Winners and Losers in the Israel-Iran Conflict — with Ian Bremmer
This marks Ian’s 13th appearance on The Prof G Pod!
Follow Ian, @ianbremmer.
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Transcript
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Episode 354, 354 Zero Code Serving Quebec, Canada.
1954, Elvis Presley recorded his first song and Godzilla premiered in Japan.
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Go, go, go.
Welcome to the 354th episode of the Prop G-Pod.
What's happening?
I am back in London after being in the south of France for a week, my favorite conference by far, Cam Lyons.
But, anyways, what else is going on?
So, we have bombed Iran.
I think the three pillars of power or political energy, if you will, are one,
a raw kinetic power.
It just helps to have more tanks and more planes.
That's the reality of the world.
The world is shaped by economic policy and military might.
Anyways,
one, kinetic power, two, alliances, and three, confidence.
So, if you look at the parties here, Israel, Iran, and the U.S.,
the U.S.
has the most kinetic power.
Israel has the most competence.
What they've been able to do with their army and a population
that is one-ninth the size of Iran's, a smaller economy, and
one-fortieth of the of the land mass is they have been able essentially to assert their power across not only Iran, but all of their proxies.
In terms of alliances, this is where things really break down.
And that is why the U.S.
has the most kinetic power as demonstrated by our B-2 bombers, and we are the only ones that have that ordinance of a bunker buster.
And I do think that's a flex.
I'm a believer that if you're going to spend more money on the military than the other 10 nations combined, that unless you're going to get off your heels and onto your toes and be more offensive and proactive about asserting that power and protecting your interests abroad, I get the argument that we shouldn't be going and bombing other nations.
Fine.
Then if we're not going to, on a regular basis, assert and flex our power across the world, and some people would argue we do that with 700 military bases overseas, basically saying don't fuck with us and nine air care strike forces, that we do that as a deterrence, I believe that if you in fact are going to have this isolationist
complexion as the far right has, then let's cut military spending to 200 billion and spend that 600 billion on many of our other domestic worthwhile needs.
So I'm a believer in flexing our power on a regular basis.
And if that makes me a war hawk, that makes me a war hawk.
And I do believe that you can threaten Israel with extinction.
You can maybe even try and move towards enriching uranium, but you can't do both and not expect to be attacked.
So here we are, a demonstration of unbelievable kinetic power.
The problem is around alliances and confidence when it comes to the U.S.
And that is typically after an attack like this, the next morning, Germany, France, Britain would weigh in with either support or thinly veiled support to show that we represent the West.
And in this instance, the only countries that have weighed in on this so far are Russia mocking us, saying that, in fact, we did not
diminish the capabilities, the nuclear capabilities that we're claiming.
And two, China putting out press releases basically saying that this is an administration you can't trust and increasing this terrible brand association we've developed since Trump came into office of toxic uncertainty.
And I think that's important, whether it's sharing intelligence, whether it's giving you the sense that, okay, if Iran strikes back, they will have to deal with several nuclear powers or several armies or several nations.
Also, the biggest mistake I think you can make in strategy is assuming that you're boxing against a speedback.
And I've told this story several times, but that won't stop me from telling it again.
When I first moved to New York, I was bored and I was lonely and I was looking for some sort of outlet.
So I worked out a lot.
And one of the things I did was I started boxing.
And I hired a trainer
and he convinced me, mostly because I was paying him, that I was really good that I had good hand speed and good reach and convinced me to enter into this you know this just little tournament at this gym I worked out at or trained at and so I'm six to 190 pounds so I went into the 190 pound weight class and my first opponent was 5'7 192 and it ends up at 5'7 192 is basically Mike Tyson and I remember the bell ringing and that's the last thing I remember and then the next thing I remember or the first thing I remember after the bell ringing was bright lights and specifically I was on my back looking upwards of bright lights.
And if you're watching this on YouTube, oftentimes I sit like this or stand like this or face like this because my nose goes to the right.
And by the way, that's a lot to go to the right.
Daddy has a real nose.
I remember when I was 13, my nose grew and the rest of my body didn't.
And I used to cry to my mom.
My nose was so big.
And she'd be like, no, sweet guy.
I do have a strong nose.
Anyways, love you, mom.
But my nose goes to the right because I was hit so hard and it hasn't gone back.
And one of the biggest mistakes you can make in geopolitical strategy is to believe that you are boxing against someone you're paying or a speed bag that won't hit back.
And there is no doubt about it.
An 86-year-old theocrat, Ayatal Khomeini, who is the supreme leader of Iran, this is really frightening.
And also the IRGC, just distinct of Israel's incredible competence and what has been so far us just literally running over them, not once, but twice, basically taking down their air defenses and overwhelming them.
To think that they're not going to hit back in some fashion is just to wake up and realize your nose still bends to the right.
So, in terms of kinetic power, absolutely incredible demonstration of strength here.
I think it was the right move given the scenario we find ourselves in.
I think there's a decent argument that maybe we shouldn't be in this scenario, that if we'd stuck with the JCPOA,
there's a decent argument we wouldn't be in this situation.
But the context, given where we were in this moment, I think it was the right thing to do.
The question is,
are we going to create a lot of soft spots, a lot of weak tissue, and perhaps the situation won't turn out as well?
