The End of the Gaza War? - with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal

You are listening to an art media podcast.

Even if nothing comes out of this in terms of ending the war, and I hope it will, at long last, we have a vision for the day after.

And this is something that we didn't have until now.

It's a serious vision for the day after.

It's very complex.

It's nuanced.

It involves this Council of Peace led by President Trump with Tony Blair.

There is a vision there.

And also there is a real possibility, not only according to the president, but also according to Arab sources, that this will actually lead to the end of the war.

Israelis, as the president has said, want the end of the war.

They want to have the hostages back home.

And many of the details in this plan are extremely favorable to Israel's concerns and the security grievances grievances that have led to October 7.

It's 3:30 p.m.

on Monday, September 29th here in New York City.

It's 10:30 p.m.

on Monday, September 29th in Israel, as Israelis learn that the two-year-long Gaza war might, might, be coming to an end.

Earlier today, we published a news update, so we can jump right into today's conversation with ARC media contributor Nadav Ayal.

Nadav, good to be with you.

Good to be here, Dan.

Nadav Amit is on the road, so he could not join this recording, but he might send in some audio responding to the press briefing by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

So we'll weave those in.

But let's dive into our conversation.

What is your immediate reaction to the announcement by Trump and Netanyahu?

First of all, as most Israelis are, I'm incredibly incredibly content that the American administration and President Trump have personally weighed in.

And the fact that the president has managed not only to bring Israel on board and for Prime Minister Netanyahu to agree to this plan, but also the entire Arab League is basically agreeing to this as far as we know.

And also Turkey and other countries.

This is extremely meaningful.

You know, even Dan, and I'm jumping towards the end of our conversation, even if nothing comes out out of this in terms of ending the war, and I hope it will, at long last, we have a vision for the day after.

And this is something that we didn't have until now.

It's a serious vision for the day after.

It's very complex.

It's nuanced.

It involves this Council of Peace led by President Trump with Tony Blair, a stabilizing force, which we don't know exactly what it will include.

So there's a bunch of issues there that I can't tell you that I know exactly how they're going to work, but there is a vision there.

And also there is a real possibility, not only according to the president, but also according to Arab sources, that this will actually lead to the end of the war.

Israelis, as the president has said, want the end of the war.

They want to have the hostages back home.

And many of the details in this plan are extremely favorable to Israel's concerns concerns and the security grievances that have led to October 7th.

Okay, Nadav, I sent the same question to Amit, so let's play that audio.

I think this is the best deal Israel could have achieved.

And here I would like to differentiate then between the official goals of the Israeli government and the unofficial goals of the Israeli far-right within the cabinet.

The Israeli government has stated from day one that it has three goals.

One is dismantling Hamas as the ruler of Gaza.

Second, releasing all the hostages.

And third, an alternative administration, which is neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority.

According to this agreement, Israel gets three out of the three.

And that's why the vast majority of Israelis are authority to a large extent.

However, the goals, the developing goals of Smotrich and Bengavir included annexation, emigration, emigration, and settlements.

And those goals are not to be achieved in this agreement.

There is, for the first time, Gazans would be allowed to emigrate, but they will be encouraged to stay according to the plan.

So that's why Smotrush and Bengivir are unhappy.

However, I think for Israel generally, this is the best it could have hoped for.

Okay, so Nadav, I'm going to have you respond.

If there's anything specific, you want to respond to that, and then let's just jump into the specifics of the deal.

I think you probably agree with most of what Amit said there.

I agree.

As far as Israel's best deal, I think that Israel would have wanted to see clearly in the deal a statement saying they're releasing the hostages and they're disarming right now or leaving Gaza.

Okay, that's not in the deal.

And that was a demand and still is a demand of the Israeli government as to Hamas disarming.

It's not only about demilitarizing Gaza.

And every word there was deliberated, negotiated between Arab countries, Qatar, the United States, and of course Israel.

I think Ron Dermer did most of that work.

And words do count in that sense.

For instance, I'll just give you one example.

It does say a path to statehood as to a Palestinian state, but it doesn't say the words Palestinian state.

Many people will say, what difference does it make?

It makes a difference for Netanyahu and his audience, maybe at a certain point, to argue that Palestinian state as an expression isn't really there.

But that entire sentence as to that path to statehood has been engineered, thought and rethought.

And I suspect, and maybe Dan, you have something to add there.

I don't know, that this is the formula that was used by Dermer in negotiating with the Saudis prior to October 7 as to the possibility of normalization between Saudi Arabia and to Israel.

And this is what they reached.

They reached these kind of phrases.

Yeah, path and process rather than an actual end game yeah but i agree with amit's general you know assessment so nadav i want you to walk through the details of the agreement as you know it the key points but before i do i just want to make two observations observation one is when i would speak to senior officials in this government those who are very involved directly involved in this entire process throughout the course of the war and i would press them on you know there's this clamoring for a day after plan where's your day after plan As you just said, here's the day after plan.

And what these officials would say to me is any Israeli day after plan will be dead on arrival.

Anything that looks like it is great for Israel, crafted by Israel, and hand-delivered by Israel, that effectively is driven into Gaza on the back of an Israeli tank, will be completely discredited.

It will be discredited by the Palestinians, and it will be discredited by the Arab world.

The phrase that was repeatedly used for me is, it's a mistake for us to present a day after plan.

The day after plan has to appear to be American drafted, American created, backed by the Arab world, and acceptable to Israel, that Israel has to be able to say, look, you know, it's not what we would have drafted, but it's the U.S.

president's plan and the Arab world is behind it.

