How will Israel Respond to the U.N.? - with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal
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If you support the idea of national self-determination for the Palestinians, it's a really bad idea because Palestinian statehood should not be a slap in the face of Israelis after October 7th.
It's supposed to be the result of compromise and negotiations and hard work.
And what's really happening, and this makes me mad, is that the the French and Kier Sturmer in the UK, and the Canadians, and the Australians, they're just using it for their own domestic political needs.
And they're turning Palestinian statehood into diplomatic virtue signaling.
And I think this is disastrous to people who actually think that national self-determination for the Palestinians is something that should be out there at the end of the day.
It's 8 p.m.
on Wednesday, September 24th here in New York City.
It's 3 a.m.
on Thursday, September 25th in Israel, where, just a few hours ago, a Houthi drone struck Israel's southernmost city of Eilat, wounding 20 people, including two men who are in serious condition.
On Monday, French President Emmanuel Macron announced his country's formal recognition of a Palestinian state at a UN conference organized by France in Saudi Arabia.
He was joined by the leaders of Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, San Marino, and Andorra, following the UK, Australia, Canada, and Portugal a day earlier.
Also at the conference, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, via satellite, he was beamed in, declared that his government is prepared to lead a Palestinian state both in in the West Bank and Gaza.
As Macron recognizes Palestinian statehood, France is reportedly pushing for a so-called, quote, international stabilization mission to govern Gaza once the war ends and work to disarm Hamas.
On Tuesday, President Trump issued an almost hour-long address to the UN in which he denounced the wave of recognition of Palestinian statehood, arguing the move rewards Hamas's terrorism.
President Trump also reasserted reasserted that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons, and he said that European nations are, quote, going to hell because of their lax immigration policies.
Following a meeting at the UN with leaders from the Arab and Muslim world, Trump once again vowed to end the war in Gaza.
During the meeting, President Trump reportedly presented a plan for ending the war in Gaza, which is expected to include the release of hostages and gradual withdrawal of IDF troops, with the provision of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip through international organizations.
Meanwhile, satellite images analyzed by the Associated Press indicate that Iran has begun rebuilding missile production sites that were hit by Israel and the U.S.
during June's 12-day war.
However, Iran is likely missing large mixers that are needed to produce solid fuel for the weapons, according to reports.
This comes as the date nears for UN snapback sanctions to be reimposed on Iran after France, Germany, and the UK accused Tehran of failing to uphold its end of the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal.
Iran is reportedly scrambling to avert these sanctions, but as of now, we will see them go into effect on September 28th.
On today's episode, we are joined by ARC Media contributors Nadav Ayel and Amit Seghal to discuss how Israel will respond to the wave of countries recognizing Palestinian statehood at the UN General Assembly.
Amit Nadav, I welcome you both and wish you both a Shanatova.
Shanatova done, Amit.
How was your chag done?
It was quite beautiful.
I was with family, well, some family I don't see all the time.
And I was in synagogue bracing for a sermon that would be complicated, shall we say, about Israel.
And I was pleasantly relieved that it wasn't complicated at all.
It was pure clarity.
So there you go.
These are the things I worry about these days.
I have to say that Rosh Hashanah is the only holiday in Israel that lasts two days, like in the States.
So it's like the movie Groundhog Days, because then again, another prayer, another shul, another meal,
the same family all over again.
Be strong there in the U.S.
Yeah, other than Rosh Hashanah, you're right.
Most of these chage are two days, and in Israel, they're only one, which I've always thought is the strongest case for Aliyah.
It's a particular joy if you work in a newsroom of a newspaper.
I spent Rosh Hashanah in a secret place labeled Camp Rosh Hashanah.
I can't discuss it too much.
And It was wonderful.
I should say, by the way, to our listeners, if Nadav sounds sort of foggy here, it's because he's in a car and he will be out of his car momentarily and then he will plug back into the recording from his regular gear.
But right now, he's in a car, so that's why his reception may not be 100%.
But I'm going to jump into it, Nadav, before you get out of your car.
We can title this episode Podcast Episodes in a Car, like that old Jerry Seinfeld show.
Okay,
Nadav, as I mentioned in the intro, a lot happening at at the UN this week.
