missile storage infrastructure.

In a symbolic move, the Israeli Air Force struck the Evan Prison, known for holding Iranian dissidents, as well as Iran's so-called Israel doomsday clock, quote unquote, located in what is called Palestine Square in Tehran.

That's the clock that has 2040 as the year by which Israel would be wiped off the map.

After this day of intense military operations and what felt like a high-speed U-turn, President Trump announced via Truth Social that Iran and Israel had agreed to a, quote, complete and total ceasefire.

close quote.

According to the Post, Iran was meant to stop firing first.

Israel was meant to stop after 12 hours, and the full ceasefire would come into effect after 24 hours.

Shortly before the ceasefire began, Iran launched six successive missile barrages toward targets throughout Israel.

At around 5.40 a.m.

Israel time, one of these missiles impacted a residential building in Beersheva, tragically killing four people, all of whom had been in their safe rooms and injuring 22.

A few hours later, at 10.30 a.m.

Israel time, Iran fired two missiles at Israel's north about three and a half hours after the ceasefire was meant to take effect.

Israeli officials vowed to respond forcefully to this breach in the ceasefire, but settled for a, quote, symbolic target, an Iranian radar north of Tehran after pressure from Trump not to escalate.

And then this morning, in front of reporters on the White House lawn, President Trump lashed out at Israel, telling reporters that he was, quote, not happy with its response to Iran's breach of the ceasefire.

We try to keep this podcast family-friendly.

So I will not repeat the words President Trump used to express his anger with Iran and with Israel, but in a post to Truth Social, Trump wrote, and I quote, Israel, do not drop these bombs.

If you do, it is a major violation.

Bring your pilots home now.

Exclamation point.

So how should we understand what this ceasefire actually means?

How did it came about?

Is it an agreement, an arrangement, or a new definition of the word ceasefire?

Once again, joining us to discuss what seems like a month's worth of news in just two days.

Our Call-MeBack regulars, Nadavael, who is a senior analyst at at Yiddiot Akhronot, and Amit Segel, senior analyst at Channel 12.

Nadav, Amit, thanks for coming back and helping us make sense of this roller coaster.

Thanks for having us.

Okay, so let's jump into this agreement, arrangement, whatever we want to call this, what was announced.

Let's start with you, Nadav.

How was the ceasefire reached?

And to what degree were Israel and Iran directly involved?

Well, this agreement was reached through mediation of Qatar and others.

But here's the bottom line.

Right after the U.S.

attack, historic attack, as you said in your opening down, against those nuclear installations, it was completely obvious that the Trump White House wants this over, that the president wants this over.

And this message was conveyed online through social, through his posts, and in other means.

It was also made obvious by Israeli sources that it is the decision of the prime minister that was briefing about this, actually saying this on the record, that Israel Israel is very close to achieving its goals and that we will not be dragged into a war of attrition.

It's also the recommendation of the defense apparatus not to keep this going for another few weeks, but rather after the U.S.

attack to use this as an exit point.

That there are two advantages for the American attack against these nuclear installations.

The first one is, of course, that the US can do this much more efficiently in Fordo, for instance, than the Israeli Air Force.

And the second one is that when the U.S.

joins, it's a perfect time to exit this specific conflict.

And when we presented these different scenarios, Dan, you probably remember that, we discussed the scenario in which President Trump decides to join the war and then, right after that, a cessation of hostilities, leading maybe to negotiations with Iran.

In other words, not a situation in which Israel drags on this until the Iranians agree to an agreement.

Now, because Iran had its response against the army base in Qatar, because that response, as we know, Dan, was totally coordinated with the United States and with the Qataris to make sure that American servicemen and actually Qataris too won't be hurt as a result of that.

And it was symbolic.

This was the entry through which the Trump administration decided to have the ceasefire.

It was a dictate coming from the president to the sides.

It was obvious that the Iranians were looking for a way out.

It was always the case with Israel that they didn't want this to drag on.

And the president used this in order to make this announcement as to the ceasefire.

And the Israeli cabinet wasn't totally aware to the timeline he was presenting.

The Israeli cabinet, the prime minister, decided not to react immediately to that and try to see what can be done in the hours left.

But it wasn't done in negation or in real conflict with the Israelis, as far as I know.