So, you know, there's like a Venn diagram and this kind of, you know, if you look at the Venn diagram of like where you can get all these parties aligned, we kind of fit in there.

So we're going along with it.

And that was the key to getting buy-in from the Palestinians, we'll see.

But the key was the Arab world.

That was the key to getting the Arab world involved.

So could it be that that is what we've just witnessed here?

That even though we both know that the Israelis were involved in drafting the plan, that's well known.

That's been reported.

There have been extensive meetings that have been reported with Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff and Ron Dermer and other Israeli officials and Netanyahu himself.

But This fits that bill, even though they were involved.

This is the American plan.

You just started off by thanking President Trump.

It's President Trump's plan.

The Arab world is behind it.

And Israel can say we could live with it.

Yeah, I think so to some extent.

Look, there are various ways, because it's so nuanced, there are various ways to look at this plan.

I guess that if you would speak with a Qatari or an Emirati official, they would tell you, hey, you have here Israel talking about the Palestinian Authority for the first time since the beginning of the war.

Actually, the plan doesn't say that in order to end the war, a precondition is that Hamas would be disarmed.

It says that there will be a process of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip.

Also, it doesn't say that every Hamas fighter would be brought to justice.

It allows them safe passage and so forth and so forth.

So they will underline these plans.

Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu, Ron Dirmer, will probably underline.

the fact that this plan includes the presence of the IDF in the Gaza Strip actually indefinitely.

If you look at the map that was published together with a statement coming from the White House, so this is a real map, and maybe we'll show this on our YouTube video.

This map shows that even after all the phases of the IDF withdrawal in Gaza, Israel holds to the perimeter in the Gaza Strip, which is, by the way, sometimes less than a mile wide, but it includes, for instance, the Philadelphia corridor.

This is something that for Hamas is absolutely unheard of.

And this is part of the reason why, at this point, in which we are speaking, the biggest mystery in the Middle East is, can Qatar supply the goods?

Can they supply the goods?

Meaning, can they bring Hamas to agree to this plan?

If Hamas agrees to this plan and Israel gets the hostages in 72 hours, all live and dead hostages.

That's an amazing thing for Hamas.

The hostages are the most important bargaining chip.

They are their human shields.

And for them to agree to release the hostages only for, I say only, you know, with quotation marks, for the murderers that were convicted and are sitting in Israeli jails, with the IDF still in the Gaza Strip, that's...

an amazing Israeli achievement.

And indeed, today in Israel, and I know that many of your listeners, Dan, feel now heavily involved sentimentally speaking with Israeli politics and with the size of Israeli politics.

So they'll be glad to hear that the opposition in Israel is basically congratulating President Trump for this plan.

Yael Golan, the chairman of the most left-wing Zionist party in Israel, is saying that only a person that hates Israel is against this plan.

And of course, Yael Apid is for this plan.

Everyone is extremely supportive from the opposition.

Netanyahu's problems stem out of his own camp of the right wing.

The problem is Ben Piran Smotrich.

First of all, both of these figures have said nothing about the statement itself.

Smotrich definitely condemned the prime minister for apologizing to Qatar in that meeting in the White House with President Trump.

There's even a photo, an image out of the president speaking with the Qatari prime minister.

And if I understand correctly, he handed over the phone to Prime Minister Netanyahu, who apologized, or at least this is according to some of the reports.

Express regret.

This is exactly the type of wording that the prime minister has used.

As you know, Dan, the prime minister made clear in his statement that the aim was never Qatar.

Now, during this attack in Qatar that failed, this assassination attempt, a Qatari security guard was killed.

And Israel has committed, and this is coming from White House sources, absolutely not denied by the Israelis, to pay compensation to his family.

This is not the first, by the way, in these kind of failed assassination attempts, also made by the Mossad at the time.

But the fact that the Prime Minister, for instance, needed to apologize, and I don't think, you know, this is not an idea that came from the Prime Minister.

I suspect that he was...

requested by the president of the United States to have regrets or apologize or whatever in that conversation with the Qatari Prime Minister.

Because immediately after the announcement, the Qatar said we're part of the negotiations again.

And also, as part of the announcement, I remind our listeners, there is a mechanism between Israel and Qatar to talk about the grievances of both sides.

Yeah, resolve conflicts, yeah.

Yeah, I wouldn't expect too much of that mechanism.

Yeah, I would say, I have a couple of observations on this, Nadav.

The first is, I actually think there's no question that the government in Doha wanted some kind of apology or some kind of acknowledgement by the Israeli government.

So that is not something that Prime Minister Netanyahu would have offered or chosen if it were just up to him.

The manner in which he did it, which is through the president, being facilitated by the president, was something that Netanyahu wanted to do because, as you'll recall, there's a precedent for it.

In 2010, when there was that flotilla from Turkey, in which something like nine Turkish nationals were killed, when the IDF

boarded that flotilla, headed for Gaza, headed it off.

And Erdogan, for years, wanted some kind of apology from Israel.

They got the apology in 2013.

But the manner in which they got the apology was almost identical to this, which was Obama was visiting Israel.

Remember, Obama's trip to Israel was his first trip to Israel as president in 2013.

And obviously, the Israelis were very welcoming and appreciative of Obama coming.

This was supposed to be kind of a restart of the relationship.

And one thing that was very important to Obama was that things get resolved with Erdogan and Turkey.

