83. The Man Who Saved The World: Countdown to Armageddon (Ep 4)

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At the beginning of 1983, tough speeches by President Reagan and his Secretary of State George Schultz had put the Soviet leaders into a state of acute apprehension.

And their fears were reinforced when they learnt about the United States Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI, commonly known as Star Wars, the plan for using anti-missile missiles to create a nationwide shield against intercontinental attack.

Because the Americans had landed a man on the moon, Kremlin reasoned, they had the capability to create the Star Wars system and were most probably preparing for all-out nuclear war in a few years' time.

I believe that in revealing the depth of the Soviet leader's paranoia to the British, I made one of my most vital contributions to international safety.

Well, welcome to the Rest is Classified.

I'm David McCloskey.

And I'm Goulden Carrera.

And that was Oleg Gordievsky, KGB officer, spy for the British, writing in his wonderfully named memoir, Next Stop Execution, about,

I think, Gordon, his most significant contribution as a spy.

We spoke in the last episode about his really crucial assistance in, I guess, really preventing what would have become a mole hunt inside MI5 by revealing the existence of a potential traitor in that organization.

So he's already contributed a lot.

But by the time we get to the mid-80s, Oleg Gordievsky is reporting out of the KGB residency in London.

He's working closely with his handlers in MI6.

And

the Cold War is getting hot in the mid-1980s, Gordon.

And Gordievsky, as he alludes to in his memoir, I think is going to play a really critical role in bringing the temperature down.

Yeah, that's right.

Early in his time, when he's just arrived in London at the start of the 80s, he does produce a report on something called Operation Rianne.

Some people pronounce it Ryan, Rian.

And at the time, you know, people go, oh, it's interesting, but they don't quite realize how significant it is.

And as we'll see, this is actually one of the most significant streams of reporting that Gordievsky will provide to MI6, which is going to go right to the top.

It's going to go to the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher.

It's going to go to the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan.

And it is going to help shape the understanding of the late Cold War.

So Rian is a kind of sign that the Cold War is going through a more dangerous phase.

Not maybe quite as dangerous as as the Cuban Missile Crisis, early 60s, when there is really nearly nuclear war, but still it's not too far off that either.

And you're right, because the context is important, because things are getting more tense at this moment where Rihanne comes into play.

And we're talking now about around 1983, the Reagan administration is trying to pressure the Soviet Union.

and take the fight to them.

So it's backed away from the some of the 70s ideas of detente about making nice with the Soviets.

and it's doing it rhetorically but it's also doing it with some covert action and with some military activities so you know you've got things like that program in afghanistan that the cia is running to arm the mujahideen to kill soviet soldiers and the u.s military is flying missions close to soviet airspace the kgb head at the time is andropov he's worried that the west is getting ready for a first strike using nuclear weapons and there's one memo which goes out from the KGB.

Reactionary imperialist groups in the USA have openly embarked on a course of confrontation.

The threat of outbreak of a nuclear war has reached dangerous proportions, he says.

And this is at the start of the 80s.

And so he, at the helm of the KGB, launches Riyan.

in 1981 and it's the largest soviet peacetime intelligence operation in history because it's run jointly by the kgb and the gru russian military intelligence and the point of it is to look for signs that that first

Western strike on the Soviet Union is coming, because they're convinced it is coming.

So all the officers out in embassies are basically being told to look for the indicators, the warning signs that the strike is coming.

Now, some of them are kind of obvious, like...

Are there any signs of major troop movements?

Which you'd hope they would already be collecting on, but nonetheless.

I mean, they literally had a checklist.

So, you know, it's like as you check them off, as you see more of these.

But one of them them is, is there a rise in the price of blood from donors because the authorities are buying up supplies ready for the war?

Do you charge for blood in the UK?

No, we don't charge for blood.

Do you charge for blood in the US?

Oh, I'm sure you can buy it somewhere.

It's a capitalist free market economy.

Blood prices are at record highs.

Yeah, I just imagine this market.

So no one has actually worked out or told Moscow that they don't charge for it.

But it just gives a side of the paranoia.

Another one, which is half obvious not exactly accurate is to count how many lights are on at the ministry of defense in london at night so if they're more lights on if they're working late those civil servants then it's a sign they're planning war again i mean that is not the most

um accurate reflection just tells you whether you've got a bad boss or you're sitting by a window and you've left the light on for the day i mean you could have left the light on for the day and triggered world war three was there like a color coded scale like the terror warning alerts inside the KGB or something like that?

Yeah, the more ticks on the database means, you know, the closer you're getting to war.

Seems ripe for false positives, I would say.

It's quintessential KGB because it's bureaucratic, it's potentially pointless, it's deeply paranoid.

It suits them.

Exactly.

So this is Andropov's thing.

And then

1982, late that year, The leader of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev, the grey cardinal, the rather dull figure who'd been there for a while, dies.

And Andropov, the KGB man, takes over as leader.

Now, I think this is also interesting because it's actually pretty unusual in Soviet history to have the head of the KGB become also the general secretary of the Communist Party and the leader of the country.

Most of the party apparatchiks don't like KGB men becoming the boss and they try and kind of prevent it happening.

There's a kind of slightly uneasy relationship because everyone knows those KGB guys are a little bit crazy, I think, and a little bit paranoid.

Putin's done just fine, Gordon.

He's done just fine.

He's redeemed the brand.

Let's look at Putin, yeah, and say you wonder why it might be a mistake to have spies as your leaders.