We're more vulnerable now because we don't have the same alliances.
And quite frankly, we don't have the same competence.
We don't have the same level of intelligence.
We don't have all of our most powerful people on message with each other.
It sounds like they're not even communicating with each other, and nobody, including our allies or even our enemies, knows what the fuck to believe that comes out of the White House because they're contradicting each other.
And we have people running the military and making these decisions.
When you have Tulsi, Gabbard, and Pete Hexeth in a room making these decisions,
we should all be worried.
So, the gross incompetence demonstrated so far around tariffs, around trying to address our immigration policy, to believe that that doesn't seep into our military policy is somewhat, and our geopolitical and defense strategy is somewhat naive.
So, you know, where do we sit?
We sit in awe of our incredible military and what they were able to pull off.
But at the same time, I think this is a time to be concerned that we're not boxing against a speed bag and we are poorly advised and we have demonstrated incompetence the likes of which
we haven't registered registered since the end of World War II.
And to believe that that does not make us less safe is naive.
Well, that was cheery.
All right.
Anyways, with this, we have our conversation with Ian Bremer.
The escalating conflict involving Iran is our topic, and what could come next on the global stage.
A quick note: we recorded this conversation with Ian on Tuesday.
So, if any major headlines have broken since then, they may not be covered here, or we'll try and ping back in.
Anyways, here's our conversation with Ian.
Ian, where does this podcast find you?
Briefly, I am in Barcelona, which is a lovely place to be and doesn't seem everyone's kind of on vacation today, so.
What should we talk about?
All right, here we are.
It looks as if we had...
Actually, you know what?
I'd like to back up and just have you give us your sense of the state of play here around this military operation attack bombing, how you would frame it, what you think we might be missing in the lead up to this.
And if you were to go very meta, what inspired this U.S.
action?
And then we'll get into some of the ramifications and how it was carried out.
Well, I guess the big backdrop, there's the Iran backdrop and there's the Trump backdrop.
And they're different, right?
right?
The Trump backdrop is he came in as president
really, really wanting to make peace between Russia and Ukraine.
He got the Ukrainians to the table by strong-arming them, thought he was going to sweet talk the Russians, completely failed on the latter front,
and so couldn't do it.
And then really thought that he was going to hit China and the world hard on tariffs and they were all going to want to do deals with him.
It's taken a hell of a lot longer to get to yes.
And particularly with the Chinese, it did not go in any way the way he expected to.
Xi Jinping was not suddenly, oh, I've got to talk to this guy, I've got to engage, I got to fix this, not at all.
They gave back as hard as they got.
So the context is that Trump, the dealmaker, wasn't getting the deals done.
In fact, even, you know, a few days ago, India Prime Minister Modi,
you know, in a ceasefire agreement that the Americans did play a constructive role in, though, at the margins, came out and publicly embarrassed Trump and said, no, actually, you did nothing at all, which is kind of a shocking thing for Modi, who has a reasonably good relationship with Trump to do for domestic political reasons, but still.
So the backdrop on Trump is he's not gotten his deals done.
He's really itching.
to make something happen.
He wants to show that he can win on the international stage.
And Iran suddenly was where he was putting a lot of time, a lot of effort, a lot of attention.
So that's the background for him.
The backdrop of Iran among countries that have heft
on the geopolitical stage is that they have lost more influence, both regionally and globally, than pretty much anybody over the last year.
And they're close to friendless, right?
I mean, you know,
they engaged with the Russians and they sell oil to a bunch of countries, but nobody's out there willing to stand up for them.
And the proxies that they had in the region that, you know, provided some deterrence and scared their enemies from taking steps against them have been blown up, principally by Israel,
also a little bit by the United States in the case of the Houthis over the course of the last year and a half.
Hezbollah, of course,
most spectacularly.
And then you have Bashar Assad also aligned with Iran, overthrown by his own people with help from Turkey.
So Iran, which has been a formidable adversary of the United States globally and has been trying to develop nuclear capabilities, which unacceptable to the U.S.
and pretty much everyone on the global stage, but in a far, far weaker position.
And with an 85-year-old ailing supreme leader.
So they looked like they would be more willing to cut a deal, but they also looked much more vulnerable to military strikes.
And that was the state of play for,
let's say, a week ago, before the Israelis attacked.
That's the context that I think we need to know before we think about what's going to happen on the ground when the Israelis start striking, when the Americans then join in, and then when the Iranians respond and do virtually nothing.
So
this is an outsider's viewpoint.
You study this.
You're much closer to it.
You have much deeper sources.
So very open to being wrong here.
My impression of what led up to this was very base.
And it was Trump deciding he wanted some of that macho.
He wanted to bask in some of that macho light.
And he was inspired by the success of the idf taking out air defenses and taking out much of the senior command of the rgc's military
personnel and thought i want some of this and was inspired to kind of come in and jump on the metal podium and flex his muscles is that too reductive an analysis here
scott you're completely right but you're taking the baton from the time frame that i left it off we have to keep in mind the broader context, which is that Trump, when he met with Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, in the White House the day after Liberation Day, so it was the first foreign leader he welcomed to the White House, he said during that meeting that he was going to start engaging directly with Iran, directly Iran negotiations, which, you know, obviously the Israeli government was very disturbed by, but it's not like they can stop Trump.