And the way the Israelis, you know, kind of set the scene up is it was like Obama's call to Erdogan.

And then while they were on the call, he handed the phone to Bibi and Bibi made the apology.

This is almost identical.

It was almost the identical setup.

So for some reason, Netanyahu or people around him have this view that if it's done in this way, that they are also making it clear they're doing it for the president.

In both cases, it was in response to something that was important to the president of the United States.

And the relationship with the president of the United States for Israel is always important, but especially now.

Yeah, it did little to convince the far right in Israel.

But Salad Smortrich wrote on X, and he's the finance minister, and without him, Nathaniel doesn't have a government.

Today is the date in which we mark the Munich Agreement signed at the 29th of September 1938.

By the way, I think it was signed on September 30, 1938, but we can check this right now.

And then he quoted Churchill saying, the UK could have chosen between dishonor and war.

It has chosen dishonor, and therefore it should also receive war.

I'm quoting from the Hebrew quotation.

And then Smotrich writes, and this gives you some sort of an impression as to what the far right really is.

It was September 30th, 1938, the Munich Agreement.

Okay, so then he said,

Smotrich said, I'm quoting, the groveling apology before a state that supports and funds terror is a disgrace.

So I think this gives you as to the state of mind of the Israeli right-wing, far-right, I would say to some extent the settler right in Israel as to this agreement.

Although I do sense even there a growing understanding that this agreement is good for Israel.

They may be not happy with Qatar being employed again there.

They might not be happy about Netanyahu again saying Palestinian statehood.

Can I just stop right there before you go through these important points?

There's just one other point I should make on Qatar.

My understanding is that obviously Qatar is in the middle of this, whether Israelis like it or not.

They're in the middle of these negotiations.

They're in the middle of the process with Hamas for all the obvious reasons.

A decision was made.

in the early days after October 7th by the Biden administration to very much work with through Qatar, and obviously that continued through the Trump administration.

There's a sense that Qatar can be very constructive or Qatar can be a spoiler in these negotiations.

If Qatar appears to be cut out of the process and the U.S.

is basically dealing directly with Hamas or dealing through Egypt, say, to Hamas, and Qatar is cut out of the process, the combination of the military operation in Doha, which obviously made Qatar look extremely weak in the region, combined with Qatar being cut out of this process, there was a risk that it would appear that the process moves forward when Qatar is marginalized.

And so the Israelis had to find a way, and the Americans had to find a way to make it clear that Qatar was actually involved so that they were a constructive actor in this process and not having them feel, you know, bitter and cut out to the point that they could somehow undermine it.

So I'm not saying that was the right thing to do or the wrong thing to do.

I'm just, it's my sense talking to different people, the atmospherics that they were trying to navigate through to keep Cutter involved in order to keep the process moving forward.

I agree.

And I would even turn it a notch up.

There's a deal here.

And here's the deal.

Prime Minister of Israel is going to put out his regret or apology to the Emir of Qatar.

And the Qataris have basically committed to bring Hamas to the deal.

And this deal is positive as far as the Israeli interest is concerned.

So now, will the Qataris supply the goods?

That's a huge question.

And I'm talking with Arab sources.

I started talking with them during the announcement in the White House.

And I'm talking with them in the last few hours when we're recording this.

And what I'm hearing is the kind of resolve I've never heard before from Arab sources.

And they're saying it's up to Hamas right now.

It's over.

And Hamas needs to agree to end the war.

That's it.

Which sources are saying this?

I'm going to say Arab sources.

Significant ones.

Yeah, yeah.

You know, no one should think this is the Omanis.

Nothing against the Omanis.

I'm talking about Arab officials.

And what they were saying is Hamas can end this war right now.

And then there'll be a ceasefire.

There would be a redrawal of the IDF, although others will argue it's not a full redrawal and it is not a full redrawal.

There is no displacement.

This idea that Palestinians will leave the Gaza Strip, which was to some extent, I think, misinterpreted.

by Israelis and by others.

My belief is that the president has never meant this as an expulsion.

It's not me trying to analyze or put words in the mouth of the president.

That's me listening to President Trump.

He said almost immediately, it's not about forcing anyone out of his house.

It's about offering migration.

And there would be aid, there would be reconstruction, say these Arab sources.

And when I talk to these sources and others, and I say, yeah, but why should Hamas agree in your mind?

As an Israeli, of course, I want them to agree, but why would they agree considering that they're letting go of these essential assets as they see them?

And I'm talking about the hostages.

And they're saying, we don't care anymore.

Dan, they're saying, we don't care.

We want them to end the war.

It's not up to them anymore.

We are in agreement.

We, the Arab and Muslim world.

And this is indeed a watershed moment happening in front of us in which there is at least what it seems to be a consensus as to the need to end the war according to the blueprint set by President Trump.

And after I said that, I just read the press notice made by several countries, by the way, including Turkey and Pakistan and Indonesia.

And this is a joint statement reacting to what happened today in the White House.

And I have to tell you that it's more toned down than I would have wanted to see.

They are not saying in clear wording, we accept the plan presented today by President Trump and we accept all those 21 points.

They are congratulating the president for his efforts.

They are committing themselves to finding a solution.

But they're also, for instance, talking about the full redrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip.

This has happened a few hours after the event in the White House.

And this is definitely not in the 21 points, because according to the 21 points and the map that the White House issued, Israel stays at the perimeter in the Gaza Ship.

And this is a really important point because Hamas has been demanding since the beginning of the war that an end to the war will come only when Israel surrenders every inch that it has taken in its military operation.

