The 8th Front - with Nadav Eyal

You are listening to an art media podcast.

What I worry about is that Israel goes for an interim deal.

Ten hostages alive are left with Hamas.

Israel withdraws as part of this deal.

This is all on the record.

This is the Steve Witkoff proposal right now.

But then the White House actually says, but the war is not going to renew.

We want this war over.

And as I understand it, according to the public statements made up by the president, this is the position of the president.

He wants this war to end.

And then Hamas negotiates when the IDF is out of most of the territories it occupied in the Gaza Strip, and when they have 10 hostages, knowing that the White House has just taken off the table Israel's most important tool in reaching an agreement, which is a military pressure.

It's 9:30 a.m.

on Wednesday, June 4th here in New York City.

It's 4:30 p.m.

on Wednesday, June 4th in Israel, as Israelis get ready to wind down their day.

During the time that we took a break on the Call Me Back podcast over Shavuot, you will notice we did not drop an episode on Monday, so this is our first episode of the week.

Pressure on Israel and on Jews around the world has been mounting significantly.

A peaceful demonstration in Boulder, advocating for the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas for over 600 days now, was violently disrupted when 45-year-old Mohamed Sabri Solomon, disguising himself as a gardener, attacked participants with Molotov cocktails and a makeshift flamethrower.

The assault injured six elderly individuals aged between 67 and 88, including one who was a survivor of the Holocaust, and at least one victim is in critical condition.

In Paris, vandals defaced the Holocaust memorial, two synagogues, and a Jewish restaurant in a coordinated act of anti-Semitic violence.

Meanwhile, U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations have reached a critical juncture.

According to reports, the U.S.

proposed a deal allowing Iran limited uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief.

While President Trump later rejected any enrichment on Iranian soil, Iran insists on maintaining domestic enrichment and has rejected the U.S.

offer.

Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that Iran has amassed enough 60% enriched uranium for multiple nuclear weapons, intensifying concerns over the potential collapse of the talks and, of course, raising prospects or at least raising speculation about a possible military attack at some point against Iran's nuclear facilities.

And then over the past week in Gaza, reports have surfaced that Israeli forces shot at Palestinians near food aid centers, killing 27 Palestinians and injuring over 160.

The IDF claimed they were responding to perceived threats outside designated aid routes.

The shootings have sparked widespread international condemnation.

The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which is the entity responsible for managing these aid distribution sites, has temporarily suspended operations following these deadly events.

Meanwhile, in Europe, the government of Spain announced that it was canceling a military armament supply contract to Spain, and the UK raised the possibility of sanctions, formal sanctions against Israel.

So one can look at recent events and interpret them as Hamas being emboldened by these mounting pressure points on Israel as negotiations continue for a 60-day ceasefire during which Hamas would release 10 living Israeli hostages and the remains of 18 others.

Both sides are actually under international pressure to reach an agreement.

Joining me from Tel Aviv to unpack all of this is Call Me Back regular Nadav Ayal, senior analyst for Yuriot Ahranot.

Nadav, welcome back.

Glad to be here again.

Nadav, let's start with what happened in Boulder, Colorado on Sunday, just before Chavuot came in over here.

You sent me an email that day, which we distributed to Call-Me Back subscribers in our newsletter, which I was quite moved by.

For those listening who do not subscribe, can you just summarize how you, an Israeli, have experienced this event and recent attacks against Jews in the United States?

So for me, first of all, it was terrifying to hear.

And I'm not special in that regard as an Israeli, the fact that people were marching there for the hostages, their devotion, their sentiment, the fact that they would take so much of their time.

It's something that happens every Sunday in Boulder, Colorado.

And Dan, both of us know that it's not the same walking or marching.

in the East Coast, where there are big, very much involved Jewish communities, the organized institutions of the Jewish community.

And it's different in Boulder, Colorado.

And these people would come every Sunday to raise awareness.

Meaning it's a small community.

If you go out to march, there are not hundreds or thousands of people with you.

It's a very small few dozens at best that we're doing that.

So their commitment for our hostages, to the return of the hostages, is for me so impressive considering that they were attacked because of that, because of their solidarity with Israel, because of their solidarity with those people who are now in the dungeons, the tunnels of Hamas.

And they were attacked in a way that was very reminiscent of the Intifada, because it was the Molotov cocktail.

Okay, I want to stay on this because I think it's important for the, you know, now that this language has been imported into the West, the U.S., the world outside Israel.

