Hamas Retakes Gaza - with Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib and Joseph Braude

You are listening to an art media podcast.

Those who have lost their homes, they've lost their loved ones, those who are waiting for food handouts, they're not standing there and thinking, wow, Hamas did us a solid with October 7th.

They're viewing Hamas's failures and horrors, not just in terms of the last two years, but as the crowning achievement of failures of the last two decades after the withdrawal of Israeli settlements and the disengagement.

What's emerging here, Dan, is a story of two Gazas.

A Gaza behind the yellow line in which an IDF presence remains, anti-Hamas fighting forces and an increasing number of Gazan civilians begin a reconstruction project.

And in those areas, you might well say that the war is over.

But in the rest of Gaza, fighting will, in all likelihood, continue because Hamas plainly will not voluntarily depart the strip or disarm.

And so Trump's plan can be fully implemented while the ceasefire does not hold, because Trump's plan allows for the reconstruction process to move forward, even if Hamas does not lay down its weapons.

It's 10 p.m.

on Sunday, October 19th here in New York City.

It is 5 a.m.

on Monday, October 20th in Israel, where Israelis are questioning whether or not the Gaza ceasefire will hold.

Before we get into today's news updating conversation, just a quick housekeeping note: a reminder that we will be hosting a live taping of Call Me Back this Thursday night, October 23rd at 8:30 p.m.

at the Striker Center in New York City.

It'll be me with Nadavayal and Amit Segel unpacking a lot of questions still unanswered as this deal is attempted to be implemented.

And there's news developing actually through the week, as we are seeing, and we'll get into today and we'll be getting into on Thursday night.

So, if you'd like to attend the event, please register at the Striker Center website or follow the link in our show notes.

Now, on to the news update.

Earlier today, Palestinian operatives fired RPGs and carried out sniper fire against Israeli forces operating in the Rafah area, killing two soldiers and wounding three more.

The IDF troops were operating on the eastern side of the Yellow Line, an area which remains under Israeli control according to the terms of the ceasefire deal.

Prime Minister Netanyahu directed the IDF to respond to the ceasefire breach with, quote, firm action.

And the IDF carried out dozens of strikes against targets throughout Gaza today.

Israel has also responded by halting the transfer of aid into Gaza, but will reportedly resume it on Monday morning.

On Sunday night, the IDF chief of staff Ayel Zamir called the incident a blatant violation of the agreement by Hamas and said, quote, we are prepared and preparing for any scenario.

Hamas denies any connection to the incident and claims the forces who fired on Israeli troops were not following orders.

However, Israeli officials are already casting doubt as to whether this ceasefire will hold as Hamas perpetrates violence not just against Israeli forces, but against Gazan residents themselves.

Since last Monday, when the Gaza ceasefire came into effect and all living hostages were returned, Hamas has been conducting executions of Palestinians who oppose their rule.

President Trump threatened Hamas, writing that if the terror group continues the violence against Gazans, quote, we will have no choice but to go in and kill them, close quote.

Today, Sunday, the U.S.

State Department said that it had received credible reports indicating that Hamas may be planning an attack on Palestinian civilians, which would be a grave violation of the ceasefire in place, but did not provide any further details as to the timing or location of this possible attack.

Meanwhile, President Trump has stated tonight that he considers the ceasefire to still be in effect.

On today's episode, we we are joined by Ahmed Faoud al-Khatib and Joseph Browdy to discuss all that's been unfolding in Gaza over the past week and how the ongoing violence within Gaza affects the ceasefire and the future governance of the strip.

Ahmed Fououad al-Khatib grew up in Gaza and left in 2005.

He's one of the most outspoken Palestinian critics of Hamas.

He's a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., and runs the organization Realign for Palestine, which promotes the de-radicalization of Palestinian society and advocates for a two-state solution.

Joseph Browdy is president of the Center for Peace Communications, an organization that has been on the ground in Gaza throughout the war, amplifying the voices of Gazans who oppose Hamas.

They are both very dialed into developments there on the ground, the intra-Palestinian intra-Gaza conflict.

In a minute, I'll be joined by Ahmed and Joseph to discuss these developments.

But first, a word from our sponsor.

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And I'm pleased to welcome back to the podcast Ahmed Faoud al-Khatib and Joseph Braudi.

Gentlemen, thanks for being here.

Good to be with you.

My pleasure, Dan.