There's a general point there, which is I think on the whole, spies who worry about bad things happening are not necessarily always the best people to have as leaders.

But here you've got Andropov suddenly this guy who's who's a bit paranoid about the West as leader.

March 83, Reagan gives this speech calling the Soviet Union an evil empire and the focus of evil in the modern world.

I mean, this is not the language of someone who's suggesting he wants to negotiate a deal or do arms control.

It doesn't sound like Nixon, does it?

No.

So, you know, Moscow's rightly seeing this is someone who wants to, rather than manage tensions down, he wants to kind of ratchet them up, maybe create an arms race, which Washington thinks it can win because it's superior economically and technologically.

Then a few weeks later, Reagan gives this speech talking about the Strategic Defense Initiative, the SDI, otherwise known much better as Star Wars.

Yeah, it's a better name.

It's a better name, isn't there?

Which again kind of sets off the paranoia because the whole point is the Cold War, you've had mutually assured destruction, each side thinking, well, they won't launch an attack on us because if they do, we can just destroy them.

But suddenly, if America has got this amazing missile shield, which can shoot down our weapons, then they could launch an attack on us and be safe.

So you can see why all of this together is fueling the paranoia.

Of course, Star Wars, as with the film, was a bit of a fantasy.

I still don't think you could build it.

It was all talk.

Unlike the films, it didn't work.

It's not actually a thing, right?

It's not fielded, but it

scares the hell out of the Soviet leadership.

Yeah, the idea that the Death Star is going to be built somehow.

And you've got Pershing missiles being sent to Germany, which could reach Moscow in four to six minutes.

Response to Soviet missiles coming into Europe.

So suddenly there is this feeling that things are getting more tense, particularly I think in Moscow.

And then start of September 83, the Soviets mistakenly shoot down a Korean civilian airliner, thinking it's a US jet in their airspace.

And again, this causes kind of outrage.

You've got this problem where Moscow doesn't understand Washington.

And also Washington and London don't understand what the thinking is in Moscow and just how paranoid they are.

And this fear.

And I think it's kind of interesting because I think the Soviets just had this fear of a surprise attack and that they're they're suddenly going to be taken by surprise by a first strike by this newly aggressive West.

I guess it also shows you how, like just from an intelligence gathering standpoint, just how scant the reporting was on true plans and intentions, right?

The sort of high-level strategic stuff, I guess you could get some of it from SIGINT, but you would need a source who actually has access to senior-level decision-making in either capital to give you a sense of how Washington or Moscow are sort of actually interpreting these events.

It seems like neither side in this period really had particularly well-placed sources.

So Enter Gordievsky, right, who's probably the most senior guy capable of delivering that.

But your point is also a good one, which is it also suggests that Moscow didn't have very good sources or analysis of what the thinking is in Washington and London.

You know, they don't have the kind of insight to know what's going on.

And so, you know, they are generally worried about the nuclear war happened.

And it's interesting because many of the staff out in the embassies for the KGB or the GRU military intelligence, like Gordievsky, originally treat Rian and these fears as a bit of a joke because they're like, oh, I've got to do my checklist for Rianne.

You know, must see if the lights are on.

Because they're in the country and they can see that the mood is not for a first strike and a war.

But what's funny is, under the Soviet system, they have to kind of please their boss.

So it means you have to feed back to your boss to say, yes, there are these warnings, these indicators.

Yes, stuff's happening.

Yes, there are more lights on this week than last week.

Because you're trying to keep your boss happy and you don't want to contradict the boss.

So the result is they kind of try and keep their superiors happy.

They're feeding back stuff to Moscow, which suggests there are some of these indicators and warnings of signs, even though on the ground they don't believe it.

So it's kind of interesting, isn't it?

Because the spies on the ground in the embassies actually have a better feel for what's going on in London and Washington than the chiefs in Moscow.

But the chiefs in Moscow are not getting a really truthful picture either.

So you can see why you get this kind of mixture of fear, ignorance, and paranoia, especially in Moscow, I think.

I mean, it really comes to a head in late 83.

I mean, 83 is a big, a big year, right?

A turning point for the Cold War when NATO's running this kind of high-level exercise, which was codenamed Abel Archer.

It's become well known now.

I don't think it was well known at the time because it was one of their regular exercises with tens of thousands of troops from NATO looking at how a conflict could escalate to the point where there's a nuclear release.

So they're kind of planning, well, here are the steps which might happen, which could lead us to nuclear war.

It's all taking place over a holiday in the Soviet Union, which, you know, the Soviets are like, oh, that's suspicious.

And they see some unusual comms.

they think american bases are being put alert on alert

and they think that the exercise is being used as cover potentially for a real attack and the reason they think that is because that's one of their strategies is you do an exercise and then you launch a real attack under the cover of it so you can see again in the kind of atmosphere of paranoia at this point you know this is a big problem and so gordievsky as well as others get most urgent flash telegrams from moscow saying this could be the prelude to a real attack.

And suddenly Gordievsky is told you must look for signs of that attack coming.

Look for signs of top officials leaving London for their secure bunker somewhere.

Look for those signs because Moscow believes this is it.

And so it's interesting.

The Soviet military is also going to go onto its own heightened alert, including some nuclear forces.

And, you know, what if the US then sees that happening and then puts some of its forces on a higher alert, seeing the Soviets move to Ireland?

You could imagine you could suddenly get this escalate quite quickly where each side sees the other putting forces, even nuclear forces, on higher and higher states of alert.

And then suddenly it doesn't take much for it to go literally bang, I guess.

