Trump: “Don’t!” - with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal

You are listening to an art media podcast.

What worries Israelis the most is the interim deal between Iran and the US.

And why is that?

Because President Trump is desperate for achievements.

The Russia-Ukraine negotiations had failed.

The Israel-Gaza negotiations had failed.

So, the only achievement that he can have at hand is an interim deal that would reduce the tensions in the Middle East.

Problem is that Iran would not give up the crucial ingredient in the survival of the regime, which is the nuclear weapon.

So, for the first time in the Israeli-US relationship, President Trump confirms publicly that he actually warned Netanyahu not to attack Iran.

What our enemies see is that there is a huge daylight between Israel and the US.

It's 10 a.m.

on Thursday, May 29th here in New York City.

It is 5 p.m.

on Thursday, May 29th in Israel as Israelis wind down their day.

Before today's conversation, one housekeeping note: next week on June 4th in the evening at 7:30 p.m., I'll be in conversation live with Brett McGurk, who was the Biden administration's point man on the Hamas-Israel war and the hostage negotiations.

Brett also worked closely with Steve Witkoff on the January hostage deal.

Brett has strong views about what worked and what didn't work in these various rounds of negotiations and where the blame lies.

Brett was also working on Saudi Israel normalization and still spends a lot of time in the Arab world, specifically the Sunni Gulf today.

So needless to say, this will be an interesting conversation.

If you want to join us for this live recording of the Call Me Back podcast at the Manhattan JCC, please follow the instructions in the show notes to register.

Now on to today's conversation.

Following President Trump's return from Saudi Arabia last week, pressure on Israel by the UK, Germany, France, and also to some degree the U.S.

has been steadily increasing to end the war.

Now, as we mentioned in last Thursday's episode with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segel, the war in Gaza is tied to the U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations.

Well, yesterday we saw what may be interpreted as major developments on both fronts, terms for a new intermediary hostage ceasefire deal that were reached by direct negotiations between the U.S.

and Hamas, according to reports, and also reports that President Trump told Prime Minister Netanyahu it would be, quote, very inappropriate for Israel to strike Iran's nuclear facilities militarily, at least anytime soon, while these negotiations are ongoing.

Steve Witkoff's new proposal on the Gaza front aims to release 10 live hostages held by Hamas in exchange for a 60-day ceasefire in Gaza.

This initiative also includes the return of 18 deceased hostages and the resumption of UN humanitarian aid.

However, the proposal has met resistance from, among others, right-wing ministers in Israel's government who argue that Hamas is weakened and that Israel should press for a complete surrender rather than a temporary truce.

On Iran, in a recent phone call, President Trump advised Netanyahu against launching a military strike on Iran, emphasizing the potential for a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear program.

Trump highlighted that negotiations with Iran are progressing and that a deal could be imminent.

And he doesn't want that process upended, at least not yet.

Despite this, Prime Minister Netanyahu remains skeptical, fearing that any agreement might not sufficiently prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

So, to better understand this rapidly evolving, increasingly complex story that involves many facets, many fronts, many characters, we welcome back Nadav and Amit.

Guys, thanks for being here.

Thanks for having us.

Thanks for inviting us.

This time from Chicago.

This time from Chicago, exactly.

All right.

Nadav, let's start with this.

Just summarize the different international pressure points that Israel is experiencing right now since President Trump returned from Saudi Arabia.

And I guess how coordinated it all is?

So we have three points of friction as far as Israel and the regional and the international community.

The first one is the pressure by the Trump administration to try to get to an interim deal, a hostage deal, a ceasefire deal as to Gaza.

This is the Witkov plan.

Basically, it says on the way to ending the war, we will have another ceasefire and release of Israeli hostages.

And the US will give some sort of direction, or as far as Hamas is concerned, assurances that the war indeed is going to end.

Israel wants this pathway.

Israel does not want a deal of all deals to end the war and get all the hostages back right now because it feels that Hamas is still very much in power on parts of the Palestinian society in Gaza Strip.

But it does want an interim deal.

It does want the Witkoff plan, as long as the US supplies it with the same promise that was given by the Biden administration at the time that it can resume the war if it doesn't reach a settlement with Hamas in the end of the negotiations.

This is very much the Biden deal.

The Biden deal from when?

The Biden deal, the May 2024 Biden deal that was demonstrated only when Trump actually came into office and was pushed over the finishing line by Steve Witkoff and by the president.

