Trump’s Peace Plan: Lessons from the Negotiating Table

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Hey, everybody.

Welcome once again to another weekly show podcast.

My name is Jon Stewart, and I will be talking throughout

this,

did they call it a broadcast?

A podcast?

I guess it's not a broadcast.

It's more like a cassette tape that you pop in.

while you're driving to Rochester or however it is that you enjoy these types of things.

It is Wednesday, October 15th.

This will probably air Thursday, so who knows what will happen.

But for now, peace,

peace, peace in the Middle East.

There is the ceasefire.

You know, there's been a lot of talk about why.

What happened?

Was it the Israeli bombing in Qatar that sort of knocked loose a couple of chains of event that brought this about?

Was it Donald Trump, the great man of peace that went in and and brought warring factions together and finally bridged a gap that seemed unbridgeable.

But there's one theory that hasn't been proffered yet, and I think it's one that needs to be considered.

And I hate to even throw it out there, but

this agreement to end the bombing, to return the hostages, to bring peace

happened

really on the heels of the Riyadh Comedy Festival.

And I just want to say, you know, perhaps, and I know, look,

correlation is not necessarily causation, but I don't think we can deny the proximity, the pro

America's greatest mirthmakers head into a region torn by strife.

Boom, airline food set, boom, couple of quick impressions

the next day.

Hey, can't we all just get along?

Is that the power, ladies and gentlemen?

I know the comics have taken just a lot of shit,

but is that the power of the jester?

And is it time to,

you know, open up a yuck-yucks and Kyiv in Moscow and bring those two factions together?

Is it time to deploy Fluffy

to

the other areas of strife in this world?

Food for thought, ladies and gentlemen.

Or maybe it was the petitions we all signed.

I don't know.

But anyway, we're actually going to find out a much more insightful

reason for what's going on over there with our guests for this podcast.

And I'm just going to get to them right now.

So let's bring them out.

Ladies and gentlemen, in this changing moment of world peace, I want to talk to two people who have great experience in this area, who've got great insight in this area.

Daniel Levy was president of the U.S.

Middle East Project and former Israeli peace negotiator.

And Zaha Hassan, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former coordinator and senior legal advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team during Palestine's 2010 to 2012 bid for UN membership.

Thank you both very much for joining us here today.

I want to start very briefly, if I can, just for the audience's sake.

Daniel, if you could very quickly give a little bit of your background because it's going to come in handy later you know people are talking about uh this being a moment not since oslo you had experience during i know oslo too uh

what's your experience in terms of negotiating these types of peace agreements well I was working with the guys who informally did the back channel of Oslo when that breakthrough had just happened.

I then do my military service as a Brit who moved to Israel, dual national.

And in my military service, I'm on the negotiating team for the Oslo B.

So that's under Rabin.

That is finished.

I actually finished my military service and three days later, Rabin is assassinated.

And then later on, I take a political role with a leading figure in the Labour Party.

I then go into the Prime Minister's office under Ehud Barak.

And during the...

Taba talks, which is right at the end of the Clinton presidency, we have these talks, which were considered to get really close.

and I'm part of the negotiating team.

Then, and then I do an informal, detailed

accord called Geneva.

Okay.

And so, this your experience is through the many different iterations of that they tried to start, then restart, then into fada.

Then

you have a good understanding about how these things

begin, how they gestate, and how they fall apart, unfortunately, oftentimes.

And Zaha, your experience is as a lawyer for Palestinian rights.

Is that correct?

Yeah, so I was brought in in 2010 after

Obama had failed to really get the negotiations that he wanted to launch off the ground.

And that failed because Palestinians were looking for

a freeze on settlement construction during negotiations, and Obama was pushing for that.

And we couldn't get that from Netanyahu, who was the prime minister at the time.

So I came in because Palestinians wanted to internationalize

the resolution to the quote-unquote conflict.

And so seeking bilateral recognition, sound familiar, and seeking membership

in the UN as a way for two reasons.

First, to sort of level the negotiating table a bit, you know, so that Palestine could negotiate as a sovereign state, you know, quote-unquote sovereign again.

Right.

But also because Palestinians wanted to access

the International Criminal Court.

And we were told by the prosecutor of the ICC that in order to sign the Rome Statute, we'd have to get sign off from the UN that Palestine was in fact a state.

So it was for those two reasons that we pursued that.

And I was a part of the team that was trying to get states, particularly in Western Europe, to recognize Palestine and support Palestine in the UN.

Thank you.

I say this because I want to give people who are listening

the understanding that this, much like Taylor Swift's Eras tour, you know, there are various eras of these negotiations and various international bodies that either cooperate or don't cooperate, or to give a sense of the stops and starts, even though the underlying conflict obviously remains unsettled.

This has been going on for a very long time.

But

unlike the Eris tour, which I had the honor of seeing, all of those eras are great.

None of these eras are very good at all.

No, none of these eras are very good at all.

And I had absolutely outed you as a Swifty from the get-go, Daniel.

I knew.

I was going to wear the t-shirt, but I was told it was inappropriate.

I understand.

We have, obviously, we don't want to get sued.

So now let's turn to today, and then we'll use some of your background from the history of it to turn in there.

I cannot help but feel

relief that at least the bomb, the incessant killing and the hostages are out.

Every petition I signed two years ago said, free the hostages, stop the bombing.

That's been done.

Are you both feeling,

forgetting about looking at what's coming up next, a sense of at least some relief, Daniel?

Look, undoubtedly,

the fact that there is not killing, destruction, displacement, starvation of that intensity.

Palestinians are still being killed, but we haven't got those daily horrors.

That's huge.

Those scenes of the 20 remaining living hostages, military-aged males being released, uniting with their families.

I know people who've worked with those families every day, hugely emotional.

Seeing Palestinians come out of prisons.

Let's not forget these people were put inside Israeli jails by a military tribunal of an illegal military occupation.

The fact that aid may get in, still apparently being nickeled and dimed and not at the level necessary.

That is all huge.

The fact that we then look at this paper.

this 20-point plan and we say there's very little there there.

It doesn't mention the West Bank once, etc.

That is also something something that we can't ignore because part of the problems you already see on the ground are a derivative of the greatest strength and the greatest weakness of this.

And if I can say, what is that?

It's Donald J.

Trump.

The greatest strength is he seems to be committed.

Therefore, the bar for Israel to violate this, to go back to attacking Palestinians in Gaza, that bar is high, especially given all the ceremonials.

But the greatest weakness is it carries all the unseriousness of the imprimatur of Donald Trump.

It doesn't have an actual path to peace.

It's full of bombast.

Trump is the head of this peace board.

Tony Blair is on there.

The only two members apparently of a Palestinian technocratic board are Donald Trump and Tony Blair.

Powerful.

Dream team.

Dream team.

Dream team.

Zah, what's been your immediate impression?

Yeah, you know, I have the same reaction as Daniel.

I mean, I think about it on a human level, and I look at my friends from Gaza, and I look at colleagues, people that have been,

you know, wanting to know that their family is going to be safe.

And of course, I'm celebrating with them, you know, and I'm happy with them.

But at the same time, I'm very frightened because

we've seen this before.

And

my lawyer hat comes on and my analyst hat comes on.

And then I look at

terms that we're asked to believe are going to produce

something of a political horizon for Palestinians, and I don't see that there.

You know, I mean, we have the phase one, that's pretty clear.

