Is Palestinian Statehood Inevitable? - with Amit Segal and Nadav Eyal

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Speaker 1 You are listening to an art media podcast.

Speaker 2 Hamas don't perceive themselves as winners. They are really worried about this UN resolution.
They see this as a decision that takes Gaza Strip from the Palestinian people

Speaker 2 to an international governance ruled by President Trump, who's not their friend.

Speaker 3 The reason that Hamas doesn't like this decision is because of the loss of sovereignty. They're saying this is neocolonialism, but not because of the weak remark as to Palestinian statehood.

Speaker 3 This is the reason they actually like the decision. Because two years after October 7th, Palestinian state is still very much there, and that actually gives them hope.

Speaker 4 It's 6 p.m.

Speaker 4 on Wednesday, November 19th, here in New York City, where earlier this morning it was announced that NYPD Commissioner Jessica Tisch will continue on as head of the NYPD in the incoming administration of Mayor-elect Mamdani.

Speaker 4 It's 1 a.m. on Thursday, November 20th in Israel as Israelis turned to a new day.

Speaker 4 Today, Wednesday, the IDF launched attacks on weapon depots in southern Lebanon as tensions with Hezbollah seem to be escalating. We'll be on the lookout for developments there.

Speaker 4 Also, the IDF launched airstrikes against Hamas targets in Gaza in response to assaults against IDF troops in the Khan-Yunus area.

Speaker 4 Yesterday, Tuesday, two Palestinians carried out a terror attack at the Gushetseon Junction in the West Bank, wounding three people and tragically killing 71-year-old Aharon Khon. On Monday, the U.N.

Speaker 4 Security Council voted to adopt the U.S. proposed resolution authorizing the establishment of an international stabilization force in Gaza, as outlined by President Trump's 20-point peace plan.

Speaker 4 The resolution allows for President Trump's Board of Peace to oversee multinational peacekeeping forces, Palestinian technocrats, and a local police force that would govern Gaza for a period of two years.

Speaker 4 The following day, President Trump met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the White House.

Speaker 4 Speaking to reporters after their meeting, MBS said that Riyadh would like to join the Abraham Accords, but also needs assurance of a pathway toward a two-state solution.

Speaker 4 President Trump refrained from making any absolute statement, saying, quote, I don't want to use the word commitment, but we had a very good talk on the Abraham Accords, close quote.

Speaker 4 And, quote, we talked about one state and two states. With MBS at the White House, President Trump also confirmed that the U.S.
intends to sell F-35 jets, also known as stealth jets, to Saudi Arabia.

Speaker 4 The Israeli Air Force responded to this news with concern, saying that the deal could jeopardize Israel's air superiority.

Speaker 4 Meanwhile, the Israeli government has moved to establish its own probe into the failure of October 7th.

Speaker 4 Justice Minister Yariv Levin of the Likud will head a ministerial panel that will determine the Commission's mandate.

Speaker 4 The panel, which also includes the highly controversial Itamar Bengvir and Petsalo Smotrich, has elicited a lot of backlash from critics who doubt their ability to conduct a thorough and independent investigation into their own government's failures.

Speaker 4 To discuss the developments unfolding with regards to Israel and the Middle East, and the meetings in Washington between the Crown Prince and the President, and recent developments at the UN with regard to the UN Security Council resolution, we are joined once again by Arc Media contributors Nadavael and Amit Sego.

Speaker 4 Before today's conversation, a quick word from the sponsor of this episode:

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Speaker 4 Amit, Nadav. Good to see you guys.

Speaker 3 Good to be here again. Good to see you again.

Speaker 2 I think it's the longest pause in our meetings since the beginning of the war.

Speaker 4 Nadav has been too busy, you know, doing auctioning off breakfasts with the Jewish Food Society. It's unbelievable record levels being raised to have breakfast with Nadav.

Speaker 4 And just two days ago, some woman comes up to me in Starbucks and says, Hi, I just want to say, and I assume she was going to say, I love listening to Call Me Back.

Speaker 4 She says, I just want to say, I'm the highest bidder for breakfast with Nadav.

Speaker 4 I'm like, really?

Speaker 2 I'm the only one in the audience that can testify and even tell his grandchildren and great-grandchildren that he have had a free breakfast with Nidavrial.