But this was the Biden deal.

The Biden deal said, you know, you're going to get some of your hostages back, then you're going to negotiate the end of the war and the return of all the hostages.

Israel basically decided not to go through that process because it felt that Hamas will never agree to its terms.

The terms are for the Hamas leadership to leave the Gaza Strip, or some of it to leave the Gaza Strip, for Hamas to disarm and for Hamas to lose control of the Gaza Strip, all the hostages go back home and to have a different government, of course, in Gaza.

Amit published this morning in Channel 12 the details of this Witkov plan that were sent to Jerusalem late last night.

And according to those plans, nine hostages will be freed.

Just one collection, it's 10.

There was misunderstanding in Israel because they thought Idan Alexander was actually the down payment for this deal.

No, it's 10.

Ah, okay.

So 10 hostages is what we thought.

And Jerusalem argues that the Trump administration will not give guarantees to the end of the war.

So it's just a win-win as far as the Israelis are concerned.

But, and this is a really big but, the idea if we need to, again, withdraw from all the areas it captured, the Netzerim corridor, the Morag corridor, and return to actually to where it was at the end of the previous ceasefire.

And according to this plan, according to what Amit published, and I think that's true, the UN returns to be the main factor of humanitarian aid to Gaza.

So the first element is negotiations towards an interim deal.

And that's very much in play right now.

And the Trump administration is pushing really hard.

I think that the Trump administration is going to give some sort of guarantees or statements as to the end of the war, although Jerusalem is saying absolutely not.

Let's see.

Jerusalem is also...

It said many things during this last week that turned some of them turned to be not as accurate.

That brings me to the the second subject and that's iran wait wait nadav you're saying that that you think you actually think the trump administration is going to provide language that implies an end to war or explicitly explicitly uh includes an end to war is that what you're saying which is not what jerusalem is saying i'm saying that the Trump administration is saying on the record, doesn't matter what I say, that this president wants the war to end.

And we know that during his conversations with the Qataris, the Saudis, and the UAE, they were absolutely clear about their desire for the war to end, and the president agrees with them.

So, and I think this would be manifested, would be delivered to Hamas in a way that will give Hamas the impression that the war will never resume.

And I think this deal is different in that sense.

And there is a large possibility the Trump administration would not allow it.

But I don't know what the president will decide in a couple of months from now after the deal is finalized.

It's up for the president.

Now, the second element is Iran.

We know that both Iranians and Americans are relatively positive as to the chances to get to a deal.

We know that the president has said on the record that he has advised the prime minister.

He didn't want to use the word warn the prime minister not to attack Iran right now.

He said it won't be appropriate.

I don't remember the exact wording that President Trump used in his Oval Office.

This was less than 12 hours after the Netanyahu office denied the reports that this

sort of warning was made during the conversation report by Barack Ravin in Axis.

But Trump just said it on the record in a press conference in the White House that he told the Israelis not to attack Iran because we're in the middle of negotiations.

And there it seemed positive.

The third issue is the international community.

And what we're seeing there is really you know, immense pressure on Israel as to the war and the humanitarian situation in Gaza, including some very concrete steps.

We have the june summit organized by the french and saudi arabia as to palestinian statehood that's going to happen and that's important the trump administration is not as far as i know cooperating with that summit and has made sure that israel knows that it's not cooperating with the summit but the pressure on israel is mounting including countries main countries in the eu that are demanding not only stopping cooperation but also real sanctions they're saying israel is russia and i'm talking mainly about countries like Spain and other countries.

So, this also, I would say, you know, is boiling up in terms of pressure on Israel to reach some sort of a ceasefire.

Okay, that sounds, I can imagine, quite alarming, the way Nadav lays it out.

If you are sitting in Jerusalem, certainly if you're sitting in the government, the prime minister's office.

Amit, what can you tell us?

From your perspective, you've been reporting it out of Witkov's New Deal, and also just the genesis of it.

Things were quiet, things were quiet, things were quiet.

Witkov gave a statement the other day, basically saying Hamas was not coming to the table and he seemed to be putting pressure on Hamas.

And now there seems to be new momentum.

So, what's in it, and what changed?

I think there is one major change, and it's not the withdrawal from areas the IDF had conquered since

the end of the last ceasefire.

The main issue is how the humanitarian aid is provided.

And I think Witkov recognizes what makes Hamas really painful.

And this is the new so-called American company providing humanitarian aid in four different centers.