And then there were a series of five direct negotiations facilitated by the Omanis
between Witcoff and others and the Iranian leadership on the nuclear file.
And there was a really sincere effort by Trump to get to yes.
And, you know, they could have had not just a redux of the old Iranian nuclear deal.
People say that.
Actually, there wouldn't have been a sunset clause.
The Obama deal, 10 years later,
it's done.
It's over.
If the Iranians at that point want to develop nuclear weapons capabilities, they're no longer in any way constrained by the deal.
And meanwhile, they've benefited from the sanctions being off.
They've taken all of their hundreds of billions of assets that are unfrozen, all this stuff.
The deal that they were going to cut with Trump would have been that JCPOA without a sunset clause.
So it would have been a permanent deal.
And further,
there was a willingness of the Iranians to really reduce the amount of enrichment that they would be doing.
They weren't willing to bring it to zero.
That's what Trump was frustrated with.
There were many in the administration that said that there can be no enrichment at all.
The enrichment has to be done by a consortium outside of Iran that will be determined.
And maybe in an interim period, it can still happen in Iran, but the deal will require eventually there's zero.
The Iranians hadn't been willing to accept that.
And that
was when the Israelis start striking.
And Trump does give them a green light because he's frustrated that it's not moving fast enough.
But what's really interesting here is Trump and Netanyahu had at least two conversations, direct conversations, between when the Israelis struck and when the Americans do.
They might have had more.
I'm just not aware of them.
But in those conversations, they were quite contentious.
And Trump was pretty agitated because Bibi wanted him to cut off negotiations with Iran.
And Trump said, absolutely not.
The whole point, you're going to war now.
That's going to, you know, sort of loosen these guys up.
The Supreme Leader, I want to now talk to the Supreme Leader and give him another chance to do this deal now that he shows that we've actually got a fist in our glove.
I want to get to yes.
I want a negotiation.
So even up until the end, Trump was still trying to get the Supreme Leader directly involved and to get to yes.
And it was after that didn't happen, and in part it didn't happen because the Supreme Leader is in hiding.
The Iranians have wisely shut down their internet because it allows the Israelis to engage in surveillance and better target them and the rest.
And that's when Trump decided for exactly the reasons that you suggest, because Israel is
getting all of this benefit from showing that they're winning against this major adversary and the U.S.
is doing none of it.
And that's when you saw Trump start to post online:
we've got control of the airspace.
No, it was the Israelis.
We know where the Supreme Leader is and we can take him out.
But there was never an intention of the Americans to assassinate the Supreme Leader.
That wasn't the plan.
But you could then see over the week that Trump is like, no, no, no, this can't just be the Israelis.
I get credit for this.
I get credit for this.
And so then you have the spectacular military strikes with the B-2s flying 36 hours back and forth.
No American casualties from the attacks, no American casualties from the Iranian response.
So then Trump gets his big win.
And it is a big win, absolutely.
In fact, it's a bigger win from my perspective than when Trump ordered the assassination of Qasim Suleimani, the head of the Iranian defense forces, towards the end of his first term.
And the Iranians did virtually nothing in response.
This guy was a massive war hero for the Iranian people.
You'd think that this would potentially lead to all-out war.
Not at all.
And now you've got a very similar situation with a lot more at stake with the Americans doing their best to take out these critical Iranian nuclear facilities.
So it appears to me that just in a matter of 24 months, it's gone from, I think most people or a lot of people would say that the superpower in the Middle East was Iran to the superpower it feels today is clearly Israel.
All of their proxies have had their hands cut off.
When I say all of their, I mean Iran's proxies.
Their air defenses have been totally neutered.
And it appears that anyone on an order from Tel Aviv can be killed.
That the Mossad has totally penetrated the security apparatus at the highest levels of the Iranian regime.
What do you think are the prospects of the Islamic Republic falling in the near term?
In the near term, very low.
You can't bring about regime change from an air campaign.
Militarily, it would require a major ground war, which the Israelis are not going to do and probably incapable of.
They'd be overstretched at this point, and it would be politically disastrous at home.
And the Americans certainly want no part of that, right?
I mean, Trump said he was going to end wars.
He's fine with
a short-term bombing campaign, but he absolutely doesn't want a Ken Burns-style war with American men and women on the ground fighting and coming back in body bags.
Absolutely not.
And so
a regime change would then have to come from the 90 million plus Iranian citizens who don't support the Iranian regime.
I'd say only about 20% of Iranian citizens are kind of hardline, hardened supporters of the military and theocratic dictatorship, led more by the military than the theocracy, frankly, these days.
But the Iranian
government has enormous capacity to repress far more than Assad did in Syria.
These are well-trained forces.
They are well-resourced forces.
And the government is absolutely willing and capable.
And we don't yet see
any
internal signs of major demonstrations or uprising, despite the fact that over 30 Iranian military leaders have been targeted and killed in the Israeli operations to date over the past week.
One of the things that struck me was the lack of support from allies that we traditionally hear from after this type of attack incursion, whether it was Bush expelling Hussein from Kuwait, the next Bush going into Iraq.
Typically, the next day we get statements of support from our allies.
