What does Trump really think about China? | Insiders On Background

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In the last few months, Donald Trump seems to be chasing something.

We need the rare earth and we have some here, but we don't have enough.

He's on the brink of signing a huge rare earths deal with Ukraine.

It's a very big deal.

It could be a trillion-dollar deal.

It could be whatever.

But does this deal actually make any sense?

I'm Matt Bevan, and on my show, if you're listening, we've been fossicking through the the past for clues about the big news of today.

New episodes on ABC Listen every Thursday.

Anthony Albanese's meeting with Donald Trump this week was widely hailed as a triumph.

The US President signed a deal on critical minerals, declared AUKUS is full steam ahead, and even defended Australia's levels of military spending.

Sure, there was an awkward exchange with Kevin Rudd, but this was clearly a successful meeting, more successful than most expected.

There were also some fascinating comments from Donald Trump dismissing the prospect of China invading Taiwan.

So as the alliance with the US deepens, we have the US President expressing at least publicly that he doesn't think a war over Taiwan is going to happen.

So what does this mean now for the debate in Australia over defence spending and our military planning?

That's what I'm keen to explore.

I'm David Spears on Ngunnawal Country at Parliament House in Canberra.

Welcome to Insiders on Background.

Well, Justin Bassey is the Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Justin, welcome.

It's an absolute pleasure to be here.

So, there's a lot from this meeting between the two leaders that I'd like to explore with you.

Perhaps starting with defence spending.

This has been a big issue for you and other analysts, looking at what Australia is doing.

And earlier this year, you had a report, the Cost of Defence report, which argued the failure of this year's budget on defence spending to meet its responsibility will make all Australians less secure.

It earned a bit of a slapdown from the Prime Minister towards your organisation.

Now we have Donald Trump saying Australia's level of defence spending, he'd always like more, but you can only do so much.

I think they've been great, he said.

What did you make of that comment?

Well, first of all, I think the meeting couldn't have gone any better, David.

Australia and the Prime Minister got pretty much everything that they wanted in Australia's interests, whether it be AUKUS or the Critical Minerals deal.

So that was exceptionally positive.

In terms of the reference that President Trump made to Australia's defence spending, look, I think that that's another win for Prime Minister Albanese and Australia.

I think it's reflective of the fact that unlike so many other American allies, President Trump and his team know that Australia has consistently

spent in the areas of defence and security security in our national interests in a way that we haven't simply been a free rider on the US.

I mean this is the thing.

He has been quite critical of European allies for not spending enough on defence.

He's had a go at Canada for its free riding on military spending.

He's had a crack at Japan as well.

It was very different in relation to Australia.

Yeah, I think for all of the assessments that President Trump doesn't care about history and is what have you done for me lately, I think that is mainly true, that the rhetoric of Australia being the only country that has fought side by side with the US in every major war in the last hundred years is not something that resonates as much with President Trump as some other presidents.

But still, notwithstanding that, I think he is

very cognizant of those countries that have spent their fair share.

on defence spending.

He's very much been about fairness and Australia.

He knows from his first term and into his second term that Australia is not akin to how some of the European countries have been and frankly not just in the Trump year.

We can go back David to President Kennedy

who was

expressing publicly in speeches his concern about Europe's defence spending.

So this has been a long time thing.

Australia though we have always spent, go back to 2016 and Australia was committing to 2% of GDP in a way that no other country was.

So I think that background and that context is very important

as well as the fact that AUKUS

is

both a mechanism and a partnership that shows Australia's commitment to our own national security.

So does it change your own thinking on Australia's level of defence spending?

No, I think that two things can be right at the same time.

I don't think

that Australia should be spending more on defence simply because President Trump says country should be spending more on defence.

The report that you mentioned, our cost of defence report, is an annual report.

We've been doing it for over 10 years.

That came out before Secretary Hegseth and President Trump mentioned that they wanted Australia to spend more money on defence.

The reality for me and for the authors of the cost of defence is that AUKUS is a vitally important defence and security partnership for Australia and is going to cost a lot of money.

But AUKUS itself is not a comprehensive defence strategy.

We need to be spending in a whole range of other areas.

And so what that cost of defence document did and other reports from the Institute is not just say we think the government should spend 3%,

that's it.

We're saying here are some of those areas in which we think the Australian government should spend more in defence and security.