And before it was just rhetoric, and now it's rhetoric that's being acted on with violence.

So there are these terms like the intifada, like globalized intifada.

I still remember that hearing in late 2023, the congressional hearing in the House of Representatives, where the presidents of the universities were asked by Congresswoman Elise Stefanek about this language and whether or not it was, you know, incendiary language or inciting genocide.

And I remember the presidents of these universities says, well, it depends on the context.

And that all offended all of us.

Well, now we know the context.

So there were two periods of Intifada.

The first period of Intifada, which is a mass popular uprising, was a mass popular uprising beginning in 1987 and probably ending about 1991, 1992 with the Madrid peace summit or with the Ostlar Courts in 1993.

It really depends how you want to measure it.

And the first thing I failed, it was about massive, violent protests against Israel's occupation of the West Bank.

And there, Palestinians would march and usually throw stones either at the end of the march or throwing stones would be the main issue against the Israeli soldiers.

And many of your listeners remember these scenes.

Israeli soldiers would use rubber bullets and tear gas.

And there was intense international coverage of the Intifada that was 20 years after Israel took the West Bank, but some of it was throwing Molotov cocktails.

Molotov cocktails was a big thing in the Intifada and still a huge thing in the West Bank and everywhere that you see around the Middle East this kind of rejection of Israelis.

And what is a Molotov cocktail?

Can you just explain that?

So you take a bottle and you fill it up with, you know, can be gas from the gas station.

Look, it's actually a firebomb.

And this could be and was deadly, but it wasn't seen like that by the international press.

It was seen like as the,

you know, that's the weapon that the Palestinians have.

You have guns, they have stones and Molotov cocktails.

And then hearing the news from Colorado, I immediately started thinking about the first Intifada.

And the reason I did that wasn't because I'm an Israeli looking for these kind of parallels, but because they said we're going to globalize the Intifada.

And now we've seen what happened in Washington, D.C.

And we've seen what happened in Boulder, Colorado.

And they're globalizing the Intifada.

And I saw this firsthand on US campuses.

And Dan, you've heard these testimonies from US students yourself but I saw the type of leaflets that are being handed in these institutions.

Meaning handed around to other students on campuses to organize them against Jews.

Yeah.

And they're saying, by the way, it's definitely not only about Jews.

It's about the institutions.

They see Israel as the long arm of the United States capitalist, oppressive complex.

And these leaflets contain so much incitement in it, but they actually have the images of the intifada, like Molotov cocktails.

And what has really happened, and this is what we talked about early in this week, is how it's absolutely logical if you believe the type of rhetoric that you've been hearing since the war began, that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza, that the people who are supportive of Israel, according to the same parallel, are what?

Are supportive of genocide.

They are Nazis themselves.

And therefore, shooting them, attacking them with Molotov cocktails, it's the right thing to do.

It's the noble thing to do for people who are actually reading

not only

hate speech on Twitter or TikTok, but actually reading some of the news.

So this is my main take-home message as an Israeli journalist to the Jewish community in the United States that has invested so much of its time, of its resources as to helping Israel and showing solidarity with Israel.

And they have become targets.

And the reason that they have become targets is that there is an all-encompassing idea that Israel is not only responsible for war crimes, but crimes against humanity and genocide.

And because of that, anyone who supports Israel is just a very legitimate target.

And you see this online.

After Boulder, Colorado, I have about just less than 400,000 followers on Twitter and about 100,000 on Facebook.

And I've been around for many years on these platforms.

I have never seen in my life the type of virulent anti-Semitism online like we're seeing now.

It's like all of them are out of their holes right now.

And you see this from everywhere.

I just wrote a simple tweet saying Jews have a right for national self-determination like any other people.

And when people ask me, by the way, I answered the Palestinians have that right too.

It didn't matter.

You had every type of anti-Semite there responding to that.

The type of craziness you would get just from that statement.

And by the way, most of which they were not mentioning specifically Gaza.

What they really took issue with is the idea that Jews have a right for nationalist self-discrimination.

And you had sort of deep Christian anti-Semitism.

You deserve nothing because you killed Jesus.

You had MAGA anti-Semitism.

We're sending you our money, sort of attacking me with anti-Semitism.

You had, of course, left radical anti-Semitism.

You committed genocide.

You need to be disintegrated.

You're an ethno-state, as though Israel is the only ethno-state in the world.