That is not the position of the White House.

And it seems to be the position of these Arab and Muslim countries.

In other words, Dan, should we read this as we won't agree to that?

I don't know.

But they definitely didn't say what the Israelis said.

Right.

The Israelis said we accept the plan.

Yeah.

And of course, Dennett and Yao went through the process of explaining, and I think that's a really important process for Israel, also for the White House, what's going to happen if Hamas doesn't agree to the plan.

Nadav, you know what?

The one problem with this conversation, which I'm finding very interesting, is that you and I are geeking out on our favorite aspects and the most interesting details and the most interesting dramas and plots and subplots.

And we actually haven't walked our listeners, our very patient listeners, I might add, sitting here with us almost a half hour in.

We haven't actually walked through the details.

We're just assuming everyone knows the details.

Now, I do think by the time people do listen to this, they will know a lot of the details.

That said, can you just walk through the key points?

Yeah.

So the 21 points made by the White House is how to end this war.

The basic idea there is that there is a gradual withdrawal of Israel and the IDF from the Gaza Strip, but, and that's the news bulletin, this is what we're interested with,

72 hours after Israel is saying, I accept the plan, all the hostages alive and those who have died are released from their captivity and returned to Israel.

And of course, This is a huge development for the Israelis and this is a sea change if you just make the comparison between this and other negotiations.

now the plan says that Gaza will be de-radicalized, it will be terror-free, it will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, and no one will be expelled from his house.

If Palestinians want to leave, they'll be guaranteed the opportunity to return.

All military operations, everything by the IDF will stop and everything will be remained frozen until the stage withdrawal begins.

But the stage withdrawal will only begin after those 72 hours in which all the hostages will be returned.

Now, after they are returned, Anne, Israel will release 250 life-sentence prisoners.

These are people convicted of murder, plus 1,700 Gazans that were detained since October 7 in Israel.

It doesn't say, for instance, who are these Gazans.

Hamas says, we want Nuhbah terrorists, the people who actually conducted the massacres in Israel to be released.

Israel is saying no.

Hamas is saying, We want to dictate the names of those who will be released with the life sentences, those murderers.

And Israel is saying no.

The fact that this is so specific, the numbers are so specific, Dan, that's very interesting because we need to see if Hamas is going to agree to that.

They usually draw a really hard bargain in order to get to their names.

There is also a calculation as to how many deceased Pasin bodies will be returned to Gaza for every deceased Israeli.

Now, then the plan says something that's really interesting about Hamas members.

It says those who will commit to peaceful and coexistence and decommission their weapons will be given amnesty.

And members of Hamas who would want to leave the Gaza Strip will be provided with safe passage.

And this is an idea that we've been floating on this show for at least a year now, giving them some sort of an exile, the Beirut 1982 model and others.

But what I find interesting is what does the White House mean by saying that these Hamas members will be given amnesty if they will decommission their weapons?

Decommission to who?

And secondly, what's amnesty?

What about the Hamas members who will not commit to peaceful coexistence and will not decommission their weapons?

They're not receiving amnesty according to this.

What does it mean as to the Israelis?

Can the Israelis hit them?

I don't have an answer to that.

I'm just putting down this question.

Aid will be restored to Gaza and the quantities of this would be about 600 truckloads a day.

There would be rehabilitation, rehab of hospitals, electricity, water, sewage, everything else.

And one of the things that Israel let go here, first,

I need to say this, Israel let go of two major ideas that you, I, and Amit spent a lot of time discussing.

One of them is, of course, the idea that there will be a massive migration of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.

To some extent, I think, I think I said that it was dead on arrival.

And the other issue is the GHF.

So I'm going to just read from that plan.

Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party.

In other words, the GHF is executed according to this agreement.

It doesn't exist anymore.

Aaron Powell, well, it also begs the question, Nadav,

who within the UN, which body within the UN is going to play this role?

Is the Frankenstein of UNRWA going to suddenly re-emerge?

This is is a very big question that needs to be clarified in terms of who within the UN, which body is going to be doing this.

Look, this is a framework, right?

This is an intention letter.

It's not a detailed agreement.

I'll give you another example.

Gaza will be governed under a temporary transitional governance of technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee.

You know, if the meaning is not affiliated with any party, I seriously doubt if you will find Palestinians that can govern that are not associated with either Fatah or Hamas, but let's say that they're not formally associated.

It's actually the PA.

Now, this is a big win for the Arab states, Qatar, the Emirates, and the others.

They didn't want to seem as though they are allowing the United States, Israel, maybe the West, a sort of a mandate over Gaza, a colonialist form of mandate in which people would come and will manage Gaza.

These ideas that Tony Blair is going to be the governor of Gaza.

This committee, at least on the record, is the one that's going to manage Gaza.

It will be made up, say the point of the White House, of qualified Palestinians and international experts.

And then comes the Board of Peace.

The Board of Peace is monitoring this.

This is the oversight.

And this is led by President Trump himself.

Yeah, chair.

The board will be chaired by President Trump.

And Tony Blair will be part of that.

And then it goes on to economic development.

Hamas and other factions, say this plan by the White House, agree not to have a role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form.

All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapons production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt.

There will be a process of demilitarization of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors.

So many questions here.

So many questions.

How exactly will this be done?

Who are these monitors?

What's going to happen when Israel finds out that Hamas actually isn't demilitarizing?