I want to start with you, Ahmed, in terms of the fire that seemed to resume.

today,

which was a Hamas attack against the IDF in Rafah.

Hamas is saying it wasn't Hamas, it wasn't coordinated, but some kind of attack against the IDF and the IDF responding.

Was this just a hiccup?

Or do you think there's a serious effort here to, at best, test the ceasefire and at worst, an effort to break the ceasefire?

Well, despite the conflicting reports, I think this is consistent with what we've seen over the past week, really, of Hamas wresting its control across the Gaza Strip.

What my assessment is, and that of a lot of observers, is that this was an attack against the Abu Shabaab headquarters.

And this is the militia that is in southeastern Rafah that has been supported by the IDF to take on Hamas during the war.

A Palestinian militia that's anti-Hamas.

Precisely.

Al-Shabaab.

Yep.

Yes.

And they have emerged as one of the chief challengers for the terror group throughout the really last eight months or so.

And so Hamas is very uncomfortable with the idea of Abu Shabaab remaining in Gaza as a representative, really, of its lack of monopoly on violence and force and weaponry.

And so it is believed that what occurred were a bunch of Hamas' individual cells in a way operating with plausible deniability, such that they could strike at Abu Shabaab.

They could attack his compound.

to take him out and some of his chief lieutenants like Ghassan and Dahane.

And that's what we really saw.

And the IDF was able to intercept this cell, and there was an exchange of fire with RPGs, sniper rifles, and that's when it evolved from what was a Hamas special operation to assassinate members of the Abu Shabaab militia to an engagement with the IDF.

And so, I believe that this was not necessarily meant to push the boundary of the ceasefire as much as it is Hamas

using the time right now now to maximally eliminate any threat to its presence and power and authority.

And I'll say one more thing is that the dragging out of the release of deceased Israeli hostages, in my assessment and view, there is a small number that maybe are unknown where they're located.

But I strongly believe that Hamas knows very well where many of these bodies are and it is deliberately dragging out that process because every day offers it a new opportunity to go after the militia of Abu Shabaab, of Hosam al-Astal in Khan Yunis, and of Al-Mensi in northern Gaza and Beit Lahia, as well as going after the civilian population, ensuring that they are deterred and that they know Hamas is still around and in control.

Joseph, we know the questions many Israelis are asking themselves these days, which include, will the rest of the bodies actually return, as was agreed upon in the deal?

Do you believe the rest of the bodies will be returned?

Aaron Powell, I agree that Hamas, in all likelihood, knows the locations of more bodies than it's acknowledging, and that in the fullness of time, Hamas has the ability to restore most, if not all, of those bodies.

So hanging on to the remains of the deceased hostages is just extending the currency they had from before the ceasefire, which was the currency was the hostages until they regarded the hostages as a liability.

So they returned at least the living hostages, and now the remains is maybe not such a liability for them.

They actually view it as an asset.

I think that's right.

You know, if you go back to October 3rd, a week before the ceasefire came into effect, and you look at what was effectively a joint operation bringing together Hossam el-Astal's militia, members of the Majayida clan, and Israeli air support in successfully routing a Hamas offensive against the Magida clan.

It was a new kind of confrontation with Hamas

that they clearly found very troubling because it shows the possibility that brave militia fighters operating with clans and in coordination with the IDF can fight back and win in battles against Hamas in a way that does not necessarily require Israeli ground forces at all.

It demonstrated the extent to which Hamas is threatened by what has been rolled out over the past three or four months and their compulsion, their need to assert dominance as quickly and as brutally as possible.

What's emerging here, Dan, is a story of two Gazas.

A Gaza behind the yellow line in which an IDF presence remains, anti-Hamas fighting forces and an increasing number of Gazan civilians begin a reconstruction project, begin, hopefully, a civil development project, a civil administration.

And in those areas, you might well say that the war is over.

But in the rest of Gaza, fighting will in all likelihood continue because Hamas plainly will not voluntarily depart the strip or disarm.

And so Trump's plan can be fully implemented while the ceasefire does not hold, because Trump's plan allows for the reconstruction process to move forward, even if Hamas does not lay down its weapons.

And you're speaking to Gazans, and you have been speaking to Gazan Palestinians for the past two years.

What questions are they asking?

So one of the issues that Gazans were grappling with on the eve of the ceasefire was the question of whether moving into the areas areas controlled by anti-Hamas fighting forces was a risk worth taking.

