Bad Monday: Shrimp, Fingers, Brains

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We're starting with light fare.

Lightly breaded fare.

Yeah, lightly fried.

Well, probably deeply fried.

Lightly breaded, deeply fried.

Deeply breaded.

All right.

Hello, and welcome to the Money Stuff Podcast, your weekly podcast where we talk about stuff related to money.

I'm Matt Levine, and I write the Money Stuff column for Bloomberg Opinion.

And I'm Katie Greifeld, a reporter for Bloomberg News and an anchor for Bloomberg Television.

What do we got today, Katie?

We're going to talk about shrimp and lobsters, all the fare of the sea.

We're going to talk about fat fingers and why Citigroup keeps having problems with those.

And then we're going to talk about brains.

Brains.

It's going to be a good one.

Yeah.

Red Lobster, did they really shrimp themselves to death?

No, maybe a little bit.

But isn't it fun to pretend?

It's more fun to pretend than almost any other thing I've pretended about.

So Red Lobster filed for bankruptcy over the weekend.

And why did they go bankrupt?

Well, you know, they like

had a series of business mistakes.

They had some onerous leases that they got in connection with the leverage bio, changing consumer tastes, inflation is rough on fast casual dining.

Those are all boring.

Yeah.

No, the real answer is that

their equity owner is a company that is also one of their big suppliers.

It's a seafood company called Thai Union.

And Red Lobster, under its former CEO, embarked on an unlimited endless shrimp promotion where for $20, you can get all the shrimp you wanted all the time.

And

in the bankruptcy papers, the new CEO, who kind of like works on behalf of the creditors,

sort sort of insinuates that there is a scheme to pump shrimp through Red Lobster to make money for Thai Union at the expense of Red Lobster.

To just line the pockets of Thai Union.

Well, it did turn into they were the only shrimp supplier for Red Lobster.

Didn't they start out with three and then it whittled down to just Tai Union?

It's not exactly clear, but yeah, the suggestion is that like there were some irregularities in the procurement process where they got rid of some of their other shrimp suppliers and ended up sending more and more money directly to TIE Union for more and more shrimp.

And TIE Union, of course, disputes that passionately.

They say that all of those issues concerning the company and its relationship to Red Lobster, you know, are basically false.

But it is interesting that this started out as a limited promotion, and then I think it was May 2023.

Actually, it turned into a permanent promotion, this endless shrimp.

fiasco.

It just makes sense.

Yeah.

That if you own a company that is going under, and by like February of this year, Thai union is saying the value of their equity is zero.

If you own a company that's going under, you got to get as much money as you can out of it.

And if you also sell that company shrimp, the goal is to sell them as many shrimp as possible.

They did end up losing $11 million on it, which is not huge in the grand.

It's not huge at the scheme.

It is a lot of money to lose on shrimp, though.

I mean, I certainly haven't come anywhere close to that.

No, it is a lot of money to lose on shrimp.

The bankruptcy file has a lot of good stats, including they're like 20% of the total market for lobster tails in the world.

So, yeah, I mean, like, if anyone is going to lose $11 million on shrimp, it's definitely Red Lobster.

But that's probably not enough to drive them into bankruptcy, but it is enough to be very, very funny in bankruptcy.

It made for some amazing headlines, some amazing thought pieces, some amazing money stuff columns.

Let's talk about the leases, though, because a lot of people are pointing to the leases.

Sure, sure, sure.

Like, the boring answer is that, like, there's a sort of classic private equity stripping story where it's like, you know, they were owned at one point by General Mills.

They were on by like Darden restaurant company and they were sold in a leveraged buyout where basically the buyer to finance the deal sold a lot of their locations and leased them back.

And so they entered into a lot of like expensive leases.

And when hard times came, they didn't own their own real estate.

And so they had a little bit less financial flexibility because they had all these lease payments.

And so that was also hard on them.

I'm always like skeptical of these explanations because it's like

that would have worked out fine had business kept improving, right?

And it worked out poorly because business was declining.

It adds leverage, right?

It lowers your margin for error.

But

it seems like.

The explanation here is not like Red Lobster is doing great and then financial shenanigans destroyed it.

The story is like Red Lobster is not doing that great and the financial maneuvers gave it less of a margin for error.

But ultimately, this is a changing consumer tastes story.