We've already seen a lot of implementation on that score.

Like Daniel said, there's been also Palestinian killing going on still during that, but not the the bombardment that we've seen and we've seen aid come in.

So,

you know, we celebrate that.

But when you get to phase two of the agreement, that's when things fall apart.

And you start to see that,

you know, this transitional period that's supposed to then lead to the political horizon is incredibly problematic.

And it looks like occupation by

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So, Zaha, talk to me about that because you talk about that phase two.

I think we're all, and I hesitate to say that the Western media is

somewhat sensationalist and perhaps attention deficit disorder driven, and that we've all been taken in by the pomp and circumstance of the announcements in the Knesset and the scenes of the people, and haven't looked behind that.

But when you talk about

phase two, an occupation by another name,

what is it exactly within that?

You know, this board that apparently, you know, or Hamas will cede control to a technocratic board that apparently doesn't have Palestinians on it, but has Tony Blair, Donald Trump.

I don't see where we could go wrong there.

What is this phase two?

Well, let's step back for just a second because, I mean, how did we get here, right?

How did we get to this Trump plan?

What was the, you know, what was the, you know, what was going on?

What's the context for it?

You know, just ahead of this, we had this big UN conference, remember, this high-level conference, and all of these states got together and they started recognizing Palestine, these whole

Macron, Starmer, Australia, Canada.

All these countries were coming out, and they had signed this New York Declaration, essentially committing to support Palestinian self-determination.

And that was because the International Court of Justice said that Israel's occupation is illegal, that Palestinians have a right to self-determination, and that third states need to support them, and that the territorial unit for Palestinian self-determination is the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem.

And so that's where we were.

All this momentum was being built around the notion the world is going to support Palestine now, finally, you know, an end of occupation.

And then we get this Trump plan.

And the Trump plan essentially says the problem really isn't the occupation.

The problem is Palestinians are radical, you know, and we need to clamp down on them and figure out how we can reform them so they could be worthy of actually governing themselves.

And so, what this plan says essentially is that we're going to have this

board, this peace board, where Trump is going to lead us.

And,

you know, he's going to make all the decisions about what's going to happen in Gaza.

And he's going to make all the decisions about what

Palestinian governance should look like.

But to start, Palestinians get to provide services to themselves.

So that's the Palestinian technocratic apolitical committee that you know that is going to be set up.

We don't know who these people are.

They're not going to be elected.

They're going to be vetted by

Trump and whoever else is on this board.

They're foreign actors, business people.

And then we're going to have security provided by some foreign actors that so far we don't see any Arab governments jumping into this.

Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar at some point.

Well, but they've but most are saying no we don't want to have anything to do with this if you don't have Palestinians uh governing here so so I mean there's a you know there's a a lot of questions about whether any of this is is implementable so let's let's break that down because I think what Zaz said gets to the heart of something that I think is really interesting which is Palestinian worthiness it's this idea that Israel gets to decide or the world gets to decide Palestinian worthiness Daniel you've been working on this for years, and it seems so often within these negotiations that there are these stipulations.

Palestine has to hit these benchmarks.

And if they can hit these benchmarks, they will be deemed worthy and get, I guess, a brown belt in governance and can then move on to have their own state.

But We've all seen how fragile this worthiness is or this idea of worthiness.

How does that figure into these types of negotiations, Daniel, in your experience?

Your voice almost suggests that perhaps a bar is being intentionally set

to place the Palestine.

How dare you?

And that's, but so this is the thing.

I've seen two styles of approach.

One is

the bulldozer approach.

We have the power.

This is clearly a totally asymmetrical conflict, an occupying state, an occupied people.

Let's bulldoze this through and drive home things that are patently not going to be acceptable to the other side.

If in a moment of weakness they sign, it's not going to be sustainable.

So my argument till I go blue in the face is this doesn't get you anywhere, Israel, because if it doesn't have acceptance on the other side, if it's not legitimate, it's not actually going to be something that the Palestinians can embrace.

And you can never have security when you run a regime of structural violence and apartheid over another people.

You can't actually sleep at night when you know that they have absolute cause to, I'm not saying break international law, do what was done on October 7th, but you're not going to have that security.

The other approach is to say, we recognize the legitimate interest of the other party.

We consider ourselves to have legitimate interests.

How do you accommodate those things?

And so often in this process, those fleeting moments when that second approach looked like it might break through, it needed something.

What did it need, John?

It needed, in this asymmetrical reality, it needed that outside power, that third party, which invariably has been monopolized by the U.S.

It needed them to take the responsible approach and say, you know what?

We have to level things up a bit.

Israel, that approach is not going to get you anywhere.

And consistently, relentlessly, it's been the opposite approach until you reach.

the place that Trump has tried to take this to.

So we've been to this movie before.

But let me let me push back on that a second because it speaks to a good faith that and maybe this is my cynicism raising its ugly head but it it seems as though placing those benchmarks is purposeful not to get you know if you talk about well israel's not going to get to where they want to be it seems like they are uh there's a smaller and smaller footprint for Palestinians, even within a political framework.

And let's talk about Oslo too for a moment.

Rabin

is seen as a peacemaker when he is unfortunately assassinated.

I can't remember if it was, was it Perez that was running in his stead?

Yes.

So Perez is seen as a dove, and Netanyahu is running against him.

And

so the idea was, well, Perez was the dove.

He's got all the wind at his back because Rabin is a beloved figure.

He's just been assassinated.

And what happens?

Terrorist bombings.

I can't remember if it was how many and how many days.

It was a two-week period of terror bombings.

Netanyahu,

then the Hawk is elected.

And we go back to brute force.

And so it seems that

these stipulations that are put in place are so fragile and so easily violated that are they really there in good faith?

Zaha, is that

am I being too cynical here?

No,

I think that's that's the

cycle that we see.

And you talk about the benchmarks

and thinking about the benchmarks that are embedded in the Trump plan.

I mean, what we see in the Trump plan is a reference to the Peace to Prosperity Trump 2020 plan

and the benchmarks that were set for Palestinians in that, which basically said, you know, Israel gets to decide whether Palestinians have addressed incitement, whether Palestinians have, you know,

really reformed, and whether Palestinians have dropped all their cases for legal accountability, because that's a no-no.

You can't be a good Palestinian authority and be seeking accountability for war crimes.

And so those are the benchmarks that Israel is looking for and that Israel is being given the authority to determine whether Palestinians have met them.

And this, again,

it's like

a bad rerun because it's the same notion back.

If you think about what you were talking about after the second Intifada started, what was the response by George Bush?

It was the roadmap, which, again, set benchmarks for Palestinians to meet before they would qualify for governing themselves.

And there were also certain things the Israelis were supposed to do as well, right?

Freeze settlements and stop those provocative actions.

But somehow the Israeli benchmarks fell off the map.

And the only thing that was, you know, that was being examined was whether or not Palestinians had done their part.

Daniel, where are you going?

If I can.

Yeah, please.

Yeah.

So

it's this preposterous notion.

that not only in order to be worthy of the right to self-determination, the right to not be occupied, the right to statehood you need to meet these metrics of perfect governance but even the right not to be bombed to smithereens you need to meet these metrics if that's the metrics to having a state i got bad news for you america by the way what if good governance if good governance hold on is now i'm is the precondition holy this just got turned around

in the meantime yeah what has been going on while those metrics were intentionally set in a place where the Palestinians were supposed not to meet them, what has been going on is that Israel keeps taking Palestinian land.