You know, Greece doesn't exist, Germany doesn't exist, France doesn't exist.

Or most countries in the Arab world.

You could literally call almost every Muslim-majority state an ethno-state.

It's a serious notion that has been twisted in order to attack Israel.

Look at the concepts of apartheid, ethnic cleansing, now genocide, settler colonialism, ethno-state.

These are all serious notions, but they have weaponized all of these notions that I have just mentioned, and they are weaponized solely for the use

to attack and delegitimize Israel's existence.

And frankly, as an Israeli and as a Jew, I'm very worried.

I am now as worried as I was on October 7.

in the morning when I didn't know if Hezbollah is going to join the invasion into Israel.

I am

existentially worried because of what I'm seeing right now.

Yeah, you could argue it's the eighth front.

We've been talking about seven fronts.

This is like the eighth front.

Yeah, because there are two distinct levels here.

One level is, of course, violence.

And I think that the Jewish community is facing the real possibility that the Intifada, quote unquote, will be globalized.

So we have two main incidents that are violent, but if we'll have more, it's definitely the case, right?

But another level that is much more strategic is what we're seeing across in polls, mainly coming from Europe, but not only from Europe.

It has nothing to do with the war.

But the war has made this much more possible and attractive to a larger audience.

I want to stay on this point, Nadav, because I think you're raising an interesting point.

Our friends Yossi Klein Halevi and Danielle Hartman on their podcast, for heaven's sake, this morning, Yossi made this observation where he said, Israel is not being attacked and and supporters of Israel are not being attacked for what Israel does.

They are being attacked for what Israel is.

In other words, if you listen to the rhetoric, you don't even have to listen to it closely, just listen to it.

And you wrote this in your note that you sent me about this.

You never hear rhetoric about support for or hope for moderate Palestinian moderates to achieve victory in Palestinian society.

There's no hope for some kind of solution, some kind of accommodation where the Palestinian people and the Jewish people can live peacefully side by side.

No two-state solution then.

Right.

In their rhetoric, there is no, when you hear two-state solution, you know that these people are reasonable and they're probably not Jew haters, but you don't hear that in any of their rhetoric, right?

The rhetoric is all about that Israel's existence is the problem, not Israeli policies are the problem.

Israel's existence is the problem.

And how pervasive that point of view is.

This is very important for people to understand.

This is not just a position of the quote-unquote extreme left.

I want to quote from a piece by Sheila Katz, who is the CEO of the National Council for Jewish Women.

She published a piece in the New York Times yesterday, and I'll just quote briefly from the piece, okay?

And I'm quoting Sheila Katz here.

When anti-Semitism emerges within progressive spaces, cloaked in the language of justice, too often it is met with silence and discomfort, creating echo chambers where dangerous ideas are amplified rather than confronted.

She says in response to sounding the alarm about anti-Semitism in left-wing circles, quote, we have been gaslit, ignored, and told that our fear is overblown, our outrage unjustified.

Among many groups that have fought to secure and reclaim civil rights, voting rights, and reproductive rights, we have seen anti-Semitism dismissed as not bad enough to matter.

Our grief met with cynicism, our safety treated as optional.

Okay, so that's what she wrote.

Now,

as our friends at the Jewish Insider pointed out, because they cited this piece, they pointed out that if you woke up yesterday and saw this piece in the New York Times, the piece was titled, and keep in mind, editors at the New York Times, like most major publications, they choose the title for a piece.

So if I submit an op-ed to a major news publication, we may agree on edits, but they get to slap the title on it.

If you look at the title of the piece, it was on Sheila Katz's piece, Jews are afraid right now.

Okay, that was the headline accompanying Katz's piece.

But as the Jewish Insider pointed out, that was a quiet, unnoted change to the title of the piece.

The Times had originally selected a different title to the piece.

And that title was, and I quote here, American Jews are paying for the war in Gaza.

It's not an explicit justification at the outrage being directed at Jews, but it is implicit.

It's what we call in journalism bearing the lead.

The point is not that Jews are paying the price for the war in Gaza, because she was mentioning October 7, for instance, before there was a war in Gaza and the accusations against Israel.

The point is that they're paying the price for anti-Semitism.

That's the story that she was telling there.

And that it has nothing to do, as you said, Dan, with what Israel necessarily does.

But as an Israeli, I think I can say sometimes people would walk up to me in events after I would speak and they would say, yeah, but they would sort of quietly ask me, but can we criticize Israel today?