And this time, the only things I saw were China saying they're at it again, destabilizing the world, Russia claiming that we are vastly exaggerating the effectiveness of these attacks.
Did that strike you as
unusual and disappointing that we don't have, we don't appear to be
either garnering or even seeking the support of our allies when we do something like this?
Well, first of all, you and I are now talking.
I'm in Europe right now when the NATO summit is just starting and Trump's a part of it.
And NATO is looking stronger than it has before because there's a lot more money going in from the Europeans, a lot bigger commitments.
And frankly, almost all of the Europeans came out publicly in favor of the Israelis to defend themselves and critical of the Iranian regime and their nuclear program.
The Finns, I think, were the only Europeans, at least the only in the EU,
that came out and condemned the Israeli strikes, most notably the French, the Brits, the Germans,
the core military allies,
all were supportive.
And I guess I take on board the fact that it wasn't as full-throated in support of the U.S.
And the U.S.
wasn't really seeking that.
It was more unilateralist.
And the Japanese condemned it, for example.
But I was looking at the contrast between the response to Israel and then the U.S.
striking Iran
with the war in Gaza
over the last year and a half now plus.
And there, I mean, the Americans are mostly by themselves since supporting Israel.
And as you and I have discussed before,
the vast majority of the world's governments and population
believes that Israel is now conducting an unjust military intervention and occupation that amounts to ethnic cleansing with lots of war crimes that is absolutely, radically different from the response to what Israel did in and to Iran.
Iran,
of course, you were targeting was military targets overwhelmingly.
And I mean, there was a civilian energy target, for example, but overwhelmingly it was military targets.
The regime is seen as actively supporting terrorism.
It is widely understood that the vast majority of the Iranian people oppose the regime.
Not to say that the majority support Israeli strikes.
There are some that would want anything to happen that could remove the regime, but I wouldn't call that a majority.
But the rest of the world, you know, either were supportive of Israel and the U.S.,
or they had condemnations that didn't matter, that didn't amount to anything, that no one was prepared to stand up for Iran here.
So for me, that was kind of the shock was how different it was, despite the fact that Israel has taken so much criticism globally for
the continuing war in Gaza, that Iran is a very, very different story.
We'll be right back after a quick break.
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There's There's a fear that
we have a perfect sort of, or the term wag the tail was invented to describe this situation.
That B.B.
Netanyahu is literally running to stay out of prison and that he's done the political calculus.
And the only way to perhaps ensure he stays out of prison is to get people to rally around the flag under the auspices of war.
And whether you agree or not, whether this was the right thing to do, do you believe we're in that situation where Netanyahu, distincted a situation or the merits or lack thereof of this type of military operation, is in fact just constantly on a war footing trying to stay out of jail?
I think it is a factor, Scott.
I wouldn't say it was dispositive.
The Israelis have been talking up the threat as existential from Iran's growing nuclear capabilities for decades now.
And so has Bibi directly.
And he did it famously at the United Nations when he brought that graphic of the bomb that he was showing.
And he's done it with, you know, investor meetings.
And I've seen him do it live.
I mean, all sorts of times, right?
So, and now that the Iranians have gotten weaker and that Israel's had so much success
in going after Iran's proxies,
they were clearly beating the drum for we should do more against them.
And I saw that in the Biden administration.
I'm seeing that in the Trump administration.
Now, the timing here, though, did play a role in that
the far-right members of Bib's coalition
had declared a vote of no confidence.
They were going to leave the government over a separate issue.
It was over this long-standing issue in Israel of whether or not the religious right would receive exemptions from serving in the military.
And of course, they are some of the people, the demographics that are arguing most about Israeli expansion of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and all of this stuff.
And yet they don't serve in the military.
And that has been a real cause
of anger for a lot of the Israeli population, including Likud voters, which is, of course, not Nyahoo's party.
And he was
increasingly trying to find a way to square the circle and kept stalling on it, stalling on it.
Finally,
there was going to be this legislation passed that was going to
put significant fines, penalties on those that didn't serve.
And the right-wing parties were going to bolt as a consequence.
That would have brought the government down.
It would have led to another election months away.
And if BB had lost that election, and decent chance he would have,
then he'd be out and he'd be facing jail time.
Now,
once
the war with Iran
was on the table and
he
brought that to Trump and Trump gave him at least a flashing yellow light, if not, you know, probably a direct green to go ahead and attack.
And towards the end, it was certainly a green.
That then brought the far-right parties to vote in favor of BB continuing to head the government.
So
the vote of no confidence
didn't pass through,
and he's up in charge again.
So, yes, I think the timing of the war starting was linked to the likelihood that otherwise his government would have fallen.
But I would not call that the principal driver of Iran's vulnerability to and Israel's decision to attack
the nuclear program and the military leadership.
I mean, I know that's a little nuanced, but I hope you see the
difference there.
It feels as if so far the Iranian response has been similar to the response to the attacks on Hezbollah, has been somewhat performative.
And that is, I need, I, being Khomeini, need to show that I still have my mojo,
but I do not want to risk escalation.
And that it's mostly, and it looks,
the oil markets have yawned.
The stock market doesn't care.
It believes that the market, and it gets it wrong, believes that, okay, they've had their
weak flex
attacking or sending missiles into
U.S.
installations in Qatar and Iraq, but they're not meaningful enough to escalate.