So Gordievsky kind of sees this and he passes it on to MI6.

And now MI6 are like, oh, hang on a sec.

This makes sense.

And they can also see signals intelligence, which dovetails and was kind of explained by what Gordievsky is saying.

So, I mean, there is a bit of debate about how close the Soviets were to actually launching an attack or doing something.

And I think in some of the retellings now, it gets slightly over-dramatized.

Yeah, it's more fun that way.

It's more fun to make out the nukes were about to be launched.

I don't think that was the case.

I actually think the crucial thing is that it reveals something to MI6 and to London.

It reveals how scared the Soviets are about an imminent attack and just how blind the Soviets are, and how capable of misreading it.

And I remember John Scarlett, who you remember was Gordievsky's case officer in London through this period, although he doesn't acknowledge that publicly.

You know, I spoke to him in a BBC interview many years ago about this period, and he said to me, We didn't understand the extent to which the Soviet leadership didn't understand us.

It's suddenly dawning on MI6.

There is a dangerous gap here and a risk of misunderstanding.

I guess it's natural in some sense to mirror image, right?

But if you don't understand or you don't sort of check that blind spot, and this is where a source like Gordievsky helps immensely, because you sort of don't have to guess at it, right?

And bring your own perspective on Soviet plans and intentions and political culture and kind of spread that over the current environment.

You can actually just hear from inside the system how what you're doing is being perceived.

This is one of my kind of questions about the case is when Gordievsky is providing this information, is he giving his assessments or is he reporting back?

Because there's a bit of a fine line, right?

I mean, Gordievsky can be asked questions about what's going on in Moscow and can kind of give an interpretation of events that's probably more accurate than what MI6 or the CIA or whoever is going to come up with.

But on the other hand, it's also like, what access does he have, right, to kind of senior level decision-making?

You know, he's abroad.

He's in the London Resident Dura.

He's not actually in, you know, in the Kremlin making decisions.

No, but I guess he is plugged into what the Kremlin thinks.

I think this is one of the interesting things which goes back to the business of human intelligence and why human spies are so important and why Gordievsky is so important.

Because you could imagine if you'd intercepted the messages about Abel Archer or how the Soviets are thinking about Abel Archer or you'd had signals collection or you'd stolen, you know, a spy, an agent had stolen a report about it and handed it to MI6.

You would have an insight into what the Soviets are worried about and looking for.

But I kind of think it's only if you can speak to someone, if you can sit down, a case officer with an agent, and say, what's this mean?

How should we understand this?

What does it tell us about the mindset for that person to be able to explain it and convey the kind of atmosphere and the thinking in Moscow.

That to me is what this shows about human spies is if you want to get inside the kind of the actual intentions and the thinking of an adversary,

actually that's where being able to converse with an agent who is plugged into that is priceless.

And I think that's what Gordievsky gives them at this point in a way that they wouldn't have got from signals intelligence or from documents stolen by a human spy and passed on.

That to me says something quite important important about where human intelligence gives you that added value over anything else.

And I guess the primo nature of the material also meant that it was essentially going straight to Prime Minister Thatcher's desk.

I would have to imagine it's also a very small circle in terms of policymakers who were consuming Gordievsky's raw intelligence, just given how sensitive it would have been.

Yeah, and it's interesting because she was actually one of only a handful of people outside of MI6 to know that there was a senior KGB officer offering up secrets.

She doesn't know his name, Gordievsky.

She knows him as Mr.

Collins.

Mr.

Collins.

Mr.

Collins, which is like a great name.

And she really gets interested in him and the reporting.

I mean, she's kind of a little bit of a spy fan.

She likes spy novels, doesn't she?

She likes spy novels.

She likes Freddie Forsyth novels.

Poor Freddie, who's just passed away recently.

And she gets this raw intelligence.

And it comes in the form of what are called red jackets because that's the folder they were in, had a kind of red jacket around around them and a foreign affairs advisor puts them on the desk and would say you know we've got some more posts from mr collins prime minister written more letters yeah mr collins has written some letters and they'd be in this special blue box for which only the prime minister her private secretary and a foreign affairs advisor have got the key so you know i love the idea it's like it needs a key it's very kind of old school but it does mean she's kind of reading some of the raw intelligence and reading these reports from gordievsky margaret thatcher's biographer Charles Moore says, you know, probably no British prime minister has ever followed the case of a British agent with as much personal attention as Mrs.

Thatcher devoted to Gordievsky.

That's Charles Moore.

So, you know, I think, you know, MI6 also, let's be honest.

Oh, this is like crack.

This is great because this is good stuff.

This is a way to, I mean, intelligence, especially an agency like MI6, which is essentially just a collector, right?

I mean, there is a bit of an analytic capability, but my understanding is it's, and I think this was true back then as well, it's kind of like there are reports officers, but there aren't analysts like you have at the CIA, right?

There's not, there's a directorate of intelligence or analysis at CIA.

You don't have that in MI6.

And so your currency is always going to be the quality of the human intelligence.

And so all of a sudden, with a case like Gordievsky,

you've got an invitation to go visit Maggie Thatcher whenever new reports come out.

And as a senior MI6 officer, I'd imagine that is exactly what you're after, is to get the policymakers hooked on the product, right?

It's perfect.

Hooked on the product.

Yeah, because you do make it sound like a drunk.

I said it.

Yeah, it's like crack.

So I came full circle, Gordon.

Yeah, it was like the cat that got the cream, someone said, of told me of MI6 at that time, of how they kind of, you know, walked around.