This is this Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, the GHF.

Exactly.

You're saying that that is a huge problem for Hamas.

I'll put it this way.

For 19 months, Israel tried to eliminate Hamas as a military force.

Now, for the first time, beginning this week, Israel has started fighting Hamas as a government.

In just 36 hours, not only the company had provided

over 2 million meals to the Gazan population, but it actually created turmoil in Gaza.

For instance, you saw a mob of Gazans actually invading the place where Hamas kept the humanitarian aid it had stolen from the population.

This is the first time in this war in which the barrier of fear has been broken.

The Gazan population sees Gazans in the south getting

humanitarian aid from Israel and from the US.

They see them shouting Trump, Trump, Trump, and

all the best for Netanyahu and the idea of Gazans, even in Jerusalem these days, people don't support Netanyahu too much.

And then they see

an option, A window opens for change in Gaza.

Because if Hamas loses its grip over Gazans, it necessarily means his collapse in a few weeks, not a few months, a few weeks.

Because the idea

behind Hamas ruling Gaza is not Hamas as a government, but Hamas as a mob, as a gang that steals the humanitarian aid.

Hence, if the humanitarian aid is transferred directly to the population, Hamas cannot take his portion, his share of this humanitarian aid, then he cannot pay salaries to his terrorists and senior officials, thus ceasing to exist as a government.

And this is why Witkoff believes that transferring back the humanitarian aid to the UN and other international bodies, aka giving the humanitarian aid to Hamas will give them incentive.

From what I hear from intelligence sources in Israel, Hamas is horrified from the combination of both assassinating his senior leadership two weeks ago, Mohamed Sinwar, Irish Sinoar's brother, and this one, this step of providing humanitarian aid through American companies.

So Hamas, the only question is, is Hamas that desperate as we speak on Thursday?

Or as I think, he'll give it a go a week or two, because for Hamas, if he doesn't see or if he doesn't get a guarantee from President Trump or Qatar or Egypt for ending the war, so in Hamas's eyes, he gives up half of the live hostages only to return to the same situation in 60 days from now.

Now, for Israel, the dilemma is exactly the same,

but not less difficult because

you see the light at the end of the Tamil for the first time in this war.

You see the turmoil in Gaza.

You see Israel cleaning Rafah and then Khan Yunis.

So, which means that Hamas's leadership in Gaza is gradually being eliminated.

Now,

Smotrich, for instance, and many figures in Likud argue, don't stop now.

We can keep pushing.

We can create more centers to distribute food even in the city of Gaza itself.

And in a few weeks, we'll get all the hostages without Hamas surviving, which leaves Hamas with no leadership and no money, which might lead for something dramatic that is going to happen, be it a rebellion or a coup d'état within Hamas or a new offer to release all the hostages.

So this is really different from any other operation from the beginning of the world because it deals directly with Hamas as a government branch.

Okay, Nadav, question then.

As I'm listening to Amit, I'm thinking, why didn't Israel do this sooner?

This seems, I mean, if what Amit is laying out is the squeeze effect, I heard from Israeli officials for months and months and months, Palestinians are not going to rise up until there's a pathway that's independent of Hamas and they don't have to worry about retribution from Hamas.

I heard this, Ron Dermer said this on my podcast, this explicitly

when people were asking for where's the day after plan, where's the day after plan?

This seems to me like

something that could have been done sooner.

This approach of heavy military pressure combined with independent path to to the Palestinian civilians in terms of humanitarian aid and food was something possibly that could or should have been done sooner?

Of course, it should have been done sooner.

And this is something that we've been discussing from day one of this war.

What does Israel envision in the Gaza Strip?

How does it actually make sure that Hamas doesn't control the Gaza Strip?

It's obvious that Hamas is a grassroots popular movement within the Palestinian society.

It's unfortunate, I think, for Palestinians.

It's unfortunate for me as an Israeli.

Therefore, it's not only about cutting its military abilities.

There are other commanders.

I mean, it is right that the main commanders of Hamas militarily in the Gaza strip have all been, almost all been killed.

You know, the commander of Gaza is still there,

a man called Hadad, who's important, but Israel will get to him at the end.

But the question is as to the Palestinian society in Gaza.

How do you make sure that Hamas doesn't have a monopoly over violence?

And there are specific answers there.

One of the answers then is very much straightforward.

It was put by the Americans, actually.