The Palestinian Bantustan keeps shrinking.

And now we still have in this plan this notion of Palestinian reform.

But what kind of reform is it?

It's a reform designed and owned by the occupiers and their allies, not a reform that is owned by Palestinians.

I think, and I'm sure Zahara agrees with me, Palestinian political renewal, reunification, rebuilding those institutions, which haven't had elections for almost two decades, that would be great.

But it has to be on Palestinian terms.

And the very idea that you can do confidence building under relentless,

structurally violent occupation is patently absurd.

And look,

when America was occupying Iraq, I mean liberating.

What did I say?

Hold on.

Let me go back.

When we were greeted as liberators but here we are where the supported by the same tony blair who's oh he was on our he was on our committee of peace he was he was on our committee of peace he's one of the ones who who had us go in there yes to we don't want a madman having the world's most dangerous weapons and yet here we are in the united states with a madman all right fair enough uh

but the point being we are the strongest military uh that the world possibly has has ever seen.

We were not able to meet the benchmarks the Palestinians are asked to meet within our own occupation of Iraq in terms of suicide bombings or killings.

Ultimately, what we used

was a little thing called the surge.

And

the surge to go into Iraq and quell some of this violence was just guys with like gold and suitcases and going, How much is ISIS paying you?

We'll pay you double.

So

I want to ask

Zaha first and then Daniel.

When these terms and conditions are being discussed, whether it's in sort of

the legal frameworks, Zah, that you maybe have more familiarity with, or Daniel, in terms of the governmental frameworks,

how explicit is that idea of benchmarks?

And

in the room, are people going, you know that this is going to incentivize the worst actors to be able to submarine these frameworks, whether it be

Hamas and suicide bombings, or whether it be ultra-right-wing nationalists on Israel's part.

How much of that is explicit?

I mean, that's the whole point, right?

That's why these things are thrown into these kinds of plans is to,

they're poison pills meant to perpetuate the cover cover that Israel needs to continue to colonize and to take land and to dispossess.

I mean, everyone knows how conflict resolution works.

You know, you need to bring the parties to the table and you need to have a process by which there is,

and the objective is clear about what you're working towards.

And all parties have to be there, particularly the ones that are armed.

But in the case of Palestinians, it's like you need to be the most perfect

opposing party for Israel.

You need to completely submit in every way and not have any, you know, not, you know,

be in conflict with Israel, but yet not be upsetting and prone to conflict at the same time

for it to want to acknowledge you.

And, you know, this is not even something that's hidden, you know, by Netanyahu.

I mean, he has taken pride in the fact that he has thwarted all negotiations just in this way, by separating the West Bank from the Gaza Strip, from creating this political fragmentation, because it really was

designed this way, where basically the Palestinian authorities have been told,

if you have national reconciliation with Hamas,

if you deal with this internal

fragmentation in the Palestinian body politic, you will have

no role to play in negotiations and you will have no support from the international community.

And so

that's how this has worked all these years.

And that's what we have to get

around and try to change.

But see, I understand that when it comes to the incentives for the Israelis.

What I don't understand is the incentives for that for the Palestinians.

I only understand it as incentivizing for more radical factions within the Palestinian public, or maybe the other, you know, they always say people are not their governments or people are better than their governments.

But I guess then,

for any agreement to that, are the Palestinians being just poorly represented then?

Yes.

We are poorly represented.

Okay.

Palestinians are poorly represented.

We haven't had elections in some time.

If you're talking about the occupied Palestinian territories, I mean, there haven't been elections in many, many years.

And,

you know, people don't like the results of Palestinian elections.

And so, you know, there's no push to have them.

And

then, if you think about the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is supposed to represent Palestinians everywhere, Palestinians and their legal claims from 48 on down to present day,

that institution hasn't been renewed in decades as well, and it's very antiquated, doesn't represent the people either, yet it has this recognition by the international community as being the interlocutor with Israel.

And so, there is a lot Palestinians have to do to

renew their institutions.

But again, the kinds of reform that we're hearing about

being imposed on Palestinians is not for democratic reform and not to rejuvenate their institutions to make them more credible.

It's to actually

put the squeeze on these institutions and make them really obsolete so that you can have a transitional body of foreign actors come in and take over and build smart cities and artificial intelligence centers and

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So, Daniel, how do you change?

You've been in these negotiations, and we talk about incentives being too fragile so that,

you know, for instance, for radicals on the Palestinian side, it's very easy to submarine so that they know that they'll be met with a force and resistance and they will continue to perpetuate.

How do you change the incentive structure in these negotiations?

Or is the problem that the negotiations, in some respects, can't be between Israel and Palestine?

They have to be between an international body that separates the two combatants.

Would that be

the solution?

Yeah, I mean,

let's understand something which follows on from what Zaha said.

Israel can assassinate Palestinian leaders israel can imprison palestinian leaders it's not a coincidence who gets left out of prison and alive and backed by israel and the west to run things in ramallah and i just think we have to uh acknowledge that expand on that because i i i i don't understand where you're talking the current leadership the current leadership is very convenient It is highly ineffective.

You have been covering this.

We've all been covering this for two years.

How many times have you said, oh, wait, the Palestinian leader is about to give a speech from Ramallah?

This is going to be an incredibly charismatic, defining moment.

He's been an onlooker.

He is there.

And

maybe in his own way, he tries, but he is very convenient for Israel and for Israel's allies.

And his narrative is convenient for them.

And he and the leadership around him seem to have made the decision that with the US and everyone else so deeply marinated in Israeli talking points, the best I can do is try and be just a few degrees away from those talking points, and then maybe I'll get something.

That has patently felt.

The alternative approach, which is what you were hinting at,

as a way of challenging Israel's attempt to impose and force a solution that is not a solution on the Palestinians.

is to change that incentive structure.

And this is something that I've been convinced of of for an awfully long time.

There is one word that tells you virtually everything you need to know about this conflict.

That word is impunity.

As long as Israel can do what it does and is treated with impunity, that the Israeli public sees that it can get away with this.

Why do you have an incentive inside Israel to do anything different?

Sure, some people may feel uncomfortable with it, but then they say, we don't want a civil war.

We know we've got some hotheads.

No one else seems to to be taking us to account for what we're doing.

So if you want to change this, I don't even think your first question to ask is who needs to be in the room?

Is it Israelis, Palestinians?

Does it need to be managed by a third party?

First of all, you have to address Israel's incentive structure.

You have to address the impunity with which Israeli relentless criminality, and it pains me that this is the case.

the way that Israel's relentless criminality is treated.

So coming out.

And by the way, this is not just a radical view.

This is, I mean, we're talking about people like Ehud Barak has been speaking of this.

There are people within Shinbet that are speaking of this.

This is not, you know, there's a feeling sometimes in the United States that the kind of talk that you're saying is, you know, is a radical position to take.

This is taken by some

very respected actors within the country.

They understand that unless there is external pressure, Israel will not budge.

And I don't want to lose sight of the fact that while everyone talks about Trump and he he led this whole thing, Zaha hinted at it earlier.

The other thing that was going on, which shifted the likelihood of Israel agreeing to something, was that pressure was beginning to mount.

You saw the mass mobilization in many societies, pressuring their governments.

You saw what was happening in the performing arts community.

You saw a shift in the cultural zeitgeist.