It's a good point, because even if you go back to World War II, it was the MI6 chief who had the intercepts from Bletchley Park, and they came through the chief of MI6 and would kind of walk them into Churchill.

And it was about very, very deliberately saying, look what we've got and building that kind of relationship.

So, yeah, these agencies know what they're doing.

They know how to play it.

So it's going to go direct to Thatcher.

It's going to have a big impact on her.

Which is not always true of the intelligence, right?

Like there's really exciting stuff that gets to the policymaker.

And then there's stuff that actually changes the policymaker's mind and eventually their actions.

We used to have a joke because you'd get feedback when you write a PDB, you know, an article for the President's Daily Brief, and it would go down to, you know, when I was writing, it was either George W.

Bush or Obama.

And sometimes the feedback from the briefer who took the stuff down would be that the president, quote, read it with interest, which essentially meant he was looking at the page for some period of time that had your article on it.

Right.

And that was like, okay, maybe it had no impact at all.

Right.

But in this case, Thatcher is actually sort of changing her approach in some ways to the height of the Cold War because of what Gordievsky is reporting, which is amazing.

It's amazing, isn't it, in that sense?

Because she realizes how dangerous it is, having seen all this stuff around Rian and the paranoia in Moscow.

And so she's going to tone down the rhetoric.

And I think it's one of the biggest contributions of any spy.

But she'll also then talk to Ronald Reagan and President Reagan about it.

And initially, he's a bit kind of skeptical about it, but it is going to play a role, and we'll come back to this in helping shift the whole approach of these two allies and very closely aligned leaders to the Soviet Union at this dangerous moment, Gordievsky's reporting starts to filter through into Washington at this point.

And it's going to be described as in epiphany for Reagan when he sees this material from Gordievsky.

Now, this, in terms of the story of the case, proves to be both good and bad, the fact that it reaches Washington, David.

Because I'm afraid this is where the CIA, time to utter those words, comes into the story.

Don't you feel better having said CIA, Gordon?

Don't you just feel like there's a lightness about this conversation that we can now proceed with because we have the Central Intelligence Agency involved?

Let's let the audience judge that lightness as

we get through the story about how we feel about the CIA in this case.

It's decidedly going to be a mixed bag, I would say, isn't it?

That's generous, even.

Yeah, it's slightly a bad bag, maybe, in the end.

Not even that mix.

So, Gordievsky's intelligence is passed the Americans, but it's interesting.

It's passed as a report, but not the name of the source.

You know, so five eyes, US, UK, MI6, and CIA are close, aren't they?

But I think sometimes people have the wrong idea that that means they share absolutely everything.

But one of the things they don't share are the actual identity of the sources.

So you might share the product of a source, but you don't always share the identity of who that source is.

And that's what's happening with Gordievsky.

Standard operating procedure on...

in both services would be to not share the name of a source, right?

Because if you think about it, your number one priority, say you're the case officer, the team running Gordievsky, I mean, really, I guess the dual priorities are to collect intelligence and to protect the source.

And sharing the source's name, even with a trusted intelligence service like the CIA,

is increasing the risk.

that you're placing on the case and on the source's, in this case, life.

And so your policy would be to not share the name.

Why would you?

You don't need to if if you're sharing the product.

There are cases where you might.

If, for example, MI6 had started to share the product and CIA looks at it and says, oh, maybe this guy actually approached us as well.

And we've got some stuff.

And maybe we're actually, this guy's double dipping.

He's actually trying to work for both services.

You might have to deconflict.

by sharing the name to be sure, you know, we haven't actually recruited the same person.

So there's de-confliction.

There's also cases, I think, where you might share share the name if either side was trying to learn more about another source through Gordievsky.

So like there are cases where it would make sense, but I really do think that it's actually not abnormal in this case for the Brits to not share the name.

Because there's really no reason for CIA to know.

Yeah, because I find it interesting because at the moment people go, oh, well, given the politics and current U.S.

administration, will MI6 stop sharing source names in case they get blown somehow in Washington in a different administration?

You go, well, actually, look at the Gordievsky case, because at that point, Thatcher and Reagan were about as closely aligned politically as you could get.

I mean, they were incredibly close in their foreign policy and in their domestic politics.

And at that point, the two agencies in the middle of the Cold War are not sharing the identity of the sources.

So it makes clear it's not what normally happens.

I agree.

So anyway, it goes to CIA.

the material treated as the holy of holiest in the CIA, I was told, dealt with by the analysts.

So the Minnie McCloskeys.

That doesn't sound right.

Are we sure about that?

I'm sure that there were analysts who had access to it, but I don't know.

It seems like it would be officers inside, you know, what was then, what was it, SE Division, the shop that held what became Russia House.

I met someone who had been on the analytical wing at the time who said it was shared with them

under very strict conditions.

So like hard copy only, you know, had to be kind of of signed in, signed out.

So I think analysts would see the product, the Minnie McCloskeys of the day in Russia House and elsewhere.

But, you know, and I think they found it very valuable because it's giving them that insight.

And he's revealing to them how kind of skewed those Soviet perceptions of Western policies were.

And, you know, wars come from those misunderstandings.

So Gordievsky's warnings, I think, then do start to feed into Washington quite deeply.

And Bob Gates, who is deputy director of the CIA, later defense secretary, said Gordievsky helped reinforce Reagan's conviction that a great effort had to be made not just to reduce tension, but to end the Cold War.

So you can see the impact there.

Although, of course, here is the problem, and we'll come back to this.