And I'll be happy to hear what Amit is saying, because this is what Israel was banking on all the time, that when the U.S.

comes in, it's the U.S.

that's going to decide when this conflict is over.

I will say, just before I bring Amit in, I lived on the Al-Udaid base.

I lived at Camp Al-Saliyah when I was there in the lead up to the Second Iraq War in 2003.

I will say there's no way that American personnel at that base, given that this base is not equipped to absorb what Iran launched, there's no way that the Americans were not given extraordinary notice, like a lot of notice, because they evacuated all the personnel because the base can't handle it, which means this thing really was choreographed with a lot of lead time.

Amit, what can you tell us about the conversations happening behind closed doors in Israel?

certainly within the government, the prime minister's office, in terms of just how they arrived at this agreement and or if they actually arrived at it or just kind of de facto arrived at it and what the response then is to President Trump lashing out this morning.

I'm not sure Israel was really in the need or the urgency to act more many more days in Iran.

Actually, it was quite comfortable for Israel and the Israeli cabinet to get pressured on this issue because

luckily it ran almost out of targets sooner than expected.

The Israel Air Force ran ahead of the schedule by two to four days.

And second, there was the fear of getting involved in something more severe.

There is something exceptional here that it's the first war in which one of the sides did not lose one soldier.

There wasn't a single casualty for Israeli soldiers.

And that's the reason why there was a big, a huge fear that one fire jet would actually fall or intercepted and there will be a kidnapped or a hosted from the Israeli Air Force.

So there was an incentive to actually wrap it up as soon as possible, and President Trump gave it.

There is the incident that followed later about the Israeli retaliation for the rockets fired to the Israeli north in the morning after the ceasefire had begun.

But then again, I don't think Prime Minister Netanyahu was under the impression that he needs a fight with a U.S.

president that had just attacked for the first time in history the nuclear facilities of a third country.

Nadav, since this ceasefire doesn't really meet the classic definition of an agreement, a real negotiated agreement, the only

one that comes to mind is the agreement reached between Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon, the ceasefire agreement, where that felt like a real negotiated agreement.

That doesn't seem to be that.

Should we expect negotiations going forward in the context of the ceasefire or in the context of the nuclear program?

Look, the results of this war are astounding.

The IDF definitely had an incredible military achievement here, and the United States had an incredible military achievement that we have never seen before in the usage of those B-2 strategic bombers using this type of ammunition.

After saying that, we need to be absolutely clear that only the future and the Iranian actions will teach us as to the true victory in this war.

And here's what I mean, because it's pretty simple.

If the Iranians stay at the NPT, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that means that they're deterred.

If the Iranians don't start announcing that they're rebuilding their cascades of centrifuges, that means that they're deterred.

If the Iranians are looking now for negotiations with the Trump administration, with the international community, reaching an agreement, that means that they're deterred.

If the Iranians answer, the IAEA is going to ask the Iranians, where are those 400 kilograms of enriched uranium?

And let's be clear about that.

This specific uranium can fit into a big box.

You know, I can't show this with my hand, but not much further than that because it's so heavy.

It's 19 times heavier than water.

So this,

you know, you can hide it everywhere.

By the way, it's not that radioactive too.

Even if it's enriched to 90%, it's not that radioactive, which means that it's more easily hidden.

And Rafael Garossi is going to ask them, where is it?

And then we will see the true intentions of the Islamic Republic.

The Islamic Republic, we know, is going to play.

And they're going to say, we don't know where it is.

That's the classic Iranian response.

You just bombed the hell out of us.

Whether you expect us?

We don't know.

Or they can say it's in a safe place.

We still don't know how they're going to play it.

And if, for instance, they're going to signal that they're leaving the NPT,

we shouldn't rule out a possible escalation and the collapse of the ceasefire.

It was never a plausible scenario that they will end this by just signing an agreement and handing over their enriched uranium unless the U.S.

would have been committed to a bombing campaign of the sort that the U.S.

had at the first Gulf War against Iraq.

President Trump made absolutely clear, as did his administration, that it is not their intention.

So now they'll be judged through the actions they take towards a negotiated settlement.

Because this will tell us if not only did we manage to degrade their abilities, but also to change their actual behavior, which is where you win wars.

