The Battle for Gaza City Begins - with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal

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I think that the Israeli cabinet has deliberately decided to prefer the goal of defeating Hamas over the goal of bringing back the rest of the hostages.

After completing 80-ish percent of the mission, it's terrible to speak about it in these terms, but 207 out of 251, now the paramount goal from the perspective of the Israeli cabinet is to defeat Hamas over bringing all the hostages back home.

The IDF chief went to the government and said, you know what, if this is what you want to do, take out the aim or the goal of getting the hostages back or downgrade it.

Now, to what extent?

A dialogue there with one Ron Dermer and the chief of staff.

Was the chief of staff saying to Ron Dermer and to the head of the Mossad, Why are you here in this room?

Why won't you go and negotiate right now now before we begin this operation?

So this is the level of opposition that you're hearing.

It's 3 p.m.

on Tuesday, September 16th here in New York City.

It's 10 p.m.

on Tuesday, September 16th in Israel as Israelis watch news of the ground operation on Gaza City unfold.

First, before we get into today's episode, a little bit of housekeeping.

It's been just over a month since we launched Inside Call Me Back, and we've been blown away by your support.

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Now on to today's episode.

Yesterday, Monday, the IDF began its highly anticipated ground incursion into Gaza City after extensive airstrikes overnight.

The IDF once again instructed civilians of Gaza City to evacuate and head to a designated humanitarian zone in the south.

According to an IDF statement this morning, more than 40% of Gaza City's population of roughly 1 million people has already left.

Today, the hostage and missing families forum in Israel declared, quote, a state of emergency amidst fears that the invasion of Gaza City will jeopardize the 48 remaining hostages.

IDF spokesman Effie Deffren said at a press conference, quote, we are aware of the concerns of the hostages' families.

We will do our best to avoid harming the hostages, close Close quote.

On Monday, President Trump told reporters that he read a report that Hamas has moved Israeli hostages above ground in Gaza City to pressure the IDF not to move forward with its plan.

If Hamas is using the hostages as human shields, President Trump said, quote, all bets are off.

As Israel expands the war in Gaza, members of the Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation met in Doha on Monday to discuss Israel's strike on the Qatari capital last week.

The summit released a joint statement urging all states to take all possible legal and effective measures to prevent Israel from continuing its actions against the Palestinian people, including, quote, reviewing diplomatic and economic relations with it and initiating legal proceedings against it, close quote.

Also on Monday, Prime Minister Netanyahu admitted that Israel is facing increasing isolation economically, stating that Israel will need to pursue greater economic self-sufficiency and become a, quote, super Sparta.

To discuss the IDF's incursion into Gaza City and what this means for the direction of the war, for the fate of the hostages, and for Israel's global standing, we are joined by ARC media contributors Nadavael and Amit Segel.

But before our conversation, a word from our sponsor.

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Your gift, big or small, can help someone find their way back.

Nadav and Amit, good to be with you guys.

I'm live from Sparta.

What's it like in Sparta?

I consider renaming the newsletter.

It's noon in Sparta.

It's noon in Sparta.

I think it's very treacherous of you, Amit, and it's very typical of the right wing in Israel not to not to give credit to the prime minister.

You're live from super Sparta.

You know, Sparta isn't enough.

First of all, I know.

I just have one question.

I mean, do you think that in the original Sparta there was a military service exemption for one-fifth of the population?

I'm not sure about that.

But you know that Sparta failed because a large percentage of its population were actually slaves.

And that's one of the reasons that Athens actually won that.

So that's another way to ask the question you just asked, Amit, in a certain way.

Well, Services, it sounds to me like to answer these questions, we need the release of a new book, Spart Up Nation.

Okay, well, the good news is Israel is not as isolated as we think it is economically, but that's probably a conversation for another day and an episode another day or maybe an episode on What's Your Number or other podcasts that focuses on the economy.

I want to jump into this military operation.

Nadav, I'll start with you.

Can you give us an overview of the military operation and what it aims to achieve as far as you and your reporting know?

So at the evening yesterday, Israel started bombing specific targets in Gaza.

Israel in these bombings has two operational goals.

The first of which is of course to hit Hamas targets in Gaza.

The second is to basically make it absolutely known to the population in Gaza, the civilian population in Gaza that they need to evacuate.

Because right now there are at least half a million to 600, 650,000 Palestinians still in Gaza.

And the IDF is saying that Hamas is trying to use them as human shields and make sure that they remain in Gaza.