Although we want to support Israel, but some of the things that Israel does, we might dislike.

And I always say to these people, and I know we sometimes have differing opinions on that, Dan, I think criticism is very good.

I always think it needs to be in the context.

I'm Jewish.

Criticism is a communitarian value in general.

But here's something important that I think I need to say about this.

I think Israel, and that's something that, again, as an Israeli, I feel very comfortable in saying, I think Israel should take more into account what's happening globally and what it does and how it might influence Jewish communities.

That doesn't mean that it needs not to do things for its security because it fears the response of anti-Semites, but it does mean that it needs to be realistic as to its approach to the world and its status in the world.

So there's a poll that came out last night by Pew,

and it's about Israel's status in the world and negative views as to Israel.

It's a terrible poll, even in the US.

You have 53%,

according to Pew, that are either have a very unfavorable position as to Israel and somewhat unfavorable, and 45% that have a favorable view of Israel, 45%.

That's not a good result for Israel in the US, in a place that's so supportive of Israel, historically speaking.

But if you look across Europe, you reach places like the Netherlands, which is led by a government that is relatively, or was led by a government that was relatively supportive of Israel.

78%

that have unfavorable views of Israel, Spain, 75%, Sweden, 75%,

Italy, 66%,

Germany, 64%.

And I can go on.

In Japan, Our situation is the worst in Asia as it is right now.

I'm not talking about countries like Turkey.

So if you would have asked me, Dan, did the cabinet in Israel have real process of discussion saying, how will this war influence us globally?

Is it legitimate to say, yeah, one of the reasons we need to try and take this to a close and to reach some sort of a change is Israel's situation in a globalized world.

Of course, it's a small country.

It's the only Jewish country in the world and history in 2,000 years.

If we don't take into account how the war influences not our public relations, but our strategic place in the world, I think it's irresponsible.

Now, again, that doesn't mean that we need to concede, you know, and say, oh, we're stopping the war because the international pressure is so immense on us.

It's not the Israeli way, and I'm not preaching for that.

But is it part of what we should be thinking?

Because it's generations to come, what's happening now, considering the devastation in Gaza, considering these images, of course.

So I have a lot to say here, but I'll try to be brief.

I know, because you're an expert on these issues and I just waded into your own.

You're just giving me heart shakes.

All right.

Yes, I know.

Okay.

I'll give you a few reactions and then we'll move on.

One, I agree Israel is very unpopular now.

Israel has always been unpopular.

If you go back and look at surveys of attitudes globally towards Israel, sadly, even in the times of the peacemaking, Israel was also unpopular in the world.

During Ariel Sharon's disengagement from Gaza, Israel was also, if you go back and look at surveys, unpopular in the world.

Is it worse now?

Of course.

Israel is at war.

And as I've said publicly, any democracy at war is going to lose a little bit of its innocence in how it conducts the war.

It doesn't mean the war is unjust.

It just means that fighting wars, any country fighting a war, it's ugly business.

So if you already have a country that the international community and international public opinion tends to excoriate, presumably when that country is a war, that data is probably going to tick up somewhat, not dramatically, but somewhat, which is what's happened.

The added layer here is the rhetoric being used about Israel, which is you and I have discussed, was being used the days after October 7th.

It wasn't like it was waiting for Ben Viren Smolcherich to use incendiary language.

So I'm not excusing some of the decisions that the Israeli government has made that I think you're referring to, and I'm not excusing certainly some of the language used by people like Ben Geer and Smoltrich.

But let's be honest, as I go back to what Yossi Klein Alevi said, people attacking Israel are not attacking them for their policies, and they're not attacking them for the statements of Ben Veer and Smoltrich.

They're attacking them for what Israel is, its existence.

And Ben-Gir and Smoltrich should be more mindful of how they speak.

Not because it's going to improve public opinion of Israel in the world.

It probably won't, but because it's unhealthy for Israel's soul.

It's corrosive to Israel's soul.

But the idea that them reining it in is somehow going to improve Israel's PR situation, I remain a skeptic, but we could have a whole episode on that.

And I do want to move on to what's happening in Gaza.

There are reports coming out of Gaza describing the shooting and killing of 27 Palestinians at a food center.

This has been going on now for a number of days.

What has been going on here?

What can you tell us about this issue?

So, first of all, these distribution centers are working across the Gaza Strip.

And this is just Israel and the U.S.

working through this Gaza Humanitarian Foundation?