Netanyahu started saying, whoa, isolation, economic autarky, where you'll try and be economically self-reliant.

And that didn't play well in Israel.

The lesson should be that if you want to go from here to actually addressing the core issues, actually getting somewhere where there can be meaningful negotiations, keep up the pressure.

There has other consequences.

I'm trying to do.

There has to be.

For somebody like Netanyahu.

But that speaks to

internal political dynamics.

for someone like, you know, people in Israel have never gone wrong when they've turned to the right politically, when they've put more pressure on Palestinians.

But let's shift the conversation for just one second because I think we understand now sort of the incentives within Israel.

Let's talk about the incentives within the Arab world, because I think what I'm trying to get at is who is incentivized to end this conflict on behalf of the benefit of the Palestinian people?

Because from what I've seen over all these years, is that there seems to be no incentive for normal average Palestinians to get the kind of self-governance and self-determination that they deserve.

And there's a couple, there's Israel's political pressure is both sides have this sort of fantasy that if they just keep doing what they're doing, the other side will magically disappear.

And obviously

not happening.

But the Arab governments, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, you know,

UAE, Egypt.

They seem incentivized to let this conflict go on in the way and the Palestinians to suffer in the way that they do as well.

And I want to talk a little bit about that.

What is your sense of that?

You know,

I don't think that it's that they

want to see Palestinians suffer.

I just, I think that they want

a stable region.

They want to have their economic development and regional integration.

They see, you know, Israel could be very beneficial in that.

But at the same time, they can't warm relations with Israel while they're seeing a genocide take place or while they see Palestinians being denied self-determination and conflict everywhere.

But did they help create those conditions?

I guess what I'm saying is, did they use

look, those governments are scared shitless of people like Hezbollah and Hamas, and yet they have helped facilitate those groups, whether through proxy armies or things like that, to take heat off of their own abuses.

I think my point is within those governments, they are autocracies, they have their own troubles at home.

Have they not used fundamentalism and fundamentalists to their own benefit, to remove pressure from themselves, and suddenly they're left with a tiger they can't control?

Is that part of the problem as well?

I think that's part of the problem.

And it's become, you know, obviously it's become unmanageable.

But I think that what's shifted of late now is, you know, they're realizing, okay, now that the region has been neutralized,

thanks to Israel's bombing pretty much every country in the Middle East at this point,

and Iran.

At least the ones we've heard of.

Yeah.

I think Oman has escaped some.

Yeah, Oman and Bahrain have done well.

But

now they're seeing Qatar get bombed.

And, you know, Qatar is supposed to be a helpful ally in trying to get the hostages back, right?

And

it's a place where we've got U.S.

forces.

We've got CENTCOM there.

And so now the regions.

But they've played that double game for many, many years.

They've played that weird double game.

But I don't think it's, I think there's a realization.

And

I was with a group of Saudi

Saudi citizens when Qatar got bombed.

And it was a huge wake-up call.

They realized,

we got another problem besides the Iran hegemon.

Now we've got an Israeli hegemon, and we don't like this idea.

So now it's not even about stability in the Middle East or

playing off the fundamentalist

proxies anymore.

It's now hitting home very closely for them.

And that's why you saw so much momentum behind the UN conference, because

this was an opportunity to really put some significant pressure on

Israel.

And that's why you've seen Saudi Arabia join with France.

in trying to encourage states to recognize Palestine.

So I think, you know, but this Trump plan, and we've talked about it and criticized it and what have you,

but it's the only game in town right now.

This is the only mechanism we have.

And so

how do these governments in the region and these European actors that are taking up the mantle now, how can they steer this in a way that is rights respecting?

And that's what I'm looking for.

I mean, we're already starting to see some fraying at the edges here.

You know,

the palestinian president wasn't supposed to be in shadow mashiach with all of those um those regional actors and and europeans but he was he was brought in by um by the arabs and and others and netanyahu was kept away and that yeah netanyahu was kept away um nope daniel says no he shook a finger

i i saw

There was a finger shake.

There was a finger shake.

I think I saw that.

Nananyahu apparently got a last-minute invitation that was possibly rescinded by some of those regional states.

And he's claiming that he decided not to go because he wouldn't have got home in time for the end of Sukkot Jewish holiday to begin.

I want to take issue a little bit with what's being said

because I don't think that's how it's playing out in the region now.

And Zaha began to touch on that.

However, governments have used this issue in the past, it has not gone down well with them that for the last two years, their citizens every day on these devices have been watching these pictures.

And so

the way those governments are now looking at it, and I think they're beginning to come to terms with what do we do, and I'm not sure where they'll come out on that.

The way they're looking at this is this has become the number one most radicalizing, destabilizing influence in the region.

They do not want their publics to be watching those pictures of a country that is an ally of their ally, those who are American allies, right?

They don't want to, because that leads to a whole set of questions which they are not easily going to be able to field.

They also look around and see that,

as Zaha suggested, with the situation of Iran and the axis of resistance, their own mapping of their national security now features Israel front and center.

When Israel, and I think this is partly how we got to the ceasefire, when Israel did that strike in Doha, Doha, in Qatar, a stone's throw from the largest American military base in the region, they had to start questioning and their publics were questioning what is the use of this security relationship with the US.

Does that mean they're going to create an alliance which deters or contains Israel way too early to say it's not their modus operandi?

The first thing they're doing is what we're saying.

You test.

What can we do with this relationship with Trump?

He's here for the next three years.

Look, this was America's war as much as it was Israel's war, right?

With the fleur of American weapons, the diplomatic, political, economic support.

So it was America's war to stop.

And Trump apparently stopped it in the end, something the Biden administration didn't do for 15 months.

And we have to also acknowledge that.

But then the question for them becomes, what do you do next?

And so one of the same time, I think they are looking, A, How do we manage this relationship with Israel?

You said something earlier, John, and I thought you were going somewhere else with it.

You said a madman with the most dangerous weapons in the world.

I didn't think you were referring to Trump, but apparently you were.

There is a

thing I was referring to.

Well, there is this nuclear arms state in the Middle East, and they have this guy who has been talking.

Ah,

heaven forbid you should have been suggesting that.

Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes.

No, I, I, again, I agree.

Yeah, I see what you're saying.

So they're looking, how do we manage this new situation with Israel?

How do we manage our equities with the US?

And they're also looking at something else, which is geopolitics is shifting.

So while everyone showed up, kissed the ring, made nice with Trump in Sharon,

most of the countries in attendance there have at least one eye on China and they're hedging their bets for the geopolitical future.

And what I say to my Israeli friends is you've created a situation where you are more dependent on the US than ever.

At the same time that your cause is more controversial in the US.

You see the polling numbers.

You're familiar with this, John, how Israel is now thought of in the U.S.

And simultaneously, where U.S.

power in the world is on the decline, is diminishing.

That is not a clever place to be if you're Israel.

But unless and until they are called out on that, they will continue down what I consider to be a path of self-harm, not just of harm towards the Palestinians.

And I think, you know, what you guys are describing is kind of a dynamic that

doesn't feel very recent.

It feels like

Arab leaders play the Arab street.

Look, this gets back to Arab Spring.

There was no one that terrified the autocratic leaders in that region more than their own people.

And you saw that in Arab Spring and leaders withdrawing and some like Mubarak and then Morsi overturned and a lot of things that go on.

So

I'm curious.

When we talk about these dynamics, unless we understand the dynamics, we can't understand the incentive structure of how we change that region.