And as long as so many civilians are in Gaza, the IDF hands are to an extent tied.

Now, right after that, in the early morning, Israel time, ground troops have started operating in Gaza city.

But this time, the idea is to go for what the IDF calls the infrastructure of Hamas.

But just to be clear, Nadav, we're in November and December of 23, they were there.

They killed a lot of Hamas terrorists, and then they left.

Yes, they did not remain in those territories.

It's what it's...

So they didn't hold the territory.

But yeah, but they were there not for like two days.

They were there for weeks in these areas.

At certain areas, they did go down to the tunnels.

Israel knew much less about the tunnels than it knows today.

And it also did not have the tactics to fight in the tunnels as it has today, you know, certain equipments that it's now using in order to fight in the tunnels.

Now, the overreaching story here that both the prime minister and the chief of staff talked about this evening openly on the record is that this is the most controversial operation that I remember, and Amit might correct me in that regard, in the history of the IDF probably.

You know, besides the IDF chief standing in the center of the Rabin Square in Tel Aviv with a loudspeaker saying, don't do this, don't go into Gaza, the IDF has done everything it can to recommend not only to the Israeli government, it was also speaking to the Israeli public through the media, although most of the cases they didn't speak on the record, but they also went to the Knesset.

So the chief of staff went to the Knesset, spoke with the Knesset Commission for Intelligence, for instance, telling them basically that the IDF is opposed to this kind of an operation in Gaza and that it suspects that it will lead or it might lead to serious harm to the hostages.

But it's not the only reason, right?

And the chief of staff said today, it's my commitment, it's my obligation to the people of Israel then.

So this is, and he's underlining, not to the government, to the people of Israel, to say the truth as I see it, I'm paraphrasing, professionally speaking, the IGIF spokesman said the same thing.

And the prime minister in his press conference that just ended a while back, he was asked about the chief of staff not wanting to go through with this operation.

And he said something like, there are always those who hesitate before an operation, which is definitely not backing each other here now the fact that this is so controversial is really the cover story of everything because for netanyahu and again i think i'm amit would be able to say more about this if somehow they find the breaking point of hamas as netanyahu and his defense minister who's actually almost serving netanyahu say then that's going to be for them a huge political victory.

They're going to say, hey, you know, Israel's top brass was against this.

They said it's a catastrophe.

And somehow we managed to pull a victory against Hamas or to pressure Hamas to disarm or something like that.

But if it doesn't, you know, there's a lot resting here.

And mainly, and these are the people I'm thinking about when we're speaking, are the families of the hostages.

The families of the hostages know, and it's just a fact, according to all the moderating sites and the IDF, that there is a deal on the table.

And that Israel is trying to improve that deal.

There isn't any other way to describe it.

It wants a better deal.

And the IDF is going into into Gaza and they are being told, not by Hamas, they're being told by security officials, your kids are out there and Hamas is using them.

So one can only imagine, and I think we can't grasp, what they're feeling right now and how they see this, even with their approachment to the Israeli government in that sense.

Okay, Amit, what is the timeline for this operation?

And then what are the challenges pivoting off some of the things that Nadav just said for this from a societal and political perspective?

So the timeframe was originally two months, one month for preparation and one month for actually taking what they called a an operational control of Gaza City.

That was the plan on August 7th, which meant, if you remember, that the due date to actually having occupied all of Gaza City was October 7th, 2025.

However, the IDF chief of staff opposed fiercely the idea of what is defined as operational control because his interpretation from a military perspective for operational control is just above the ground.

Exactly as Nadav described the last two operations in Gaza City by the IDF that took only, I think, two major tunnels but left the rest in operative shape.

So what the plan is now is to actually take care of both the overground Gaza and underground Gaza.

And this is to take give or take three and a half months, which would bring us exactly to the end of 2025.

That's what we heard from senior Israeli sources last week in the mid-conference.

And I think it can draw with the idea that Witkov articulated last week, I think, that the war is going to end around the end of 2025.

So the idea, if I'm taking it a step forward, is that Israel is not going to take care of every part in Gaza, in Gaza Strip.

Why?

Because we talk now about three areas, right?

We're are talking about three areas.

Gaza City, in which the IDF is operating as we speak.

Second, the refugee camps in central Gaza, that this is the only part in Gaza Strip that was not attacked by the IDF with offensive ground during the war.

And the third part is the humanitarian area in the Moasis that no one is going to attack, of course.