They understand that there is this emerging bifurcation in Gaza, right?

An IDF zone of influence and a Hamas zone of influence.

They're wondering whether attempting to enter the IDF zone of influence is worth the risk.

And the challenge, and ultimately the way reconstruction wins out is if, number one reconstruction proceeds and shows that it's viable and number two gazans in increasing numbers vote with their feet and actually seek to participate in that project and become a part of it themselves all right ahmed you have family in gaza you have lived in gaza when you were younger what are you hearing from family in gaza well so multiple things are true people are relieved that immediacy of survival has significantly subsided in the sense that they're not running for cover from bombardment every other minute.

The price of goods, including commercial goods that are now coming in through merchants, as well as even aid that is being resold, has gone down like 50 to 70 percent, proving that there was clear manipulation during the wartime by Hamas, by merchants of death, by gangs, by criminals.

Then there's the just journey of emerging from hideouts, if you will, and just being like, okay, let's go check on what remains of our communities, of our homes.

Let's go reconnect with family members.

But what has been happening is that Hamas's campaign in Gaza, there are two things that are going on.

There are criminals and gangsters and looters that have wreaked havoc throughout the last two years.

And that is common.

Look at Haiti, for example.

Look at Iraq post-2003.

It's very common in war-ravaged areas to suffer from that.

So Hamas has gone after elements of those people.

And that has created a sense of, okay, I hate Hamas, but at the same time, I'm grateful that there's some element of law and order.

But then the opposite end of the spectrum is Hamas going after the clans, the Durmush, the Hellis, the Abu Amra, the Majaida.

And again, these clans that you're citing, Ahmed, they are viewed by Hamas as independent power centers, which is why they're a threat to Hamas.

Precisely that.

You know, when we speak of Gaza, it's two-thirds of the population is estimated to be of descendants of refugees from 1948, whereas one-third are called natives.

And the natives are either Bedouins or they're part of these clans.

These are folks for whom Gaza has, in fact, been their home for generations.

And that includes the aforementioned clans, many of whom have actually been really hard for Hamas to contain throughout its rule.

And during the war, when the IDF sought to form these alliances with the clans, Hamas felt that from its perspective, that was the final straw and that it needs to break these clans.

And so there's this general fear and terror across Gaza by a ton of people, including activists, journalists, friends of mine, who ironically and sadly and pathetically felt safer speaking their minds on social media during the worst of the Israeli bombardment than now during the ceasefire.

Because Hamas was largely underground during the Israeli bombardment, and so they didn't have to worry about having to come face to face with Hamas.

Whereas now, Hamas has freedom of movement.

Precisely that.

That's exactly right.

The most most dangerous time throughout the war to be an anti-Hamas Gazan activist has been those periods of ceasefire.

And we see it because we have people who are working with us in Gaza throughout this period.

And what they are afraid of most is ceasefires for that exact reason that these fighters emerge from their tunnels and their first order of business is to exact retribution on those who are opposed to them within Gaza, who are many.

Yeah.

We should clarify for the record that this isn't to say we're in opposition to a ceasefire and the cessation of the war.

Clearly, we want the end of the conflict.

We're simply highlighting the terrible, sad, and heartbreaking irony that a ceasefire, which freezes the conflict, which allows Hamas to remain in power, which allows Hamas to exact retribution and revenge on the people of Gaza, is in a way just as deadly as the continuation of war, even if it's not a one-for-one comparison in terms of the application of firepower.

To add to that, one final point, many Gazans feel that what was the point of this entire tragic two-year war if Hamas is somehow able to reclaim authority, even in a substantial part of Gaza?

How much support do you think, I guess I'll start with you, Ahmed, and then I'll go to you, Joseph.

How much support do you think Hamas has among Gaza's population?

I mean, you see these surveys.

How much support does Hamas have right now?

Very, very minimal at best.

And I will tell you that those who have lost their homes, they've lost their loved ones, those who are waiting for food handouts, they're not standing there and thinking, wow, Hamas did us a solid with October 7th.

This is very, very important for your audience and for everybody to look at.

They're viewing Hamas's failures and horrors, not just in terms of the last two years, but as the crowning achievement of failures of the last two decades after the withdrawal of Israeli settlements and the disengagement, they're looking at the systematic waste of tens of thousands of lives, tens of billions of dollars, and Gaza lays in ruins.