Can you just briefly tally up or summarize where we are with the movement to recognize a Palestinian state at the UN as we work through this week?
So we have 10 new countries that joined the club, which consists of over 100 countries anyway, that recognize a so-called state of Palestine.
But what do you mean by 10 new countries?
What do you mean by that?
I mean France, Portugal, the UK, several other countries that, you know, if we were speaking like two weeks ago, weren't recognizing the country or a country named Palestine, and today they do.
And out of these 10, let's say four are important.
I'm sorry, Luxembourg.
I'm not counting Luxembourg as an important country in that sense.
They were absolutely clear that some of these recognitions are conditioned on Hamas not being in control of Gaza, on the hostages getting back home.
But the general message of rewarding Hamas is absolutely clear.
We just had a Hamas official in the last 12 hours saying this is a victory as a result of October 7.
It doesn't really matter the type of interviews that Emmanuel Macron is giving Channel 12 in Israel, trying to convince, or the article written by the Prime Minister of the UK to Yadioto Ronot, my newspaper, trying to explain what they're trying to do.
The message in the region is absolutely clear that this is a result of October 7, and that's the message.
And now it's up to the United States and to Israel.
And I think that this is the order of things, the United States and Israel to decide what would be the response to this wave of recognition.
We heard President Trump speaking loud and clear in the UN, talking about this, sort of warning the members of the UN.
Remember, October 7.
As an Israeli, it was very important to hear that.
I think it wasn't important only to Israelis.
And what Israel is considering is a scale of possible options.
One of these options is, of course, annexation.
We are hearing reports in the last few hours that President Trump is ruling that out.
I'm not sure.
I didn't speak with the White House.
Another possibility is, for instance, closing down consulates in eastern Jerusalem, which I suspect is going to happen.
Okay.
So I want to come back.
to you in a moment, Nadav.
I will, I just, one thing you said, you said that some of these governments are saying that their support for a Palestinian state is only conditional upon Hamas not being in power, the hostages being released, et cetera, et cetera.
Except that for the countries that matter, let's just say the countries that really matter, Canada, the UK, France, perhaps a couple of others, they're not saying that.
They're not articulating it in these very conditional terms.
So to your point, there's a reason why Hamas is not only celebrating this decision, but almost they're explicitly issuing congratulatory statements because they know they get to stay in power, at least under the terms of many of these announcements.
I want to play a clip of what President Trump said at the UN.
So let's just play the audio.
And then, Amit, I want you to respond.
This is just a part of what Nadav was referring to when he said that President Trump spoke clearly on this matter.
As everyone knows, I have also been deeply engaged in seeking a ceasefire in Gaza.
Have to get that done.
Have to get it done.
Unfortunately, Hamas has repeatedly rejected reasonable offers to make peace.
We can't forget October 7th, can we?
Now, as if to encourage continued conflict, some of this body is seeking to unilaterally recognize a Palestinian state.
The rewards would be too great for Hamas terrorists for their atrocities.
This would be a reward for these horrible atrocities, even while they refuse to release the hostages or accept the ceasefire.
But instead of giving in to Hamas's ransom demands, those who want peace should be united with one message, release the hostages now.
We have to get them back now.
We don't want to get back two, and then another two, and then one, and then three.
Have this process.
No, we want them all back, and we want the actually 38 dead bodies back too.
Those parents came to me, and they want them back, and they want them back very quickly and very badly, as though they were alive.
They want them, they want them every bit as much as if their son or daughter were alive.
So, Meet, A, what do you make of what President Trump said?
And B, how is his response from his speech being interpreted in Jerusalem?
You know, my thinking that every Trump plan to the Middle East is a plan written by Ron Dermer and just wrapped in this shining, bright gift package of President Trump.
So when President Trump actually says that he has a plan to end the war in Gaza with 21 points, I guess it's not that Ron Dermer or Prime Minister Netanyahu heard about it at the very same second.
They are not surprised.
And I guess it was pre-planned.
And there is a logic into it because for the last two years, Israel and specifically Netanyahu was criticized for not offering his scenario for the day after.
And I thought there was something to it.
But Netanyahu's reply and Dermer's reply was that the second Israel would introduce a plan for the future of Gaza or the Middle East, it would be the exact moment in which it would die because no one would take an Israeli plan.