So the plan unfolds in front of our eyes.

Taking care of Gaza City, dismantling each and every infrastructure of Hamas, thus destroying the city underground and overground, and then having a siege on the refugee camps in central Gaza and ending the war.

That's the plan.

And in 95% of the Gaza Strip, which are not in the control of Hamas after the operation, to have an alternative regime consists of American, Arab, et cetera.

Yeah, Emiratis, Egyptians, who knows?

Yes.

Okay.

So, Amit, everything, the way you laid it out, it all seems very reasonable and even perhaps achievable, and yet it is so controversial.

And we've seen some of that controversy manifest itself in the way that Nadav described, where the senior brass of the IDF is so hostile in many ways, publicly hostile, to this plan.

So maybe I'll ask you, Nadav, first, why are they so opposed to it?

And then, Amit, I'll have you respond.

It's the professional opinion of the Israeli almost entire defense apparatus that it's not achievable and not reasonable.

And let me explain why.

First of all, right now, Israel is allowing the population in Gaza to evacuate, including in cars.

Then, do we understand that it means that every Hamas terrorist that wants to leave town is leaving or has left?

It also includes the hostages.

Actually, I think that Israel hopes that Hamas is going to evacuate the hostages.

But that means that Hamas will be moving out of Gaza.

And the operation started with no real evacuation of the majority of the Palestinians in Gaza.

People who see the videos, sometimes on the defense minister's Twitter page, can see that Israel is bombing in Gaza and you can physically see civilians being rattled because the bombs are hitting a building next to them.

This is not how the IDF wants to fight this war.

The IDF doesn't know what would be the prices in terms of, you know, the people who will need to sacrifice their life for that.

It's going to fight in an urban area, which is right now filled with civilians.

And again, the IDF has been ordered to do two things, not one thing and another.

It was ordered to do two things, and the government never gave it an order of importance to get the hostages back and make sure that Hamas doesn't control the Gaza Strip militarily and in government.

Now, many people hearing us will say, how can you compare?

You know, they'll say, 20 hostages alive compared with Hamas, it's a strategic threat to Israel.

And I can understand the argument there.

But I need to say that it was up to the government to say, look, we're prioritizing and we're ordering.

This is an order, Dan.

This is not a PR note.

And the IDF, the IDF chief, went to the government and said, you know what, if this is what you want to do, I'm asking you, take out the aim or the goal of getting the hostages back or downgrade it because I can't maintain this.

Now, because for the Israeli public, Dan, getting the hostages back, poll after poll, is important than anything else.

And that's the truth.

Whether or not people listening to us, all of them like it or whether they do.

This is the positions that you see on Channel 12, Channel 13, on Yadiot, everywhere they conduct basically polls.

I don't think I even saw a poll in Channel 14 that showed something completely different.

If this is the case, and the IDF is composed of reserve soldiers and it's been fighting for two years, the IDF professional recommendation to the government, including in the last meeting, was take the deal at hand.

Take the deal that we can achieve right now.

Get out the hostages.

It will allow us to fight more freely against Hamas

and try and solve this, first of all, diplomatically.

Now, to what extent?

A dialogue there with one Ron Dermer and the chief of staff.

Was the chief of staff saying to Ron Dermer and to the head of the Mossad, Why are you here in this room?

Why won't you go and negotiate right now before we begin this operation?

So this is the level of opposition that you're hearing.

And I think that a lot has to do with the IDF, frankly, being worn out from two years of war, from the Israeli society, and from reserve soldiers serving 200, 300, 400 days.

And because of that, what they worry about is that, you know, Hamas will move to the central camps.

The hostages will move to the central camps and we'll meet here in November, December, or January.

And then afterwards, then, Hamas will return to areas that Israel has already left because it's not really holding to the territory, really, you know, street to street.

And then we'll have this conversation again after the entire Gaza city is ruined.

as a result of the war.

And this is the home of 1 million people right now.

So I know that many people will push back against this, including people listening, will say, you know, strategically saying, you need to beat Hamas.

It's crucial that Hamas will not control the strip the day after.

But this is not what most of the chief of staff, not all of them, by the way, not all of them, think.

I should also say, but there's a consistent 40% or more within the Jewish population, more than 40%,

closer to 50-50 in terms of the hostages and the rest.

So I want to put it fairly.

I don't want to.