Now, I want to say something according to the sources I'm speaking with who are experts on Hamas in the Israeli defense apparatus and, you know, the Shin Bet officials, those who their work, their life work is to deal with Hamas.

Hamas is, and I'm quoting, a mawakama organization.

It's an organization.

of armed resistance.

It doesn't transform.

It's not going to transform overnight.

They are going, even if they agree to this agreement, they're going to break it.

Then what's going to happen?

What's going to happen?

Israel learns about this.

You know, it phones up the international stabilization force that's going to be armed.

They're saying, look, Saw are down there in Hanyunes.

There is a lab in which they're producing ammunition.

You should raid it.

Hamas is going to shoot.

And President Trump, to his credit, immediately said, I hope there won't be any more shooting.

Something like that.

I'm paraphrasing.

But it's not always the case.

And he's absolutely right that it's going to take time, it's going to take effort.

Just to be clear, this international stabilization force will be comprised of who?

It doesn't exactly say who are going to be the countries there, but it's going to be the Egyptians, the Emiratis, and the others.

One of the issues was what's going to be the position of Qatar there.

You're right.

But even before you get to that, I just think to your scenario that you just presented a moment ago, if Israel identifies a threat or some trouble, you know, violations that it needs to be addressed militarily, it can alert the security force.

Will they deal with it?

Who knows?

Will they deal with it in the way Israel wants it dealt with?

Who knows?

Will it be dealt with with the speed Israel wants it dealt with?

Who knows?

Then Israel is left with the choice.

Does Israel go in?

But then Israel goes in to an area where there's these international.

I mean, one of the ceasefire with Lebanon.

The most recent one from something like a year ago, Israel can just go in and out as we're watching.

They keep going in and out and just taking out, you know, remnants of Hezbollah, and they don't have to worry about coordinating around international stabilization forces.

They just go in and they go out and there's no problem.

It's a lot cleaner.

It's one of the biggest nightmares that the IDF has is to have an international force that stands in its way when it sees a clear and direct threat to Israeli national security.

And then it has this force.

In this case, this is going to be an Arab force.

I'm just reading from the outline of the White House.

The United States will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary international stabilization force, ISF, to immediately deploy, immediately deploy in Gaza.

The ISF will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza, in Gaza.

So they won't be important for the West Bank.

Who's the Palestinian force in Gaza?

And we'll consult with Jordan and Egypt who have extensive experience in this field.

This sounds like a plan that the Biden administration used to have, led by General Fenzel, who's not there anymore, to train Palestinians that are part of the PA or part of the Fatar in order to work with Israel in Gaza.

It says also that this force will be the long-term internal security solution in Gaza, meaning this force is actually holding the security of Gaza.

this force and not the Palestinian Authority.

Okay?

Dan, we're going into these details.

I think it's important for our listeners, but here's the bottom line.

We don't know if this is actually going to happen.

But I do think what's interesting is, Nadav, if Hamas agrees to the deal, big if, but if Hamas agrees to this deal, and at least the implementation begins, before we get far down the road of the scenarios that could go wrong that you're describing, which I think are all fair scenarios, at a minimum, and it's a pretty valuable minimum, if the initiation of the implementation proceeds, Israel will see a lot, if not all, of the hostages return.

So we will know very quickly whether or not Hamas is committed to at least implementing the first part of this deal.

And if they are not, and those hostages don't return, I mean, President Trump was unequivocal today on that front.

He says, this is the deal.

We're committed to it.

I'm glad Israel is committed to it.

And if Hamas doesn't get on board or Hamas jams it up, these weren't his exact words, Israel's going to go back in and they have our backing.

Absolutely.

It's a pretty strong statement.

I think that this could be the beginning of the end or this could be the end of the beginning.

And it's a very hard thing to say after two years.

And what I mean is it could be the beginning of the end if indeed those Arab countries have a united front pressuring Hamas and they manage to pressure it or convince it to go for this agreement.

And then by mid-October, by the way, very interesting, it's exactly the time in which the Peace Nobel Commission needs to make its decision as to who's under.

The Nobel Peace Prize.

Dan, I'm absolutely serious about this.

Yeah.

We know that President Trump is aiming for a Nobel Peace Prize.

I think it's a wonderful incentive for any leader, by the way.

I would want every leader in the world to aim for the Nobel Peace Prize.

And we know that they're going to make their decision in October.

That's important.

And if that's going to happen, if they're going to accept it, if Hamas is going to accept it, even with small corrections, and Israel will agree to those corrections, then that's a wonderful development.

But the other option that you just mentioned is absolutely there, that Hamas is going to say no in various ways and means, mainly because they need to let go of their main playing cards in this conflict, who are the hostages.

And if they do that, Israel has the full backing not only of the United States, it has an international legitimacy from its region to go into Gaza.

At least this is how Prime Minister Netanyahu thinks about this.

Nadav, domestically in Israel, the political implications of this agreement, how do you see things playing out?

If this agreement goes through,

it's most probable that the government will start disintegrating.

And just to be clear, the Knesset's out of session now.

They do not return until after the fall holidays, which is we have Yom Kippur later this week, and then we have Sukhot and Simchatorah, and then the government comes back in.

The Knesset comes back in.

The reason I mentioned that is because the government cannot fall while the Knesset is out of session.

There has to be a vote in the Knesset to.

It's much harder.

Right.

It's much harder.

So here's why disintegration of the coalition going to an election is highly likely if this agreement goes through.

First of all, because when the war ends, this is going to be the dynamics.