Speaker 4 Okay, guys, let's get into this.

Speaker 4 So, yesterday, Mohammed bin Salman and President Trump had this meeting in the Oval Office together at the White House, in which MBS said that Riyadh wants to join the Abraham Accords, but he called for the need to secure a path towards a two-state solution.

Speaker 4 Let's play that clip.

Speaker 5 We want to be part of the Abraham Accord, but we want also to be sure that we secure a clear path of two-state solution.

Speaker 5 We're going to work on that to be sure that we can prepare the right situation as soon as possible to have that.

Speaker 1 I don't want to use the word commitment, but we've had a very good talk on the Abraham Accords. We talked about one state, two state.

Speaker 1 But I think you have a very good feeling toward the Abraham Accord.

Speaker 4 Okay. So, Nadav, let me start with you.

Speaker 4 Both Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump himself have signaled over the past few months that Riyadh's two-state demand can be addressed through more symbolic or rhetorical measures.

Speaker 4 Was that your takeaway from this press conference?

Speaker 3 My takeaway from that press conference is that we don't know yet. I think we need to be humble as to this, Dan.

Speaker 3 The truth is that we still don't know if President Trump has achieved some sort of understanding with the Crown Prince as to normalization with Israel or a path to normalization.

Speaker 3 It's absolutely the case that there is a difference between promising F-35s, promising civil nuclear energy projects with Saudi Arabia, and between actually selling those.

Speaker 3 And the the reason we know that is because we were in this story with the UAE and the F-35s

Speaker 3 back when we had the Abram Accords. And still years after, that issue isn't set yet.
And there are other issues that you know well, Dan, like Saudi Arabia's sort of connections to China.

Speaker 3 And that's also an issue that is totally unrelated with Israel.

Speaker 4 I just want our listeners to understand what you're referring to there. So Saudi Arabia has done a joint military exercise with China because of the ties between Riyadh and Beijing.

Speaker 4 In the U.S., there's concern about possible Chinese espionage in Saudi and the Saudi system. So that is what you're referring to in terms of the concerns.

Speaker 3 Leakage of military technology, of the military technology of the F-35, which is by far the most sophisticated and the most efficient aircraft of its kind in the market today.

Speaker 3 And because of that, the fact that they had this fantastic meeting and the fact that President Trump really gave MBS such a welcome, including quelling questions during that press conference in the Oval Office that he thought were too critical of the Crown Prince, that doesn't mean that there are not things that are happening behind closed doors.

Speaker 3 Now, after saying that, this doesn't look good. I should say that too.
Right now, it seems that the Saudis are getting a lot.

Speaker 3 They already got Israel and the United States bombing the Iranian nuclear facilities. So that's one worry that they don't need to tackle.

Speaker 3 And that was one of their motivations to go to that normalization process back then.

Speaker 3 They are getting, and this is just a decision by the president, and non-NATO preferred ally status, something that Israel has since 1987.

Speaker 3 and the Saudis formally did not have, although in actual terms they did contain that status. They're getting a promise for F-35s.
They're getting a promise for nuclear. This is the kind of stuff.

Speaker 3 This is the fabric that was supposed to lead us to normalization with Saudi Arabia. And it's not there.
Also, we have briefings coming from the royal family in Riyadh.

Speaker 3 And they are saying that right now, they cannot proceed unless there is a tangible, effective plan for Palestinian state in 1967 borders. So taking all of this together, we really do not know.

Speaker 3 We do know that the president is resolved to getting peace agreements in the region.

Speaker 3 I should say that just looking at what had happened yesterday without knowing what's happening behind closed doors, that doesn't look too optimistic at this point.

Speaker 4 Let me your reaction.

Speaker 2 So prior to October 7th, the due date for this birth of the second phase of Ebon Accord between Israel and Saudi Arabia was October 19th.

Speaker 2 If you remember, the Crown Prince gave interviews for CNN and I think Fox News actually recognizing the state of Israel. It was the end of September 2023.

Speaker 4 Yeah, during the UNGA. It was during the UNGA.
It was before October 7th. Yeah, before October 7th.
Exactly.

Speaker 4 I was actually, in a good way, I was shocked when he gave these interviews because he was very clear that normalization was moving forward.

Speaker 2 And then came October 7th, and all of a sudden, the Palestinian question went back on the table.