Well, I just, this is, I think you're making an important point here, and I appreciate it, that you're basically saying, on the issue of whether or not it's worth doing a deal that will have the practical effect of keeping Hamas in power, on that question, at least among Israel's Jewish voters, it's more evenly divided, A.

And B, I would add to that, Nadav.

I suspect, like we saw in the lead up to the Brexit vote in 2016, like we saw in both Trump elections here in the U.S.

in 2016 and 2024, there is a shy vote.

There's always a shy vote in polling.

In Israel, we call it shast voters.

Yeah.

Because shasts, the Sephardika party always gets significantly more than in the polls.

So I would say that there's probably, I agree with you, it's probably closer to 50-50 among Jewish voters on this question.

And there's probably some voters' sentiment that's that's not reflected in the polling that probably people feel like they don't want to say they're against the deal.

But I'm not saying it's a big number, but I'm just saying it's, I mean, that's why this is so complicated because you're right on the question of, do we want the hostages back?

Should we do a deal?

It's always overwhelming.

But then when you ask the question, but what if it means Hamas staying in power?

I just want to stress that according to every deal on the table right now and according to Hamas, formally they do not control the Gaza Strip.

And what we are arguing about or trying to get, which I think is very important, is for them not to have the weapons to call the shots.

But formally, they have already said we're willing not to control the strip.

And I think that's important.

That's an important victory for Israel.

I'm just not sure that the constitutional law in Gaza Strip would be that he who holds the legislative power controls the Gaza Court.

You don't think that they'll go to the Supreme Court of the palestinian

jihadi movement that surprises me i i think they'll go to the supreme court in jerusalem but here's the thing first of all i agree with dan that i think that most of israelis would not like to see the war ends when hamas is still still ruling gaza however when you go to wars it's quite problematic to go to wars even if it's 60 40 because we know the watershed line is right versus left bb versus anti-bib etc so this is not the ultimate way of engaging yet another step at the war, another phase at the war after two years with 60-40 or 50-50 or 40-60.

So this is one thing which makes it very challenging to say the least.

The second thing is that it should be explained why the tension between the IDF and Netanyahu.

One thing is the hostages, but I think it goes way deeper than this.

The IDF chief of staff said repeatedly that if you want to defeat Hamas, one month would would not suffice.

You need much more time.

He talked even in a year or something like this, we might agree that it's three, four months.

However, according to what Ron Dermer said, and Ron Dermer's main motive to oppose a midterm deal of releasing only 10 hostages was that Israel doesn't have the time to initiate after those two months another step at the war.

So even according to Dermer, we don't have more than two, three months.

So the operational schedule of the IDF does not meet the diplomatic schedule of Minister Dermer.

However, from what I see, I think that there is a joke about Netanyahu that he wakes up according to Eastern time.

He suffers from constant jet lag in Israel because he works only according to the time in Washington.

As for Washington, Washington is 105%

with Israel.

I would say that each and every plan written in Washington or introduced in Washington is an Israeli plan, that every step in Israel is pre-coordinated with President Trump.

And that's why I think there is full support for Israel to assassinate the Hamas leaders in Qatar and then to initiate a full military invasion to Gaza City.

And this dictates the rules.

And that's why Israel would go into Gaza City.

Now, I expect two things to happen.

One is that it can be paused if a a new deal is brought because Hamas is under the impression, be it accurate or not, that Israel is going to take Gaza City and the taking Gaza City means the end for Hamas regime in Gaza after 20 years.

This is one thing.

And the second thing, and it's totally different from what we saw from the beginning of the war, as a result is that Hamas terrorists are not running away from Gaza City, from the battlefield, but they are going to the battlefield.

According to the intelligence, there are 10,000 terrorists brought to Gaza from central Gaza, from the refugee camps.

They see it as the final battle, as their own Masada.

And they are going to fight for life or death, which makes me a bit more optimistic.

Why?

Because if Israel breaks the soul of Hamas, the fortress of Hamas, and the symbol of Hamas, it might be good news in terms of what comes next.

I just want to add to that that I agree with Amit that Netanyahu is after a deal.

With Dermer thinking that the war will end until the end of the year, it's absolutely the case.

What they want is a deal, and they're using the operation in Gaza City as leverage.

Okay, it's obvious that this is what they're trying to do.

And it's also obvious to me that they'll be willing to stop if Hamas will say, okay, you know, we agree to the terms.

But it's all about Hamas agreeing to the terms, Dan.

You know, everybody was saying, no, no, we're going to vanquish them.