So, this is a culmination of Hamas's fraudulent armed resistance.

However, now that Hamas is out of the tunnels, people are even more so reticent to express their true views and beliefs because they're going to think you're either an informant for Hamas or you're an Israeli spy.

Furthermore, there are people who despise Hamas to the core, and yet, because most people in Gaza are unarmed civilians, when you have a criminal with a gun and he is able to wrestle food boxes from you or is able to take over your property or steal your money during the war, you're terrified.

So you may hate Hamas, but in a way, you're like, well, other than Hamas, who else is going to give me security and safety?

And that's where I fault the ceasefire agreement that should have entailed in it, as part of the ceasefire, the immediate entry of some sort of a security apparatus so that the population has somebody else to look to for safety and security, so that you separate the Palestinian people from Hamas.

Because if it's not resistance that Hamas is providing, then it's now going to claim, oh, it's law and order.

And that's where I worry about the Qatari-Turkish role, is that they're preparing the stage for Hamas to be recycled as Gaza's chief policeman.

Maybe the Qataris and the Turks have convinced the United States and Trump.

I hope not, but they've convinced them that only Hamas can provide security in the near term.

Indeed.

Anger at Hamas is at an all-time high, but it is true that it is more the culmination of a long-term resentment of Hamas as governing actor in the strip that predates October 7th.

On the eve of October 7th, one of the last substantial polls that was taken showed more than 70% of the Gazan population in favor of Hamas disarming and being replaced by an alternative authority.

And the reasons that people cited was Hamas corruption, systemic abuse, violent abuse of the population, maintaining a kind of oligarchy of power in which the vast majority of the population were disenfranchised, and systematically obliterating all alternative voices from public expression.

So, the anger is not to be confused with affection for Israel.

It's possible to be both anti-Hamas and anti-Israel at the same time.

And indeed, that remains the majority view in Gaza today.

But if the question is, is there any sort of a constituency for resurgent Hamas authority in Gaza?

The answer is barely any.

Do either of you foresee a real uprising, a mass uprising against Hamas?

I believe that we've seen substantial resistance.

We've seen Gazans showing courage in facing Hamas.

But what I described, in which elements from the Majidas, Hossam al-Astal, in cooperation with gaining some IDF air support, were able to rout Hamas on October 3rd is a very significant show of courage.

We've seen the protests in the spring, which were widespread.

They spanned Gaza, protests demanding that Hamas leave.

Ultimately, these kinds of things don't necessarily develop into a mass movement without coordination and support, but there is courage in the strip, and it's just a matter of finding ways to assist these people in growing their numbers.

I was speaking to my brother this morning.

And he's in Gaza.

He's in Gaza, correct.

And I just asked him point blank.

I was like, why do you think there are folks who appear from the outside as if they're willing to tolerate Hamas's return to power?

And he said, come on, dude.

Like, one guy with a gun can show up in an area that has 100 or 200 or 300 people and not a person can open their mouth.

Because otherwise, you're going to get a bullet to the head and you're done nobody can do anything about it because hamas right now is behaving like a thuggish militia like at the beginning of the war when people were like hamas equals isis i never really adopted that but right now hamas in a way is heading the path of ISIS in Gaza.

Like the way they're enjoying their brutality, there's a certain amount of barbarism.

There's just a certain amount of sadism that is involved in exerting the control.

And that terrifies people.

That scares people.

If all it takes are a few activists to lose their lives like they have and then people are like, oh, maybe now is not the right time.

Maybe not.

But I am a believer.

Nevertheless, just to close this thought, this is my chief concerns about the ceasefire.

In this gap between phase one and phase two, and Hamas's like de facto return to power, in that gap if things just go back to like a static situation, I actually wonder if that will be the time when spontaneous protests happen during peacetime.

My counter concern to that is Hamas has been known to co-opt small protests and then be able to hijack the narrative and say, we're protesting against the genocide.

So we could see both a native Gaza organic effort and an effort by Hamas to counter that in the near future.

Part of the problem is that when Hamas enjoys the back firm backing of a state, really more than one, it enjoys different kinds of support from Qatar, Iran, and Turkey, it is very difficult for its opponents to counter it effectively without equivalently staunch backing.

And that's not just military backing.

It's backing in the war of ideas, both inside and outside Gaza.

And I'll give you an example.