And it turns out the consumer tastes are not for that that many shrimp.

That's true.

Although, the funny thing is, like, in conjunction with these stories about Red Lobster's collapse, you do also read a lot of anecdotes about people eating 180 shrimp at a sitting or whatever.

I mean, why wouldn't you?

For reasons, but like, you know, but someone will.

I mean, shrimp, I don't like shrimp, but shrimp are kind of the perfect food if you're just trying to get a lot of protein.

It is true that if I were going to eat 180 of a food, it might be a shrimp.

Yeah, come on.

When Red Lobster advertised all the shrimp you could eat, that attracted some number of people who were like, oh, I can eat a lot of shrimp, Red Lobster.

And it probably did get people in the door, but there was a really

good negative margins.

Yeah, exactly.

And there was a fun Bloomberg news piece just talking about the state of the restaurant business right now.

I don't think it's any surprise that inflation is still pretty high, pretty sticky.

The absolute level of prices is much higher than it was.

And you have all of these restaurant chains who, you know, their businesses are in much better shape than Red Lobster, but they're just going for these promotions.

You think about Applebee has $1 margaritas right now, which I actually would like to try.

I can't imagine there's much alcohol.

And then Chili's has recently introduced the Big Smasher.

It's part of its broader campaign to have three menu items.

You put them all together.

They cost $11.

Stay with me here.

Anyway, and then they...

When you say you put them all together, like on a plate or like...

When you say, like, do they actually, like in a blender?

No, definitely not that one.

Like, you order three menu items, and altogether it costs like $11.

But then they quote this man.

He's the CEO of Aaron Allen Associates.

It's a restaurant consulting firm.

And he says that these chains sabotage themselves by trading down just to get cheap hits.

It's like taking grandma's jewelry to the pawn shop just to get a few quick bucks.

And I guess that's kind of what Red Lobster did.

Are the jewels the lobsters in this scenario?

I think they're the shrimp.

I don't know.

I'm torturing this person.

Yeah.

And so I don't know.

I feel like it was a whole host of factors.

It's probably crushing the entire restaurant industry right now, sort of the fast casual space, those financial maneuvers that you describe.

Yeah.

I just, I love the idea that there was a shrimp conspiracy.

Yeah.

Because, like, right, there are a lot of factors that are affecting all of the competitors, but like here, there's the specific factor that they're owned by their their supplier and so it's like we can just pump shrimp through the red lobster system and no one will ever know no one will ever know except that the ceo knows who put in place the ceo was it tai union well so the old ceo tai union yeah

and the allegations now are that he was in the pocket of tai union but no the new ceo is from alpha resident marshall he's like basically part of the restructuring team so he like kind of works for the creditors And, you know, I wrote in my column in the first day of the bankruptcy filing, he writes this statement sort of alleging that Tai Union was doing all this stuff to stuff shrimp through the system.

And I wrote that, you know, in his position, quote, you cast a wide net for possible ways to claw back money for creditors, which I didn't really intend as a lobster pun, but like several readers pointed out, claw.

Terrible.

That's just terrible.

But no, I mean, like, he works for the creditors and like they need to find as much money as they can.

And like, to the extent millions of dollars went out the door to pay Tai Union for shrimp, you have some case to say that you shouldn't have done that.

And like that was a violation of their duty to the company and you get the money back.

I mean the fact that Ty Union appointed the CEO and then whittled it down.

I mean it's the owner of the company.

I know, but still, and then whittled it down to be the sole supplier.

If they were one of several, maybe that would be a better look.

It's definitely something that looks like a conflict of interest.

It certainly does.

What I'm unclear on is whether the promotion, it's not still going on.

Could you and I go to the Red Lobster in Times Square right now?

I was thinking about trying to record this podcast from Red Lobster, but I thought they shut down a lot of the restaurants.

But the one in Times Square is still open.

I know that because Bloomberg News actually sent some reporters there and had them.

Did they get the shrimp?

They interviewed a lot of guests.

Did they get the shrimp?

That was not in the article.

Go to Red Lobster and not.

At this late date, going to Red Lobster and not ordering the end of the show.

I know.

I know.

It wasn't in the article.

I feel like we need a little bit more on-the-ground reporting.

But if the shrimp promotion is still going on,

I don't eat shrimp, but I would choke down

maybe not 180, but

I will say.