And that's not because President Trump is wanting it.

It's because it's in our interests.

So Trump might be relaxed about what Australia is doing on defence spending, but you're not.

I think that, unfortunately the world is on fire, David.

And if we look right now at our defence spending, and if you look at the percentages, which is what most of the world looks at, around about 2% of GDP on defence, that was a commitment that has been made eight, ten years ago.

I think the first time an Australian Prime Minister referred to needing to get 2% was Prime Minister Gillard in 2013.

So it's been a long time.

I mean, the government, the Prime Minister, keeps saying he doesn't want to have these sort of percentage targets.

I do know Pat Pat Conroy, the Defence Industry Minister, has been floating a number of 2.8%.

I think he said, once you tally up all the things that Europeans usually include in their figures, is he right?

We've looked at this as well, and I think that it is the case that NATO's,

the way that NATO gets towards its percentage is slightly different.

Australia has usually been more strict, yeah.

I think the important element, though, David, is to say if we were looking at between 2013 and 2016 a need to spend 2% of GDP on defence.

Look at that era 2013 to 2016 David.

There was no war in Europe.

The Middle East was relatively stable.

The number one security threat, the number one security threat was the rise of ISIL.

China at that point in time in 2013-2014 wasn't considered the security threat that it is today.

So if we have had since 2016, if we have had China's military and technological rise, if we've had Russia's war on Ukraine, if we've had the Middle East crisis, we have all of these things, we've got aggression against Taiwan, aggression against the Philippines, all of these security threats, wars, conflict, and tension have increased in the last eight years.

It must mean that our defence and security spend has to increase as well.

Okay, so you still hold that view.

I think you also argue, though, when Trump returned to office that he would be expecting more defence spending from allies like Australia.

Did you misread that?

Well, I think it's clear from the meeting this week that President Trump is absolutely satisfied with Australia's commitment to our security and defence.

I think though,

importantly, and this is not just on this topic but a whole range of topics, it's less about what President Trump says, David, for me.

You've got to watch his actions.

And so I think that notwithstanding how successful the meeting was, and it was a successful meeting, the two two most important elements in that meeting are important for Australia: AUKUS and critical minerals.

So they came at the right time for us to say that.

Let's talk about that.

I mean, on AUKUS, Donald Trump says, if we look at what he says, AUKUS is full steam ahead.

Are we to believe that?

Yes,

I think it's probably been...

The fact that there has been a review, the Pentagon review this year, I think some people have taken it as though, well, there's nothing happening while we're just waiting for the review to happen.

I think it was a misread, talking about misreads.

I think it was a misread that the review would automatically result in a termination or a substantive change to AUKUS, and therefore it's pens down, nothing's happening.

Undoubtedly, the three countries, whether at the political level, but particularly at the Defence Department level, have been powering on.

They haven't stopped.

The work that Australia needs to put into our shipyards continues.

The work that the US has to put into its submarine industrial base,

that is continuing.

And of course, the UK is exactly the same.

So all of this has been happening.

The issue now that the meeting has happened and that President Trump didn't just enable AUKUS to survive, but actually backed it in strongly, it means that we can move on from whether it has support at all.

And now we can actually remind ourselves, why did the three countries establish AUKUS to begin with?

And now we can push on with that.

Down the end of the table in that cabinet room was the Secretary of the US Navy, John Phelan.

He did suggest, though, there are some areas of ambiguity when it comes to AUKUS that need to be clarified.

And it's got a lot of us here in Canberra scratching our heads.

What did he possibly mean?

What do you reckon?

It's a good question.

His statement that there are ambiguities was ambiguous itself.

Do you think it's small stuff or big stuff?

I know that the Prime Minister, I think, tried to say to journalists asking, don't make something that's not there.

Don't get too carried away.

And he might know what's in the review and have confidence saying that.

I think he did indicate that he knows.

And Trump also, to be clear,

seemed to push this, slap this down a bit as well, didn't he?

Yes.

But

so look, I think that's telling that both Prime Minister Albanese and President Trump's reaction, but

it's still the case that in a leadership meeting between President Trump and Prime Minister Albanese, the Secretary of Navy still felt the need to say it.

And so I don't think there's nothing there.

I think there has to be something there.

Now, he's not a politician, so he will be looking at different things to what the President and Prime Minister will think of.