It makes the CIA a bit jealous, doesn't it?

You know, those kind of base emotions, Gordon, are not.

Those are below the Central Intelligence Agency.

I think you'll find, maybe in your time, David, but I think if you go back to the early 80s.

We'd We'd matured by the early 2000s.

No, I could see there being a sense of rivalry, for sure.

I think there is occasional competition, or maybe just a constant undercurrent of competition between the two surfaces that usually is resolved peaceably and to the mutual benefit of both capitals, but occasionally can be disruptive.

That makes sense to me, especially given how good of a case this is.

I could could see there being

number one, yeah, some sense of like, why didn't the Russia house guys in the States or, you know, whatever it was at the time, SE Division, why didn't they get this?

Why haven't you recruited a sort of mid-to-upper-level KGB officer, right?

What's going on?

Yeah, that makes total sense.

Yeah.

Well, maybe they're Gordon, with the Central Intelligence Agency being a little bit naughty.

Let's take a break.

And when we come back, we will see how this case careens toward disaster.

See you after the break.

See you after the break.

Hi, David McCloskey here from The Rest is Classified with an exciting announcement for U.S.

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well welcome back oleg gordovsky is of course spying for mi6 in london but gordon you know how much i love to talk about family on this podcast families of all kinds and gordovsky is interesting with his second wife now and his daughters.

I mean, they are absolutely not in the loop on what he's doing.

That's right.

So he's London

leading this double life, spying for MI6 while working for the KGB.

And he doesn't really have any doubts himself.

We spoke before about his kind of ideological commitment to the ideas of freedom of democracy.

The only times where he does a little bit question whether he is on the right path is when it comes to his family.

And he looks at his wife and his daughters and thinks, what have I done?

How do I get out of this?

And he knows there's not really any way out.

But that's the one thing which makes him worried is the knowledge he's embarked on a path which could be dangerous for him, but also for his wife and his two pretty young daughters.

He doesn't actually at the time share any of these worries or his doubts with his MI6 case officers.

I think he's always very keen to present this disciplined focus intelligence officer front to them in the meetings that he has with Scarlett and others.

But I think behind the scenes, there is just that element of struggle.

And he sometimes feels the urge of perhaps he should tell his wife.

One time he's criticizing something about Moscow.

She tells him to stop.

And she says, Well, you can't do anything about it.

And he thinks, Maybe I can do something about it.

Maybe one day you'll see I was able to do something about it.

That's what he says.

He nearly wants to go further and say, I am doing something about it.

You know, I'm spying.

I'm taking on the kgb but he knows you know her mother and father are you know in the soviet union and deep inside the system and linked to the kgb itself she also talks about being a bit homesick you know and she's got friends back in the soviet union she's got a part-time job in the kgb station in london i think he just knows he can't guarantee that she will share his views.

And then what if she betrays him?

If he says anything to her, the risks for her go up as well, whatever she decides to do about it.

He's keeping his spying and his secret life closed off from her.

Seems very stressful.

It seems stressful.

I think he's very good at compartmenting his life, but you can still believe that all this emotional energy is going into staying on the road, you know, kind of keeping the show on the road rather than perhaps having a positive relationship with his wife.

So you get a sense the relationship is not easy and he's kind of tense and he's preoccupied, but she hasn't got any idea.

So he's walking this tightrope and it's about to get even more tense and even more important.

Gordievsky's reporting about how to manage the Soviet Union, as we saw, has been important for Thatcher.

It's going to feed into a meeting that Thatcher has at Checkers, which is the Prime Minister's country retreat, in which they decide in London they want to reach out to reformists in the Soviet Union and invite some of them to Britain.

And there's a younger star on the rise in the Communist Party at this point, which is Mikhail Gorbachev, not yet leader, but the invitation is made in 1984 to come to London.

It's going to be in December.

It's a big moment for Oleg and the embassy.

But also things are getting a little bit tricky at the embassy.

He's not entirely popular with other KGB officers.

You know, he's not one of the...

He's not one of the drinking boys.

He's not swilling vodka from a tumbler in the office.

He is really an outlier, though.

He doesn't really drink.

I mean, I guess he will.

He doesn't seem to be totally a teetotaler, but he's not.

He's not a social drinker.

He's not a social drinker.

He's not consuming it to the extent that Resident Gook might be considered.

Envy, yeah.

Our friend, Arkady Gook.

Arcady, our favorite resident.

But he's also, especially at the start, not been recruiting that many agents because he's busy spying for MIC.

Is anybody recruiting agents, though, in the London Resident Aura?

Good point.

I think they're busy trying by having fancy lunches people are trying i think they've got a few contacts so mi6 start to realize this is a bit of a problem and they start to help they start to give him chicken feed which is material he can send back to look like he's writing useful reports and they also put him in touch with people who can be confidential contacts so not full agents but contacts and these are people that mi5

have put in his path deliberately so that he can up his quota of people he's talking but it would not kind of feed real stuff yeah it's good ben mcintyre mentions this in his book the spy and the traitor on this that you know they put a young woman who worked in the conservative central office in front of him so he can say look i've got a contact so he's on the up and mi6 also do this smart thing which is they maneuver against his colleagues so they expel one of them in March 1983.

So now Oleg is the head of Line PR.

So he's the head of political reporting for the whole embassy.

And then Bettany, Michael Bettany, as as we heard last time, unmasked as a kind of wannabe traitor.

When the trial comes for that in 1984, they've got a pretext to do what seems like a wonderful move and a tragic move for our favorite character, Arkady Gook.