I'm going to throw something out there that seems obvious to me, but

it seems like a functional Palestinian state, independent of Israel's strictures on what they have to do to hit those benchmarks, an international

Arab agreement of a NATO-like agreement within the region for Israel being attacked and they will all join in there would create the kind of stability

that we're all talking about.

It strikes me that the Arab governments are more afraid of Hamas in some respects

than they are of some of these other and those images for their people

than Israel.

Or do you think they believe Netanyahu is also a madman who wants to take over the region?

I mean, I think if he, if they didn't think so before

October 7th.

Oh, yes, absolutely.

I mean, like I said,

I see a marked shift in the way people are talking about Israel from the region.

People or the governments in the region.

That's what I'm trying to do, is separate.

No,

government officials, the way they understand Israel is very, very different

after October 7th.

Prior to that, would you have said that Arab governments would rather deal with Israel than people like Nasrallah and

Sinwar and Hamas and Hezbollah.

Because that was my understanding.

Maybe that's a misguided one.

I don't know if I would say that.

I don't know if I would say that because

I think

there was already a growing realization that Israel is not ever going to make peace with the Palestinians.

And that's going to ultimately be troublesome for the region.

I mean, that's why the Trump 2020 Peace to Prosperity Plan fell flat because people,

governments realized that

it was never going to be possible to have regional integration with Israel so long as this issue remained between the Palestinians and Israelis.

What about that rapprochement?

So the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel prior to October 7th, because some have said that that attack in itself was there to submarine that.

Was that not much of a reality as we were led to believe?

I mean, except, of course, it didn't happen.

And much as Team Biden tried to say, okay, what's the lowest bar you can go to on some rhetorical head fake towards the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia?

Whatever, however low they could take that bar, it was too high for Netanyahu and the Israelis.

And so I think this is the shift that's happened.

The shift that happened is in the 1990s, Israel got to yes with the Palestinians, with the PLO.

The PLO said yes to a state on 22% of the historic land.

And Israel ultimately chose not to go with that.

2002, the Arab Peace Initiative.

Then you have, which basically says, we will all recognize you.

We will all have relations with you if you withdraw from the occupied territories and allow a Palestinian state.

20 years later, you even go further with normalization, with the Abraham Accords.

Israel got to yes

with the Arab states and Israel chose that it didn't want to go down that path because it wasn't capable.

I think this was a huge mistake, obviously.

It wasn't capable of accepting withdrawal Palestinian statehood deoccupation.

And so the Arab states started scratching their heads.

Then October 7th, and then the response to October 7th.

And you know what?

I think there were, and there's no monolith here, right?

The views on Hamas, you know, these are 22, 23 different states.

Some of them, after October 7th, were, I imagine, sitting there saying, I hope they teach Hamas a good lesson and that this whole Hamas thing is done with.

Fast forward, a month, six months, 24 months.

And they're scratching their head and saying, wait a minute, what Israel is this?

We thought these guys, Smotrich and Ben-Gavir, were a marginal marginal phenomenon, but the society seems to have mobilized around what

has been documented by UN commissions of inquiry and elsewhere as a genocide.

Once you've manufactured consent for genocidal actions inside a society, there's something fundamentally wrong.

And then they see Israel's military actions across the region, then that extends to the Gulf.

And so I do think that you're now at a position where they say, you know, partly as a consequence that Israel did in significant ways degrade Iran and

that axis, that they are saying, how do we get control of Israel?

And so I think they are looking at this and saying, can we get this time around?

Normally you have these ceremonies, you have these peace processes, and when the music stops, it's still the Palestinians who don't have a chair.

It's still the Palestinians who are left stateless.

Can we change it this time around?

But they are well aware, and I've been speaking to them over the last few days, people from the region involved in this.

They are deeply pessimistic.

They don't think this is a serious enough process.

Oh, really?

They're not sure two states is still possible because they see the realities on the ground.

And much as they're trying to push for this, they acknowledge that.

They say two states is not possible because

that Israel will not allow.

It's almost like you have, boy, this is a dark thought.

You have two groups that would like to rid the world of the other.

And I think it's hard to, you know, when you look at the language from the leadership Hamas and from some of the more right-wing elements in Israel, it's hard not to think that this is eliminationist in

belief, but you only have one side that's capable of doing it.

And

is that the issue?

I'm going to go somewhere slightly different with this.

Okay.

I think we are in a painfully zero-sum moment, but I also think there's something that's true in many struggles.

When you are the weaker struggle, the weaker party in an asymmetric struggle,

you have to understand the other side.

Okay, you have to, you have to have a strategy that deeply understands the other side.

When you're the stronger party, you can be a bit dismissive.

Ah, they're all Palestinians.

They're all the same.

We can crush them anyway.

And I would argue that,

and this is in no way pretending away what happened that was appalling on October 7th.

But I think Hamas have a quite significant understanding of Israel

and the fact that this society, call it settler colonial, call it what you like, is not going away.

Rashid Khaledi, the Palestinian professor, has said, you can begin as a settler colonial community, but this is now a nation that is there and it's not going anywhere.

And so our challenge is Palestinians aren't going anywhere.

Israelis aren't going anywhere.

If we peel back from zero sum, and what I fear is

that what has been generated in Israeli society has taken us further away from that.

And somehow we have to pull that society back from the brink to be a place that can acknowledge Palestinians again.

And what has happened in the last few days hasn't helped that because Trump in his narrative, perhaps very unsurprisingly, he doesn't recognize Palestinians.

He keeps posting on Truth Social and saying, everyone loves this.

And he talks about Arab states and Muslim states and Israel.

He never mentions Palestinians.

He kept meeting with the hostage families.

And that's, you know, they deserved that.

They should have been embraced and had their arms wrapped around them.

But he's not.

dealt with Palestinians.

He's not met with a survivor of what's gone on in Gaza.

He's gone back and forth to the region twice now.

He does not engage with Palestinians.

Netanyahu gave that speech in the Knesset when Trump was there.

You know what word didn't pass his lips once?

Palestinian.

So you can't be in denial at the existence of the other side.

Well, he revoked his ability to travel.

The Palestinian president couldn't travel even to the UN

to go do that.

They took away their visa.

Trump did that.

Exactly.

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Zad, was there any, you know, Trump and Abbas were both in Sharm el-Sheikh.

Was there any that you know of conversation even between the two?

Is there anyone that would be recognized, certainly by other international boards, to lead the Palestinians?

You know, would someone like Barghudi be a person that could,

you know, certainly unify the Palestinians and maybe the international community and the U.S.

would acknowledge him as well.

What's your understanding of that?

I mean, he was on the list to

get out and the prisoners

exchange, but he was.

Barghudi was.

Barghoudi was, and his name was removed by the Israelis, you know, because of this very truth that he could unite Hamas and Fetah and all of the factions and possibly be a bridge from this moment to

a political agreement.

But

we will not know this because

he's not out.

But there are names that have been floated ever since October 7th and discussions around day after.

And these people that they talk about are all business people.

And those are the ones that have currency with the Trump administration.

People that they think they can make business deals with and people that are apolitical.

I mean, we saw that explicitly in the Trump plan.

These people have to be apolitical if they want to be,

you know, engaged with

in Gaza's day after.

Do you sense that as being different, Zaha, that this used to be a political process?

And it is, I agree with you.