Anyway, we are going to have an election by October of 2026.

That's the Israeli law, right?

And for Netanyahu, as I mentioned before in previous episodes, he has an interest in getting a kind of a deal, which he says, you know, we won the war.

So that's a general dynamics.

The war ends and everything that waited to the end of the war comes creeping back.

And we are in an election year anyway.

But the second reason is, of course, the Israeli right wing.

They are not happy with this deal.

And I'm talking about mainly the far right, but not only the far right.

And as the deal continues, if this deal goes through, all these cracks and friction that we spoke about, all this daylight between implementation and wording and what the Arab counterparts want.

And now Islamic Jihad, by the way, we're recording this.

The Islamic Jihad, one of two factions in the Gaza Strip, is saying we're against this framework.

So that's already another development.

If it goes through, Israeli far-right is probably going to leave government.

And that also means that we're going to go to election.

If the deal doesn't go through,

so there is no agreement by Hamas, or for instance, this is seen by the Arab countries and Hamas only as a starting point to negotiating with Israel, which I suspect is where we are at right now.

Then, I think they are thinking, let's start negotiating.

And I think that Israel is saying,

that's it.

You know, that's the best, that's the last offer on the table.

If this is the case, the government survives and probably israel escalates its war in gaza now as far as the israeli you know ya i'll appeal the chairman of the opposition as far as uh you know yael golan as i mentioned earlier they're supportive of the deal no one will criticize the president for such a deal in israel from anything that is between the likud to the israeli zionist left Okay, I asked Amit this question.

I asked him what he thought led to this moment and how he thinks it'll go down in history.

So let's start by listening to Amit's response to my question, the audio of it, and then I'll have you respond.

So, Alan, let's play that audio.

I think this was the most successful, unsuccessful assassination in the history of assassinations.

The fact that Israel attacked Docha, the sixth capital in a row in the Arab world that supported the Hamas, led the Qataris to understand that they can no longer risk all their diplomatic stand and to risk it at the cost of helping Hamas.

Hamas caused Lebanon to collapse, the Syrian regime to collapse, Iran to get attacked, Sana'a to get attacked and bombed, Gaza city of course, and then came Doha.

So that's the reason why for the first time Qatar pushed Hamas to agree.

And the most interesting part here is that Qatar and Turkey alike are now stating that if Hamas refuses to the deal, they will support the continuation of destroying Hamas in Gaza Strip by the IDF and an alternative regime.

So this is the number one ingredient, in my opinion.

And of course, from the Trump side, his will to end the war and get an achievement, but this is not something new.

So, Nadav, about that point, I've heard this from a number of Israeli officials that when Israel conducted its operation against Doha, there were two results or two takeaways that Qatar had.

One was suddenly the fire was coming to them.

And keep in mind, this has not been pretty for Qatar.

In the last few months, they are the only country in the region, I think, that has been attacked by both Iran and Israel.

So suddenly the heat is coming to them.

And in this particular case, it was coming to them because Hamas was in Doha and that Hamas and advocating for the Palestinians has just become a net negative, a big headache for them, A.

And B,

there was all this Sturm and Drummond tension and hysteria among the Arab countries after the IDF operation against Doha or in Doha, against Hamas in Doha.

I should say it wasn't against Doha, but it was against Hamas in Doha.

And everyone thought this was a big setback and suddenly

all these Arab countries are not going to want to deal with Israel anymore and Israel's overshot.

What many people start to realize is that was the news for a few news cycles.

And then all these Arab countries kind of moved on.

And they're all like things are not that much different now than than they were before.

So from Doha's perspective, they didn't gain as much sympathy from the region, I think, as they would have hoped.

And then also the war was coming into Qatar, which is dangerous.

Yeah.

First of all, there is an assumption here that Qatar has somehow changed its position and now it wants to end the war.

And previously, it didn't want to end the war.

Now, I'm a fierce critic of the Qataris.

And people listening to the show know that.

I think that the Qataris wanted to end the war two months ago, too.

I don't see a lot of difference between the Qataris' incentive to do what you just described, Dan, between before and after the assassination.

What I do find different is Israel's position.

Israel was in a very difficult position, not vis-a-vis the Qataris, or not only vis-a-vis the Qataris,

but also with the Trump administration, because there was a Trump offer on the table when these Hamas officials were attacked in Doha, but mainly it embarrassed its friends in the Arab world.

And what happened as a result of that assassination is that suddenly the UAE and Qatar and all the rest of the moderate Arab countries, what we consider moderate Arab countries, I don't consider Qatar to be as such, decided to unite together with Qatar to one front, something that...

was very worrying to Israel.

I think that like any good breakthrough, this has happened because all sides found themselves in a dead end.

The Qataris found themselves in a dead end because of what you just mentioned.

Now, I met a source close to the Qataris in some sort of an event lately, and all he could speak about is the story of the Texas A ⁇ M University and its Qatar campus.

What's happening there, and just in a nutshell, is that the Texas A ⁇ M University has been talking about closing a campus that was donated or endowed by the Qataris by a specific date.

And the Qatari hosting of Hamas officials and their apparent sympathy to Muslim Brotherhood ideas has caused a lot of problematic attention to their activities.

And the Qataris, seeing this happening in Texas, are very worried that it's going to happen all around.

around the United States and the West.

And they are listening to people who are telling them, hey, you have overplayed your hand in this country.

Qatar, unlike, you know, people are very big, including myself, and saying that Israel is seeing its popularity in the United States being eroded.

It's very true.