When you take the ability of the other side to do things they might have wanted to do, or you deter them to a point that they limit themselves.

On the 400 kilograms, which now, like, it's in every conversation I'm having now.

I, you know, everyone's talking about the 400 kilograms.

My teenage sons know about the 400 kilograms of enriched uranium.

They're like, what's going on with this?

Like, it's a Sherlock Holmes, you know, novel, like finding the 400 kilograms.

It's now like going to become part of the popular culture.

It's become like the 800-pound gorilla in the conversation.

I was thinking about the, you know, the unconventional weapons of the Iraq war, right?

Right.

But this time it exists.

It exists.

So here's my question.

The way some experts have explained it to me is that in order to build a nuclear bomb, you need the enriched uranium.

You also need the ballistic missiles.

You need the nuclear warheads.

And you obviously need continued, sustained expertise from scientists.

You need the knowledge.

It seems like the knowledge is largely wiped out.

And I think Israel and the Mossad is probably going to continue with those efforts to make sure the knowledge, shall we say, the expertise within Iran is wiped out.

The infrastructure is eviscerated or at a minimum, severely hit, if not, and really set back.

So how worried should we be about enriched uranium in a world in which there's no knowledge and there's no infrastructure?

Technically, you're not supposed to be very worried.

I mean,

12 days ago, every Israeli-American would have bought this scenario.

No further, yes to enrich uranium, and not the other way around.

But you still don't want 450 kilograms of enriched uranium to take an afternoon walk in the mountains of Iran.

And that's why there is an urgent need in order to understand where it is.

And is that because Israel is concerned, Amit, that they don't know what facilities Iran may have that Israel doesn't know about?

And then that enriched uranium could take its walk to a facility that Israel knows about Furdo, it knows about Natans, it knows about Isfahan, but maybe there's, you know, a place they don't know about.

This is one option.

Second is because this, it gives the death certificate for the Iranian nuclear program.

It actually not taking them years back like it is now, but it actually cancels the Iranian nuclear program this is one thing second you don't want this very rare very dangerous material to be in a in the most hostile country on earth i'll give you a few examples i know it's quite it's a far-reaching scenario but i'll give it none the nonetheless because it appears in briefings from israeli from high israeli officials for instance dirty bomb Let's say Iranians decided to go nuts and to actually give up the mission to become a nuclear superpower with a missile, ballistic missile, and to actually put it on this and the weaponization process, et cetera.

And they decide to actually put it on a truck arriving at

the Alenby border point in Israel, thus trying to explode it in Tel Aviv, for instance.

Is it very probable?

I don't think so.

Would you like to eliminate this scenario?

Sure.

Do you have anything to add to that?

I think that the issue here is quite simple.

They invested so much Dan in trying to produce this enriched uranium.

It's still capable to produce a few warheads.

Israel wants to take it away.

By the way, Iran agreed in the past during the JCPOA to take some of the enriched uranium outside of the country, right?

This was part of previous agreements.

And because of that, it's essential for the Israelis to know that it isn't there.

You don't need a ballistic warhead.

You can use enriched uranium to have just a very modest, primitive installation that you blow up in the middle of the desert two years from now.

But it's really the enriched uranium discussion is all about is there real change here?

Is there real change here in the sense that the Iranians understand, as President Trump put it, that they don't have a nuclear program anymore?

Or are they going to be what the Islamic Republic is?

And they're going to just look at this.

We know that they still have sentry fugit left.

They still do have knowledge then.

They do have knowledge.

It's true that Israel killed basically every scientist that it aimed to kill that was working on their nuclear program, but there are hundreds of people in Iran who know how to do it.

And because of that, it's really about the final tests of this war.

And that test is five years ahead of now.

We really need to look into the horizon to say that strategically speaking, this helped.

And, you know, I saw some analysts saying, hey, didn't the JCPOA take them even further than the bomb, than what happened here?

And that's, if you just look at the nuclear program, that might be, you can deliberate on that, okay, to some extent.

But it's not about that.

On October 7, Israel was attacked.

On October 8th, it was attacked by Hezbollah and by the Axis of Resistance.

And what happened ever since was a war about security.

the existence of Israel, the existence of the Axis of Terror, and deterrence.