It seems more like a financial transaction that they're looking at,

you know, Gaza or the West Bank as an, you know, they always describe it as an opportunity.

This is an opportunity, not for self-determination and a free people that deserve independence and the right to live without having to meet a list of 10

precepts that have been set out by the people occupying the land.

But as if we can get everybody to get along, we've got ourselves a really good opportunity here.

It's a much more cynical

notion now than it was in the past.

In the past, they would frame it as

economic peace.

You know,

we can't have a political agreement, but let's focus on economic peace.

And eventually that will lead to

a political solution.

Now they're just saying, let's make some money.

Let's create this Gaza Riviera.

We'll have an Elon Musk area.

And

we'll name this area after this person.

And it's beachfront property.

And I mean, so it's become very.

Gaza coin.

They're going to do a Gaza coin and all these things.

Daniel, having been in these negotiations, you've seen why they fall apart or why they're unrealistic.

If you were to give some advice there to

the people that are about to execute this supposed 20-point plan,

what are the minefields that you see

that

they could bypass if there really is a

good faith desire for Palestinians to finally get that self-determined future that they deserve.

Look, sadly,

it begins with probably rewriting the plan, or at least filtering out the bits that can perhaps get you anywhere.

I mean, the plan,

you know what the first four words of the plan are, five words?

Gaza will be a de-radicalized zone.

Oh, geez.

Wait a minute.

In Israel, that's okay.

There's no de-radicalization needed there.

You know what it sounds like?

It sounds almost like, I don't know how much you follow this, but what they're talking about for like Harvard or wokeness, like they view ideas as something that you can wring out of people.

Like even that, the idea that you can get rid of Hamas, but how do you get rid of resentment?

How do you get rid of families that have been torn apart?

That their houses have been, their city blocks.

This idea that ideas can be bombed out of people,

it seems like madness.

Because it is madness.

And look, normally when something like this ends, and yes, it's a huge achievement that this hopefully will end, it's fragile.

There's at least some acknowledgement that there needs to be some accountability, right?

Some very bad things have happened.

There's an ICC arrest warrant against Netanyahu.

Yeah, isn't that part of the plan is to remove that, is it not?

I think one of the...

So

you go after the ICC.

You don't go after accountability.

And so

I don't think we're going to see this move forward.

In a way, we're probably worse off if the plan moves forward because of the things that are in there.

What we want to do is take the ceasefire.

I would say give Palestinians the space.

to renew their politics on their terms.

I would say keep up the pressure on Israel.

But that's a huge, you know, give them the space.

so that's the point coming back to what i was talking about earlier how do we create the space in the world in my mind the only way to do it is a demilitarized zone manned by not the united states and not israel and not europe by by

arab nations that the palestinians feel like they can trust otherwise how do you do it yeah so that may be one of the few things that one could pick out that could be useful.

There's this reference to an international stabilization force.

And Hamas have actually in the talks

spoken about, they're not going to disarm, right?

When you're still under occupation, you don't fully disarm.

But Hamas could put some of the heavier weapons out of use.

They could have non-display of weapons.

You could have, if there were a trusted...

accepted by Palestinians force in there that was there to protect Palestinians, right?

To act as a tripwire that Palestinians won't again be attacked.

Then you could begin to develop some of these things.

It's not actually rocket science.

It's stuff that's been done elsewhere.

It's stuff that when you have

is there a model that you've seen that you thought, oh, this, you know, is it, is it Yugoslavia?

Is it, you know, is there a Northern Ireland is a perfect I think Northern Ireland.

That's a great one.

That's a great one.

Expound on that because to the Western ear, that's a much more

understandable

conflict and has tremendous similarities to what we've seen.

Yeah, I mean, in that context, you had the two sides, the loyalists and the IRA,

they didn't just hand over their weapons.

There was a political process that they were a part of, and other multilateral actors were a part of.

And it was a phased approach over time.

And there was civil society engagement to to help with the decommissioning of the weapons and the storage of the weapons and monitoring all of those steps I mean these these things have been done in Northern Ireland but they've been done elsewhere as well and and we have UN mechanisms that can help and to support these things but for some reason when it comes to Palestine You're talking about multilateral mechanisms.

If you're talking about international law, it goes out the window.

I mean, the way it's set up in this Trump plan is that this board, this peace board will oversee

trump and blair trump and blair will oversee the international state uh stabilization force blair will apparently go door to door he will

you have any guns

hello yeah come on

was that your attempt at an english accent

sadly

very kind of you're going to disagree again yeah no and by the way daniel i believe you're right point to daniel on that one that was a terrible accent uh

so the united states is really this the stakeholder in Israel.

And it's clear that, like, if Netanyahu is going to listen to anybody, it'll be the benefactor that gives all the weapons and all those things.

Is there a counter link to that for someone like Hamas?

Is it Egypt, Turkey?

Is it Qatar?

You know, who would be the one that would have that kind of authority?

Because even now, you're hearing reports not only of some killings still from the Israelis in Gaza, but that Hamas is reasserting a control over citizens violently as well.

So they're, again, trapped in that squeeze.

Who could be

that force that could help facilitate what you're talking about, Sahaz, more of that

Northern Ireland type peace process?

Yeah, I mean, it's these regional actors, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar.

Does Jordan have sway there in your mind?

No.

Well,

as a part of a regional group, yes, it would.

And, you know, the thing is, it's not like these haven't been discussed with Hamas and there hasn't been actual an agreement signed between all the factions.

Back in 2024, all the Palestinian factions got together and they agreed on certain things, including that the two-state solution was the goal, and that the Palestinian Authority would govern and

Hamas would not govern in Gaza.

But what Hamas wanted in exchange for all of that was they wanted to be a part of the PLO.

They wanted to be a part of the political future of Palestine and be integrated within that body.

And that was agreed on by Feta and Hamas and all of the Palestinian political factions, 12 of them.

And that was never implemented.

Why?

Because there was so much pushback about the notion that there would be Palestinian national reconciliation.

And the actors, the donor countries, the U.S.

were opposed to it.

But that's really the only way you're going to get this

cookie

out of the way.

I mean,

it's going to take Palestinian national reconciliation because if you don't have that, you will always have spoilers.

You will always have somebody that's going to try to,

you know.

But doesn't every society, you know, this is where I think we get into that point.

Think about it even within Israel.

So no society is a monolith, but Rabin makes steps towards this reconciliation.

He tries to bring together Israel to try and have, to try and be the Sadat of, you know,

for Israel in terms of a two-state solution and bringing along Palestinian reconciliation.

And he's killed by an ultra-right wing Israeli.

He's not assassinated by a Palestinian.

He's not assassinated by a Muslim fundamentalist.

He's assassinated by an Israeli radical.

And since that time, who has gained the strength in Israel?

It hasn't been the moderates.

Well, look, one of the guys who led those radical protests.

At that time, someone who actually pulled the, I think it was a Mercedes or something symbol off Robin's car just weeks before the assassination and proudly displayed it, is now the national security minister in Israel, Itamar Ben-Gavir.

So when I was working there in this stuff, I'm not saying it was perfect.

I'm not saying there was a golden era, but you had a peace camp.

You had a center-left party at least vying for governance.

You now have a political landscape which runs from the extreme right to the center-right.

And when in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, a vote was put forward, a declarative vote, can we ever accept a Palestinian state?

Not one single Zionist member of Knesset voted that you can have a Palestinian state.