Is that your sense of what's going on right now?
That is not my sense of how the Iranians responded to Israel, right?
Lots and lots of drone strikes, none of which got through, and missile strikes, many of which got through, about probably 5% of their missile strikes.
And, you know, their hope was that they were going to deplete Israeli interceptors to a degree that they'd be able to hit Israel harder.
So they were trying to kill a lot of Israelis.
And they wanted to hit military targets, but I mean, they were also aiming for anything they could hit, right?
I mean, they were going for urban centers, too.
And they just didn't have the capabilities.
But this was not.
I mean, they were, the Israelis are
assassinating their leaders.
They assassinated also
the lead nuclear negotiator.
They were hitting so much military capability,
including lots of the ballistic missile launchers that are critical to Iran's own deterrence.
They hit the nuclear program above ground, all of those things.
So Iran was not, in my view, restrained in how they hit Israel back.
But Iran was restrained in every other way.
They certainly have the ability
to block the Straits of Hormuz for a period of weeks if they wanted to.
Now, the U.S.
has a massive amount of naval and air power that they've redirected to the Gulf.
In fact, more right now than at any point since the war in Iraq.
And so it wouldn't be, you'd be able to escort some tankers pretty quickly, and you'd be able to get the straits cleared probably within a month.
But they didn't do any of that.
And they didn't launch any attacks against Gulf energy production, nor did they authorize or order their proxies to do so.
They didn't go after U.S.
bases in the region until after the Americans were involved, nor did they try major cyber attacks or assassinations against non-Israelis.
So, I mean, all of this, you know, sleeper cells, people talk about potential terrorism, nothing, nothing.
And then, then, when the Americans are directly involved and launch attacks,
including against Fordot, which is, you know, the crown jewel of Iran's nuclear capabilities, Iran's response, as you suggest, is purely performative.
It is purely for their own domestic popular consumption.
And they launch a whole bunch of missiles at the Al-Udaid base in Qatar,
which is the most well-defended U.S.
base in the entire region.
FAAD missile defense, Patriot missile defense.
Qatari defensive capabilities and U.S.
air defense destroyer capabilities right off the coast.
And they tell the Americans through the Qataris in advance.
So it is very obvious that they are intending to do everything possible not to further escalate, not to risk American casualties.
This is frankly, given the briefings that Trump had received
over the course of the week as he was thinking about these strikes and how vulnerable U.S.
servicemen and women in Iraq were.
to Shia militias attacking, how vulnerable American servicemen and women in the base in Djibouti would be to the Houthis launching short-range missiles just across the Red Sea Channel.
Trump was actually given a fair amount of pause about ordering these strikes because he was worried about Americans getting killed and didn't want a broader war.
He was also concerned that he might not be able to fully take out Ford.
That was the other thing that made him wait.
and gave him some concerns.
Maybe I don't want to do this.
Because, I mean, he was, there was a lot of back and forth internally with Trump and with his broad suite of advisors on whether or not he wanted to do this.
But the Iranians, again, to be clear, Scott, the Iranian response was as restrained as humanly imaginable, given what the United States and Israel over the course of the week had done.
In terms of options on the table for
Khamenei and his government, one,
respond or create chaos in the Straits of Hormuz.
Two,
overt aggressive acts against the United States, whether it's going after military installations in the region or illuminating terrorist cells, what have you.
Or three,
continuing to attack Israel.
It strikes me that if they shut down the Straits of Hormuz, they're alienating the wrong people.
They're being heavy-handed with the wrong people.
That would mostly hurt China and India.
The U.S.
doesn't get that much oil through the Straits of Ormoz.
Now, if it spiked oil, obviously we would feel out of the pump, but it feels to me
they would be being heavy-handed with the wrong people.
Two, it seems as if they're not looking to gin up or escalate with the United States.
So
isn't it likely that 90-plus percent of the ire or response will be focused on one place and one group of people, and that's Israel?
I don't think of it exactly that way.
I mean, first, I agree that it's very, very unlikely that they're going to hit the Straits or the Americans going forward.
And of course, if oil prices go up, I mean, yes, the Chinese are buying the oil, but I mean, oil is a global market.
And, you know, that could potentially
bring the world into a one-quarter recession, which is a problem, right?
And certainly Trump, as you know, you've seen Trump saying, don't you dare, right?
All caps, like, you know, don't fall into our enemy's hands, don't do that stuff.
I mean, he's angry about that potential just as he was angry about the Israelis subverting the ceasefire earlier today.
You know, the reason I don't think of it quite the way you framed it is because I'm not convinced that Iran will continue to have the same capacity to formulate thoughtful, restrained policy over the next six, 12 months that they have over the last month, right?
I mean, you know,
if Iran starts getting desperate, again, if they can't communicate well, we saw it with Hezbollah.
The Israelis took out their ability to communicate.
They scared the leadership, they decapitated the leadership.
And so, I mean, Hezbollah was no longer able to formulate, you know, sort of strategic policy for the organization as a whole.
What happens if that's true with Iran?
I mean, you know, if they kill the supreme leader, which some Israelis in leadership have said they are inclined to do, though Trump would be very angry about it, at least as long as a ceasefire is in place.