Anyone who saw anything in Iraq or Afghanistan, you need to have a military occupation.

You need to interact with the local population.

You need to make sure that, you know, establishments are still being managed, that schools at some points would be open.

There are no schools in Gaza since the beginning of the war.

You need to control the territory.

Israel didn't want to do that.

Israel didn't want to do that.

Its military brass didn't want to do that.

The prime minister and the government never wanted,

they kept on saying on the record that there would be no occupation of Gaza.

So what would there be in Gaza?

And there, there were a bunch of answers.

And I remember on your show saying, telling the story about how Gallant and the Biden administration and General Fanzil, who's coordinating between the PA and between Israel, had this plan of getting thousands of Fatakh people with guns and make them be responsible for territories in which food would be handed.

You know, when was that?

That was like a year ago when they had this plan.

Now, what's the difference between what's happening right now?

The difference right now, some would say, is that you don't use local agency of the Palestinian Authority that everybody knows is corrupt and the rest.

But if you look at the pictures now in Gaza, if you look at these centers, what do you see there?

So there's a core of actually,

let's put it

plainly, mercenaries, foreign mercenaries that are there.

Some of them are Americans, some of them from other countries.

Contractors.

We choose to call them contractors.

Okay, sorry.

I apologize for not being PC with mercenaries.

Yeah, so they are there.

Near them, they are Palestinians.

These are actually

large families, Hamulot of Palestinians that were hired by the humanitarian operation that Israel is actually supportive, according to the Israeli opposition, is behind this operation and everything.

And these are Palestinians who are standing there with vests and everything, and they've been hired to the job.

And now these Palestinians are armed, Dan.

It's very important to say that they are armed.

Okay.

And now beyond this circle, you have the circle of the IDF that is actually securing the entire premises.

And if something happens, like things happen in the first and second day of riots, there, the IDF is responsible to pull out the American or other contractors out of there.

So why didn't we have it at the beginning?

So some would say, oh no, the IDF rejected that.

The IDF didn't want that to happen.

They didn't want these companies to happen.

The IDF was very particular, both the current IDF chief and the previous one, that they don't want IDF soldiers to hand over food,

but they never rejected the idea that other contractors will hand them.

And I know that Amit wants to respond to that.

Amit is like jumping out of his chair.

For those listening and can't watch this, you see Amit is like bouncing.

So, and not bouncing like he is on the basketball court on top of Chicago skyline.

Amit, you seem like you want to jump in here.

There was a huge debate over this humanitarian supply.

For instance, Minister Gallant, the former Defense Minister Gallant, opposed specifically this way of distribution, and so did Herci Alevi, the former IDF chief of staff, because they argued this would be the first step towards

an Israeli military rule over Gaza.

So they actually opposed every initiative directed or that looks like the current one.

Second, the Biden administration had opposed it for a year.

They wanted the humanitarian supply to be provided through the United Nations, which actually led to strengthening Hamas.

Now look at the absurd.

The United Nations that was built, was initiated in order to help pool people around the world opposes.

Every day issues a few statements against this distribution.

The Gazan population enjoys something, and therefore the United Nations is against it.

This is crazy stuff.

I mean, the fact that it actually shows that

their

objection to this way does not emanate from

being worried about the population in Gaza, but because they want to keep Hamas.

They don't want this war to end when Hamas is not there.

This is the thing.

And unfortunately, what we see is that over the last year, this unholy coalition of the UN and Hamas actually helped this terrorist government to survive.

And now, when you see the light at the end of the tunnel, everyone is panicked.

Now, everyone who supports, who really supports humanitarian aid, a real humanitarian aid, and not a budget to Hamas, should actually encourage this initiative.

Unfortunately, and the tragedy of Israel, and the reason why at least 200 Israeli soldiers got killed, and the war was prolonged from a few months to almost two years now is because no one actually allowed Israel to operate this huge operation prior to the election of President Trump.

Now, when President Trump is in office, it is allowed.

And we can just imagine what would have happened had it started in November 2023.

And just to understand, the reason is because the Biden, I think what you're suggesting here is the Biden administration was too responsive to the conditions of the U.N.

and their various affiliated organs, and they wanted to be in control of any aid coming in.

So between the U.S.

government and the international bodies, there was no way anything could be done this way, whereas the Trump administration has gone rogue and they're less responsive to the international bodies.

President Trump doesn't care that Israel or the U.S.

would control Gaza.