Who has deterrence in the region?

Only by virtue of what the Israelis did in those 12 days, deterrence is completely restored.

You know, we said that a few times after Hezbollah, but now it's the real deal.

It's the Iranians.

And this is what was achieved here.

It's not only about taking back the nuclear program.

It's also about the surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.

It's about Israel showing how capable it is in hitting every country in the region that threatens it.

And if the Iranians were, you know, the biggest guerrilla in the room fighting against Israel, they don't seem like that anymore.

So it really depends on the resolve of both Israel and mainly the United States.

Look at President Trump today and the way that he basically ordered the Israelis.

to fall back.

This really reminded me of 1956, the Sinai War, and President Eisenhower ordering not only Israel, but also ordering France and the UK, step down.

You know, we turn that territory back to Egypt.

David Ben-Gurion came to the Knesset and he said, it's a famous quote, this is the third kingdom of David.

This is how euphoric David Ben-Gurion, who was the most rational, realist kind of leader, founding father that we had, he was so ecstatic about the victory of the IDF after 1948,

such a dreadful and difficult war.

And then he just got a phone call from the White House saying, pull back your soldiers.

I was reminded of this.

Why?

Because Israel needed to fight another war merely 11 years later, in 1967, and it felt that it was under an existential threat in the Six Days War.

It needed to fight again.

In the Six Days War, Israel won a resounding victory.

And six years later, it was attacked in a surprise attack that felt to many at the beginning as the end of the third house in Eretz Israel.

So, wars in the Middle East are always judged in retrospect and a few years later, always dependent on you not allowing yourself to be conquered by the feeling of Hebris, of euphoria, and keeping to the values and doctrines.

And this is going to be a test not only to Israel, because Israel is very much there.

It's a test to the West and mainly to the U.S.

result here.

And I'm asking you right now, Dan, you know this White House, this party better than I do.

If they see Iran starting to rebuild, if they see Iran starting to play their game again with the enriched Iranian with their nuclear program, will this White House order another strike or allow the Israelis to strike again?

I will say that I think the, I don't want to say ease, because it wasn't easy, but the seamlessness and precision with which the U.S.

executed this strike on Saturday night has validated those voices within the conservative movement,

even with those within the MAGA movement, and those around the president, that when the U.S.

needs to take care of business, it can.

And when Israel needs to take care of business, it can.

And it can do it with...

pretty, not zero, but pretty low risk and pretty low cost to both the U.S.

and Israel.

So keep in mind that, Dav, before Saturday night, even I'd say before 13 days ago, there was all this speculation about the horror show that could erupt if there was a war against Iran, an Israeli war against Iran, a U.S.

war against Iran, an Israeli U.S.

war against Iran, that it would thousands of Americans be killed and military bases and personnel throughout the region would be at risk and oil prices would just skyrocket and

America would be in another quote-unquote forever war.

And so, you know, that was speculation.

There was no basis upon which to actually argue for or against that until the proposition is tested.

The proposition was tested Saturday night.

So now the U.S.

knows it has tools at its disposal.

And I think those who were advocating to the president, both in his inner circle, the six officials the three of us have talked about before, who I think were the only ones in the room among those who were advocating action, and then others outside the immediate ring, people like Senator Lindsey Graham and others, Senator Cotton, I think their stock has gone up considerably.

And so the proposition now has been tested.

The model has been tested.

So I think short of getting bogged down in a war, the U.S.

can take action again with pretty high level of confidence.

Go ahead, Amit.

Can I just add to this from an Israeli perspective, from a political analysis?

I think what President Trump did here was to actually do what was considered to be mission impossible.

He had two pledges.

One, that Iran would never have a a nuclear weapon.

And the second is that he would end wars, not starting it.

There was an alleged contradiction.

How can you bomb a country and then promise to end wars?

And what President Trump did here was brilliant because he actually bombed Iran, thus leading to the end of the Israel-Iran war and maybe hopefully the entire war in the Middle East that began on October 7th.

Now, that's the reason why he said this morning he didn't want to risk this unbelievable achievement with a miscalculation.

He didn't want Israel to retaliate because then he was under the impression that Iran would have to retaliate and something might come up and it would escalate rather than de-escalate.