But beyond that, you know, with all the military leaders getting killed, you know, and and not being able to effectively communicate, what happens if the command and control structure in Iran starts to break down?
What happens if we start to see rogue actions
from smaller numbers of Iranian leaders?
You know, that's a very different situation.
That makes it much easier to pay off some Shia in Iraq to take pot shots on American bases and kill 10, 20, 50 American servicemen and women, right?
That makes it much easier to pay off and support a suicide bomber or five or 10, you know, in the Middle East or in Europe or maybe even the United States.
That makes it much easier to harass tankers,
to blow up a couple that would cause a spike in oil prices.
I mean, all of those things, I think, become more plausible as the Iranians get weaker and more vulnerable.
And even though I don't see the Iranian regime collapsing,
there's a very big distance
between
the regime is gone to the supreme leader, together with a coherent military leadership for the IRGC, are able to sit down and figure out, okay, here's what we want to do to respond to Israel and the rest.
That's my worry.
It's more of a like progossian kind of worry.
Like what happens if some group inside Iran decides we got nothing to lose?
Because desperation leads to very different kinds of decisions.
Right now, the Iranian leadership doesn't feel adequately desperate for me to be that worried about it, for the markets to be that worried about it.
I'm not confident that that will continue to be the case in three months' time.
We'll be right back.
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We're back with more from Ian Bremer.
Let's talk a little bit about the Trump administration and their approach to this.
Our intelligence community.
It strikes me as inconsistent, sclerotic, and they can't even support one another's they can't even get on the same page in terms of messaging.
Tulsi Gabbard comes out and says we have no evidence that they're enriching uranium.
Trump says she's wrong.
Secretaries Hexeth and Rubio claim we're not interested in regime change, and then he starts tweeting what feels like supportive tweets regarding regime change.
I just want to acknowledge up front, I have a bias here.
I'm not an enormous fan of the president, but it strikes me that we come across as inconsistent and that our intelligence community
comes across as just very unprofessional.
And in the eyes of the world, while our military continues to be, in my estimation, the most impressive, competent organization in history, that our intelligence service and the way that the Trump administration equips itself around communications here, that it comes across, quite frankly, as amateurish.
Your thoughts?
In the tweets, I mean, you know, maybe if he knows he's not going to get a nobel peace prize he wants a nobel for literature i don't know but uh it obviously doesn't doesn't go over well internationally it seems childish it seems anti-diplomatic um so i mean some of it is style as opposed to decisions and results some of it is the way he antagonizes individual allies
I think those things are important.
I think like you've got a great friend like Canada.
You shouldn't be antagonizing them the way Trump has, even though he's done a better job with Carney than he did with Trudeau.
Ditto, the Nordics, I mean, Denmark, the Greenland thing, our top friends in the world and NATO, I mean, do everything we ask them to do.
I mean, you know, Afghanistan, more people per capita, they said, than the Americans.
And, you know, this is the way we treat them, completely wrong, right?
So that undermines us.
And a lot of the way that he handles the decisions around Iran,
even if you agree with the decision,
is problematic.
But, you know, I will say a couple of things that should give you at least some comfort.
So
Trump doesn't like to read, right?
He doesn't like reading like long policy memos, but he's been receiving the president's daily brief consistently and frequently, much more than Biden did in his last year.
Much more.
He likes his briefers.
He feels like they're giving him good information that make him smarter when he's talking to foreign leaders.
He brings his briefers on Air Force One.
Biden didn't do that.
That's kind of interesting.
He doesn't have a great relationship with Tulsi, but Tulsi's talking to Marco Rubio all the time, like, I mean, every day, and sometimes more than that.
And that has been helpful to ensure that, you know, sort of the intelligence is largely on the same page with the conversations that Trump is having with principals, whether or not Tulsi is always in the room.
I think that's been helpful.
So it's not like Trump is rolling in
without any understanding
of what the better minds with access to all of these military intelligence resources know and have.
The problem is that Trump is so driven by id.
He's so driven by personal grievance.
He's so driven by his own confidence that his instincts are right.
And he's not thinking about the second and third order consequences.
And he doesn't have a lot of the policy experience or interest to get those things as right as he should.
And he has some quite competent people around him.
He has some that clearly aren't competent at all.
And he's not relying on them enough to make decisions because he doesn't have, you know, sort of favored individual advisors in that way.
He has, you know, a constellation.
He has a chorus of voices on every issue, which include advisors and it includes the Mar-a-Lago crowd.
It includes former personal employees and people that text them, some of whom gave a lot of money to the campaign.
And one of the amazing things about Trump is that so many people have direct access to him.
One of the most concerning things about Trump is that so many people have direct access to him.
And some of those people, like Laura Loomer, you know, making policy decisions for who should and shouldn't be fired in the National Security Council, like that's insane, right?
So there are real problems with having Trump making decisions the way he makes them that are consequential for life and death, that are consequential for the global economy, that are consequential for the future of the American democracy.
I think there are huge problems that you and I share
in that regard.
Now, I mean, I do my damnedest.
I have my personal views, but I also recognize because my career is about understanding global politics, I understand that, you know, everyone has an opinion.
It's not a big deal, but, but that's not, nobody cares really about what I like or what my bias is.
What they care about is on the basis of my experience, what my analysis is.