Unfairly villainized in this series.

He's been villainized by us.

He's just a humble KGB man who wants to drink vast quantities of vodka and conspire against his colleagues.

And he's been tossed out, sent back to the Soviet Union.

So he's going to get expelled because, you you know, his name can come up in Betany's trial.

It means that Oleg has moved from deputy head of political reporting to head of political reporting.

Now with Arkady Gook removed, the deputy head of the whole Residentura becomes the acting head and Oleg becomes his deputy.

So suddenly he's number two in the embassy and the person above him is only the acting head.

So there's a succession battle.

Oleg has got a shot at this.

And MI6 wonder about expelling the acting head, but they're kind of like, that's because because that's too obvious

too obvious and you know oleg's going to go back for a regular meeting that summer 1984 he's told he's a candidate to be resident the head of the kgb in london but he knows it's going to be a battle and he knows that this big moment is coming up which is that in december gorbachev is due to make this eight-day visit to london And as the head of political reporting, as well as deputy head, he's going to be briefing Gorbachev on British politics.

And as an MI6 agent, he's going to brief London about Gorbachev and Soviet politics.

And this is just, I think this is absolutely wild as a kind of triumph of human intelligence.

He is writing reports on British politics, things like the miners' strike, Margaret Thatcher, to prepare Gorbachev for the meetings.

And when Gorbachev arrives, he reads these reports.

And back to your point about PDBs, Gordievsky will get the briefs for Gorbachev back with the things underlined that Gorbachev is interested in for the visit and then Gordievsky can go tell MI6 this is the stuff Gorbachev is really interested in and you know you should be prepared for that and MI6 even give Gordievsky a brief on what the British Foreign Secretary is going to raise with Gorbachev so that then Gordievsky can write the brief for Gorbachev ready so that he knows what's going to be raised.

Spot on.

Yeah, spot on.

Amazing, Mr.

Gordievsky, how you seem to have this amazing insight into what the British will be raising.

And it's wild that in the middle of this is this kind of political reporting officer for MI6 who is basically briefing both the British Prime Minister and the upcoming Soviet top official through an agent.

Through an MI6 agent.

I mean, it is wild.

An asset like this, like Gordievsky, you could argue actually releases a lot of pressure from the system because what's being passed to Moscow, the Brits are providing through Gordievsky real insight into the British position and decision-making, right?

So this can help to take the temperature way down to have this kind of free flow of communication.

I mean, the Brits know what's going on, the Soviets don't, but it kind of decompresses things.

Yeah, you're reducing the space for misunderstanding or miscalculation or going down rabbit holes off the wrong way.

Thatcher's going to have noticed how well-breathed Gorbachev is.

It means that when they meet Thatcher and Gorbachev, they have back and forth about things like the miners' strike, which is going on, and Soviet distance.

And yet they kind of can get beyond that and understand each other and actually get to like each other.

Now, you know, Gordievsky, when Gorbachev first arrives at the embassy, actually thinks he's a bit disappointing.

He thinks Gorbachev is just this kind of, he's another apparatchik, he thinks, you know.

Screwed up that assessment.

Yeah, he did, didn't he?

Although that's interesting as well, isn't it?

Because I think it maybe speaks to Gordievsky being so cynical about the Soviet Union and so pro-Western that he can't see any potential that even Gorbachev could be a reformer.

He doesn't see that there's a chance of reform.

It means the trip is wildly successful and a really important success because Thatcher comes away from it convinced, and she says this publicly, that for all the differences the two sides have, Gorbachev is someone she can do business with.

She says, you know, this is someone we can work with to lower tensions.

And she immediately sends a note to Reagan in Washington.

And then she actually flies out to Washington soon after, a few weeks later, to personally brief Reagan at Camp David, saying to President Reagan, it is worth getting to know Gorbachev.

This guy is interesting.

And that, I think, will help shape policy in these crucial years.

You've had these years of tension.

And now, partly thanks to Gordievsky, they've realized the tensions need to be lowered.

And again, thanks to Gordievsky, Reagan and Thatcher are realizing that Gorbachev offers a different path through the second half of the 80s.

And it's going to open up, I think, that possibility of engagement and reform, which is going to bring the Cold War to a manageable end rather than a blowout.

And I think that's, I mean, in terms of contributions, that's pretty big.

Slightly significant, I would say.

Also, I mean, I'd have to think that those briefings that Gordievsky provides would have played really well in Moscow, given how accurate they were.

Someone would have taken note and said, you know, that sort of deputy resident out there in London is a

straight shooter with upper management written all over him.

Yeah, so it does.

It does him no end of good.

Although, noticeably, his rival for the top job as resident kind of is slightly suspicious at how good the briefings were.

What do you understand?

Isn't it remarkable?

British system so well.

And actually, tells Oleg, I think, at one point, you know, hmm, those briefings were suspiciously good.

So it looks like, you know, there's a little bit, he might have been too good.

But the result of all this is at the start of 1985 he is told you've got the job you are resident designate you are about to be the head of the kgb station in london outside of perhaps washington the most important foreign posting for the kgb at that time a very senior officer privy to all the secrets and he's due to start in a few months this is an amazing prize i think for mi6

And then it's going to start to slip away.

And why, David?

Why does it slip away?

Enter a CIA man wearing a Stetson with cowboy boots on, trying to understand who in the world is providing this exceptional information to our British cousins, huh?

Who is this?

The CIA getting particularly jealous, it looks like, at this point.