Well, formally, it's not Israel.

Israel is supportive of the Gaza humanitarian effort.

And Israel is saying the prime minister is adamant that Israel is not funding the actual food.

But everybody knows that the U.S.

and Israel are standing behind this international body, technicalities aside.

There was an incident when it just started happening more than a week ago in which it was argued that the IDF shot Palestinians next to a distribution center.

It turned out to be a complete fake news item.

But what did happen this week is not fake news.

The IDF is saying on the record that shots were made by IDF soldiers because a crowd of Palestinians was advancing towards a post of the IDF, not at the distribution centers, but a few kilometers away.

The Red Cross, that basically owns the hospital, the relevant hospital, has issued a statement saying, you know, we had a mass casualty event with more than 180 people getting into a hospital.

19 received dead on site.

Then another eight, I think, died later of their wounds.

These are gunshot wounds.

And since the IDF is saying on the record that it did have shooting in the region, it's a bad incident anyway.

You want to cut it.

There isn't an argument out there that they were trying to attack.

And the fact that that this happened is a tragedy, of course.

There are a lot of images, pictures, and stories coming out of the Gaza strip in the last two months with overbearing human misery and people and civilians that are getting hurt in this conflict by IDF fire.

And this has built another and another layer in the international opinion.

Now, what is happening on the ground beyond the international opinion is that Hamas is losing control.

So explain that.

It is losing control in a multi-layered process in the Gaza Strip.

First of all, we mentioned this in our previous episode with Amit that Hamas is not taking control of those big trucks as they did before, but food is now handed per family.

Now, of course, Hamas people can rob these people because they still have the guns in the Palestinian society in Gaza.

They can rob these people when they're coming back home with flour, with conserves, with the food that is actually handed over by the humanitarian effort in Gaza, by this distribution centers.

But then you need to rob every other person that will take the food.

And it's much easier to just take control of a truck, of a lorry, right?

And then distribute it yourself or sell it in the markets.

And they can't do that anymore.

So first of all, it's a blow to Hamas, any way you want to look at it.

Another layer that's really interesting is that you see Palestinians that have started to work with Israel.

And this, again, is multilayered.

You see Palestinians that are securing the distribution centers hired by the company who does that and not by the Israelis.

The company that's working for the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation is hiring Palestinians to work at these distribution centers.

And Palestinians are willing to do it.

They're willing to step up and do it, even though it cuts out Hamas.

Exactly.

And they are armed.

And Israel knows that they are armed.

So I don't know if you remember, Dan, the point in which the Israeli government said, we're not going to arm Palestinians in Gaza.

The Israeli government is now allowing the arming of Palestinians in Gaza as long as they are on our side, so to speak.

So you see the Hamas rule to an extent starting to, I don't want to say disintegrating, but is very much eroding together with huge military pressure by the IDF.

There's actually, it's like an algorithm here that we're seeing.

On one side, factually on the ground, Hamas is losing much of its control.

And Palestinians are starting to cooperate with Israel.

Palestinian population taking the food is saying thank you for Trump for supplying them food.

And you see these armed groups of Palestinians that are disconnecting from Hamas.

But Hamas is looking at what the West is doing, international press.

They're looking at countries threatening sanctions against Israel, like Spain and the UK.

They're looking at the White House.

And what Hamas is seeing is that the world is demonizing Israel to that extent.

And that gives them a lot of hope for the future, that the war will be stopped because of the international pressure or the U.S.

pressure on Israel.

And let's be absolutely straightforward about this.

No one can make Israel stop the war, but one person.

It's not even an administration.

That person is President Trump.

Only President Trump can pressure Israel to the point of stopping the war single-handedly.

But as you know better than me, Dan, even for the president, it's much more complicated.

And we don't know that the president would do such a thing to pick up the phone and say, I'm not supplying you arms anymore.

I'm not giving you diplomatic defense anymore.

You have a week to wrap up.

I don't see this happening now.

I don't see this happening next week.

Let's put it this way.

I don't know.

Yeah.

Yeah.

Well, first of all, A, I agree with you.

B, I spoke with an American official who's involved with the hostage negotiations in the last couple of days, and he made the point, not only is everything you're saying accurate, but that he and the president himself are getting far more frustrated with Hamas in these negotiations than with Israel.

They believe Hamas is the problem.