Possibly whether Australia is going to be ready to crew one of these Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines in the early 2030s when we're scheduled to get one, whether we're going to be ready to run one of these and look after one of these.

That's right.

I think it's important to point out that we're not dealing with a traditional acquisition of military equipment here.

We're not buying

the design and development of a ship, of a boat.

What we're buying is in-service submarines.

So it has to go through a certification process.

What some people have described as the veto that the Americans have over the Virginia-class submarines coming to Australia is actually just

a highly usual certification process of when a country is transferring, when the Americans are transferring an in-service bit of equipment.

And so that's interesting, right?

So it's a bit like selling a car and re-registering it.

That sort of certification.

Well,

in this case,

it's certifying that the in-service equipment is able to be transferred.

And And so what people have been thinking about in that way is, well, the President might not allow the transfer.

And so this is where this claim of veto has come.

I'm more sanguine about that issue.

The issue is that the certification process would actually require the Secretary of Navy to tell the President that you can sign this certification because everything,

every

I and every T has been dotted and crossed that allows us to have the confidence to provide this in-service Virginia-class submarine to Australia.

And that's where I think you're right.

It will be not just where the focus has been on the American submarine industrial base, which needs to increase the production, yes, but it will also be can Australia continue to show that we are ready to receive the boat.

Because even if the Americans can put themselves in a position to say they are confident from an American domestic situation, they will need to have the confidence that the Australian system,

from the personnel who are going to be in control of the boats to the dockyards, that we are all ready and prepared to take on what is the most complex, exquisite bit of equipment that the world would see.

Coming back to the meeting itself, I thought Donald Trump's comments on China were also very interesting.

He was asked about China potentially invading Taiwan, and he said, I don't see that at all with President Xi.

I think we're going to get along very well as it pertains to Taiwan and others.

He said, now that doesn't mean it's not the apple of his eye, because it probably is, but I don't see anything happening.

Justin Bassey, what did you make of that?

Well, it is not the first time that

what President Trump says in answer to a question is thoroughly interesting and leaves people saying, well,

what does it mean?

I do think, though, David, that again,

it's more important to watch President Trump's actions and the administration's administration's decisions than it is necessarily to try and deeply analyse every single word that comes out of President Trump's mouth.

So again, you don't think we should necessarily believe what he says on this one?

I think that

everything that Trump says is a message.

I think he's always negotiating.

He's always looking to

look down the barrel of the camera and tell the person he's speaking to what he thinks.

And in this case, I don't don't think he was thinking about having Prime Minister Albanese in the room or the Australians in the room or even the journalists who are asking the question.

For him, I think this was not about him telling the world or telling the Prime Minister Albanese or the journalist that I think that China is benign.

I think he was looking down the barrel of the camera and saying directly to President Xi, not on my watch.

And so it's his form of deterrence.

How do you arrive at that though?

Because this isn't the first time we've heard Trump speak in this tone about Taiwan.

Even before he returned to the White House, he was quite dismissive about the idea that the US would come to defend Taiwan.

And again, here this week, when he's asked directly, he says, I just don't think it's going to happen.

I don't think Xi's going to do it.

So, why do you have a different

issues?

I think what would America's response be

to an invasion versus

what

America is doing to deter the invasion.

Two different things.

I think

unfortunately

with President Trump,

we know that at times he flatters his adversaries and he takes a wire brush to his allies.

I don't like that aspect where he doesn't separate allies from adversaries in that way.

However, it doesn't mean that he doesn't still have those two buckets.

He knows who his adversaries are and he knows who his allies are.

He's not forming AUKUS with China.

He's formed AUKUS with his ally.

So what is he doing here?

I think it's just my analysis, but I think he's not saying trying to say to the world China doesn't pose a threat.

I've seen some people talking about, well, why do we need AUKUS now if China doesn't pose the threat?

His assessment has been long held that China is a threat, particularly in relation to economics, but also security.

And I think that what he's effectively saying is he's wanting President Xi to know, because as you wrote about very well today,

he didn't just say that China wasn't going to invade.

He made it clear that America's military power was almighty, was all-powerful.

And that is part of his message in Terrence to say

every time President Xi wakes up and thinks, should I use force to invade Taiwan, not today, because the Americans are there.

I do think it's also really relevant, David, to point out that I'm one of those people and that there are many analysts, I'm one who doesn't think that China or Xi want to invade militarily Taiwan.