At one point, supposedly, pinning an MI6 officer up against the wall at a Christmas party and asking, like, you know, who is this one?

No.

I find that a bit implausible.

Anything's possible if someone has 10 scotches at a Christmas party.

You know, they could do anything.

It makes sense to me that MI6 would sort of politely demure and say, we're not going to tell you the name.

Also, I mean, to some degree, I kind of wonder if the CIA is even really asking.

It also makes sense that the CIA sort of behind the scenes would try to figure out who the source is because it will give you more confidence or I guess potentially less, right?

It helps you understand the stream of reporting that you're looking at if you really know who it is.

So it makes sense to me that the agency would maybe try to figure it out or at least come with a list of suspects.

It's maybe a little bit hard for me to say it's all down to jealousy, because I guess there is a practical bit where if you know that this source is so influential in the White House with your president, you kind of want to be sure about it.

So early 85, Burton Gerber, head of SC division at CIA, decides he's going to try and find out who this source is.

I still think this is bad practice and very naughty, David.

You think it's naughty?

I think it's naughty, yeah.

And the Brits, I can tell you the Brits think it's naughty.

It's a naughty business, Gordon.

It's a naughty business.

That should be our slogan for the podcast.

Is it naughty?

It seems understandable on all sides.

It seems understandable that the Brits would say, this is an amazing source, and here's a bit of information on who it is, but we're not going to tell you the name.

It also makes sense to me that...

Burton Gerber would want to figure out who it is.

Well, I can tell you that the Brits think it's naughty because I talked to someone who was involved in this case and they were fuming about it still years on.

And they said it wasn't a game.

If we'd wanted to tell them, we would have done.

Well, that's why we had to find out ourselves because you didn't tell us.

Okay.

I think it's naughty.

I'm going to stand by that position.

Fair enough.

I guess lots of naughty things are also understandable, right?

Even if they remain naughty.

Those are two different things.

So they're going to try and find out.

In their naughtiness, the CIA will be trying to find out how to do it.

And it's interesting because, of course, you can see how they could start to piece it together because they know it's someone who the Brits are able to meet regularly.

If you've got the analytic product, you can say, Well, this guy knows a lot about what's happening in London.

He knows a lot about this.

He knows a lot about that.

You can start to go, oh, well, there was that arrest of Bettiny in Britain.

There's been an arrest also, we should say, of a Norwegian agent of the KGB who Gordievsky had informed on.

So you can start to see, oh, well, there's someone who was working in that division between Britain and Scandinavia and who's been doing it for a while.

And you can start to piece it together and narrow it down.

And of course, you've got the expulsions in Britain, you've got Arkhaidi Guk.

And so, if you're in the CIA, if you're smart CIA analysts, the best of the mini-McCloskeys, you can probably start going, okay, you can start to see what the Brits are up to.

Analysts were never read into this little game to find out the name.

No, no, no.

I can guarantee you there were, I would be shocked if a single analyst had known that this was happening.

This was going on

inside SE Division and in the kind of

operational bit.

Yeah, exactly.

Exactly.

Yeah, that does make more sense.

So they are going to work it out and they're going to work out that Gordievsky fits the profile.

And they're going to send a cable to the CIA's London station saying, Would Gordievsky fit the profile?

And the London station will say, Yes, he fits the profile.

They're not going to tell the Brits they've had a guess about it.

Now, here is the problem: that one of the people, one of the counter-intelligence officers in the SE division, the Soviet division, is a man called Aldrich Ames.

And he

is a baddie.

He is a baddie.

He is a baddie.

I think we should do his story properly.

We will do his story properly, won't we?

Because it's a good story.

I mean, it's one of the defining espionage and counterintelligence stories of the Cold War as well, is

the sort of betrayal of Aldrich Ames, his betrayals of the agency and so many of its Russia sources.

And he's essentially after money.

right?

Ames is.

And it's just, it's remarkable that he's one of the people running the sort of hunt for Gordievsky's name inside the CIA.

It's unfortunate.

I know it's a little unclear if Ames was really the one who gave up Gordievsky's name, but certainly, you know, him running the sort of CIA investigation to figure out who the source is is bad.

Yeah, and we will delve into Ames more.

This all happens then in 1985, in May, because just before Oleg is due to take up his role as resident, Ames first approaches the KGB, but he doesn't talk to them properly until may the 15th and he might have at that point told his handler about the fact that there's some kind of mole but you're right there is a bit of ambiguity about this because ames himself when he's later interrogated will say he doesn't give up gordievsky's name at this point you know and he is clear about that but a lot of other people think the coincidence is too strong but the fact there's a bit unexplained you know is an issue and he will say i only gave up the name in june now these dates might seem a bit kind of marginal May or June.

It does matter because it's in May that things are going to go south for Gordievsky.

And there is also the possibility that the KGB had some fears about a mole anyway that, you know, you've got Gordievsky's rival for the resident job who's also kind of got his suspicions.

So there might have been other circumstantial reasons why the KGB could have been suspicious about it, even if Ames, perhaps, at his first meeting, had just been vague about a penetration in Britain and not mentioned that it was Gordievsky.

But whatever the exact causes, the result is disaster.

Because in London, Gordievsky has the prize in sight, becoming resident, when a cipher clerk brings in a telegram to his office, May 16th.

So it's the day after Ames has had a meeting with his KGB handlers.

Gordievsky gets a telegram.

And without warning, he's being recalled to Moscow.

A sudden summons home, two days, and I think it's fair to say that's really good news.

It's never good news in the KGB, Gordon, I suppose.