And the Biden administration and the Israeli figure leader, former figure leaders, Gallant and Halevi, were horrified from the option that Israel would control Gaza militarily, would control, would take control over Gaza's population.

And this combination actually stopped Israel from providing the humanitarian aid way, way earlier.

But we see how rapidly things change in Gaza.

He who controls the food in Gaza controls the Gaza Strip.

And I'll explain why.

Gaza is the place that relies heavily on humanitarian supply, be it from the UN, UNRWA, Arab countries, Israel, and Egypt.

So Hamas doesn't really have to govern Gaza like the US administration governs America or the Prime Minister Netanyahu governs Israel.

All he has to do is just to take a portion of the money and the provisions supply to Gaza.

Once you cut his lifeline, you actually

kill Hamas without shooting even one bullet.

Okay, so I'm gonna beg to differ factually and as to the analysis.

First of all, Gaza is producing or has produced before October 7 and has continued to produce, by the way, vegetables, some agricultural and food.

And that's very material.

And I'm not talking like five or ten percent.

It's an agricultural area.

And of course, during the wartime, it's impossible.

Nada, the import salt was more than I mean, it was

10 times colder.

Okay.

Yeah, it's absolutely the case.

But in terms of food, it produced much of its food.

I don't want, it's not the majority of its food, but much of its food.

And since the beginning of the war, it's impossible.

But my main thing is about, you know, Israel just wanted to do everything

and it was prevented by the Biden administration, by the UN, by the international community, by UAF Gallant, by its own chief of staff, and so forth and so forth.

The truth is that Israel had, and by the way, still does not have, a vision to what's happening with the local population in Gaza.

And at a certain point, President Trump came out with his idea about a voluntary immigration and this government took this idea and made it its charter for Gaza, but actually it has no idea.

And that's the reason nothing happened.

The Israeli chiefs of staff are saying, and I think they're saying on the record, the former chiefs of staff that they never rejected plans to hand out food by other aid organizations to the Gazans which is what is happening right now what they didn't want to happen and this IDF chief the current IDF chief and the previous IDF chief Herzia Levi are both saying and this was a shouting match then during the

cabinet meetings in which the current chief of staff nominated by Netanyahu shouted that he is not not willing for the IDF to hand over food to the Gazan population.

Why?

Because the IDF, not only the previous IDF, but also the current IDF, thinks it would be a terrible, terrible mistake.

I don't think that the international bodies or the Biden administration, if Israel would have come to them and said, you know what, we're going to hand out food too.

You know, you're going to hand out food.

We're going to hand out food.

What do you care?

It's our responsibility, according to the fourth Geneva Convention.

We need to hand out food.

We're the occupier force right now.

I don't think that they would ever get a veto to that.

Israel never produced a coherent plan.

It took Israel

an eternity to produce this plan.

And it's a very, very complicated plan.

Why?

Because it's a humanitarian effort that Israel denies that it's funding.

Its opposition is saying that it is funding.

don't also agree with Amit saying that food is everything in Gaza.

In Gaza, you control everything through the guns that you have.

It's the guns that matter, not the food.

Why?

Because all of these people who are taking the food back home can be robbed on their way back home, and some of them are being robbed by people who are carrying guns, most of which are controlled by Hamas.

So in order to win this, it's not only about food, it's about having the guns.

Monopoly over violence is the most important thing in taking over a territory.

Whoever has the guns can control the food distribution.

What Israel is doing right now, it's trying to bypass it.

I think it's a positive development.

And I've just written it, you know, I just saw a, you know, a professor in the LSC on Twitter saying, you know, showing the picture of people waiting in queue, trying to draw a parallel between this and something else.

And he said, you know, something like, whatever stands behind this principle needs to go away from the world, needs to disappear from the world, whatever ideology.

And I wrote back, the ideology standing behind people queuing up to foods in Gaza with an Israeli supported operation is the idea that if you control a piece of territory, you are responsible to some extent to supplying aid or assisting aid reaching.

to these people.

This is a humanitarian idea.

And I think that I agree with

one point.

If the Israelis would have done this much earlier with a career in plan, with the result of their political leadership and also their defense apparatus, I think that would have helped fantastically to winning against Hamas.

But let's keep our eyes on the bull.

And the bull is disarming Hamas in a way, if it is even possible.

Before we move off this Gaza issue, there are reports that there are tens of thousands of Hamas fighters still in Gaza.