And so in that regard,
I probably come across a lot as more even-handed and certainly much more willing to praise a Trump decision that I think is successful, even if I'm not particularly inclined to like the guy.
Because what I like, who cares what I like?
Like, I mean, it just doesn't, it doesn't really matter at the end of the day.
Well, you're trying to be a critical thinker.
You advise big corporations and investors, try and bring this down to a very tactical level.
If you're talking to, if a large multinational corporation contacts your Asia Group and says, okay, how should we be thinking about the world and the winners and losers differently this week than last week?
To the extent you can, recognizing you don't have a crystal ball, how do you think this plays out?
Who are the winners and losers to you politically?
And are there firms or economies or shifts in the landscape that you see coming that weren't visible or apparent?
seven days ago.
Well, there's the Iran question and there's the global question.
The Iran question, there are very clear winners and losers.
Israel, very clear winner.
The Gulf states, very clear winners.
And Trump gets a clear win here.
And I think those things matter.
Globally,
we are still in a position of extraordinary uncertainty.
And so much of that uncertainty is being driven by the most powerful country and by the president of the most powerful country.
And markets hate uncertainty.
They like good policy.
They can deal with bad policy.
They hate uncertainty.
And there is so much uncertainty on so many issues.
There's fundamental uncertainty on how the Americans are going to handle illegal immigration in the U.S.
that has major consequences for lots of multinational corporations.
There's fundamental uncertainty as to the nature of globalization and U.S.
trade policy with tariffs that are now at 1940s levels and that with massive pushback from the courts that's going to last for months and months until the Supreme Court finally rules.
And this is a very, very hard environment for companies to operate in.
There's massive uncertainty around the relationship between the U.S.
and China, not just on trade, but also export controls and technology and critical minerals.
I mean,
these are huge macro issues that affect almost every company in almost every sector, and they are dealing with greater macro uncertainty politically for their business than they have at any point since they've been running their businesses professionally.
That's the problem.
So
we've taken a significant amount of uncertainty out
because of what's happened in the last seven days in Iran.
I think that people can have a fair amount of confidence that oil is going to be trading in a band between
broadly speaking 45 and 75 for the coming year because the market's going to be largely oversupplied with comparatively low demand
and and that was absolutely not ex ante the presumption of a lot of major players until the last week so that's a big deal that's a big deal but none of the other uncertainty is off and in fact in some way you could even make the argument that Trump now with this win is going to feel more confident that he can do more
in other areas.
I wouldn't go that far.
I think that these things are separate.
And I think he thinks of trade separately than how he thinks of Iran.
And Lord knows he thinks of Russia separately than how he thinks of Iran.
He can learn as he has successes and failures in different areas.
But the uncertainty globally
is still extraordinarily high.
But implicit in that statement, Ian, is that you think this was a good move.
Because if you believe that the world is less risky today than it was seven days ago, that implies this was a good move.
And when you use that band of 45 to 75,
you believe that actually oil prices are going to come down because what are they at now?
70, 72.
So
it sounds to me like you feel this was a win, that the world is a safer place.
It was a win, and I think it was on balance.
We were in a better environment than we were a week ago.
That does not mean that I think it was the optimal move.
Remember, I think the tail risks of Iran's leadership being desperate and therefore doing catastrophic things have gone up.
They were probably 2% before.
Now they're 5% or 10.
I don't like that.
I think you could have gotten to this outcome with these oil price ranges if the Americans, after the Israelis had struck, had actually, instead of jumping on board and taken out or tried to take out the three nuclear facilities, if they had leaned into
negotiations, I think that was a more optimal outcome with less tail risk and with a better long-term trajectory.
But I ain't Trump.
And he's ultimately the guy making the decision.
And some of those decisions are being made for very personal reasons that I don't think are particularly appropriate in the President of the United States.
So last question before we let you go, Ian, and I can't imagine how busy you are this week.
So very much appreciate you coming on.
I know, but you know, I love having our conversation, Scott.
So, you know, likewise, brother.
By the way,
12th time you've been on the show.
Is it really?
It is the 12th time, yes.
So
we've all been very focused on this over the last week.
And my belief is that it's always the shit you're not focused on that gets you.
Is there anything in the world right now, because our focus has been diverted away from because of what's happening in the Middle East, that you think is a bigger deal and not getting the attention it warrants?
Oh, the China stuff is a bigger deal, and it's not getting the attention.
It's getting much less attention.
U.S.-China relations,
enormous mistrust.
And not Taiwan, that's not near term, but the Americans making it harder for the Chinese, making the Chinese feel like they're being contained in developing their technologies.
The Chinese do everything possible to resist that, to find ways to skirt around it.
Massive efforts to get more trade flows with other countries that have historically been more mistrustful of China than they are of the United States.
That's playing out in Southeast Asia.
It's playing out in India.
It's playing out in South Korea.
So particularly Asia, less so Europe, but Latin America too and the global south.
This stuff is very important.
And the Chinese are so capable technologically.
AI, they're much closer to the U.S.
than the Americans thought they were a year ago.
The biotechnology.
and ability to develop new drugs and what they're doing with world-class hospitals and testing.
You always thought 10, 20 years ago, you thought the Chinese were like essentially at least a second world country, if not a third in some of those areas.
Now they're first and competing with the United States.