And maybe there, with Oleg now headed home to see what awaits him and into the dark embrace of the KGB, who is going to investigate him and try to understand if he is truly the mole.

Let's end.

And when we come back, we'll see how Oleg navigates through that minefield.

But wait, before we go,

there's more.

If you don't want to wait, don't wait.

You don't have to be an Aldrich Ames trying to piece together what happens in your own mind because you can just join the declassified club.

You don't have to be naughty.

You can just be, you can just join the club at the restisclassified.com and you will get all the deepest secrets from the podcast.

But especially you can listen to the next few episodes right away without any delay or having to to piece together any fragments of intelligence.

So do join, but otherwise, we'll see you next time.

We'll see you next time.

Hey, this is David from the Rest is Classified again.

Here's that short excerpt from my upcoming novel, The Persian, which will be available on September 30th in the U.S.

wherever books are sold.

And even though I'm reading right now, the audiobook is wonderfully narrated by Fajr al-Qaisi.

I hope you enjoy.

Where am I, General?

Cameron as Fahani loads his questions with a tone of slavish deference because, though the man resembles a kindly Persian grandfather, he is, in the main, a psychopath.

The general is looking hard at Cam.

He plucks a sugar cube from the bowl on the table, tucks it between his teeth, and sips his tea.

Cam typically would not ask such questions, but during the three years spent in his care, hustled constantly between makeshift prisons, he has never once sat across from the general, clothed properly with a steaming cup of tea at his fingertips, a spoon on the table, and a window at his back.

Something flashes through the general's eyes and it tells Cam that he he will deeply regret asking the question again.

It has been over a year since the general last beat him or strung him up in what his captors call the chicken kebab, but the memories are fresh each morning.

Cam can still see the glint of the pipe brought down on his leg, can still remember how the pain bent time into an arc that stretched into eternity, and how that glimpse into the void filled him with a despair so powerful that it surely has no name, at least not in Persian, Swedish, or English, the three languages he speaks.

And he's got more than the memories, of course.

He's got blurry vision in his left eye and a permanent hitch in his stride.

What is the spoon doing here?

A spoon?

2,721 consecutive meals have been served, without utensils, on rubber discs, so Cam can't help but blink suspiciously at the spoon.

A mirage, an eyeball scooper, a test?

Perhaps the general plans to skin the fingers that pick it up.

The general calms his fears with a nod, a genuine one, which Cam knows looks quite different from the version he uses for trickery, for lulling him into thinking there will be no physical harm.

Cam puts a lump of sugar into his tea and slowly picks up the spoon.

He stirs, savoring the cold metal on his fingertips.

He sets it down on the table and waits, listening to the soft metallic wobble as the bowl of the spoon comes to rest.

You will write it down again, the general says.

He is rubbing the gray bristle on his neck, and Cam follows his eye contact as it settles on the portraits of the two Ayatollahs looking down from the wall above.

When Cam was a child, the sight of the Ayatollah's frightened him.

It still does.

He looks away.

You will write it again, and you will leave nothing out.

It will be comprehensive and final.

Final?

Cam considers another question.

The general's silent gaze screams, do not.

The first drafts, right after his capture three years ago, were utter shit, like all first drafts.

To call them stories would be like calling the raw ingredients spread across your counter a meal.

No, they were just a bunch of facts, information wrung from his tortured lips and committed to bloodstained sheets of A4 paper.

But Cam knows he's being too hard on himself.

As a dentist, his writing had been limited to office memorandums and patient notes.

As a spy, his cables adopted similarly clinical tones.

Just the facts, Glitzmann, his handler, the man who'd recruited him to work for Massad liked to say, leave the story to someone else.

Masad had preferred he write in English, not Swedish.

The general, of course, demands that he write in Persian, and it is in Persian that Cam has found his voice.

Now the cell becomes Cam's scriptorium.

In his dragging, tedious Persian script, he writes the Quranic inscription, In the name of God, honesty will save you, across the top of the cover page.

Cam knows that the general appreciates this self-talk reminder right up front.

Beneath it, Cam titles this as the first part of his sworn confession and then signs his name.

Someone will fill in the date later, because though he does not know the date today, he also knows not to ask.

The general's men will fill in the location for their own files.

He writes the number one in the top left corner.

But which story should he tell?

The general said it was to be his masterpiece.

Perhaps the best of each, he thinks.

He would also like to write something the general will let him finish.

He would like to reach the end.

Across hundreds of drafts, no matter the type of story, Cam has only managed to write one version of the end.

It is the part he fears the most.

Someday, he has told himself, someday he will write a new beginning to the bleakness of the end.

Will he find it here on this last attempt?

A prisoner can dream, he thinks.

As always, Cam completes a final ritual before he starts this draft.

He imagines writing down his last remaining secret in crayon on one of these A4 sheets right in front of him.

One secret.

Three years in captivity, Cam has held on to only one.

Then he pictures a wooden cigar box.

He slides the paper with the secret inside.

In the early days of his captivity, he locked the real secret written on imaginary paper in the imaginary cigar box into an imaginary safe.

But the general's men broke into every physical safe in his apartment, and Cam thought he should also improve his mental defenses.

He now pictures the cigar box with his secret incinerated on a monstrous pyre, the lights and heat so fierce that every dark corner of his brain burns bright as day.

This way Cam's not lying when the general asks him if he's been truthful, if the story is complete.

He's written it all down, has he not?

The prisoner cannot be held responsible for how management handles the papers.

Cam presses the crayon to the paper, and begins.