That's why Netanyahu chose to actually go with the orders, advice, requests of President Trump.

And then I would like to add something more.

Nadav talked about the fear of hybrids.

And I would like to speak about the fear of pessimism.

I think we still don't understand the miracle that had happened here.

The miracle that took in 12 days the most severe threat ever posed to the Jewish state since its establishment in 1948.

The fact that a fundamentalist regime almost possessed a nuclear weapon aimed at Israel only became more horrific when you see what they were doing over the last 12 days with their ballistic missiles.

And the fact that they did it with their weapons of limited destruction would lead us to think what would they have done had they had weapons of mass destruction.

And that's why I think the history would not remember this last segment of Trump versus Bibi and the fighter jets on the way to Tehran.

But the entire Middle East will see that the United States of America, for the first time in history, stood against a nuclear superpower in the making and adopting the Begin doctrine after the late Prime Minister Menachem Begin that said that Israel and now the U.S.

would never allow a Muslim country, a dictatorship, to have a nuclear weapon in the Middle East.

I completely agree with that.

It's so easy to forget just the historical nature of this.

The other point I would add is, well, I want to talk to you guys about does this inch us closer to Saudi normalization?

I don't want to suggest it's going to happen imminently.

I don't think you can overstate the point that one of the complaints I would hear from Saudi officials over the last few years as to why, or certainly over the last year, why they weren't prepared to leap in to normalization was they weren't sure exactly where the U.S.

was.

That like, because to normalize with Israel is to take on certain segments of the Arab street and is to be at risk with Iran capitalizing on the Riyadh getting too cozy with Jerusalem.

And they were worried about it.

And they're like, if the U.S.

is not leaning into this, then we're alone.

We're out on the ledge alone.

And if the U.S.

is not going to lead into this with us.

And then what I think happened last weekend was the U.S.

not only conducting this operation, but making clear that it was in partnership with Israel.

And they're like, that they were on the same team, you know, that the way Trump talked about this team, the partnership, never has there been a better partnership.

I just got to wonder whether or not leaders in Saudi Arabia, I haven't spoken to anything in the last couple of days, are saying, wait a minute, that's the team we want to be part of.

And I I guess, so my question is maybe to you, Nadav, is, does this get us closer to Saudi normalization?

I think it does.

It does bring us closer simply because when Israel is strong in the region and when Israel is strong at all, and I think this is a point that you made, Dan, in our previous episode, if Israel comes from a position of strength, not the position of the victim, the just victim, but a position in which it's powerful, it's the Turing force.

And we saw that with the Abraham Accords.

We saw that with the peace with Egypt after the 1973 war, then great things can happen.

But if you speak with Saudis, you speak with Saudi affiliate sources, it's very obvious that it's not going to happen before the war in Gaza stops.

Now, I want to say something about this because people are not paying attention right now.

They're really focused on those 400 kilograms.

And I want us to refocus on what's happening right now.

So about a week.

week ago we published an interesting story on Wainet and Idiot that said that there are huge developments or substantial developments in the negotiations between Israel and Hamas, and that these developments are far greater than the original Witkoff proposal.

And they actually now are discussing a final status end to the war in Gaza.

Israel is not sending a delegation to Qatar to discuss this because right now Hamas is waiting for the war with with Iran to end and Israel is also waiting and both sides think that sending a formal delegation will probably

actually stall the negotiations.

But this

really looks like a Gaza for Tehran deal behind the scenes between the White House and Prime Ministers Netanyahu.

And what I mean by that is,

Look, you want us to greenlight your attack in Iran, and then you want us to join this fight against Iran.

Fine.

But the president has made clear that he wants the war in Gaza to end.

The president has made sure that people understand that he wants the Gaza war to end.

We know that countries that support the president in the Middle East, specifically Saudi Arabia and Qatar, I'm saying this unfortunately for me as an Israeli because what I think about Qatar is probably widely, you know, people can guess.

By the way, you know the joke, Nadav, that Iran bombed the Likud headquarters in Qatar.

I'm really glad the joke came from you, Amit.

If you made that joke, Nadov, the Twitter trolls would be all over you.