Speaker 2 And the Palestinian path for independence ceased to be merely merely lip service by the Israeli government, the Israeli far-right government, but something more feasible, tangible than this.

Speaker 2 And this is where we are standing today.

Speaker 2 Now, my humble opinion is that Netanyahu preferred greenlighting the F-35 sold to Saudi Arabia rather than more dramatic measures when it comes to Palestinian statehood.

Speaker 2 There is a reason why Israel hasn't fought against those F-35s sold to Saudi Arabia.

Speaker 2 So the quid pro quo, in my opinion, is that Israel will be willing to actually let Saudi Arabia have F thirty five in principle until it is provided, which is something like 2029, 2030, then normalization will be on the table.

Speaker 2 And that's exactly why you saw yesterday the Crown Prince saying in the White House that normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel under the Abraham Accords framework is something that Saudi Arabia is looking for, but it's not something that is imminent yet.

Speaker 2 So it's somewhere between tomorrow morning and 2029.

Speaker 3 Which is, by the way, like saying in the Middle East. It's now or never.
Somewhere between now and the end of times when the Messiah would come riding a donkey on the way to the Temple Mount. Yes.

Speaker 4 But Nadav, given what both of you are saying, has the U.S. forfeited a lot of its leverage on the F-35s to Saudi Arabia?

Speaker 4 Is there an aspect to this where it used to be the F-35s were like a non-starter and the U.S. had all the leverage here? And now that the U.S.

Speaker 4 is talking so openly in such an advanced way about it, is the U.S. giving up its leverage and what leverage does Israel have here?

Speaker 3 So, first of all, that's my main contention with what Amit said. I don't think that Israel let anything happen.
I don't think that it's in the driver's seat.

Speaker 3 I think that the Saudis believe that they're in the driver's seat. But beyond that, Israel right now is not in a status in Washington, D.C.

Speaker 3 to dictate dictate or explain to the White House how to maintain Israel's quality of edge. It's simply today in a very precarious situation.

Speaker 3 And what's happening is that Israel cannot make demands at this point to the White House as to its relationship with another ally when the President of the United States is Donald Trump.

Speaker 3 Now, there's another side to this coin, Dan, and that is we also know that the president can have this magnificent welcoming party to MBS say, we're going to sell you F-35.

Speaker 3 Israel wants them to be limited in their capacity. They're not going to be limited in their capacity.
He can say all these things, but this is part of how he does business in the diplomatic sphere.

Speaker 3 First, he gives you this welcome and he hugs you so hard, as we say in Hebrew, until you can hear the knuck.

Speaker 3 And this kind of hug that the president gives is only the opening of negotiations, right? Right now, Israel is starting to discuss its next MOU with the United States.

Speaker 3 The MOU, the Memorandum of Understanding, is basically its relationship as to the security aid that it's getting from the United States.

Speaker 3 I need to remark that this aid is spent in US dollars with US manufacturers, buying US arms. And this aid is an issue that is more critical strategically to Israel right now than the selling of F-35s.

Speaker 3 There were a lot of ideas there. For instance, there was a concept that said Israel should forgive the aid, should say thank you very much.
We're not doing this at all right now.

Speaker 3 And Trim Minister Netanyahu said that a few years ago.

Speaker 3 And now the perception is I think it was published by Barack Ravid, that Israel is offering an MOU for 20 years that will operate differently than different MOUs.

Speaker 3 So there are a lot of fish to fry out there, Dan.

Speaker 4 Okay, let's take a break to hear a word from our sponsor.

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Speaker 4 A meet on Monday, the UN Security Council adopted this U.S. resolution on Trump's Gaza Plan, which authorized a transitional authority and the International Stabilization Force.

Speaker 4 By the way, if listeners want to go deeper on the issue of a Palestinian state, because it's addressed in the context of this U.N. Security Council resolution, they should listen to for heaven's sake.

Speaker 4 There's a terrific episode up called Who's Afraid of a Palestinian State. So I highly recommend listening to our Arc Media podcast for heaven's sake on this issue, which is up now.

Speaker 4 So, Amit, I was reading the document and I've spoken to some of the people involved in in it on the U.S. side.

Speaker 4 You know, a number of key players like Jared Kushner and then others like Josh Grundbaum, who were very involved with the U.N. Security Council resolution.