We're going to finish finish them.

No, it's about Hamas agreeing to have some sort of a disarmament.

Now, who's going to monitor the disarmament?

We've been through these points.

Nobody.

Nobody.

Because if there's going to be an agreement, the IDF is not going to go house to house in Gaza or in the central camps in the Gaza Strip and check house to house, tunnel to tunnel, if they actually disarmed.

So a lot of it is about positioning and much less of this is about substance.

As to will they fight, will Hamas fight in Gaza City?

You know, I'm hearing the same kind of intelligence that Amit is hearing.

I wonder what will Hamas actually do?

Will they fight?

They can still escape.

And this is one of the reasons they are keeping the civilians in, because they need the civilians to escape with them in order to flee to other parts of the Gaza Strip.

Now, Israel is not only evacuating the population to the central camps and to the Muasi area, it's an area on the shore, it's now evacuating them to the areas of Hanyunis that have been depopulated during the war.

So it's basically, you know, the Gazan population here is moved from one place to another in a completely destroyed piece of land.

And the international criticism of Israel is a factor.

In Israel's cabinet, it's not me saying that, you know, senior ministers, ministers who are also speaking with Damit are saying, The amount of damage that we're taking, the amount of fire that we're taking internationally, is not worth anything we're going to get in Gaza City.

And these are senior ministers within the Israeli cabinet who are saying that right now.

And even Etanyo, in his Sparta speech, started answering that.

I think he failed in his answer and he needed to clarify, but he started answering that argument.

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Okay.

Amit, how do you respond to the perception out there that following Israel's Doha operation and what we heard about Hamas and Gaza using the hostages as human shields, that by Israel still going forward with this operation, I'm not saying this is accurate, but there is this perception that the Israeli government has effectively given up on the rest of the hostages.

In light of these two events, how do you respond to that?

I think that the Israeli cabinet has deliberately decided to prefer the goal of defeating Hamas over the goal of bringing back the rest of the hostages.

After completing 80-ish percent of the mission, it's terrible to speak about it in these terms, but 207 out of 251, now the paramount goal from the perspective of the Israeli cabinet is to defeat Hamas over bringing all the hostages back home.

By the way, I don't think that Netanyahu believes there is an imminent threat to the lives of hostages who will be brought to Gaza by serving as human shields.

Because usually, if you want someone to serve as a human shield,

you give the other side the notice where the human shield is.

But neither one hostage can become a human shield for an entire city, nor 20.

However, when you decide to invade Gaza City, where according to the intelligence, six out of the 20 hostages were held, you actually decide that it's more important for you to defeat Hamas over bringing them back home.

Nadav, zooming out to the region, and you've been speaking out about this, to events of the past week.

Obviously, the Doha operation, this conference that I referred to in the introduction of the Arab states.

How do you see this phase playing out geopolitically?

I want to say something about the Doha strike, and I'm interested in your views, Dan, what you have to say.

I mean,

I think, and I'm speculating here, but let's say it's just a bit more than speculation.

I think that Netanyahu wanted it to be vetoed by the U.S.

President.

I think Netanyahu didn't want to go through with the Doha operation to begin with.

I think the Israelis did notify the White House and President Trump.

They wouldn't have done so beforehand.

There's no way they would have done this

with a U.S.

base 30 kilometers away.

There's no way they're not going to notify the U.S.

As you know, it's already a consensus.

I saw my colleague Barack Ravid writing about this.

You know, it's a consensus that the White House and President Trump knew in advance.

I suspect that

because of the velocity of the process of making that decision, meeting in the morning, the IDF says, we're willing to go through this, but why now?

You know, you have the meeting to discuss a deal.

We think you should discuss that deal too.

Why hit them now?

The Mossad head, who's a loyalist of the Prime Minister, a nominee of the Prime Minister, the closest person in the entire defense system to the Prime Minister, sits down and writes a letter.

to every worker in the Mossad.

I've never heard about anything like it, explaining he objected to this strike, hours after the strike, then.

I think that Netanyahu wanted the president to say something like, you know, not now.

I think Netanyahu calculated Qatar's influence and clout in Washington, D.C., and I think he didn't get the type of negative.

Why would he initiate this process if he wanted to get vetoed?

For domestic consumption, of course.

In October 11, in that famous meeting in which the Israeli cabinet is considering striking and killing Hassan Asrallah, it's Prime Minister Netanyahu who calls President Biden and actually makes, you know,

actually a request for an American interference.