Yeah.

This is less funny than the shrimp, but people email me about this.

There is this analogy to the AI investing boom.

Oh, my God.

No.

Okay, go ahead.

There's this article from a poor vagar a couple months ago about large language model AI startups.

And a lot of their investors are like big cloud and chip companies, like Nvidia and Google and Amazon and Microsoft.

And he wrote this article being like, there is a weird tension there because these companies are investing billions of dollars in these AI startups, but a lot of that money is going right back to the cloud providers in the form of like paying for chips or paying for cloud compute.

And so like when NVIDIA or Microsoft invests in an AI startup, it can say, I'm putting in a billion dollars at a $10 billion valuation, but it's getting most of that money back, right?

It's like going to the supplier's bottom line.

So he argues that's bad for venture capitalists in that space because, like, the valuation of these companies is being driven up by people whose interest in the company is not just being an equity investor, but is also being a supplier.

And he's like, there's conflicts of interest where, like, if you are Microsoft or NVIDIA and you're a big shareholder in these AI startups, you know, you're like on the board, you have control over this company.

You might make decisions that are in your best interest as a supplier and not necessarily in the best interest of the company or the other investors because your money is not really an equity investment.

It's really about finding customers for your cloud compute power.

Similarly with the shrimp.

Yeah, I was going to say I was skeptical.

And that actually that is a really neat parallel.

Yeah, and I think in most of these cases, like these companies are not the controlling shareholder appointing the CEO.

Usually there's like some independent, you know, like the startup has its own business model.

But right, I mean, like, there are conflicts of interest there where if you're like a big supplier, a big exclusive supplier, a lot of the equity investment is going directly to you, like your interest is maybe less as an equity investor and more as a supplier.

I will say, like, imagining, you know, an executive with semiconductor chips falling out of his pockets and his briefcase is definitely not as much fun as shrimp, but that does make a lot of sense.

Right.

Like, you hope that

like this is like in the earlier stage where it's like not as fun.

You're not like, oh, they're like stuffing computing power into these AI startups, right?

Because they're all trying to make money and they're all optimistic and hopeful.

It's not like Red Lobster with sort of the end of the run, but I don't know.

Food for thought.

Some shrimp for thought.

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From shrimp to fat fingers, this is a sad story because

I mean, it is about human error and who among us hasn't accidentally tried to sell $444 billion worth of equities?

It is the most natural mistake you could possibly make.

Why don't you walk us through the worst 14 minutes of this trader's career?

Okay, so there's a trader at Citi in London, apparently working from home.

On a Monday holiday.

On a Monday bank holiday.

Talk about a bad Monday.

So this trader works on the Delta One desk at City to hedge an index futures order, has to sell a big basket of stocks on 13 different European stock exchanges,

pulls up the order management system.

There's like a box where you enter the quantity you want to sell.

Actually, there's two boxes.

You can enter the quantity in terms of like units, basically like shares of the index, or you can enter the quantity in dollars.

This person wants to sell $58 million,

enters $58 million in the shares field, and therefore sells 58 million units, which is, you know,

444 billion dollars worth of stocks.

So fills out the form.

And then this is the amazing part to me.

The order management system displays 58 million units, but then also displays a dollar amount.

But instead of displaying 444 billion, which is the actual dollar amount, it displays negative 58 million.

Because

in that field, it like pulls in from an external pricing source, and the pricing source is turned off that morning because I don't know if the because the market's not not open or because of the bank holiday or whatever.

The pricing source is turned off.

And so City's system says, oh, the pricing source is unavailable.

So we're going to default to negative $1

as a price for each share.

Right.

So the trader types in 58 million shares and the thing pulls in a price of negative 58 million.

So the trader looks at that and says, yes, right.

I wanted $58 million.

It's showing me $58 million.

Now there's a minus sign, but

everything is like, no one knows what the sign is supposed to be on any of these systems.

And so the trader is like, yes, okay 58 million dollars just like I thought clicks okay

and then the next thing the system does is pops up 711 warning error messages right saying are you sure you want to sell you know a billion dollars worth of stock in Sweden are you sure you want to sell a billion dollars worth of that stock and the trader first of all only sees 18 of these messages because you have to scroll down to see the other 600 and why would you And why would you?

And secondly, yeah, it was a big order, whatever.

I'm clicking yes.