Now, obviously, how how one defines a Hamas fighter, the standard, the quality, the professionalism of the fighter, the commandos that invaded southern Israel on October 7th were a whole other level, I think, of

quality, shall we say, in terms of fighting capability relative to the kinds of fighters they're recruiting.

Now, that said, the numbers that are being thrown around in some public reports, it's something like 40,000 fighters.

And the tunnel network, while a lot of it has been destroyed, a lot of it is still operational and it's still extensive.

So I open that to either of you what what do you make of those reports and how worried should israel be about that first of all israel destroyed 25 percent of the tunnel system but it's the strategic 25 percent the main intersections for instance or under hospitals as for the uh armed people i think gaza will never get short of two things young anti-jewish males and weapons what israel can do is actually eliminate Hamas as an army.

And this is what it is doing now as an army

and as government to tell you that we will destroy each and every tunnel and that we eliminate the anti-Semitism and the hatred maybe in 200 years.

This is the same kind of you know counting bodies is the same kind of mistake done, the famous mistake done as to Vietnam.

And to an extent at some point, some point during the Iraq war, although the US, and you know this better than I do, Dan, did learn a lesson from Vietnam in Iraq, try to implement a lesson.

But if the local population is still supportive of Hamas, and some of it is, you'll find the fighters because in Gaza today, you know, $10 a week is a lot.

And you will find people to grab a rifle and fight the Israelis.

And that's the reason why the main question is who's going to control Gaza.

Now, let me just quote the IDF to the cabinet more than a year ago.

In Gaza, you have three options.

This is the IDF, Herti Elevi's IDF, now being trashed by the Netanyahu people.

You have three options.

The first option is Hamas.

They are in control of the Palestinian society right now in Gaza.

They might be losing it as we speak, but they were.

The second option is Fatach.

Fatach is the other party controlling the PA.

Which they're in Ramallah on the West Bank, and they used to be in Gaza before Hamas drove them out.

Yeah.

The third option is military occupation of the Israelis.

That's it.

There's not going to be an invention here.

There's not going to be a new startup with this.

Can I give you a fourth option?

Yep.

A fourth option is the PA option, which is basically the powers to be in the West Bank resuming power in Gaza.

But I have a hard time believing they will be able to pull that off both based on their competence and their strength.

Oh, no, by Fatach, I mean PA.

Yeah, PA.

That's true.

I know.

But they're not going to be able able to pull it off without Hamas having some kind of seat at the table.

Okay, so exactly.

And that's what worries Israel.

Israel is worried that this would be the Hezbollah model in which Hamas still has the monopoly over violence.

And as one Israeli official put it to me, the biggest setback for Israel,

like the worst outcome of all of this, is that if there's any semblance of Hamas rule in Gaza, even if the PA comes in and it's Abu Mazen or his successor and it's their infrastructure, but it's well understood that Hamas, they have some kind of deal with Hamas and Hamas has some presence.

The message to the region for Israel would be devastating.

That after all that has happened and since October 7th, the idea that Hamas could still kind of crawl out of the rubble and have a seat at the table is strategically the worst of all worlds.

They will crawl out of the rubble because as long as they are Palestinians

supportive of Hamas, Hamas will have some sort of ability to leverage this into, I don't want to say, seating the table, but

you're really hitting the issue that should have obsessed Israeli decision makers from day one.

Not the number of tunnels, not the number of fighters.

But how do we maintain this?

And one of the things that we're seeing in Gaza, I think it's positive, is that the Israelis, through this operation that Israel says that it's not behind of, are trying to think this through,

but they didn't think that through.

The IDF got from the Israeli government something that no other IDF has ever gotten.

They just were told, unlike in 1948, 1967, 1973, they were told, you can do whatever you need to do and you have time.

What we call the political clock to end the war, you know, the moment in which the UN decides at 6 p.m., all forces stop shooting.

This was always the nightmare for an IDF commander.

That at a certain point, they'll tell him, you know, you can't proceed.

And they were stealing another minute, another minute.

Always the IDF was looking for more time.

Suddenly, in this war, the government said, you know, you have loads of time.

Do whatever you need to do.

Go ahead.

There is no world.

The Americans are with us.

October 7th was so terrible.

Do what you need to do.

But in fairness, that's what initially Biden was giving Israel time.

Yes, yes, yes, yes.

I don't think that this was a misrepresentation.

I think that the time always ends specifically for Israel.

And this is something that the founding fathers knew very well.