Explain this to me because everything Xi says and does towards Taiwan indicate that

he's very determined to reunify as he pushes it.

So that is their number one, Xi's number one strategic goal is to, in his words, reunify.

There's never been a unity there with the Chinese Communist Party, so unification.

But

in his ideal world, in Xi's world,

he wears both the Taiwanese people down and the rest of the world down so that he doesn't have to take over Taiwan militarily.

We just wake up one day and all the hybrid warfare that we've been seeing over the number of years and the unification has happened without having to fire a shot.

That to me is what our task is, that we've got to, of course we've got to prepare for war.

That's just unfortunately what we have to do, and it's what Europe didn't do well enough in relation to Russia and Ukraine.

So of course we have to be prepared.

It sounds like you're almost arguing what Donald Trump said publicly, that you don't think China is going to invade Taiwan.

So

here's, I suppose,

the nuance.

What does Xi want?

She wants to take over Taiwan without firing a shot.

Political warfare, hybrid warfare.

And he thinks the rest of us are,

we lack the stamina, David.

Just, you know, time after time,

we can show that we're up for a fight for a day.

If that doesn't work, if that doesn't work, he has made it very clear.

He's going to actually invade.

The cost is too high for him.

He has made it very clear publicly for a long period of time that he wants to take over Taiwan.

with force if necessary.

Our job is to ensure that President Xi thinks that the only way he he can take over Taiwan is by force, that he can't take over Taiwan unless he uses force.

Our secondary job is to deter him from using that force so that he wakes up and says, I can't use that force.

So let's go to the bottom.

So that's the dual track there.

Under Joe Biden, it was pretty clear that the then president was willing to defend Taiwan militarily.

He kept saying it four or five times.

The White House would then walk it back and say, no, no, it's still strategically ambiguous.

And then he'd say it again.

Trump, however, very different.

He's never said that he would defend Taiwan.

He's never talked about this being important strategically to militarily defend Taiwan.

Do you think Donald Trump would defend Taiwan?

Well,

I'm not Donald Trump,

David.

But based on his language, based on what he has said.

I'm of the view that for deterrence to work, for deterrence to succeed,

there absolutely has to be a worldwide view and a view within China that the Americans, no matter who the president is,

would not allow a military takeover of Taiwan.

And so, yes,

the whole point of, as you said, strategic ambiguity has been the American strategy in relation to Taiwan for many years, many presidents.

President Biden did go further.

And I thought that was the right thing.

But Trump is the opposite, isn't it?

Yeah.

So I don't know that it's the

again two things can be right at the same time here.

When President Trump even this week talked about he didn't think that Xi would invade Taiwan he didn't just put a full stop there he said America has the greatest military.

So that is in a way in my assessment that is still Trump getting the message directly to Xi that

I

do not want you doing this because you're going to feel the the repercussions.

But is he also potentially miscalculating here?

There's no doubt the US still globally has the military might, but when it comes to a conflict over the Taiwan Strait, would the US win?

Aaron Powell,

so that's where we need to be very, very careful that two things can be run at the same time.

I think that we still have the strategy of strategic ambiguity.

I still think that the Americans would not allow

China to

take over, to invade Taiwan.

That's my view.

But

could there be complacency?

That is a risk.

Unfortunately,

the West has been complacent in basically every judgment we've made about China and most about Russia.

If you go back very quickly in a line...

Why is Trump being complacent right now about whether he could win a conflict over Taiwan?

Whether he can win a conflict?

I don't think no one wins.

But the reality reality at the moment is that the U.S.

and China are the two biggest militaries.

It would be a terrible terrible outcome.

It would be a terrible outcome.

And this is the question.

Would Trump really be prepared to risk this?

If it meant China firing missiles off to U.S.

cities,

does he care about Taiwan that matters?

So

this is where

I believe countries like Australia and Japan have a role to play, that we've got to be ensuring, and

NATO allies, partners of the US as well, we've all got to be saying to President Trump and the administration that we're not just sitting back here and saying, once again, we are free riding and we're going to get all of the economic benefits that come with an engagement with China, but we expect you, America, to take all the security burden.

We've got to be able to say, we're going to have this conversation.

What does deterrence look like to avoid that situation, David?

But then secondly, what are the scenarios at play?