Because just to update people where we are, last week we spoke on this podcast with you and Amit about Hamas's refusal to Witkoff's proposal, which was 60 days of ceasefire, as I mentioned in the introduction, and for 10 live hostages and the remains of of the 18 hostages who have been killed.

Hamas refused this proposal.

And now I understand they came back with so many changes to it, as it was explained to me, that was so redlined that it was to be ridiculous.

And their demands expressed in those edits were, according to Witkoff, which he said publicly, quote, totally unacceptable.

And then it seemed as a result that full military force was underway, although it was really already underway, IDF military force.

So the U.S.

wasn't even going to respond to Hamas's counterproposal.

And the U.S.

basically said, this is unreasonable.

This is unacceptable.

If you want to come back to us with a different counterproposal, fine, but we're not responding to your counterproposal.

And so we're apparently now waiting for that counterproposal.

But what this official explained to me, and I'm curious for your reaction to it, Nadav, is he says, if you look at the trajectory of Hamas negotiations, at least since Trump has been president, but I hadn't really thought about it.

It's probably the case before that too.

Every time Israel and Hamas were close to a deal and Hamas threw up some kind of stumbling block, objection, complication, with time, the situation always got worse for Hamas.

Hamas thought they had leverage that time will play in Hamas's favor.

Every time it has worked in a negative direction for Hamas.

And so if you look back at when Israel, the U.S., Hamas, and the intermediaries were originally negotiating the release of Idan Alexander, the U.S., when all that leaked out and Adam Bowler was meeting with Hamas and all that, there was that big kerfuffle many months ago.

The U.S.

was willing to, it's not clear what, but was willing to make some meaningful concessions to get Idan Alexander back.

Fast forward to Trump's visit to the Gulf and to the Middle East.

And the U.S.

basically said, Trump's coming to the Middle East.

He sure would like Idan Alexander out of Gaza by the time he arrives, or at least a process for it to happen.

And this is your last chance, and you better do it.

And Hamas did it for nothing.

They could have gotten much more from what I understand, had they done the Adan Alexander release sooner.

And so now we're in the same situation where Hamas thinks it has momentum, Hamas thinks it has leverage, Hamas thinks Israel is in a weakened position and it's over-negotiating.

What is your response to all of that?

So, first of all, I agree.

And I think that to a large extent, this is very much related to the access of resistance in general.

They have been time and time again assessing Israel and downplaying Israel's strategy, telling themselves stories as to the future.

And that goes for Hassan Asrallah, who was eliminated at the end by Israel.

It's also true for the Supreme Leader in Iran.

That, by the way, we're not going to go into this, but is again, I think, making a huge mistake by declining the very generous offer made by the Trump administration, according to the New York Times and Axios, to the Iranians.

There's something lost in translation constantly in their engagement with the Israelis and the Americans.

An IDF general told me last week, is very much part of the operational plan of what's happening in Gaza.

And he told me, look, I want you to understand it's not about politics, it's not about the government, it's not about the prime minister.

I'm telling you, we feel quite certain that we know how to take down the Hamas rule in Gaza.

We believe that our plan is going to work.

Now, after saying that, I will say something that we need to keep in mind as to Hamas.

All wars end.

All wars end.

And now, it's this question.

Let's assume right now that they will agree to an interim deal.

And 10 hostages, live hostages of Israel, will walk, will be released.

And of course, for Israelis, this would be a huge moment.

And then we will have a ceasefire for about two months.

During this ceasefire, who controls Gaza?

Palestinian society in Gaza is again ruled by Hamas.

They'll get their power back.

The IDF will withdraw from most of the territories it took.

And at the end of these two months, where is Hamas?

Hamas has 10 live hostages for a small nation like Israel.

That's the Lord.

And they are again in these territories.

And if they started eroding, they're going to take care of all the traitors, the collaborators with Israel Israel in the meantime.

So we'll see nightly executions of Palestinians in Gaza.

And of course, one of their demands that Israel is not saying a complete no to is that aid will come again through those trucks and not through the aid distribution centers.

And I'm still not sure.

The Trump administration is right now saying no to that, but I'm not sure if it's going to be a deal breaker.

So here comes the question.

If the Trump administration is willing for Israel to return to the war after this deal, that's one thing.

But if Trump is actually saying to BB off the record, look, this is going to be called an interim deal, but you're not going to do this again.

It's the end of the war.

You need to negotiate with us, with the Arab world, with Hamas.

I don't care about the final status situation agreement in Gaza.