When Ahmed mentioned the Hamas effort to co-opt the anti-Hamas street demonstrations of this spring.

What happened on the ground was fascinating.

Some Hamas elements entered an anti-Hamas protest and tried to put up signs of their own.

And they had their own cameraman sending that to Al-Jazeera to create a distorted image of what the protests represented.

But young people actually grabbed them, took away their signs, and pushed them out.

So that was a tremendous show of courage.

The thing is that only one side in that dispute has a pan-Arab TV channel to present a distorted picture to tens of millions of viewers across the Arab world and those who believe anything they say in the West.

And so having that architecture makes all of the difference.

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Ahmed, you mentioned earlier the experience of Iraq in 2003.

I was there when things spiraled out of control, where there was that big vacuum, where Saddam's regime had fallen, but U.S.

forces had not really asserted themselves.

The RAND Corporation had produced this study.

It looked at the history of successful occupations in stabilizing a post-war situation going back to World War II.

And the average average ratio of local population to occupational forces providing basic security and stability was 20 to 1.

In Baghdad in April of 2003, when I first got there, it was approximately 700 to 1, 700 local Baghdad residents for every U.S.

occupational force, which means nobody was there.

Nobody was in charge.

And that's when we saw all the mass looting, and that's when we saw the mass score settling.

That's what I worry about in this conversation we're having right now.

I do worry that each day matters where things are spiraling out of control and Hamas is able to do what it's going to do and the looting and the score settling, you know, is able to go on and on and on.

I agree.

Like every day is precious.

Every day creates a mindset among the population that learned helplessness, that Hamas is back in control.

Today, in statements to Reuters in an interview, a leader of Hamas, Nazel, said, we have no intention of disarming.

This is just the hudna.

This is just a temporary truce.

We're going to rebuild our strength for the next round, which is mind-boggling for considering Gaza's circumstances.

But on the subject of the peacekeeping force, I went to the Association of the United States Army here in Washington.

They have like an annual trade show, but in presence were not only a lot of military attaches, but there was also who's who in terms of foreign policy and defense contractors.

And I had a lot of side conversations with them.

And there really was a general consensus that you're going to need private operators that are highly professionals to spearhead some of this work.

Because unfortunately, the million-dollar question is, will a Muslim Azeri soldier or an Indonesian soldier or an Egyptian soldier actually be comfortable shooting a Hamas member or a Palestinian that is violating the ceasefire heading towards the border border with Israel.

Or if they go into a tunnel, are they really willing to risk their lives?

You know, in the Vietnam War, they used to call them the tunnel rats that would go into the tunnels.

And I actually came across a company that had a small robotic system just designed for tunnels.

So the technology is there.

The private...

armies are there.

The question is the political cover.

All of these guys said we can't just have, you know, like blackwater basically type military assets going in there but they said we could do it with a light footprint and a very surgical approach we don't need a lot of firepower but he said that's politically untenable so that's the million dollar question is every day Hamas gets more entrenched and there's a confirmation bias in a lot of minds that's like really there's nothing for Gaza other than Hamas one of the key differences, of course, this is a much smaller piece of territory than Iraq and it's possible to experiment and pilot different types of initiatives in ways that weren't possible in iraq because for the simple reason that a little more than half of the territory of gaza remains in idf hands at the moment and it's unlikely that that is going to change if we begin to see foreign troops it's more likely that they will begin to displace idf forces within that zone of influence so you really can have the beginnings of of reconstruction and the beginnings of forging an alternative civil administration in Gaza in that area behind the so-called yellow line.

The problem is that it's going to, at least initially, have a much smaller population of Gazans than the rest of the territory.

Hamas holds a minority of territory, but the vast majority of the population.

So the challenge really is to build something viable behind the yellow line and begin to repopulate it with vetted Gazans who have no connection to Hamas and create a model that spreads so that it becomes possible to gradually reclaim more and more of Gaza for this emerging civil authority.

I do not anticipate foreign troops entering Hamas's current zone of influence, but I can see a a way to gradually build up an alternative that is much more appealing for Gazans who have no connection to Hamas in the rest of the area.

The idea of building up a portion of Gaza in which people are living decent lives under a forward-looking civil authority that is putting the money into building schools and hospitals and homes rather than tunnels and weapons depots is a very appealing one to a lot of Gazans.

If you do it right, if you have a way of communicating what is going on to the Gazan public as well as the rest of the world, you can very quickly tee up a model that Gazans by and large will want to join.