But if it's shipped to Washington and then sold as a made-in the USA product, then it has a chance.
And that's exactly what we see now, in my opinion.
Then, I think that from what we hear, the leaders of the Arab countries said that they're quite positive about Trump's plan, and there is room for negotiations, but it's something that they can work with.
And in my opinion, this is the most important game in town as we speak.
Because if it's true that this plan is agreed on both Israel and the Arab countries, it might mean, it might mean that what we see at the end of the tunnel, the light that we see at the end of the tunnel, is not a truck coming to you, but the end of the tunnel.
And this plan, so this is the plan that Trump discussed with the Arab leaders when he met with them this week, leaders of Muslim countries at the UN.
Is this basically, from your understanding, the Blair plan that he presented?
The Blair-Kushner plan.
Yeah.
Tony Blair, Jared Kushner, and Trump are basically organizing the same plan.
By the way, no surprises there.
There is a gradual Israel withdrawal against demilitarization of Gaza Strip.
So it's going to be gradual.
This is one thing.
Second, releasing all the hostages.
And third, no Hamas.
Now, the main question, as far as I understand, is the reports about a certain ingredient of the Palestinian Authority within the plan for Gaza.
Now, Israel has consistently opposed it.
So this is quite interesting.
How is the wording of it going to happen?
I mean, we all know that most of the Palestinians are either Hamas or Palestinian Authority, but what is the exact wording of the PAEA presence in Gaza Strip the day after?
Because this is a big no-no for Netanyahu.
And there was also the French plan, the Macron plan, which was also leaked.
The Times of Israel reported on it last week.
Others reported on it, in which they envision some sort of UN supervised, it's not clear who would be the participants in the plan, but some kind of UN supervised security presence in Gaza, either at the end of the war, meaning after the war, or as the French plan lays out, or even if the war is not over yet, which seems like one of the most preposterous scenarios, that you're going to have a UN supervised force in Gaza while the war is still going on.
But I guess I'll go to Unadav.
What's your sense of the difference between the plans?
And is the French plan basically irrelevant?
So the French plan is as dead as they come, Dan.
It's not going to happen.
Anything that is French right now is not going to fly.
Not with this Israeli government, and I suspect not with the next Israeli government, even if Netanyahu is not going to be the prime minister, as long as Emmanuel Macron is the president of France.
The fact that the French led this initiative to begin with is, you know, treated with a lot of animosity in Israel, and one can understand why.
And as to the UN, the Israeli sources I'm speaking with, they would rather see first Arab forces in the Gaza Strip of, for instance, the Emiratis, than see a UN armed force that is seen now in Israel as a hostile figure as far as not only the Israeli government is concerned.
And the Emiratis, for instance, are definitely not seen this way.
Now, as to what Amir remarked as to the Blair-Kushner plan, it's my understanding that the conversation about the plan was as to the day after and not as to what's going to happen in between.
What I mean is it's trying to do this leap from where we are today and the war and getting the hostages back.
And it sort of assumes it's not going to be Hamas, Hamas is not going to be there.
And then what?
And I think that the attempt here, a senior Israeli source, which I just talked before we recorded and I was saying I'm going to go and call me back and I want to be as brief as possible, told me, look, this is an attempt to unify different visions as to Gaza.
There were the five conditions made by the prime minister, Probably remember those.
There were ideas that were floating during the Biden administration, definitely ideas that the Trump administration dealt with since the beginning, since President Trump came into office.
And what are we aiming for?
Let's all be on the same page about what's going to happen in Gaza.
As to that component of the Palestinian Authority, it's my understanding that whatever governance is going to be there, there's going to be some sort of representation to PA elements.
We need to explain that the Palestinian Authority is mainly a body now recognized and supported by Fatach.
And while the Israeli government sees the Palestinian Authority as completely ineffective, corrupt, it's in working with the Palestinian Authority, but it never ruled out Fatah people, so the political party, as people you can work with.
It did rule out formally working with the PA in Gaza.
That's the position of the prime minister.
And that's an opening for something as to the future of Gaza.
Well, that's interesting.
Two things, Amit.
One is, just staying on the French plan for a moment, and we shouldn't spend too much time on it.
I think that there's an understanding that the UN, whenever it has had a role in Gaza, it has resulted in Hamas having enormous influence.