So trader clicks yes.

Then it shows like a final confirmation, like, do you really want to sell?

And at this point, it has crossed off half of the orders.

It's like half of these orders.

Even Citi's somewhat janky system knows that it should not sell, you know, more than $2 billion worth of any stock.

So like all the stocks that it has to sell more than $2 billion worth, it cuts out.

But still, it says, okay, fine.

Do you really want to sell $196 billion worth of stock?

And at this point, the trader says, sure,

and clicks yes.

And off Citi goes to sell 196 billion dollars worth of stock which causes a flash crash in like a bunch of different European stock markets yeah I mean

it's just amazing hearing you describe it makes my blood run cold I do like to think that somewhere along that line I would have stopped myself but one never knows

I got a lot of emails from people being like this person should have stopped themselves I tell you,

I know at this point from my own computer use, I know enough about myself to know I would not have read the error messages.

You know, because you're an experienced trader, right?

You've done this before.

You fill out the form.

You see the form show you $58 million.

You're like, yes, click yes.

And then you get like seven more click buttons that to you are just a waste.

Yeah.

They're like, okay, I've already checked it.

It's already yes.

Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes.

And you just click and you don't look.

Yeah.

I think is what happened here.

I'm not responsible for trading tens or hundreds of billions of dollars of stocks across Europe, but like

I click yes all the time.

I mean, I think about like my own stupid mistakes.

I don't have anything of this magnitude, but like sending an instant Bloomberg message to the wrong person, making typos, et cetera.

It happens.

What is amazing, you described it as city's somewhat janky system.

It wouldn't have happened in New York necessarily, but it did happen in London.

They had hard limits on how much you could sell at one time in New York.

Yeah.

Not in London.

And the natural question is why, but I I don't know if you have that answer.

I don't know the answer, but you know, everything is like siloed and hierarchical.

And some people put it in place and some people don't.

And, you know, I don't have a good answer to why, but one boss put it in, one didn't.

This, in and of itself, is amazing, but it's even more amazing when you think about Citi's history, which you write about, and you think about what happened with Revlon, for example, because it hits a lot of the same notes.

Yeah, I mean, the Revlon thing, Citi was like the administrative agent on this big loan to Revlon, and like there was a sort of fight over whether Revlon was in default.

And as part of that fight, Revlon meant to pay like $7 million in interest to a couple of hedge funds.

And instead, Citi paid $900 million,

paid back the loan in full.

And then City was like, oops, can we have the money back?

Half of the lenders were like, sure, here's the money back.

And half of them were like in this fight with Revlon and were like, no, we're keeping the money and going to court.

They kind of went in court and eventually lost.

But in the court decision, in loving detail, describes how City messed this up.

And it's just incredible.

Like,

they had this system where, like, the only way for them to make this interest payment was for some reason to pay off the entire principal of the loan.

And the city's like, well, obviously, I want to do that.

No, it's okay.

You can pay off the entire principal to a fake memo account.

So the system thinks it's paying off the entire principal, but it's not really.

No money is going out the door.

And City's like, sure, that sounds great.

Let's do that, right?

Which is, first of all, like a terrifying thing to agree to.

But then, secondly, in order to have it only be paid to a fake account and not actually go out the door, you have to click like three boxes.

And one is like, pay the principal to the fake account.

You're like, okay, click the principal box.

And then the other two are like just bizarre buzzwords.

And so like the three people, because three people had to do this, the three people signing off on the city thing, like, yep, the right box is checked.

But then they didn't check the other two boxes that were more complicated.

And so they sent out $900 million by accident.

And then when they saw that it had gone out, they called tech support and were like, the system isn't working.

And ultimately, it turned out the system was working.

But like, you know, the system was terribly designed.

Right.

And that happened in 2021.

Yeah.

This trade happened in 2022.

So maybe

it's all fixed.

Maybe it's all fine.

It's all fine.

It's all fine.

I thought it was an interesting size and scope.

So ultimately, they were fined $78 million.

And apparently, when regulators were thinking about how big the fine should actually be, they were thinking about how much it cost them in part.

So basically,

the bank's Delta One division had generated roughly $612 million in the nine years leading up to this trade, an average about $68 million a year.

So you layer on the fines and the trading losses from that day, and that trade cost those desks nearly two years of revenue, which is pretty painful.