Yeah, okay, of course, the joke relates to the suspicions against some of the Netanyahu advisors at Qatar.

So at this point, what I'm hearing, here's the bottom line.

The cabinet discussed this last night.

So just imagine, Dan.

They're talking about the end of the war, right?

They're talking about the proposals by Trump.

Why would they devote time to a hostage deal at Gaza?

I know, Amit probably has more details, but he's keeping them to the eight o'clock news.

No, no, no.

Call me back.

We'll drop after the eight o'clock news.

Two hours later, after Wynette and myself were reporting that the cabinet is dealing with that, and Netanyahu is positive as to a deal.

The prime minister of Qatar, after he was attacked just last night, is saying Hamas and Israel agreed to send delegations and negotiate a hostage deal and a ceasefire in Gaza.

Now, is Smortrich and Ben Guerrill against it?

I think so.

Does Israel at least need to show the president that they're trying absolutely?

Does this mean that it's actually going to be a nice kind of wrapping of the entire war?

It's too perfect, but we're seeing signs that there's an attempt there by the White House.

And just listen to President Trump.

The president has the tendency to allow or to order.

And I can definitely imagine him saying to the prime minister, you got what you wanted from me.

Now I get what I want from you.

Okay, I just want to say before Amit jumps in, to be clear, it's true what the president did helped Israel, but it was also consistent with the policy that Trump has been laying out for years that was in America's interest.

So it wasn't like he was just doing Israel a favor.

But go ahead, Amit.

Okay, so first of all, it has a lot to do with Saudi Arabia because I think their incentive of having a peace agreement with Israel in an absurd way decreases following the Israeli successful attack on Iran.

Why?

Because they already got the commodity.

They are the free riders of the situation.

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc.

Meaning they're benefiting from a weakened Iran.

Yes, once Iran is no longer a threat, both in terms of the nuclear weapon, which is more important for Saudi Arabia, their proxies sent to each and every country in the region, so they have no special incentive to sign it.

This is one thing.

But on the other hand, if we take a look at the last phase of Abraham Accords, the UAE signed this deal in exchange for cancelling or at least postponing the annexation of parts of Judah and Samaria to Israel.

So what I have in mind is a scenario in which Saudi Arabia uses the end of the war as an incentive to sign the peace agreement.

For instance, Israel would end the war and then Saudi Arabia would actually explain to its constituency, to its Muslim constituency, this is the reason we stopped the genocide, we stopped the killing in Gaza.

Now, as for the framework of the agreement, as far as I understand, it's not Smotrich or Bengvir that oppose a unilateral withdrawal of Israel or bilateral withdrawal of Israel from Gaza completely.

It's Netanyahu himself.

He doesn't want Hamas to keep its position as a ruler in Gaza, staying on the borders of Nirozbury and the Ikfarazza.

But what I hear emerging is something in between Israel staying on the Philadelphia corridor at the perimeter encircling Gaza and having a license to kill or invade if something wrong is happening in Gaza.

If Israel sees a terrorist activity in Gaza, it would be allowed to act and a symbolic expelling of senior Hamas officials.

Benjamin Netanyahu, in my opinion, would definitely go for it.

And second, his coalition would not collapse.

I think Smotric and Bengvill would not resign, first of all, because of the successful Iran campaign.

Amit.

But what about...

I fully agree with you.

I'm hearing the same thing, specifically about staying in the Philadelphia corridor as a final status agreement for Gaza.

With a different government in Gaza, we just heard today, and it's no coincidence that Abu Mazin is changing the Palestinian Authority.

Amit is smiling because he thinks the Palestinian Authority can never change.

And we're not going to go into that.

It's like a married couple.

You can fight your own, the fight for both of us.

Let's call it the militia.

It's based in Ramallah.

But I'm hearing the same thing.

I remind us that the Netanyahu government was very insistent that Hamas should disarm.

Not only should it lose control of the Gaza Strip formally, but disarm.

And I think it's very logical, by the way, because if they don't disarm, they hold a monopoly over violets.

behind the scenes.

And what I'm hearing now is that even if they will disarm, it will be very symbolic.

And actually,

there's not a lot of difference between the ideal scenario that Israel is presenting and between the scenario there.

I am too hearing that Hamas, some of the Hamas leadership in Gaza is willing to go into exile.