This is the reason David Ben-Gurin said, have short wars, because he knew, even after the Holocaust, which was more terrible than October 7th to the Jews, that even if you are the victim, you need to act very realistically.

And now we'll see if the Trump administration is, you know, making that phone phone call saying you're out of time with this interim agreement.

I don't know.

According to Witkov's last proposal, as far as I know, as far as I mean, it published, it's not saying, you know, we're committed to ending the war anyhow.

There's nothing there that gives that sort of assurance.

Right.

I just want to add, because I think it has, we talked a lot about Gaza, but the main issue here is Iran, and it has a lot to do with this.

Yeah, so let's talk about Iran.

So go ahead.

So Witkov got three missions, three minor missions to end the war between Russia and Ukraine, to get a nuclear deal with Iran, and to end the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza.

And then the question arises what he does afternoon, because usually people finish their tasks before lunch.

He has a lot on his plate.

And I think what the U.S.

is trying to do is to actually reshape the Middle East according to the needs of the US and its allies.

Now, it would, in my opinion, it will not tell Israel to stop the war.

It would not put a ban on the import of ammunition, but

the main risk lies within the nuclear deal with Iran.

And here is the thing.

What worries Israel is the most is the interim deal between Iran and the US.

And why is that?

Because President Trump is desperate for achievements.

The Russia-Ukraine negotiations had failed.

The Israel-Gaza negotiations had failed.

So the only achievement that it can have at hand is an interim deal that would reduce the tensions in the Middle East.

Problem is that Iran would not give up the crucial ingredient in the survival of the regime, which is the nuclear weapon.

So it gets a year, probably a year give or take, and it gives nothing in return.

Not the ballistic missiles program, not dismantling the nuclear program.

There isn't a single laboratory that is going to be blown up, as President Trump had said yesterday and this is why it is so dangerous and when you add to this the fact that for the first time

in the Israel-US relationship President Trump confirms publicly that he actually warned Netanyahu not to attack Iran not to defend itself I know he does it in a I don't know in a in a relatively modest way he does not lecture Netanyahu but what our enemies see is that there is a huge daylight between Israel and the U.S.

It is as big as the range between Israel and Iran.

Yeah, well, I don't know if it's as big as the distance between Israel and Iran, but let me give you a contrarian take.

Okay.

Hear me out.

What if President Trump has already greenlighted an Israeli military operation against Iran at some point?

Some kind of strike.

Not immediately, but at some point, he will be on board with it.

And that right now, Iran is being tricked into giving up its stockpiles, giving Israel time to strike at some point later on or strike and reattack for as long as it needs to without fear of Iran racing to immediate breakout.

I mean, Hamas has already seen, by the way, Trump has no problem breaking a deal with bad actors in the Witcoff, the first Witcoff deal.

Once hostages were returned, then

the U.S.

pulled back from

its commitment to move to the final phase.

And then Trump started talking about

moving Palestinians out of Gaza entirely.

So, what if Trump plans to do the same here to Iran if there is some kind of interim deal and the nuclear materials

are out of Iran?

So, you say that it's a deception plan aimed at taking this stuff out of Iran and then attacking it.

It's a win-win.

Let's put it that way.

At a minimum, even if Israel doesn't attack, the U.S.

is getting the stockpiles out of Iran, and it could be a way to give Israel the option to attack without having to worry about the speed with which Iran moves to a breakout in the event that Israel does decide to attack.

So it just creates more options.

I wish it was the case.

I'm just not sure because I don't think the vivid democracy of Israel is built to such a deception scheme.

And what I hear from

senior officials in Jerusalem is

more and more

hysterical.

There was a tension in the air over the last two weeks of something imminent militarily, and it wasn't yet another attack on Gaza.

So I think this phone call was original.

It was not a fake phone call coordinated with

hysterical, the government was also hysterical during the first hostage deal, including many on the right in the government.

No, no, no, I was thinking about criticized the hostage deal.

Right.

And it turned out once the Trump administration got what they wanted wanted out of that deal, or at least out of phase one, it seemed that Trump couldn't care less about where the deal went.

And he ultimately blessed Israel going back to war.

I'll say again, I wish it was the case.

I'm not sure it's the same because I don't think I know that Israel didn't want these negotiations and Israel didn't want these things to happen.

So to be honest,

if one day we wake up and Netanyahu and Trump hold the press conference saying, hey, we cheated the Iranians,

I mean, I'll be the first first to be very, very happy.