If he does that, Hamas is left with 10 hostages with the regained territory.

So here's the question.

Maybe it's better to get to a deal now that is complete when Hamas is weak, Trump is on our side.

You can maybe get the hostages out and a different government in Gaza and not negotiate when

the US has lost its patience to the war completely.

Now, this is a question to you, Dan.

What do you think?

Because what I'm hearing from DC is, if the war stops now, we don't think that the war will renew.

I'm not saying we're going to veto it to Israel, but the president doesn't want to see this war renewing if there is a ceasefire.

And I don't know.

You know, if I'm an Israeli leader, I'm not sure that it's not the right time to say, you know what?

Let's take our wins.

There is a lot to take.

Get a full agreement now when they are relatively weak and we control most of Gaza and not do this after we withdraw from Gaza and leave them with 10 hostages alive.

I have two views on this.

One is I do think we are at an inflection point where Israel has made some extraordinary gains and achieved some extraordinary successes throughout the war, but especially really in the last month or two, because there really is virtually nobody left in the command structure of Hamas.

So Hamas as an organization militarily is largely wiped out, not entirely, but largely wiped out.

And now the governing structure of Hamas is also being severely hit.

So this could be a moment to quote Joe Biden, to paraphrase Joe, to take the win.

However, there are some in the Israeli government, I'm thinking of Ron Dermer, for example, who feel strongly that if there's any remnant of Hamas left in Gaza that can climb out of the rubble after Israel declares this war is over

and say, we're still here.

You thought we were gone, but we're still here.

And we're not only still here, but we're intimidating Palestinians.

And we're going to organize acts of retributions against Palestinians who are working for you.

And we're going to change the culture gradually.

It may take us time, but we're going to change the culture in Palestinian society in Gaza because people are going to become afraid of us again.

And oh, by the way, we're going to start looking at ways to attack Israelis.

Now, it could be inconsequential, it could be de minimis in terms of numbers and statistically in terms of the impact they'll actually have.

But the symbolism of Hamas climbing out of the rubble and still standing less than two years after October 7th will be such a blow to Israel standing in the region on all its fronts.

And that all these enemies of Israel and friends of Israel in the region or potential future friends of Israel, all of them will be looking at Israel saying, really?

After what Hamas did to Israel, Hamas can still declare a symbolic victory.

That will be such a blow.

to Israel's existence and its standing, and that this is the one shot Israel has now to not allow that to happen.

I mean, that's the debate happening in the innermost circles, I think, around the leadership in the Israeli government.

And so I understand why it's not such a simple decision.

First of all, I agree it's not a simple decision, but, and we're talking timing now.

What I worry about is that Israel goes for an interim deal.

10 hostages alive are left with Hamas.

Israel withdraws as part of this deal.

This is all on the record.

This is a Steve Witkoff proposal right now.

Even this positive proposal for Israel.

But then the White House actually says, but the war is not going to renew.

We want this war over.

And as I understand it, according to the public statements made up by the president, this is the position of the president.

He wants this war to end.

And then Hamas negotiates when the IDF is out of most of the territories it occupied in the Gaza Strip, and when they have 10 hostages, knowing that the White House has just taken off the table Israel's most important tool in reaching an agreement, which is a military pressure, knowing how Israel's status in the world.

I'm very worried.

And because of that, I'm not sure that we shouldn't go.

But if you believe that Israel, you know that how President Trump's views on these things can.

They're fluid.

And so the question is.

I don't know.

We don't know.

Look at how the attitudes, the position of the administration has changed on the Russia-Ukraine war.

To be fair, this could also be an argument against reaching an interim deal at all.

If you really believe that in a month Hamas is going to disintegrate completely, it's going to be in a Hezbollah position.

And maybe you don't need to have that.

You do need to have a full kind of an agreement and not an interim agreement now.

So the people were saying, let's not do a deal now.

But as to this point about Hamas can climb out of the rubble, according to the polls I'm seeing, even in Gazan right now, as long as there would be two Palestinians in Gaza, one of them at least would be a Hamas supporter.

These are the polls.

So someone, even if you will have a technocrat government led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE or something, someone will walk in a Gazan Strip with a Hamas banner and say, we won.

Is this an argument?

There's only one thing you can make sure that it won't happen.

And that argument is basically that you need to have a full military occupation of the Gaza Strip.

This is the only option that you have if you don't want to see those images or scenes.

And I don't think it's on the table as far as the prime minister is concerned.