That was just last year in July.

That

the de-radicalization that's needed, I don't think it means one gives up on Israeli society, right?

Israel is going to be part of a solution by definition, but it means you need to try the things that you haven't tried before.

And showing the Israelis that there's a different, we've said this, but it's crucial, that there's a different cost-benefit calculation, that it's not normal, it's not okay.

And there, it's not just about America.

There, this mass mobilization of people, and you know, those marches have been criticized.

I've been on those marches, and I'm not exactly hiding my Jewishness.

Jewish people are saying, this is not good for us.

This is not where our future well-being lies.

I think one has to hold up a mirror and say, this isn't okay.

This isn't normal.

You can't carry on with this.

And we're doing you a favor by telling you this.

Exceptionalism has been an impunity, have been the handmaidens to extremism.

Reverse that.

And so many things that look impossible today suddenly might become possible.

Perhaps, you know what?

I think that's a really good point, but it's hard to imagine that Israel turns in that.

in that direction, given, as you said, the incentives that have kind of come out of it previously.

That, you know, if anything, I would say, and Zah, maybe you can speak to this, that even for Arabs or Palestinians that live within Israel, I would think it's going to turn differently.

I, you know, I look at the United States, right?

And, you know, this experiment in multiculturalism and all these other things.

And, you know, we all try and manage that as best we can, but murders by people who are in the country illegally have sparked a $150 billion

new

force

that is going through into cities and dragging people out, is the fear that Israel turns more towards that future, that even the Arabs and Palestinians, because the idea that they can remain democratic and still remain a Jewish state seems not likely either.

You know, I think it's

very true that it's hard to imagine Israeli society making a shift in another direction right now.

But I agree with Daniel.

You know, it's gotten there because it's been emboldened.

The right has been so emboldened over so long.

But what do Israelis really

need and what do they really value more than anything is knowing that they have the U.S.

support?

behind them.

That is where it is.

Do you think that's still true?

I think it is.

I think, you know, if you see how popular Trump is in Israel, why is he so popular?

Because they feel they trust him more than they trust Netanyahu.

He actually delivered the release of the hostages for them, and they see that he is willing to have their back at all times.

What if the U.S.

said, I will have your back, but I need you to do this and this and this.

And, you know, and you have to, or I'm going to withdraw this.

I think

that would begin to change the way Israelis understand their future as well.

Does he have a part?

Do you think Trump has a partner in the Arab world that could be considered a counterpart to that?

Could it be bin Solomon?

Could it be, you know, who would be that counterpart?

Or would that have to be a coalition?

And is the idea then to create that, to create a type of,

I would say, NATO-like coalition within that that can impose that from

the outside there.

Because if we're talking about it in the sense of, look, the only force powerful enough to get Israel to do that is maybe Trump and America, would the counter part

be present as well?

I mean, to me,

what's missing in the equation is how do you get the United States to want to

take those kinds of actions with Israel?

And I think

if that's the question, then I would say, with this president right now,

Saudi Arabia has a big role to play because we know, especially in the last few days, how important it is for Trump to be the peacemaker and to feel like he's worthy of a Nobel Prize.

It's huge to see him.

Kissinger got one.

So

how worthy do you really have to be?

I mean, you know, and so, but, but I do, but you, I I mean, but this is where we are right now.

This is where we are, you know, and it's that's the path, I think.

Holy shit, peace in the Middle East.

If the Nobel Committee could just go in and have a little list and say, you do this and it's yours.

In fact, it's yours for the next five years.

And that list is there.

That could do it.

I don't know.

I don't know.

Yeah.

But I think Trump does really value his partners in the Gulf and, in particular Saudi Arabia.

And he does see Saudi Arabia as being sort of the crown jewel of normalization still.

Actually, no different than the Biden administration as well on the score.

But for Trump,

there's a lot of ego at play here.

And how do you operationalize that in a way that actually could get you

a permanent peace?

I don't think it's going to take, I mean, it's not something that's going to happen

the next few years.

This is to

construct a new incentive structure for Israel is going to take a lot more time.

So you think Trump 2028 is still going to be

2032.

I think it's going to be Trump 2032, John.

Is really when that's going to go up.

You know, it is funny that you mentioned, though, Trump is not hamstrung in the way that the Biden administration was by pretending that they were disturbed by human rights violations.

You know, the Biden administration always had to pretend, oh, I don't know, these guys, you know, they're bad guys.

And then they go to Saudi Arabia and give a fist bump and act like, well, we're going to try and work.

Trump is much more trans.

And in some ways, I think you appreciate the

more honest approach, which is, yeah, we work with these guys and they do shit and we do shit.

And that's just kind of how the world works.

Well, the honesty was on full display in the Knesset, right?

Yes.

Miriam Adelson.

Right.

But also, also, let's also acknowledge that they did something which is so obvious.

They got in the room with Hamas.

They talked to Hamas, something the Biden folks didn't do.

That's not, I mean, you know, we constantly say, oh, these guys are diplomatic neo-fights and the smart diplomats of the Biden administration.

They didn't do the thing that was most obvious.

However, we're having this conversation

as if some of the normal rules of American politics on this issue don't apply.

And they do apply, unfortunately.

I don't know if Trump, with his relations in the region, with his relations in the Gulf, elsewhere, can be brought to a place where he says, oh, okay, is that what's needed?

Forget for peace, is that what's needed for a prize?

Okay, I'll try and do that.

There will still be the Trump whisperers.

There will still be those who can get in the room with him.

There will still be the evangelical dispensationalist lobby pushing in a different direction.

There will still be the neoconservative.

So one has to get past an awful lot.

And I think we're

actually helped if we understand that this is about building blocks.

This is about going on a journey.

I wish I could tell you that we can finish this in short order.

But that process of generating leverage, of generating a different incentive structure, of challenging impunity, of Israeli society changing, of rebuilding Palestinian

politics, of changing those dynamics in in America.

Europe, by the way, we haven't talked about it, but the three Ts, Israel's trade, tourism, and participation in tournaments is through Europe.

And there's that public pressure.

Those things, I'm not trying to be a downer, quite the opposite.

One can build those things.

Those things are achievable.

And that's what will get you on a path to something that finally.

does right by Israel, acknowledges Palestinian rights, achieves those rights and sets you on a path.

Daniel, that's a wonderful summation of everything that that goes along.

And I have to say, and as pessimistic as I've been about it and as cynical as I've been about it, it is the most hopeful sentiment about that that I think I've heard.

And I'll give you the last words, Ob, because what I heard from Daniel, and I think I believe it as well, which is as dark as it is, this is the first opportunity moment that I've seen in a very long time.

And

if that small crease of opportunity can be opened, maybe there is something really positive that could happen here.

What do you think?

No,

I totally agree with that sentiment.

And I think, look,

we saw the beginnings of some real momentum earlier this September.

And international civil society has done things that we have never seen before in terms of the global solidarity marches, the flotilla that went to try to break the siege on gas and deliver humanitarian aid, the ways in which

we're seeing countries now finally talk about sanctions and actually start to implement sanctions and divestment.

We're seeing countries like Norway divesting their sovereign funds.

So there's a lot happening, these building blocks that Daniel's talking about.

It's not happening fast enough for any of our liking.

It's not happening fast enough for people in Gesa or in the West Bank, but it is happening.

And I think we should build on that and continue to push for that.