While you continue to degrade Hamas's ability to fight or organize in the other territory, so that is, I think, the only viable way to have reconstruction.

Because if there's one thing investors around the world and great powers, both in the region and beyond, agree on, is that they don't want to spend money on building up things that they anticipate will be blown up only a few years down the line.

There needs to be a viable civil administration and fighting forces to protect it with a sense of continuity in order for reconstruction to begin.

You can't do that in all of Gaza, but you can do that in a substantial portion of Gaza.

So while I agree that the current configuration of 50% under IDF control can be a staging area for the deployment of international troops, I've heard the idea of a North-South Korea partition-like, and I do not see that happening.

I believe that actually would be disastrous on multiple levels, least of which is that the concentration of the population in such a small territory is already subjecting them to horrendous inhumane conditions and diseases on the ground and the lack of sanitations.

And, like, this is not humane.

This is not sustainable.

There's no scenario in which this can go on for months or years.

Like, the urgency of the situation right now is where the focus should be on the Qataris, on the Turks.

Honestly, if six months from now we're still here, I might support an entirely private option in which we find a coalition of the willing type scenario that's willing to support liberating large blocks of Gaza with private arms.

I'm for it, man.

But I do not believe that the solution should be keeping the population concentrated in horrendous conditions.

The other thing, too, is that the people need access back to their what remains of their properties.

One of the things that's so commonly overlooked is the fact that virtually every plot of land in Gaza is accounted for ownership-wise.

And so, if you, as an international reconstruction authority, are going to come in, you're either going to have to buy people out, you're going to have to go through old records and find out who owns this plot.

My mom and my brother, and the family are homeless.

Our actual home that had four stories where each uncle lived is flattened right now.

And that's in Gaza City in the north.

So, if some international reconstruction body just rolls into our neighborhood and says, We're going to put mega towers in here, you're going to have to call my brother up and be like, Hi, there's you.

I know you, you, you, and you guys, you own all these properties.

So, that's why I'm saying it's unviable to reconstruct part of Gaza while the actual property owners are all concentrated.

That's another layer to why we shouldn't settle for this.

The final thought is that I believe that the same level of pressure that President Trump was able to apply on the different players should be pursued maximally.

Now is not the time to resign to Hamas's thuggery and criminality and just say, well, unfortunately, they kind of walked back.

This is kind of the end of the road.

Let's just build a North and a South Korea model.

I want to ask you, Ahmed, and then Coda Joseph, how is the Arab world responding to Hamas's barbarism now that it is being directed at Palestinians rather than Jews?

I mean, you know, over here, for instance, Zoram Amdani can't call Hamas a terrorist organization.

Do you think Arab states will be calling it a terror organization if it's directing its violence at Palestinians?

The Arab world, in a way, and the Muslim world largely, are no different than the hordes of Western-based pro-Palestine communities that at best have been silent about Hamas's barbarism.

At worst, they're actually okay with it.

They're like, yeah, you know, every society you have traitors and you just got to kill them.

And so what is happening right now is absolutely mind-boggling in the sense that Palestinian lives really only matter depending on who's harming them.

And it's not just the pro-Palestine community.

It's the army.

of so-called human rights organizations.

And unfortunately, they're subject to audience capture.

They have fundraising goals.

They have audiences that have been fed the genocide diet for the last two years.

And now this is inconsistent for the narrative they need to foster.

And so I unfortunately will tell you that many in the Arab public are subject to those dynamics.

However, when it comes to Arab governments and the Gulf countries, notwithstanding Qatar, they're very frustrated, I would argue, actually even angry at the situation we're in because they feel that the U.S.

provided Qatar with way too many concessions.

And I'll tell you this: this was shared with me by a senior Arab official.

He said that the entire kind of political underpinning of the transitional period or day after, whatever you want to call it, was that not a penny of reconstruction will go back into Gaza while Hamas is still in control.

He said, However, the way things are headed right now, it looks like the Qataris alone might be willing to actually foot the bill, the 50 to 70 billion dollar bill to reconstruct Gaza, giving them the ability to bypass entirely what the donor community, what Europe, the U.S., and the moderate Arabs have established as the core tenant of Gaza moving forward.

We're done pumping billions only to see it destroyed.

The Qataris are like, well,

it's all good.

You know,

we have stupid money.