I have two quick points to make before we go.

And the first one has something to do with the international community and the pressure or the lack of pressure on Hamas.

Just imagine, Dan, what would have happened if World War II wouldn't have ended?

Because

after Hitler committed suicide in his bunker, the remaining Nazi leadership would say, no, we're not going to sign a surrender agreement with the United States and with the USSR.

We're going to continue the fighting, even if Germany is completely devastated.

We don't care.

We're going to fight from the forest.

We're going to fight from the bunkers.

What would the US do?

What would have happened to Germany, to Germans?

Imagine what would have happened in Japan if after those atomic bombs flattened Hiroshima and Nagasaki, what would have happened if the Japanese Empire would have said, I'm continuing the war anyhow?

Hamas needs to surrender.

Israel is not demanding Hamas to sign an agreement in which it says formally in a 19th century style, we are now surrendering to you.

We have violated your sovereignty on October 7, and we are going to pay reparations for the damages and compensation for what we have done on Crow 7.

This is not a demand made by Israel.

We are not far from actually reaching an agreement that answers Israel's demands.

These are that Hamas loses control of the Gaza ship, hostages return.

They have already basically agreed to that.

And disarmament of Hamas, because that was one.

And disarmament of Hamas and exile of part of its leadership.

As to exile to part of its leadership, Hamas basically to its Arab contacts is saying we will agree to some exile because it gives them safe passage and life.

And they know that if they'll remain in Gaza, they'll be killed by Israel.

And as to disarmament, they're still refusing.

And they are refusing, Dan, when Hezbollah, that wasn't hit as hard as Hamas, is now disarming in Lebanon.

By the way, a major achievement of the Trump administration and of Morgan Ortegas that needs to get credit for what she has been doing with Lebanon.

I think that's one of the most efficient things that the Trump administration has done globally.

So Hamas is not willing to disarm while Hezbollah is actually disarming.

I don't think that they can hold that position for long, let's put it this way.

Except in Lebanon, you have a government that seems, a local government, a Lebanese government that seems a new government, it's so far intent on being a reliable partner.

And you just didn't make the argument for the PA in Gaza or for Palestinian agency in Gaza, because then you can make the argument as far as Hamas is concerned.

If you believe

they will be an equally reliable partner.

I'm skeptical, but you know.

No, but we don't believe that the Lebanese government is a reliable partner.

But what I'm saying is that wars need to end, and they need to end when the party that has started the war and has been beaten in the battlefield and everywhere else is willing to put its people's interests first.

And this is the demands I'm hearing from Palestinians.

It's not my rhetoric.

It's what Palestinians are saying also on your show, Dan, but are saying in Ramallah and in other places.

And that's one thing.

And another point that isn't contradictory of pressuring Hamas is that, you know, I'm looking at Israeli politicians' statements and remarks, thinking about civilian casualties in Gaza and thinking how to minimize those and being sensitive to the human suffering of Palestinians in Gaza, there's nothing about this that is against.

the Israeli narrative.

Criticizing, asking the IDF for answers for some issues in Gaza is important.

It's important for us.

It's not only important for PR or for advocacy.

It's the type of standard that we need to be keeping.

And I think that sometimes people feel that this is somehow counterproductive or even treacherous as to the Israeli cause.

And I can see why, because it's being misused internationally in such a way, it's being in such a deviated way.

I think it's still important.

It's still the Israeli, at least narrated even in 1948 after the Holocaust.

I just mentioned Nazi Germany and its surrender, that, you know, the prime minister would say, yeah, we know of some actions that were done done by the IDF that shouldn't have.

We need to investigate those and we need to punish people and so forth.

This is the Israeli narrative and this is our founding fathers.

And I think it's important.

I said that not in order to somehow balance between the points.

I think that the first point is most important.

Hamas needs to let go.

of the Palestinian society in Gaza that it has devastated.

It has led to the destruction of the fabric of society that was there.

And they need to let go.

And the international community that is so critical of Israel needs to make that case that Hamas needs to surrender, use these words maybe, surrender in the Gaza Strip.

And the fact that the UK and Spain and the rest won't say that, I think that we should really make that demand to them.

I think it's an immoral position to take.

Okay, Nadav, obviously we could keep going here.

I have some additional thoughts, but the good news for me and maybe the bad news for you is we're going to be speaking again on this podcast.

Stay safe over there, and thanks for this.

Thank you so much, Dan.

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