You know, we see the polls.

That's our empirical evidence.

We see this, unfortunately, also with young Republicans.

I don't know of any popularity of the Qataris in the United States.

I don't know of any base.

You know, I don't know if any many Americans who I meet, you know, who are saying, you know, we root for Qatar or put the flags of Qatar in their backyards.

Qatar is in a problem in that sense.

And so they found themselves in a dead end to some extent.

The Arab moderate countries think that this entire war is destabilizing for the entire region for a long time.

Israel constantly attacking targets across the Middle East and also the Houthis rising power and all the rest, that's worrying to them.

They also want to kill that fundamentalist fundamentalist fanatic element that you mentioned, Dan.

Israel's victories against Hezbollah and against Iran are really, for them, such an opportunity, and they do not want to miss that opportunity.

And of course, as far as Israel is concerned, Prime Minister Netanyahu understands what's happening to Israel around the world.

I know this because he's talking about Israel as a super Sparta.

And he's talking about Israel being isolated.

You know, we're going to get into a whole discussion.

There are two things going on.

One is you're right that he recognizes it when when i reached the israeli dead end you stopped me yeah yeah no i just don't think this i think the sparta thing he said was taken he misspoke it was taken a context he was speaking specifically about the defense supply chain and how it affects israel but i take your point i agree with you i agree with you that he recognizes that this war has not only exhausted israel militarily it has exhausted Israel diplomatically and reputationally.

And it's got a lot of repair work to do.

And the repair work cannot begin until the war ends.

Now, he believes a war has got to end on a winning footing, but nonetheless, it needs to end.

My basic point is that a good breakthrough happens when many parties feel that there's a dead end.

To that extent, that failed strike in Qatar created that to, I think, to all sides.

However, everything is dependent on Hamas.

If Hamas says no, what will the Qataris do?

Because the Dav, the question you're asking is very important because for the longest time, all the press pressure has been on what will the Israelis do?

It's always been, what is their day after plan?

Now there's a day after plan, as I said earlier, that's not Israel's, but Israel is saying it's accepting it.

The president has

accepted it.

Most of the Arab world more or less supports it.

We can get into the nuance of that.

So now it's all eyes are on Hamas.

That's like a big deal.

We have not had that in a long time.

Yes.

And in that regard, it's very important even diplomatically for Israel.

Look at these countries that just recognize the state of Palestine in the UN.

Where are they today?

Macron said, Hamas better take the deal.

Starmer said, Hamas better take the deal because now they're called out because they, in my view, idiotically, stuck their necks out for calling for a Palestinian state unconditionally a week ago.

And now there's a deal.

So they have to look at Hamas and say, okay, guys,

you better.

They're really exposed.

exposed as irrelevant right exactly the white house just did something in the world now what did the white house do it didn't come and punish israel by the way it didn't come and punish hamas too it said we have a plan they worked a plan it's not about domestic consumption it's not about trump trying to flatter any of the base it's about trying to get this done and they did that this is to the credit of steve witkoff and jared kushner and the people involved in the White House, the ambassador in Israel, Mike Huckabee and others.

They came and they did go through the work, which is talking with the UAE's foreign ministry, talking with MBZ, talking with MBS, talking with the Omanis, getting everyone on board, getting the Egyptians on board, talking with the Prime Minister of Qatar and having a real plan.

Now, these are the same people.

If I'm going to go through this kind of

Trumpian march right now, I'm going to finish my pointer to this.

These are the same people that have continuously been criticizing the White House and President Trump for not being serious enough, for not making their homework.

So look how things have changed, have shifted.

It's France and what we call in Israel classic Europe that have been basically been completely populist.

And here comes the White House.

And now we might have a real breakthrough.

Again, not because of punishing Israel, but because Israel is willing to let go of some of its principles, for instance, to recognize the pathway for Palestinian statehood, and which is what they just did, French and the British to some extent.

And at the same time, Hamas is demanding to do something.

This is real diplomacy.

This is how you get things done in the world if you get them done.

Because if tomorrow morning Hamas is saying no, I think that the White House is going to expect the Qataris to kick them out.

Right.

Or if they say yes, maybe,

the White House is going to say, what's the maybe?

And let's see.

And what's the timeline for you to get to yes?

Now, I'm speculating here, but it's more than a speculation.

I've heard it from sources that we're making a calculated estimate.

This is an exit strategy for Doha.

Doha has just put its mark, supported the president's plan.

If Hamas comes and says, hey, we're not going to go with this, Doha has the legitimacy of the entire Arab world and Pakistan and Indonesia to kick them out.

And then people who come to Qatar and say, you support Hamas, they said, no, we supported President Trump's plan.

And when Hamas said no, we kicked them out.

So this is, in that sense, it's a fascinating moment of politics and power.

And of course, there's a lot of money involved.

We can't end this without mentioning that the rebuilding of Gaza and who's going to lead the rebuilding of Gaza is a crucial question to many investors and investing countries in the region.

It's going to be many, many billions of dollars.

And the Israelis, for instance, don't want to see Qatar leading this effort.

And the Qataris, of course, insists that they're going to lead the effort, but everybody wants a piece of that cake too.

All right.

I'm going to leave, end this with one question for you.

Okay.

The 1979 Egypt-Israel peace agreement that saw Israel withdraw from the Sinai and Egypt recognize Israel and commit to a long-term peace agreement with Israel that with all its flaws and warts still holds to this day.

It never resulted in a Palestinian state.