It's just, we could walk through the whole history.
We've dedicated many episodes on this podcast to this history.
The UN ultimately becomes an organ of Hamas on the ground.
So the idea that Israel would put the UN back in a, agree to a UN being back in a position of power in Gaza is preposterous.
The other point is that, according to the French plan, the UN would be responsible for disarming Hamas, and good luck with that.
And lastly, what's really crazy about the French plan is it says in there that it would also play a similar role at some point in the West Bank, as though Israel would agree to a French plan to put the UN in charge of the West Bank.
So anyways, for so many reasons.
But Amit, I want to pick up on something Nadav just said about who within the PA that this government, the Israeli government, could make their peace, so to speak, in terms of having a role in Gaza.
What was your response to when Nadav laid out there?
Practically, Netanyahu's answer would be none, because the whole idea of the Netanyahu policy through the years...
None, meaning none of the PA.
None of the PA.
Why?
Okay.
Because the main idea behind differentiating between Gaza and the West Bank, Judan and Samaria, was to actually weaken the Palestinian authority.
One of the outcomes was coming to terms with the idea that Hawaz gets money from Qatar because it weakens the Palestinian Authority.
So there is no incentive for Netanyahu after October 7th to actually give the Palestinian Authority another territory named Gaza Strip.
The Emiratis, for instance, had the idea of Salam Fayyad.
Salaam Fayyad, the prominent leader, one that does not support Terror.
He never supported Terror.
So this is a long time ago, Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority.
20 years ago.
20 years ago, he's considered the moderate, educated in the West.
Unfortunately, his support within the Palestinian Authority is something like 2%.
Right.
He's a very technocratic guy.
He has no political support among the Palestinians.
So the joke in Israel is that if it's 2% and the margin of error in the polls is 4%,
it might be minus 2%.
But
the level of support.
But however, it's not the case.
What I understand is in the text, the way to actually bridge between the Emirati and Saudi demand for involvement of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli resistance towards the very same idea is that it's going to be figures with affinity, with connection to the Palestinian Authority.
So they're not going to be officially part of the Palestinian Authority, but everybody will understand that they have something to do with this.
And as Nadav said, it's going to be only at the end of the process and not at the beginning.
Okay.
Nadav is sitting here getting himself hooked up.
Amit Netanyahu is scheduled to speak at the UN on Friday.
What should we expect to hear in that speech?
I would not expect something dramatic.
We have to remember that the Netanyahu English speeches on American soil are the peak of his career in Israel.
It's for domestic consumption.
So when Netanyahu is going to deliver his UN speech, he's not going to make headlines.
I guess he might say that he's accepting the Trump plan to actually give the Israeli case and to stand firmly against the French, British, Canadian, Australian initiative of recognizing a Palestinian state.
Here is the interesting thing from an historic perspective.
Netanyahu's speech two years ago at the UN Assembly in 2023, just two weeks before the October 7th massacre, was the first speech in Netanyahu's history in which he hasn't mentioned the Palestinian question.
So he was under the impression that he killed the idea of Palestinian independence.
And there we go again.
Wow.
Okay.
All right.
Nadav, President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu will be meeting in the White House on Monday.
What should each expect from the other?
What should Netanyahu expect from Trump and vice versa?
So the first question that we're asking is: will President Trump tell Netanyahu do not annex?
Okay, is this going to be a thing?
And the second question is, what kind of response Netanyahu is going to negotiate with Trump as to this wave of recognition.
I think it's exceptionally wise of Netanyahu to send this message to the Israelis.
Look, we're not going to respond until we have a decision that is completely corroborated by the White House.
And by the way, in terms of his base, in terms of what people feel in the right wing in Israel, mostly in the right wing, but not only in the right wing, as to this wave of recognition.
We shouldn't
take this for granted.
Netanyah made a decision here that he's first going to be completely on the same page with the White House before he does anything.
And what I'm hearing, Dan, is that these consulates in East Jerusalem of the British, the French, they're going to close down.
Israel is going to expel those diplomats.
This is going to be part of its response.