It's terrible.

Two years.

Two years and 14 minutes.

That's so sad.

It is so sad.

It's so sad.

Everything you work for, and you put like one number in the wrong box, and it's like it's all

goes up in flames.

I always think about that when you read stories like this about someone who just makes a human accident, some unintended pilot error, no malicious intentions, and just it's all over.

And I always think about like the months and the weeks leading up them going about their lives not knowing that this cataclysmic event was going to happen.

And here we are.

And Bloomberg News has reported that this traitor doesn't work at Citi anymore.

I'm not that surprised.

But I will say, this fine and even this loss are not about the traitor putting the number in the wrong box.

Like this is a system design issue, right?

Like, the problem here is like, yes, putting the number in the wrong box, but like having a system that like

the computer also got confused between the number of shares and the dollar amount, right?

The computer was like, oh, yeah, they're all worth $1 a share, right?

Like, wrongly.

But then also, like, the after-trade checks were just not effective, right?

In New York, they would have blocked this trade automatically.

Even in London, like.

If you're popping up 711 error messages, it's like maybe make a bigger one.

But all that being said, do you think that any of the other banks who could potentially hire this trader are thinking that way?

Yeah, I would hire this trader.

Really?

Yeah, that's not like on the list of like.

Well, they're probably never going to do it again.

Right.

One, they're never going to do it again.

And two, like, look, obviously people care a lot about attention to detail, but like there are other skills.

And like, probably everyone would mess this up once.

It's just that if they have better software to catch it, they won't actually cost the bank $100 million.

Yeah, make better software.

I think that's the answer.

That's poor trader.

Now I feel really bad.

Yeah, this was kind of a bummer.

I do think the other thing that's amazing in this case is that the risk managers who are like directly responsible for oversight of this, like their job was to catch this, they went on vacation eight minutes before the trade happened.

That is wild.

I mean, just the timeline of this whole thing, but the eight minutes, that seems like almost unbelievable.

I'm exaggerating when I say they went on vacation.

Like what happened is that like the handoff from the right team to the wrong team happened eight minutes before this trade, which I think must mean that the right team in like Asia was handing it off to the wrong team in London because the right team in London was out for the bank holiday.

Yeah.

But in any case, right.

They probably sent that email, slammed the laptop shut, and then they literally were on vacation.

Yeah, yeah.

I wonder if they got in trouble.

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This is the section of this podcast that I have the lowest expectations for.

Your nucleus accumbens is not lighting up at this one?

I was hoping that

section of your brain that anticipates rewards.

I did Google that, and the definition was something along those lines.

And then it said it was an incomplete definition to just think of it as like the reward center of your brain.

But I don't know what no, I have a much more nuanced understanding of the nucleus accumbens that I will not share with you.

Very good.

Very well.

I know all about the nucleus accumbens.

We're in this situation again where we're recording this podcast before your newsletter on this topic has come out.

I read the actual paper and I got to say a lot of it was beyond me, but why don't you tell us about this paper?

This is an incredible paper by basically business school professors as opposed to medical school professors.

But it's called Brain Activity of Professional Investors Signals Future Stock Performance.

So what they did is they took a bunch of like Dutch professional investors, like people who work at mutual funds, and they popped them in an MRI machine

and they like showed them slides of investment presentations about 45 stocks.

And they're all like historical.

So they would show these like sort of masked investment cases for a bunch of stocks at like different times over the past 10 years.

And they were like, what do you think?

Would you buy this stock?

Right.

do you think the stock will outperform its sector the investors in the MRI machine either said yes or no and they also ran the MRI while they were doing this and it turns out that the investors answers were worthless like they did not accurately predict no better than chance ability to predict whether the stocks would go up or down but their brains

their brains did accurately predict whether the stocks would go up or down, which is to say that if you looked at like a region they brand called the nucleus of cumbens, which is like

sort of the thing that anticipates rewards.

Right.

It lit up when they saw presentations about stocks that were going to go up.

So subconsciously, they knew which stocks would go up, even though consciously they did not know what stocks would go up.

I do love that.

It's amazing.

But

how do you apply it?

How do you possibly?

You put your portfolio manager in an MRI all day.

That's it?

Yes.

I mean, I think that that would be

a terrible, a terrible existence.

But like, if you made a lot of money.

Yeah, true.