And I suppose to give you an example of where,

a quick example of where I think we can look at President Trump, despite his desire to be a peacemaker, have a look at his relationship with Iran.

So he went against his MAGA base, the likes of Tucker Carlson,

who didn't want him to bomb Iran.

No, that's true.

It's a very different risk appetite, though, to bomb an Iranian nuclear site or two than to go to war with China over the Taiwan Strait, which is, you know, what is it, 8,000 kilometers from the US.

We're talking about right on China's doorstep here.

They have that advantage.

We've all seen the regional build-up that they've been engaging in for the past decade.

I mean, Australia, Japan can make the case, but ultimately, is that going to make a difference to Trump if he's considering whether he really wants to pull the trigger on this, whether he really wants to defend Taiwan if it means

China firing off missiles at US cities?

Sure.

Well, again,

no one wants the war to happen.

I suppose I'd look at it also this way.

If you're President Trump and you're saying that, A, you're the peacemaker, and B,

he has said publicly that if he had been president during President Biden's time, Russia wouldn't have invaded Ukraine, Hamas wouldn't have invaded Israel.

He has staked his presidency on being both the peacemaker and not allowing new wars to begin.

So if China, during President Trump's term, did what he is saying isn't going to happen, then I think that's an impact on his legacy.

So both

from an American national security perspective, from a regional national security perspective that takes in Australia, as well as Trump's own legacy, my strong view is that no one, no one outside of China has an incentive to allow an invasion of Taiwan.

Sure, and look, no doubt he'd be weighing his legacy.

I think he'd also be weighing American public opinion on whether they want to do this for the sake of Taiwan, whether they want to enter such a devastating conflict with China.

Look, it's such a fascinating thing that we'll be contemplating, I'm sure, for years to come.

I want to get your thoughts, though, finally, Justin Bassey, on Kevin Rudd.

Yeah.

There was that awkward moment between he and Donald Trump.

What did you make of that?

What do you make of Kevin Rudd's role as ambassador in achieving the outcomes we saw this week and whether he should stay or go?

I think Kevin Rudd has done an excellent job.

It added a little bit of spice and colour to the meeting.

But for me, I travelled to the US earlier in the year.

I got to see firsthand how indefatigable Kevin Rudd is.

And he was then working hard, advocating every day in relation to AUKUS, why it was in the three countries' interests, why it was in the US interests.

He was advocating back then in relation to Australia's great assets of our resources for the critical minerals deal.

So he has been working very, very hard and the work that we see, the outcomes that we see, I think,

not just to the credit of people in Canberra, but to the credit of Kevin Ryder.

I do think that the...

that the calls for

Kevin to be removed because of his tweets a few years ago or his statements when he was running a think tank, Asia Society think tank in New York when he criticised Donald Trump.

They're so excessive.

It is such a big deal to recall an ambassador, David.

And if we ventured down that territory,

we would be cutting off our nose to spite our face for a number of reasons.

We would also be effectively putting Kevin Rudd and his tweets in the same category as the UK who did recall their ambassador, excuse me, but they recalled their ambassador who,

not because he'd criticised Donald Trump, but because of reported links to Epstein.

That's a good point.

Very different.

Very, very different.

So, look, I think in the meeting for me,

what was also telling was that Trump made a joke of it.

He imposed his dominance, as Trump is wont to do, and then he moved on.

We've seen in other meetings that if Trump doesn't like something, he'll stop it and he'll ask people to leave the White House.

This meeting was the opposite of that.

They apparently kissed and made up once the cameras left the room.

That's right.

So

I think that

it's been a little bit

overblown.

I do think that the fact that we have a former Prime Minister, David, as the ambassador, that shows the value that we hold the relationship.

We've had previous deputy prime ministers and defence ministers, Kim Beasley.

We've had Joe Hockey, Arthur Sinodinas.

We consistently show the Americans how much we value that relationship.

But the fact that we had a former Prime Minister there, I think

that's something that shows the significance.

And I do think on the whole, the Americans understand the significance of having a former Prime Minister there.

Justin Bassie, it's been great to explore such a big week for the Alliance with you.

Thanks so much for that.

Pleasure.

And if you have any thoughts on this conversation, drop us a line, insiders at abc.net.au.

We'll have more on this on Sunday morning.

Hope you can join us for Insiders at 9 a.m.

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