And what I'm hearing from the French and from mainly from the british but we can assume that as to france too they're going to expel israeli diplomats in response so this isn't over yet they're going to expel consular officers or are they going to expel ambassadors i mean if france or the uk expels their respective ambassadors that's a big deal no no they're not going to expel the israeli ambassador it's something we need to explain to our listeners so there are embassies in israel these countries hold their embassies in tel aviv they don't recognize jerusalem as israel's capital or they don't recognize East Jerusalem, and they will not put their embassies in Jerusalem.
And they also have consulates in East Jerusalem that are actually a relic of the time that East Jerusalem was controlled by the Jordanians, but also their way of saying, we don't recognize East Jerusalem and we see this as a possible capital of the Palestinian state.
And these consulates, in every sense, if they recognize Palestinian statehood, then they need to make these consulates into embassies or maybe move them to Ramallah.
So I would say that the most initial response by the Israelis that you can expect is to close down these consulates.
And I'll be extremely surprised if that won't happen.
I'm not weighing in, you know, in terms of is it, you know, the right thing to do?
Isn't it the right thing to do?
But I can absolutely can say we can understand why.
Now,
the British will expel, you know, Israeli diplomats, but they're not going to cut down ties.
They're not going to expel the ambassador.
And when I speak with diplomats from these European countries and I ask them, what's the effective thing that's going to happen?
So for instance, the UK changed their maps.
One can go in the Foreign Office of the UK and see the new map of that state.
It's like that description of the Holy Roman Empire that was neither holy nor Roman, not an empire.
It's the same like the Palestinian state.
But then I asked these diplomats, what does it actually mean?
As someone who still thinks that the two-state solution is the least worst at the end of the road, maybe not tangible right now, not viable right now, not going to happen right now, but I don't see any solution out there that is practical.
I think that this does real damage to the two-state solution idea.
I saw the new address for the Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv actually has the street in Tel Aviv where the Canadian Embassy exists.
And then it says, it says Tel Aviv, Israel, Palestine, or something like that.
So it basically locates Tel Aviv, not just in Israel, but in Israel and Palestine, which is fantastic.
And I want to give other governments their due.
I just want to, before we jump into meat, I wanted to say it's not just the U.S.
that has its embassy in Jerusalem.
Guatemala, Honduras, Kosovo, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, and Fiji, and Argentina.
Malay hasn't, Argentina hasn't moved its embassy yet, but it has recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and indicated that they will be moving their embassy.
So I want to just be clear.
It's it's not just the U.S.
that has its embassy in Jerusalem.
I'm sorry, and I stand corrected for forgetting about Guatemala and Fiji, but I don't think we should sugarcoat this.
Israel is being hit.
And I spoke with the Israeli sources about that.
And I'm talking from within this coalition.
They're acknowledging it.
And this is what we used to call the diplomatic tsunami.
And people used to laugh about this.
It would never come.
And after two years of war, we're facing a diplomatic tsunami and people are feeling it jewish communities are feeling it israeli companies everything from vcs and tech companies are feeling it and it's going to have repercussions it's symbolic but symbolism can beget more symbolism which then can create facts on the ground but here's my pitch about this which is a bit different than people who just reject palestinian statehood okay if you support the idea of national self-determination for the Palestinians, it's a really bad idea because Palestinian statehood should not be a slap in the face of Israelis after October 7th.
It's supposed to be the result of compromise and negotiations and hard work.
And what's really happening, and this makes me mad, is that the French and Kirsturmer in the UK and the Canadians and the Australians, they're just using it for their own domestic political needs.
And they're turning Palestinian statehood into diplomatic virtue signaling.
And I think this is disastrous to people who actually think that national self-determination for the Palestinians is something that should be out there at the end of the day.
I think you're right, Nadav.
And I think it is leave a bitter taste in the mouths of many people that those who want a Palestinian state someday, they don't want those people to have a bitter taste in their mouth.
Foremost among them is President Donald Trump.
If you just listen to him this week, his comments are dripping with disgust for this process and for the U.N.
And my friend John Pothorit said on the commentary podcast the other day, just sort of threw this out there as a, not based on anything, was to the extent that this administration likes to do big, bold, dramatic things to really turn things upside down, don't think it's crazy that by the end of President Trump's term, he won't say the U.S.
is pulling out of the U.N.
And the U.N.
can go live somewhere in Geneva or something.