I mean, if this really worked.

By the way, I'm not, you know, I'm not so sure how well this really works, but it worked in some experimental design.

But it's fascinating, too, because like, how could this work, right?

Like, how could it be that you can subconsciously

instinctively know, but you can't translate that into an actionable decision?

Yeah.

But so here's what I think the explanation is, to the extent this is real.

In the introduction to this paper, they're like, there are other experiments like this.

And one is like a sort of famous one is like, you play songs to people in an MRI, and the songs that light up their brains in certain ways go on to become hit songs.

So it's like people's brains instinctively know it's going to be a hit song.

Well, that makes a lot of sense, right?

Right.

Like something about that song instinctively like makes everyone like it, right?

Like it lights up a section of your brain.

Like, of course, that's going to go on to be a hit, right?

Maybe it's the same with stocks, right?

It's like a meme stock phenomenon where like something about a stock makes these investors like it that's going to make other investors like it and so the stock will go up right so that's how it works it has nothing to do with fundamental financial analysis it just has to do with something in the shape of the stock makes people like it and stocks that people like go up because they buy them right yeah and if you look at the paper like The way they present these investment cases to like the portfolio managers and the MRI is like they show them a company description and they show them a price chart and they show them like a fundamentals page that's like a bunch of like ratios and like earnings information and they show them news.

They show them like summaries of like some news items about the stocks.

What actually lights up their brains is just the description and the price chart.

Yeah.

So like the fundamental page worthless for the price chart.

They see the price chart and their brain lights up like that's a good sign, right?

People like lines.

Yeah, but only some lines, right?

Right.

The lines that make their brains light up are the lines that will go up in the future, right?

Like the good-looking lines are the good stocks to buy.

It's like technical analysis.

If you look at a chart and the chart makes you happy, then it'll probably make other people happy.

And so you should buy that stock.

That is the best reason why technical analysis might be real that I've heard.

It's the only reason.

It's just good lines.

Technical analysis is like...

organized mass psychology, right?

It's like, oh, this line shows that people like the stock, right?

It's not that weird to think that you could grasp that at a pre-conscious level, right?

Where you'd see the lines and you don't know what the lines mean, but like somewhere deep in your animal brain, you're like, oh, that's a good stock.

Your lizard brain activates.

And that's basically the foundation of technical analysis.

I mean,

again, who knows if any of this is actually real?

I feel like the only way to really find out is if this was applied at scale and we gave

all, you know, academic finance papers, it's like, okay, sure, that's an interesting result, but like what hedge funds are implementing it, right?

Yeah.

And like, I don't know.

Like, you could see Steve Cohen and be like, hmm, right?

Like, that's like a thing that someone should send him this paper.

It's in money stuff.

Well, I hope he read it.

I mean, you probably have to pay a premium, but like there's some marginal investor who like can't quite get a job as a portfolio manager at a top multi-strategy fund.

But if he were in an MRI machine, he could.

Oh, yeah.

Yeah.

I mean, it's all in there in his brain.

Exactly.

Exactly.

He can't translate it.

I will say it's been a while since I read a paper like this, and I always love methodology and there were a few charming details in here about the actual participants like you said they're from leading dutch investment companies 34 participants only one was a woman

i noticed that immediately the mean age was 47 you want to do that experiment better right by the way like i would be interested in doing this experiment because these are all like dutch professional money managers yeah i'd be interested in doing it on day traders right oh yeah because the thing that is happening here is not like deep fundamental analysis right there's something that's happening here here is like, oh, that line looks good.

Maybe like a random amateur would be just as good.

Yeah, that's true.

We should try it on all different members of the population.

I also thought this is cute.

So participants received no compensation, but whoever was the most accurate in predicting stock outcomes would be awarded a prize of 500 euros.

There were two winners, so they had to split the prize.

They each got 250 euros for, all told, this lasted 85 minutes.

So that's a pretty good return on your time.

Not, I mean, I don't know.

I mean, probably

like a one in like 30 chance at 250 euros for an hour and a half at an MRI.

Like, I don't know.

I would do it.

By the way, these are professional money managers.

Like, their day job is picking stocks that'll go up and they get paid more than that for it.

Yeah, but it sounds like they're not too good at that.

And that was the Money Stuff Podcast.

I'm Matt Levien.

And I'm Katie Greifeld.

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