October 11th, 2023.

Yes.

But this is just a speculation.

This is to say that right now, everybody in Israel understands that it backfired.

Even Netanyahu understands it, it backfired.

Because Qatar is now being hugged by moderate Arab countries.

Qatar has got a get out of jail card from President Trump, who both met the prime minister, but also said there will be no further attacks.

He said that, I think, twice or three times since the attack.

So they got immunity for Hamas in Qatar.

I'm not even talking about this failing, right?

I'm just talking about the risk assessment here.

And of course, with moderate Arab countries, you have Egypt leading the charge against the Israelis.

The basic dynamics was not successful.

It was a gamble.

It was a gamble.

But Nadav, every one of these operations, taking out Hania in Tehran in the summer of 2024 was a gamble.

Taking out Nasrallah was a gamble.

The operation in Iran in June of this year was a gamble.

We can go on and on the list of gambles.

Those are just all gambles that paid off.

These are not gambles.

You know, if we would have sat here and we would have asked, diplomatically speaking, regionally speaking, Was there a downside to trying to hit Ismail and Nia in Tehran?

No one would have said that.

You know, in the discussion, the security chiefs didn't say, let's not hit Ismailania in Tehran.

They were all for it.

They were all for Hassan Asra.

They wanted to do it in October 11.

This time, considering that there is a deal on the table and you're going to break into Gaza City the day after and you want to leverage this to get a surrender from Hamas.

Anyway, it's an agreement.

You know, we can discuss it, but I don't think that Netanyahu would have ordered it.

And I'm crediting Netanyahu for thinking that he might have thought that the president is going to veto it.

But this is only a speculation.

Amit?

I beg to differ.

I think Netanyahu is not under the impression these days that President Trump is going to say no or don't.

He wanted to attack and he wanted to score.

The main idea, in my opinion, was not only to eliminate the Hamas leadership, but to actually divorce the Qataris live on television, preferably on Al Jazeera, stating that you are no longer, I mean, no soup for you, no negotiation for you.

It would be better if it succeeded.

But I think we should separate two different things.

One is the timing, and the second is the crime scene.

Do you attack for the first time in Israel's history, or do you take responsibility for the first time in Israel's history, for an assassination attempt in a country that is not defined as an enemy state?

The only incident I can think of is the Entebbe operation in 1976, 1976, but it was to rescue hostages.

Or what about going after the Munich, the Munich terrorists?

And they went through the European countries.

Israel never took the responsibility.

Khaled Mashal in Jordan.

Israel would have never taken the responsibility unless it failed.

Israeli Mossad agents were exposed, but to say five minutes after the assassination attempt, to take responsibility, to say it's the IDF, it's Israel, even before you know if it succeeded or not.

This is not only an assassination attempt.

This is something deliberate against Qatar.

And from a strategic point of view, the IDF wasn't against it.

Yes, the Mossad was against it because the Mossad is the protector of Qatar.

Exactly.

Exactly.

Maybe getting tickets for the quarterfinals in the World Cup in 2022 from the best seats in the stadium helped the Mossad leaders to actually oppose the assassination.

Maybe.

I'm just speculating.

But I mean, I just want to say this for a moment because I take your point, Nadav, that you could argue it wasn't a diplomatic gamble had Israel tried to take out Hania and Tehran and failed.

But it would have been a blow-up.

First of all, it would have made Israel look incompetent.

So it would have looked like Israel looked like they're

not to be as feared as we now know they are, having been successful at many of these operations.

And I think you would have gotten a lot of blowback internationally, and including from within the region, that Israel is like, you know, this wild cowboy, you know, galloping through the region.

What the hell are they thinking?

They need to understand that they're fighting a defensive war and that we're here to help them to some degree fight that defensive war, multi-front defensive war.

But if they start taking these brazen actions, I mean, I could see the press playing out, you know, had it gone the other way.

But if Israel's taking these brazen actions and destabilizing the region, what the hell are they doing?

It's many of the criticisms that you hear today.

I take your point that hitting Doha is different than hitting Tehran.

However, don't underestimate the old cliché that success as a thousand fathers, but failure as an orphan.

Had this operation been successful, I think people would have been impressed.

The region, many regional players would have been impressed.

They would have put up perfunctory statements being critical of Israel, as they've done.

repeatedly over the last two years at various developments, but they wouldn't have done this gang up that they've done now.