And maybe this moment helps

maybe bypass the long process of those other pressure points that you're talking about by creating the space for more profound change in just this moment.

Perhaps.

Agreed.

Yes, agreed.

Absolutely.

Come on.

Look at us.

We've done it.

Guys, I so appreciate your time and helping me with a much more nuanced understanding of a region that

is oftentimes impenetrable to me.

So thank you both for your insights and your time.

Daniel Levy, president of the U.S.

Middle East Project, former Israeli peace negotiator, Zaha Hassan, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former coordinator and senior legal advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team during the 2010-2012 bid for UN membership.

Guys, thank you so much for being here.

Thank you.

Thank you, Joe.

Boy, am I appreciative

of people with real knowledge.

No,

I liked your take, John, that the incentive we've been needing is an American president fixated on the Nobel Peace Prize.

I think, I mean, it's a cash prize.

So I can't imagine being them and watching this episode play out over and over again over time, but I really appreciated their insights into how

this is just the first step and there's lots more to come.

And I have to say, the one thing that both in

all the different ways that they laid out all the kinds of

little minefields and setbacks that could occur on there, they both seemed like, and I know credit work creditors do, but this, in this moment, there does seem to be more opportunity

than in the past.

And in some ways, maybe is because they're viewing it outside of the paradigm of

Oslo and Oslo 2 and Taba.

Like maybe it is time to just like tear all that shit up and go like, here's what we're doing.

It is weird to be in this moment where we watched Biden not accomplish this.

And now that we're here and Trump has these relations with the Arab world and we're in this tumultuous moment in the international stage and all of these people giving into Trump.

I think there's this weird,

I don't know, perfect storm of things that there's weirdly hope.

Maybe that is how you're supposed to do things.

Maybe it's all just a series of like kind of mafia moves like, hey, let me tell you something.

Here's what we're going to do.

You're going to stop your fucking bombing and you're going to let these people go or I'm going to come in there and I'm going to fucking, you're not going to have a moment's peace.

Like maybe that is what, because it's not just Biden didn't get it done.

Obama didn't get it done.

Bush didn't get it.

Nobody got it done.

That's true.

And by the way, I don't want to, you know, he's a master at the proclamation,

but it is significant.

It is not nothing that the bombing has stopped and that the hostages are released.

Like, that's not nothing.

It's not only not nothing, it's fantastic and a real reason to be hopeful.

So.

Yeah.

A reason to be hopeful.

You know, Jillian, it's interesting you bring that up because

that's the title.

You know, I journal every day.

I'd I'd like to see those entries.

It's entitled A Reason to Be Hopeful.

Here's what I love about that conversation, too.

Like two experts in the Middle East, they've lived through failed peace agreements.

They've lived through these types of things.

And I'm the most pessimistic one.

I'm like the most cynical one of them.

They're like, well, I wouldn't go that far.

Well, they have to have optimism.

This is their work.

What's the point if they don't believe in it?

Right.

And both have been at it for decades.

And, but it does seem like a moment where maybe there is an international consensus that can be forming that puts pressure on

this situation to finally create the conditions for the occupation to end, for independence to flourish, for self-determination, and for everything else.

And

I'm sure our viewers have wonderful questions about it.

Related?

No, probably not.

I wouldn't think so.

Brittany, I don't even know.

Like,

as you siphon through those, I have no idea what

the ones that you leave out must be.

Yeah.

I mean, last week, this is a personal thing, but there were a couple of comments that I look like Caroline Levitt, the press secretary, and I did not appreciate those.

What?

That's literally somebody just looking at the screen and going like, I think her hair is blonde, and I think that lady's hair is blonde.

So

I'd appreciate those stopping.

They're like, is that a woman?

Okay.

By the way, for those at home, maybe the nicest person we've ever met.

We call her the Carolyn Lovitt of the

as far as you could ever say that, I can't even begin to describe how off base

that whole thing.

Because I need to clip this out for my family.

Clip it.

All right, John.

Yeah.

We'll tit it.

John, who do you think is to blame for this government shutdown?

The Riyadh Comedy Festival.

There is no question in my mind if they hadn't gone over there,

done a 10-minute set on poor quality hummus, that we wouldn't.

Who is responsible for the government shutdown?

I'm going to go with the founders

who came up with this fucking fucked,

overly complex, bureaucratic web of nonsense that it takes to get anything done.

And

I think it's very difficult

when one political party that represents 75 million voters has zero say, authority, heft.

And in a functioning political environment that isn't a zero-sum game, there would have been conversations up until now that took some consideration.

Some.

I'm not saying a lot.

I'm not saying like they don't still get the shitty little offices and don't get to use the, you know, the Senate steam room,

except when Schumer's in there, towel-less.

But some consideration that those 75 million people should have a scintilla of representation in the federal budget.

So that seems reasonable.

Thank you, Jill.

Thank you.

So, yeah, once again,

fuck you, James Madison.

Boom.

Every day.

Yeah.

You're always saying that.

Every episode should end with that.

Arnie Slogan.

Thanks so much for watching.

Thanks so much for listening.

Fuck you, James Madison.

Boom.

Cue the music.

All right.

What else again?

When Trump insults a reporter, do you think they should insult him back?

Ooh.

Do like a rap battle.

Like dozens.

Like, tell that to your cankles.

Hey, you know, you can remove remove me like you can't remove excess fluid subcutaneously.

Boom.

Roasted.

I mean, that's what Pam Bondi did.

Like she went to basically a hearing with just like a roast.

Like each, each person on the dais had roasts and they'd be like, hey.

Why did they move Ghillaine Maxwell to like a prison that you would never do a, you know, a sex offender?

And she's like, I don't know.

Why are you so fucking bald?

how about that how about that boom

um

i mean it's certainly where it's all going isn't it i think it didn't work out too well for terry moran but he didn't even like i think that was like he called someone a hater i want to see a real burn like i want to hear them be like and follow up are you a little baby oh are you gonna cry caitlyn collins has it in her caitlin collins is the only one i actually think she's the only one that even they aren't quite sure what to do with.

Yeah.

Because his usual, because she's always just like matter-of-fact, like, because you did say two and a half weeks ago, and I think I've got the quote right here, and they're all like, what are you doing?

Homework?

Why are you trying to make us all look bad?

Is this witchcraft?

I don't understand.

You're collecting facts and then you're going to say them back at me live?

Unacceptable.

It would be cool though to just see that.

Like, just a bunch of the thing just deteriorates into.

Although they're also changing uh the format so that there's a bunch of people like even within the questions who will be like uh mr president you why are you so awesome and you know still like 79 and you seem to still be growing how do you do that

nonsense uh brittany how can they get us their thoughts and questions uh Twitter, we weekly show pod, Instagram threads, TikTok, Blue Sky, we weekly show podcasts.

And you can like, subscribe, and comment on our YouTube channel, The Weekly Show at Jon Stewart.

Word, word.

And because of the conversation with the generous Professor Hinton, I'm afraid to go online now.

So for those of you at home who want to do that and go to those sites and send us stuff, God bless you because

I'm deadly afraid of it now.

Thank you guys again very much.

Lead producer Lauren Walker, producer Brittany Mamedovic, producer Jillian Spear, video editor and engineer Rob Vitola, audio editor and engineer to Cole Boys and our executive producers, Chris McShane and Katie Gray.

We shall see you guys on the next Weekly Show podcast.

Thanks for listening.

Bye-bye.

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