Speaker 4 They thought that the language here was hugging the Israeli government.

Speaker 4 And as one official put it to me, and I just want to read this, okay, and I won't name the person, is that just on Palestinian statehood, far from recognizing a state as some Western states have done, and far from calling for a Palestinian state, which the UN Security Council has done numerous times in the past, this resolution effectively affirms, he writes, one, no such state currently exists.

Speaker 4 Two, Palestinian authority reform is a prerequisite for any possible statehood. Three, statehood is described as something that a pathway that may open, not an inevitable outcome.

Speaker 4 For all the expressed Israeli fears, this resolution in UN terms actually takes a step back on Palestinian statehood.

Speaker 4 The best indicator, he writes, is that Hamas rejects it, as opposed to how Hamas welcomed the recognition of Palestinian statehood by the UK, Canada, France, Australia, etc.

Speaker 4 Are they not embarrassed, he writes, meaning all of those European states? So, Amit, what is your reaction to my question and to this message I was sent?

Speaker 2 I think it's even better than this. Yes, I'm so happy to see how people, journalists in Israel and in the US alike, are so worried of a Palestinian statehood.

Speaker 2 I mean, for many, many years, I felt alone in the trenches against Palestinian statehood.

Speaker 2 And all of a sudden, I see that the 99% of the journalists and pandits alike are so worried by any aroma of something similar, remotely close to a Palestinian statehood.

Speaker 3 So here's the thing.

Speaker 2 I have sources in the Israel intelligence, and they are closely following what Hamas officials say behind closed doors. They are really worried about this UN resolution.

Speaker 2 They see this decision as a decision that takes Gazche from the Palestinian Palestinian people to an international governance ruled by President Trump, who's not their friend.

Speaker 2 For the first time in 20 years, the UN itself actually separated the West Bank, Judah, and Samaria from Gaza Strip.

Speaker 2 Second, it actually gave the keys of managing the Gaza Strip to President Trump rather than the United Nations itself.

Speaker 2 Third, it recognized Israeli presence in the perimeter, in those 20% of the Gaza Strip and circling the place where Hamas is still now. Fourth, they actually, as you said, set 20 different conditions.

Speaker 2 And I'll give you a few examples, okay? Recognizing the rights of the LGBTQ plus community.

Speaker 2 I mean, if you think the Palestinian Authority is about to recognize the rights of the homosexual community, I have land on Mars to sell you.

Speaker 2 So the Palestinian Authority is out of the equation, in my opinion. I think that the fact that the IDF is still controlling 53% of the Gaza Strip is crucial for defeating Hamas.

Speaker 2 And to be honest, since I don't think that President Trump is about to dismantle Hamas and demilitarize Gaza, all this UN resolution does is to actually enable yet another Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip in 2026.

Speaker 3 I'm going to be the party pooper here, but I guess this is my job. Netanyahu and Dermer are pushing this UNSCC decision as a great success and a victory for Israel.
And I don't see it this way at all.

Speaker 3 And I also don't completely agree with Amit. And let me explain why.

Speaker 3 First of all, in the first time in history, and this is just a fact, Israel is forced to agree for a military force to be positioned between itself and the Palestinians on an area occupied in 1967.

Speaker 3 This is something that has never happened. Now, in the Hebron Agreement, in which Netanyahu agreed to give the Palestinian Authority Hebron during the late 1990s.

Speaker 4 This is during his first premiership.

Speaker 3 Yeah, there was a small monitoring force, but this is a fully fledged military force that is sanctioned by the UN and by that peace council that is going to stand between the IDF and between Gaza.

Speaker 3 If indeed this force will come into being, this ISF, this international stabilization force, that means that the IDF will find itself in an operational problem because it will need to speak with, I don't know, the Azaris or the Indonesians or someone else.

Speaker 3 By the way, many of these countries are countries with a Muslim majority that are going to be stationed in Gaza.

Speaker 3 And there's still some sort of an argument as to Turkey that wants its share, although right now Netanyahu is ruling this out.

Speaker 3 And the second thing that has happened is that, for the first time, and this was a principle with Israeli foreign policy making, that Israel is not internationalizing the conflict between itself and the Palestinians.