And I think one of the reasons, the pathway for the gang up on Israel was failure.

Yeah, that's very possible.

But you've been in the same conference together with Amit and myself in Washington, D.C.

in the last week.

It was the Mead conference, and it became a really important meeting point for people from across the region.

By the way, sometimes countries that don't have relations with Israel.

And I've spoken with Arab officials there.

I'm talking about Arab officials that come from countries that do have relations with Israel.

And here's what's different than hitting Tehran and succeeding or failing.

We embarrassed the Gulf countries, the UAE, Bahrain.

We embarrassed Egypt.

Why is that?

Because Qatar is an important country.

Because of Al Jazeera, I think it's very unfortunate.

And my views on Qatar are very known, I think.

But it is an important country in the Arab world.

And what they're seeing, Let me portray it this way.

There is something really popular in Israeli social networks.

And Israelis are always saying, let's be, you know, we're we're gonna be the crazy the nutcase in the neighborhood okay and everybody's gonna fear us it's a very israeli kind of strategic perception of the israeli social network let's be the crazy nutcase in the region yeah yeah okay great you know but there's a difference between being this crazy nutcase of the neighborhood and being the crazy nutcase in the neighborhood that nobody not only doesn't want to interfere with but everybody wants to disassociate with and maybe call the police in this case call on Washington DC as as the Qataris did and say, we want a guarantee from you, Mr.

President, that it will never happen again.

And then the president did say that.

So they are threatening our relations with them.

And that's a basic legacy of Prime Minister Netanyahu.

And by the way, what we're not talking about is how his really historic achievement could not be denied by anyone of getting a peace treaty with Arab countries without having any sort of compromise territorially with the Palestinians.

And now this is under risk.

And his second achievement, which you wrote at length about, is making Israel this globalized startup nation.

And nobody can take this away from Netanyahu that it happened during his term.

People can say, yeah, but it began, you know, in the Robin era and the Australian.

Of course, okay, great.

But it was during Netanyahu, during Netanyahu's economy.

And now he's talking about autarkic markets and super Sparta.

And he needs to correct to explain that.

These are his positive legacies, which are beyond any doubt.

And he's risking those to some extent for Gaza City.

That's a big thing.

Amit, before we wrap, against the backdrop of what Nadav just said, and then also what we're talking about, the fallout from the Doha operation, and then the risks, diplomatically speaking, with the UN vote for a Palestinian state coming up, I think it's next week.

Where does all this go?

Are you worried?

Yes, I'm worried because of miscalculation and the phrase that you don't extinguish a fire with gasoline.

That's exactly the attempt here.

A French and the British governments want to recognize the Palestinian state, and then Netanyahu threatens in unilateral steps back, which means some kind of sovereignty, which might be one challenge too far for Israel's economy and stateshood.

Since I think that the number one achievement for Israel's diplomacy since the six-day war was the Abraham Accords, the accords that changed the perception that peace with the Arab world must go through Ramallah and through evacuating Jews from their homeland.

I think that we should be very, very cautious when it comes to the Emirates.

And when they warn us that this is one step too far for them, not for us, I think that other measures should be taken.

So I know that there are two things that are going on as we speak.

One is to try and somehow talk President Macon out of his crazy attempt to recognize a Palestinian state as a result of October 7th.

However, I think it's going to fail because it's more about domestic French policy rather than international.

You say it's going to fail.

How is it going to fail?

No, it's going to fail.

I mean, the attempts to talk Macon out of this initiative.

Oh, I see.

Yes, yes, yes, yes, I see.

French diplomatic sources have told me, we published it.

Even if there's a deal, okay, I agree with Amit's point about this being totally for domestic consumption in France.

Even if there's a deal, said these officials in France, we're not going to let go of unilaterally recognizing Palestinian state.

So it's off the table.

Yeah.

Exactly.

Okay.

So this is one thing.

And the second is try to actually change the Israeli revenge.

So the unilateral steps are not going to be annexation with all the implications, but something more minor, like moving territories in Judea and Samaria, the West Bank from areas that are Palestinian controlled to areas that are Israeli but not something that is permanent.

But it's going to happen in two weeks, specifically speaking in three days in September between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, after the Netanyahu speech on September 26 and before Yom Kippur.

Okay.

Amit Nadav, we will leave it there.

Much to follow in the next few days.

So I'm sure we'll be back in touch with you guys.

And until then, I hope you guys hang in there.

Thank you so much.

Thank you.

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