So me, respond to the Dav there, and then I have one closing question.

And then I'm going to wrap this up because I know you guys got to run.

I don't think it's going to be the Palestinian Authority, but it's not going to be in a new settlement in Gaza Strip.

And therefore, I think the solution for the first time is at hand.

Plus, I don't think President Trump would actually force Israel to stop the war.

I don't think if President Biden didn't do it, President Trump wouldn't do it as well.

But I think there is a desire in the U.S.

to actually have it wrapped up.

And that's why I think we can, for the first time, see the end of the war at sight.

Okay.

I think from Prime Minister Netanyahu's standpoint, I mean, this is his life's work stopping Iran.

And so stopping Iran's nuclear program.

So this is such an inflection point for him.

While to keep Israel on a hard edge in terms of how it's protecting against prospective enemies or existing enemies, but to say he's got a huge victory behind him is a real opportunity.

My question for you both quickly in the remaining four minutes we have, I get this question almost every day from family members living in Israel, from friends living in Israel, from Americans.

who are listeners of this podcast who are in Israel right now who can't get out are saying, when does this end?

And what they mean by this, it's not everything you guys are talking about.

But the way my sister Wendy Singer described to me yesterday, she says, it's kind of reminds you of the COVID restrictions, only worse, because with the COVID restrictions, you could be outdoors, she said.

You could go on hikes, you can go on bike rides.

Here, everyone has to be so close to home, so close to a physical structure with a safe room.

So when does that loosen up?

And when did the airport reopen?

Like paint a picture as best you can.

So I'll just put aside the Houthi missile, which is very annoying, one a day, twice a week, threatening to shut down the Bengon airport or foreign aircraft.

But I would look at it generally speaking.

I think we see the light at the end of the tunnel.

Just remember what happened here on October 7th, missiles from the south, and then it came from the north, and then came Iran twice, and then the war with Iran.

And in between the Houthis.

And you see, the Seventh Front War comes to an an end.

The Lebanese front is over.

The Iraqi front is over.

The Syrian front is over.

The Iranian front is over.

Hamas is half over.

I think we see it.

We can see the end.

And that's why I think you can grip the opportunity and wrap it up in a fashion that would not create yet another problem in Gaza in 20 years from now.

We can do it.

David, anything to add in the remaining minute or two?

I want to say two things.

First thing is that I agree with Amit.

I think even if you look at the political incentive for Prime Minister Netanyahu, which you always need to look at to understand where it's going, the political incentive is to get a deal as to Gaza, get the hostages back home.

And I want to say something that's obvious.

For me, it's not a cliché.

The real victory is seeing the hostages back home.

You will see real

happiness in Israeli streets and joy by getting the hostages back home.

And getting the hostages back home and an exile of the leaders of Hamas and a road for normalization after you just won a war against Iran.

What could be better for a prime minister who's trying to erase his strategic failure as to October 7 to go to an election campaign and say, you know, he's not going to say it, but say, yeah, I failed towards October 7th.

I'm taking responsibility.

But look what I have done since then.

And my second point relates to something you said before that, and it's a recognition of of something.

President Trump, you know, people sometimes mock the idea that he will get the Nobel Peace Prize.

Why?

Seriously.

And I'm not saying this as someone who every tweak in his history was enthusiastic about the president, you know, during his first term.

Why?

Look at this president.

Did he bring the first hostage deal?

He did.

He's responsible for that.

Sure, Bill Burns and the Biden administration, they worked for that deal, but it's the president who brought back that deal.

You know, he just made sure that Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons.

Is that important for world peace?

It is.

The most successful non-proliferation strategy that's been experimented with by the U.S.

in decades.

So everybody's criticizing the president for not getting a deal with Ukraine and Russia.

Right.

One could make the argument shouldn't, there shouldn't be a deal there.

You know, Russia should just surrender and pull back.

But if he's going to get a normalization agreement, even a road to normalization, an end to the war in Gaza in an ideal, a more ideal world, he's much more than a candidate that you would expect.

All right.

We are going to leave it there.

I know you guys have a heart out.

Thank you for this.

And I will no doubt be back in touch soon.

Thanks, Dan.

Thank you so much.

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Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.