Speaker 3 It wants to have a bilateral process of sorts.

Speaker 3 It wants to have the United States in that process, but it definitely doesn't want to have an international trustee or something like that that enters anywhere between its own sovereignty and these areas.

Speaker 3 And it has that too. Gaza has been internationalized through this UN Security Council decision.

Speaker 3 Now, I said that in the beginning, that Dermer and Netanyahu are pushing this narrative because it's highly political.

Speaker 3 And Amid actually remarked about that when he said, ironically, now I find these journalists really worried about Palestinian states. But explain what he means.
You know, he was dripping.

Speaker 3 He was dripping with contempt. So go ahead, Nadab.
So here's the context. As always, as with the attack on the nuclear installations in Iran, everything is so tribal and political.

Speaker 3 So if you say, look, this is a good decision to Israel, that means that you're buying the narrative of Derma or Netanyahu.

Speaker 3 If you're saying this is the pathway for Palestinian statehood two years after October 7th, that's because you're against Netanyahu.

Speaker 3 You're against the narrative that's being spread by Dermer for Netanyahu. And it's all very tribal and political.

Speaker 3 And what Amit was pointing out is that the same journalists in Israel that supported two-state solution are now going, oh, yo, yoi, there's going to be a Palestinian state and it's all the fault of Netanyahu while they're preaching for it.

Speaker 3 That was the irony. Now, to that, my answer is.
Let's be fair with this and let's really analyze this.

Speaker 3 The truth is that there were other UN Security Council decisions that contained the wording of Palestinian statehood.

Speaker 3 However, if you actually look at UN Security Council decision back to 2008, a decision that was actually charted by the United States, that was an actual effective mechanism, you didn't have that then since the roadmap back in 2008, 18 years ago.

Speaker 3 So you had during the Biden administration all kinds of decisions saying, we call upon.

Speaker 3 By the way, many of these decisions, for instance, in 2016, do you remember Barack Obama and the decision by the United States to abstain as to a decision as to settlements?

Speaker 4 As he was leaving office resolution on settlements.

Speaker 3 This is a big deal. Now, it's true, on the other hand, what Amit is saying in Gaza and in the Middle East.
What's important is what's really happening.

Speaker 3 And I think this was the point that Amit was making. The IDF still retains half of Gaza.
It is committed to withdraw for that ISF.

Speaker 4 Hold on, Nadav. The IDF is still in Gaza, and the UN Security Council resolution legitimized a buffer zone for Israel in Gaza, which is unbelievable.

Speaker 3 The UN has basically said we are blessing Israel being in Gaza is kind of a big deal. The question, of course, is what size of a perimeter?

Speaker 3 We also know that Steve Witkov was supposed to meet with Halil al-Haya, and that meeting was cancelled. There were rumors in the Israeli press that this was done because of Israeli pressure.

Speaker 3 I have no idea if this is the case.

Speaker 3 But I think that the reason that Hamas doesn't like this decision, the Palestinians don't like this decision, is not because of the weak remark as to Palestinian statehood.

Speaker 3 This is the reason they actually like the decision, Dan.

Speaker 3 They like the decision because two years after October 7th, Palestinian state, even in a decision chartered by the United States of America, is still very much there, although it's a very slim window, okay?

Speaker 3 The reason they don't like it is because of the loss of sovereignty. It's because of the international trusteership that has developed to Gaza through this, because they see this as colonialism.

Speaker 3 This is what they're saying. They're saying this is neocolonialism.

Speaker 3 We are taking Gaza and moving it to the hands of what is this thing, the Council of Peace, and they will have their military force and Hamas is to disarm.

Speaker 3 This is the reason they don't like it, not because of the mention of Palestinian statehood. That actually gives them hope.

Speaker 2 Now, when I take a closer look at the UN resolution, I still don't see anything that hasn't hasn't been written not only in the October 13th Trump plan to end the war in Gaza, but in the 2020 deal of the century by Trump that offered Israel to annex parts of Judea and Samaria.

Speaker 2 So there is nothing short of full Israeli control of 53% of the Gaza Strip.

Speaker 3 This is not the decision, the decision that Israel is going to withdraw from these 53%.

Speaker 3 And it's going to redraw all the way to the perimeter.

Speaker 2 Yes, but it's a quid pro quo.