And we're going to, you know, and the U.S.
is going to take that fantastic real estate on the east side of Manhattan and actually develop it.
And like, and just like, like, put the nails in the coffin of the U.N.'s relevance.
And so what you're saying is of a piece of that.
It's turning off all the people that those who want to advance some kind of process shouldn't be turning off.
And I think there's something to it.
I mentioned it to someone who's in the Trump administration.
I said, you know, I heard this idea.
Is it crazy?
And they said, not so crazy.
So anyways, we shall see.
Amit, I know you got to wrap here in a few minutes.
I just want to pivot now to the operation in Gaza City.
How would you assess it as going right now?
As As planned, I think we talked about it before it began that this operation is going to begin, but it might end before Gaza City is conquered.
And I think the Trump plan is exactly what everyone expected in Israel.
There is a hope that there won't be a need to go through this mission almost impossible of going through every alley and every street and every building and every tunnel.
So it's going very slowly.
There was an IDF officer that got killed on the Rosh Hashanah evening, leaving a pregnant wife behind him.
And there was a picture of him dancing with a groom three weeks before.
The groom is dead.
He died in Gaza and he died
two days ago.
So everybody would be very, very happy to just end the war as soon as possible.
Nadav, anything to add to that?
Yeah, I think it's a very somber Rosh Hashanah in Israel.
Many of the hostage families were spending this chag protesting for their loved ones.
A lot of pressure, a lot of criticism of the government, and a feeling that, as Amid said, that this war should end.
But the timetables, they just don't correspond with what the IDF is saying as to what it needs in order to make sure that Gaza is free of Hamas handling the way that the government has defined it.
So how is this going to happen?
Two hours ago, had a conversation with a person that has a brother in Gaza fighting in an elite unit.
Many people are asking, it's not that they doubt the need to fight against Hamas, but they do doubt this operation.
As I said, amongst them are the chiefs of staff.
You know, it gives me no pleasure to detail these facts, but these are the facts of where the Israeli society is at right now as to this war.
First and foremost, the pain of the hostage families who think that there is a deal on the table, we should take it and continue from there.
And the position of Israelis, there is data that's going to come out soon by the JPPI, Jewish People's Policy Institute, showing that there is no daylight between the American Jewish community and the Jewish public in Israel.
If you pronounce the question is, Hamas will stay in Gaza, but the hostages will return back home.
And it's about the same kind of size in both the Jewish public in the United States and the Jewish Jewish public in Israel.
And it's basically a tie.
It's a tie between those who say, you know, get the hostages back even if Hamas is going to stay there in power or continue the war.
Do you see that there is not much of a difference between the Jewish community in the United States and between the Israeli Jewish community?
Very interesting.
Amit, before you jump, final word on what Nadav just said.
So we are at the beginning of the Jewish year, and there is always the hope of a more peaceful year.
for me the most thought-provoking sentence in the prayer is that on the countries it would be said it would be decided which one would go to the sword and which one one would go to the peace so over the last two years we we were on the verge of the sword and let's hope that this year is going to be different okay gentlemen we will leave it there Thank you as always.
I should mention this is not only a happy new year, but it's also the 400th episode of Call Me Back.
so you know congratulations then i look forward to you guys
i'm not gonna i'm not gonna let you end this nadav i was under the impression that we participated in at least 402 episodes of call me back so something is weird here but then i want to tell you something you know because 400 episode for this project, which I really don't think I'm exaggerating, changed the Jewish conversation specifically in the United States.
You know, we pull your legs sometimes, Dan, but it's your work.
It's the work of your producer, Ilan.
Yeah.
And it's you guys that did that.
And not only in the States, I have to say, Nadav.
Not only in the States, you know, Australia, everywhere in the world.
I've never seen anything like it.
I don't know, you know, Amit.
Absolutely.
I live in Jerusalem, and there are two neighborhoods.
People know me in Israel because of the television channel 12.
However, Baca and the German colony are neighborhoods in which I can go anonymously.
That was the case until I started taking part in Call Me Back.
Because since then, because it's largely Anglo communities.
So thank you for this.
Dan, yourself and Elon, you did it by yourself.
So congratulations for that.
All right, gentlemen.
Thank you so much.
Goodbye.
Shanatova.
Shanatova.
That's our show for today.
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