Critical minerals, supply chain, and post-carbon energy.
The Chinese are way ahead of the Americans.
We see that playing out with the electric vehicle
market, but it's happening everywhere.
And so this is a really, really capable competitor at scale.
And the United States is right now doing a lot of stuff that is not long-term in terms of policy.
And that worries me a lot, and it is not getting anywhere near the attention it should be getting.
Ian Bremer is the president and founder of Eurasia Group, the world's leading political risk research and consulting firm, and GZero Media, a company dedicated to providing intelligent and engaging coverage of international affairs.
He is also the author of 11 books, including the New York Times bestsellers, Us vs.
Them: The Failure of Globalism, and The Power of Crisis: How three threats and our response will change the world.
He joins us from Barcelona.
And my producer just corrected me, Ian.
This is your 13th appearance on the pod.
More appearances than books I have done, and clearly that is the more important
subject.
Get on it.
You need to write a few more books.
Oh, God, no.
I need to do more Scott conversations.
There you go.
At the end of the day, what am I going to get more value from?
What's going to make me happier?
We're down with that.
If I don't speak to you, I will hopefully we'll break bread and have a drink sometime this summer.
But very much appreciate your time today.
And I think this is a,
when this, this is how much, when this thing broke out, one of the first thoughts I had was, oh my gosh, Ian must be, Ian must be writing so much right now and in so demand and talking.
You must be working 19 hours a day right now.
Sunday was rough, man.
Sunday was rough.
There's no question.
Today's a little bit easier, thank goodness.
And I feel like I've caught my breath.
And pretty soon, you and I will take some sun and we'll have some drinks, and
hopefully, a lot of this will be in the River View Mary.
Let's hope so.
All right, my brother.
Safe travels.
Be good, Scott.
Algebra of happiness, one of the things I really
am working on because I really don't like it about myself is I have a tendency.
I hate complaining.
I think one of the things about trying to be a man is you absorb more complaints than you complain, right?
I think that's a signal you're doing well.
People trust you enough and they're comfortable enough to complain to you,
but at the same time, you don't complain a lot.
And I think that's one of the keys to being a man in a relationship.
And that is,
you know, why do people want to be in relationships?
Why do people want to be in romantic relationships?
Do they want to have a partner?
Do they want to have procreate?
Do they want to have affection, sex, economic security?
Yeah, all of those.
But I think as much or more, they want someone to notice their lives.
They want someone to witness their lives.
It's like
whenever I travel alone, I inevitably get upgraded to some fucking crazy suite in a hotel.
But it's as if I didn't stay there because if I don't have to share with someone, it just doesn't happen.
It doesn't matter.
When I was younger and I didn't have a girlfriend or a serious relationship, I used to call my mom whenever anything good happened to me because I needed someone to witness my life.
I needed someone.
And now it still feels like it doesn't happen sometimes, but I needed, you need people to register.
You need people to notice.
You need people to witness your life.
And so I think to absorb complaints and witness people's lives means you're meaningful in their life.
I oftentimes, and I don't like this about myself, feel sorry for myself.
I manage to think, oh my God, I I can't believe how many fucking podcasts I have to do.
And I have to ramp up and be engaging and smart and try to be funny.
And none of these people know how hard it is.
And da-da-da.
And then I'm like, what the fuck am I doing complaining to myself like this or complaining to other people?
And I have this complaint
volcano, this complaint inoculation, this complaint
destroyer, whatever you want to call it.
And it's a photograph.
And it's a photo.
I only own two pieces of art.
One is a Grayson Perry
called Map of the Politician.
And this other piece, I call it art because I spent a shit ton of money on it, but it's a photograph.
And it's a photograph of Otto Frank.
And Otto Frank is the father of Anne Frank.
He hid with his family in an attic in Amsterdam.
And there's this photo of him when he returned to the attic where they were hiding out.
And it's this picture of this man in a suit, this older sort of nondescript man in what is clearly an attic.
And it's this, it's this black and white photograph.
And literally all I need to do, literally all I need to do, and I'm feeling sorry for myself, is I go to the stairway on my second floor where this photograph is.
And I force myself to look at that photo for 60 seconds.
And I realize I have no fucking problems.
I just realize how petty and stupid.
And quite frankly, unforgivable my self-wallowing complaints are.
And I think everybody needs something that they can count on to give them perspective such that they don't fall into the downward spiral of feeling sorry for themselves and to recognize that if you live in America, if you have people in your life that love you, if you have a job, if you have health care, if you're not under threat of persecution, if there's very unlikely you're going to be rounded up and separated from your family, that you are in the top 1% of people who lived in this planet in terms of your blessings.
And that might be staring at your children when they're sleeping.
I used to get a lot of comfort and gratitude and perspective when I would just walk into my boy's room and see them asleep when they were little.
It might be spending time with someone else.
It might be reading history, whatever it is.
Try and identify the things that give you perspective or a thing.
And then force yourself to think about that thing, look at that thing, because you want out of that spiral.
You want to recognize constantly how fortunate you are.
What is that one thing?
What is your photo of Otto Frank?
This episode was produced by Jennifer Sanchez.
Drew Bros is our technical director.
Thank you for listening to the Prophecy Pod from the Vox Media Podcast Network.
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