Speaker 2 First of all, let's remember that in the last two years, each and every offer made to Israel demanded the full withdrawal of the IDF in return for the live hostages without even the deceased ones.

Speaker 2 This is one thing. Second, now the UN accepts the idea of a quid pro-quo of Israel which will only in return for a full demilitarization of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Speaker 3 No, because the 20-point plan has a specific clause there that says that even if Hamas doesn't stand by its obligation, Israel is going to withdraw for the ISF.

Speaker 3 And this is what was accepted as an annex to the UN Security Council decision.

Speaker 2 Exactly. Which leads me to the third point.

Speaker 2 According to the last plans offered by the Biden administration and by the international community and by the Israeli center-left, the Israeli opposition, Israel was to fully withdraw from the Gaza Strip where Hamas is still there in exchange for the hostages.

Speaker 2 This was a very dangerous deal. Nowadays, the deal that was actually recognized by the UN

Speaker 2 actually says that exactly as former Minister Dermer kept saying during the last three years,

Speaker 2 the real ruler of the Gaza Strip following the war will neither be Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority or Israel. And that's exactly the case.

Speaker 2 Now, I fully agree with Nadav that this is not the dream of the far-right in Israel, of Smodrich and Bengvir. We see here neither annexation nor settlements nor emigration.

Speaker 2 However, we have the IDF inside the Gaza Strip as long as Hamas is not diligent. And I think it's a huge achievement for Israel.

Speaker 2 And as a first opponent of a Palestinian statehood, I have to say that at the risk of being perceived as a far leftist, that I'm not that worried by mentioning Palestinian statehood in the decision.

Speaker 3 We mentioned Smotric, and I think he's more allergic than you are even to national self-determination of Palestinians. I hope I'm not libeling you.

Speaker 3 I do not want to undermine your position. I mean, here's what he said about this.
He said, Mr.

Speaker 3 Prime Minister, two months ago, immediately after the several countries declared their unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood, you committed yourself to react to this way immediately when you returned from the United States.

Speaker 3 It's been two months. You chose silence and you chose political shame.
This escalation we are seeing is dangerous. It's your responsibility.
It is because of your silence.

Speaker 3 And he goes on and on and on, attacking Netanyahu. Now, he has his political reasons, and you're not running for office, Samit.

Speaker 3 And Smortich is running for office and he's trying to maintain his far-right base. However, let me say this again.

Speaker 3 There is nothing in this decision that will prevent the IDF from redrawing, even if Hamas does not disarm.

Speaker 3 Now, it's true that Israel might have an agreement with the Trump administration that it doesn't happen, but that's not the decision. That's not the 20-point plan.

Speaker 3 Because the Americans knew that Hamas is probably going to violate, and that's the reason that they construed this: that the ISF is going to take the responsibility.

Speaker 3 Now, I don't know what's going to really happen, so I want to be cautious about that. And I also don't think that the decision is a disaster to Israel.

Speaker 3 I do think that if I was a far-right persona in Israel, which you, Amit, are not, but if I were worried about Palestinian statehood, to have this UN Security Council decision after the unilateral recognition, to have the French Saudi initiative within the wording of this decision supported by the United States, after all Israel has said about the French Saudi initiative for Palestinian statehood in the latest months, that's not, you know, I wouldn't go to an election campaign saying this is the great victory.

Speaker 3 So let's ask, Amit, so that's a good question. Just take this week.

Speaker 4 This week is a snapshot. MBS's visit to Washington, but then also this UN Security Council resolution.
As Israel inches closer to elections, what does this mean for the right?

Speaker 2 Okay, so first of all, it means more to Netanyahu himself. Netanyahu is measured against the pledge he had made months before to bring back all the hostages and defeat Hamas.

Speaker 2 He achieved the first goal. As for defeating Hamas, I would say it's the pause button rather than the stop button.
So he can still promise it's going to happen.

Speaker 2 I would say that he is in his best position in two years. Netanyahu's coalition was elected on the basis of 64 Knesset members out of 120.

Speaker 2 The first poll after the war in November 2023 gave him 41 seats, the lowest achievement for the right-wing camp since Menachem Begin in the 50s.

Speaker 2 However, according to Channel 12 poll last week, he scores at 52, which means he returned half of the votes he had lost following the war.