It had language about a path to Palestinian self-determination.

I don't have the exact precise language in front of me, but it did not.

It certainly didn't result in a Palestinian state.

And it didn't even really have the contours, a pathway to a Palestinian state.

The 1994 peace agreement between Jordan and Israel didn't result in a Palestinian state.

So here's systematically Israel's normalizing relationship, normalized relations with Egypt, normalized relations with Jordan.

And then, of course, the third of these three, which was the 2020 Abraham Accords, or as we now call them, the Abraham Accords, the 2020 Abraham Accords, nothing for the Palestinians, other than in order to get the deal done, Israel pulled back from West Bank annexation or partial annexation, whatever it was.

But the point is there was no Palestinian state at the end of that.

So the track record of the Arab world normalizing with Israel and kind of letting history pass the Palestinians by has been pretty consistent.

Do you think this, what we're experiencing or witnessing now, is going to be like those previous agreements in the sense that Palestinian statehood never really happens?

Or do you think we're at some kind of inflection point, a turning point, and this is the exception to the history I just ran through?

I think that this is definitely not an inflection point it's not a breaking point from history sources i'm speaking with across the region understand that there's not going to be a palestinian state supported by israel in the near future it's not going to happen politically from within israel they also to some extent and i'm talking about arab sources they don't expect the israelis to agree to that tomorrow morning Everything has shifted after October 7 to the idea of restoring peace and security in the region, building trust, de-radicalization programs.

There is a specific clause in Trump's plan that talks about interfaith dialogue between the sides, which I suspect that the Emiratis put in.

It's a very Emirati kind of concept.

And because of that, I don't think that...

we're seeing now any change from the pattern that you noticed that.

I should say that in the 1979 agreement, the wording Palestinian statehood wasn't there because Menachem Begin, the prime minister, wouldn't agree to that.

I know.

And so my point is, Sadat went along with it.

Even though he was annoyed, Sadat did go along with it.

They did agree to a Palestinian autonomy.

And indeed, the Palestinians got that autonomy 14 years later in the Ottawa Accords.

And that's the autonomy that we're seeing today.

And I think that's important.

I just want to mention something else that the president has said, which I think is very important when we end this.

And this is the way that he talked about the demonstrations in Israel, about the love that people are showing to him in Israel and the protests.

And he was talking to the prime minister during those statements in the White House.

And he was saying, and I'm paraphrasing, I've seen those protests in Israel, and people in Israel want the hostages back, and they want to end the war.

And he also talked about the love that he, President Trump, is getting from these protests.

And I think it's remarkable, Dan, because it says that whatever these protesters protesters have been doing across the country in Israel, fighting for the hostage release, it came all the way to the White House, to President Trump seeing that.

And I know that people worked to show the president and to make this part of his legacy.

And the people I continue to think about, and I suggest going into Yom Kippur that we do think about, are the hostage families.

I've been speaking with them before the statement and after the statement with some of them.

Think about this moment for them.

President Trump has just put the entire prestige of the presidency of the United States trying to end the war and get everyone at once,

no more part-time face days, getting them all back home.

And I remember what Rachel Goldberg-Polin

told you.

told me about that moment that she awaits.

And the expression she used in Hebrew is keherif ein,

which could be translated as immediately, in a blink of an eye, about how change can happen, how change for the better can happen.

And this is the moment that we are in.

And we can only hope towards Yom Kippur and these chagim that it will manifest itself.

Speaking of Rachel, on that note, Nadav, I'm always struck that she, when I'm in touch with her before Shabbat comes in in Israel, she'll say something to us, Shabbat, Shabbat, Shalom, and we'll speak.

You know, we often, whatever, if we're planning to speak about something, we'll, you know, I'll speak on Sunday, I'll speak next week.

And she says, and God willing, we'll have good news over Shabbat.

Meaning, she always had this view in the, or if it was, I was speaking to her before a chag, before a holiday, it was always like this sense that, like you just said, in the blink of an eye, you know, things can just change.

And she's right.

This morning we woke up.

We didn't know what President Trump was going to say.

And then he said what you said.

And you're just like, then now the new bar is all the hostages home at once.

And not just from Rachel Goldberg and not just from you and not just from the hostage families forum but from the president of the United States saying that is our new bar that if we have not achieved that this has failed and he said I want them all back one shot all done now

wow and that's also a testimony to the power of world leaders and what they can do and what the president of the United States can can attempt to do because to be fair it's not only up to him it's not only up to the prime minister of course.

Hamas needs to be part of this bargain.

That's also something we need to say after this war.

The idea that it would be erased completely.

We wouldn't be needing to sit here two years after and say, what is Hamas going to do?

I suspect it's not going to be an easy ride.

It's not going to be an easy yes.

We're still in for some twists and turns in the best case scenario.

All right, Nadav, thank you, as always, for a

thoughtful conversation on this historic event as we head in as well to Yom Kippur.

And I guess if I don't speak to you before then, I wish you a meaningful fast.

And Martov.

Khatimatova.

That's our show for today.

If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members-only show, Inside Call Me Back.

Inside Call Me Back is where Nadavayal, Amit, Segel, and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling.

To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes or you can go to arcmedia.org.

That's arkmedia.org.

Call Me Back is produced and edited by Elon Benatar.

Arc Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin Areti.

Sound and video editing by Martin Huergo and Marianne Khalis Burgos.

Our director of operations, Maya Rockoff.

Research by Gabe Silverstein.

Our music was composed by Yuval Semo.

Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.