I'm just not sure this is the case.

Yeah, I have a slightly more positive,

more positive outlook as to this.

I think that this might have been played out more hostile than it was really,

according to my sources, both in Jerusalem.

Meaning they may have projected publicly that there was more tension between Washington and Jerusalem than there actually is.

The U.S.

is definitely using the military threats made by Israel as credible in order to get the Iranians to agree for more during the negotiations.

This is for sure.

This is for a fact.

Now, does this conversation help project a credible military threat?

The conversation that was made by President Trump to Prime Minister Netanyahu saying don't attack now.

I think it does.

And I think that to a large extent, this is like damage control because there were people in the trump administration that gave the iranians the vibe that nothing's going to happen to iran anyway you know even if they don't reach a good agreement it wasn't the president himself the president himself was very careful to make sure that all options are on the table.

There is a quote there that Israel might lead an attack or we will lead an attack or something like that.

You remember that, I think in the Oval Office.

But there were other people in the administration.

And I think that the Iranians are trying to bank on these people to make sure that at any rate, even if the negotiations fail, they won't be attacked.

And the fact that Israel is out there, and by the way, this was the same during the Obama administration before the JCPOA.

The fact that the Israelis are saying we're willing to do this, we will do this, I think this helps the negotiations be more fruitful as far as the US is concerned.

But I agree that at the end of the day, the US

is maintaining a very clear position that they want an agreement.

And one of the things we need to think about, Dan, in that sense is Gaza.

I wrote about this last week, about Gaza for Tehran.

Okay.

So

I think we should look at this as a sort of a trade-off, you know, even within,

and your input here, Dan, could be really important, even within the American sphere.

Is it possible that the US is for now weighing towards Israel with the Switcock proposal and in other elements in Gaza, knowing that it's going to proceed to an agreement with Tehran anyway?

Or might it be the other way around, that the Israelis, you know, the US would come to Israel and

the US would say, you know,

the negotiations with Tehran collapse.

We heard your conditions.

We know how this plays out to your strategy in the region.

But now you're going to walk with us to the end of the war in Gaza.

Think about this even within the Republican Party, within the people that support Israel.

You know, I think it's going to be very challenging to the East American administration to come and say to not only to the Israelis, but also partners in the region: hey, you know, we're going to end the war in a way that Hamas is still a player in Gaza, and we're also going to sign an agreement with the Ayatollahs.

And there was a question yesterday in the White House that really made President Trump angry.

It came from a reporter and she said something like,

chicken out,

about Trump chickening out.

On the tariffs.

It was about the tariffs.

She used the acronym that someone on Wall Street used that she was quoting.

She said it's taco.

Trump always chickens out about the tariffs.

If Trump got angry, it means that something dramatic happens because he's the calmest guy around.

Yes.

So Trump didn't like the question.

And I think that one of the points that is being made by Israel's friends in Washington and by Israel is that the U.S.

should not this time compromise and sort of push the negotiations so that they will last with no deadline at all.

And for this to become what happened between Russia and Ukraine, which we know that the president is very unhappy with the situation right now.

Yeah, well, I would say, Nadav, and I think we've talked about this in a previous conversation,

you'll be hard-pressed in the few months since President Trump has been president for this term, you'll be hard-pressed to find congressional Republicans challenging administration policy, even challenging the direction of administration policy on virtually any issue, really.

And I was struck in the last couple of weeks when 52 of 53 Republican senators signed a letter really challenging what seemed to be the Witcoff direct, where Witcoff was heading directionally and obviously establishing the zero enrichment condition, which it's not clear that's where the administration was, or at least where Witcoff was early on.

And it's one thing for Republican senators to communicate that behind the scenes, behind closed doors, but to do it in such a public way

to me was

relevant to what you're talking about right now.

And I don't think Republicans, I think it's where they are generally from a principle standpoint and also the politics of their base, can go back to their base and say, we've just cut a deal that's basically a watered down or heated up version of the JCPOA, of the Obama-Iran deal, and we've pressured Israel to wind down its war against Hamas.

I think that is a tough pill for Republicans in their

states and congressional districts.

All right.

Nadav, Amit, we will leave it there.

I'm sure we will be regrouping shortly in spite of Amit's

global travails.

We will be reconnecting soon.

Until then, thanks for this, guys.

Thank you so much.

Thank you.

Bye-bye.

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