Speaker 3 Okay.

Speaker 4 So, Nadav, as we get closer, what do you think the elections will be centered around, if you had to predict?

Speaker 3 Netanyahu is going to try, as he always does, to set the agenda of threats to Israel in these elections and to maintain that he is the right person to deal with these threats.

Speaker 3 His campaign is not going to be look at the past, because then it's looking into October 7. And I think that's very complicated.
It's about look to the future threats of Israel.

Speaker 3 And I'm the only person there that can actually handle this.

Speaker 3 Now, you see that Bennett, that is definitely Netanyahu's strongest competitor right now, is trying to maintain a right-wing position, attacking Netanyahu exactly for this UN Security Council decision, attacking Netanyahu for what he sees as a deterioration of Israel's regional status and the rise of Turkey and Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood Axis.

Speaker 3 So he's also forward-looking. He's looking into the future into these threats.
He also thinks that this is what it's going to be about.

Speaker 3 Less about responsibility for October 7, according to the pronouncements of Bennett as an opposition figure.

Speaker 3 However, for the rest of the opposition, let's say Yai Lapid and others, it's definitely about the responsibility for October 7.

Speaker 3 The struggle is to what extent the failure of October 7 and the responsibility of the prime minister, the only senior Israeli that was at the home on the morning of October 7, that did not resign, wasn't kicked out of office, still maintaining his position, to what extent will this be the major discourse of the 2026 elections?

Speaker 4 Amit, before we wrap, I want you to respond to what Nadav's, his take and also to what extent you think Netanyahu will try to pivot to the center and what case he'll make to the Israeli public.

Speaker 2 Well, he speaks for unity, but I think it's too late for him. He's 30 years late to represent unity to the Israeli public.

Speaker 2 However, Netanyahu's main advantage is the fact that the opposition in Israel is divided, not only politically.

Speaker 2 Let's imagine that an alien would have landed in Israel and say, take me to your leader, to the opposition leader.

Speaker 3 Who would they take him to?

Speaker 2 To Yair Lapid, the head of parliamentary opposition?

Speaker 2 But Lapid, I mean, is lagging far behind in the polls, to the head of the political opposition of Taliban, but he doesn't really represent the center left.

Speaker 2 He's a right-winger, to the head of the leader of the protests.

Speaker 2 But the main opposition, when it comes to achievements in hindering the efforts of the coalition to promote agenda, is the Attorney General.

Speaker 2 So whereas the coalition has one leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, the opposition doesn't have a clear leader. And they are in an urgent need to define the leader.

Speaker 2 And that's exactly why Netanyahu wants to push forward the election.

Speaker 2 That's why he is willing to pay a heavy price to the ultra-Orthodox parties, because he recognizes the fact that as time passes, they have harder times in trying to actually topple him and to find an agenda.

Speaker 2 Because if he survived October 7th, it means the time works on his favor. And that's why, in my opinion, he'll do whatever he can to have the election in September 2026.

Speaker 4 Thank you, Amit and the Dove. I will be speaking to both of you soon.

Speaker 4 And for our listeners and subscribers to Inside Call Me Back, please be sure to listen to our Inside Call Me Back episode that will be released later this week, in which we take a bunch of interesting questions, including one that drew out a story from Amit about his own experience with Bencion Netanyahu, Prime Minister Netanyahu's father, and also a very important question about why Israel has no constitution and whether or not that is about to change.

Speaker 4 But for now, Amit and Nadav, thanks.

Speaker 2 Thank you so much. Bye-bye.

Speaker 3 Thank you.

Speaker 4 That's our show for today. If you value the Call Me Back podcast and you want to support our mission, please subscribe to our weekly members-only show, Inside Call Me Back.

Speaker 4 Inside Call Me Back is where Nada Vayal, Amit Segel, and I respond to challenging questions from listeners and have the conversations that typically occur after the cameras stop rolling.

Speaker 4 To subscribe, please follow the link in the show notes, or you can go to arcmedia.org. That's A-R-Kmedia.org.
Call Me Back is produced and edited by Elon Benatar.

Speaker 4 Arc Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin Aretti. Sound and video editing by Martin Huergo and Marian Khalis Burgos.
Our director of operations, Maya Rockoff. Research by Gabe Silverstein.

Speaker 4 Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.