And the Egyptians can make serious money off of the reconstruction.

The Turks, of course,

anything anti-Israel they're going to be a part of, to the detriment of the people of Gaza and the Palestinian National Project and Palestinian aspirations.

What Ahmed said is certainly correct, that Arab governments, with the exception of Qatar,

are fully aware of Hamas's terrorist nature and deeply concerned about being put in a position of investing in a project that would empower Hamas.

And as to Arab publics, while Jazeera remains the single most popular broadcast in the region, it doesn't command a majority of viewership, just a plurality.

And let me give you an idea of the kinds of stories that are also going around the Arab world and making an impression on ordinary people.

The killing only a few days ago of Ulfat Abu Ajwa, a woman and her five-year-old son Zayd, accused of being a collaborator, a five-year-old being a spy for Israel.

The killing of Hishama Saftawi in his home on October 18th.

No friend of the state of Israel, someone who actually spent years in an Israeli prison and was released in a prior arrangement, was killed in cold blood by Hamas.

Arab publics are increasingly aware of this and they understand the nihilist, ultimately bestial nature of Hamas terror.

And I think there is a kind of a sea change happening in significant portions of the Arab world.

Would that word of this tragedy reached American college campuses, which, as Ahmed mentioned, are slow in most cases to acknowledge who is destroying Gazan lives today and remain under the spell of kind of a false resistance narrative that fails to distinguish between supporting Hamas and supporting the people who suffer under the rule of Hamas.

Joseph, I want to ask you one final question and then Ahmed, and I won't hold you to your answer, but sitting here today,

basically a week after the ceasefire, more or less, what future do you foresee in Gaza?

Not indefinite future, not long-term future, but kind of near-term, medium-term future.

Well, what I hope and believe is possible for the near and medium term in Gaza is that within the territory that is held by the IDF, there is an increasing international role as a civil administration of Gazans led by Gazans is forged from a combination of like-minded Klan elements, those fighting forces that have assembled against Hamas, that gradually demonstrates that a different future is possible for the Gaza Strip.

Growing numbers of Gazans begin to populate these areas and creating a dynamic where Hamas is beaten down, its vision is exposed for its emptiness and destruction, and the better

situation gradually swells over time to overtake what remains of Hamas in Gaza.

Ahmed, last words.

I mean, I see both an awakening among Gazans and Palestinian society to the fact that Hamas and the so-called armed resistance narrative have been nothing but an maximally destructive agenda, not just since October 7th, but even going back at different milestones in our history.

I do believe that there will be an assessment and a recognition that Gaza lays in ruins and that Hamas is to blame for that.

On the other hand, I've sadly predicted from the humanitarian point of view, Gaza is going to be in really terrible shape.

The diseases, the trauma, the rubble, the hope of just resuming education, you know, that has been largely suspended for three academic years.

If the war really truly just stops like right now and Hamas is completely out of the picture, you're going to need a minimum three to five years just to get people out of the rubble, metaphorically and literally.

And so I predict that we will be dealing with the aftermath of this for the foreseeable future.

However, I very much so believe that there will be critical and radical change in Gaza.

There will be the seeds of that, even if it doesn't materialize immediately.

I just see too many people that are done with Hamas.

And it's not just Hamas, by the way.

They're also done with the failures of the Palestinian Authority and their lethargy and their corruption.

And they feel that the Palestinian national project is in shambles and no amount of symbolic recognition at the UN by Western countries is going to change that for them.

So I see both a really dark, grim, near-term future that awaits Gaza, but I also in that see numerous threads that will actually create the beginning of a hopeful future of something radically different that leads to peace, rejuvenation, revitalization, and Gaza becoming the best version of itself.

Those are

cautiously hopeful words, which is a good way to end this conversation.

But I think we'll be calling on both of you guys quite a bit in the weeks and months ahead because this is really going to be playing out day by day with a lot of twists and turns.

And I thank you both for your, you really have on the ground connections and sources.

And this perspective is extremely helpful for me and for our audience.

So thanks for being here.

Thank you.

Thank you, Dan.

Thanks.

Call Me Back is produced and edited by Elon Benatar.

Arc Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin Areti.

Sound and video editing by Martin Huergo and Marian Khalis Burgos.

Our director of operations, Maya Rockoff.

Research by Gabe Silverstein.

Our music was composed by Yuval Semo.

Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Seno.

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